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Abstract: The present dissertation explores the motif of gesture and demonstrates that it 
encompasses the resonances between the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. My thesis 
specifically is that the notion of gesture articulates the problems of art and language, 
revealing fundamental convergences in the ways in which Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
investigate a non-metaphysical approach to the sensible and question the limits of 
philosophy. I develop this argument by closely following Merleau-Ponty’s reading of 
Heidegger’s works in the lecture-notes from his courses at the Collège de France. I also rely 
heavily on Heidegger’s reflections on gesture and the body as they are depicted in the 
Zollikon seminars, considering that some of these reflections retrieve crucial arguments 
from Being and Time and that they bear a significant resemblance to Merleau-Ponty’s 
understanding of the body. In this way, I elucidate what may be called the gestural character 
of the work of art and language, establishing structural connections between the texts of 
these two thinkers. 
This dissertation is divided into three parts. I devote the first part to the themes of 
the body and gesture and show that the concept of form and the problem of perception lead 
to questions concerning the possibilities of a phenomenology of the body. I conclude this 
part by arguing that, for both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, the notion of gesture 
corresponds to a phenomenological approach to the body as openness to the world and as 
an affective milieu. Departing from the arguments and comparisons delineated in the first 
part, in the second and third parts I examine separately the works of Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty in order to determine the settings of the notion of gesture within their respective 
approaches to art and language. The second part treats problems concerning the sensible 
character of the work of art, arguing that gestures perform a poetical disclosure of nature. In 
the third part I focus on questions of language and demonstrate that gestures unfold what 
could be called the logos of the sensible, which constitutes the primary source of language and 
meaning. I conclude by interpreting Heidegger’s work as a gestural philosophy that 
emphasizes the performative dimension of language, an emphasis that is missing from 
Merleau-Ponty’s work.  
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Introduction 
Gesture, Art, and the Limits of Philosophy 
In what sense is the phenomenon of gesture a philosophical problem? How do the 
works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty introduce the problem of gesture into the domain of 
philosophy? The present work springs from these questions, and considers them to be 
questions involving the destiny and nature of philosophy, the limits and possibilities of 
thought. This perspective seems necessary if one is to trace the problematic of gesture back 
to the grounding concerns that give impulse to the work of these two philosophers, and 
which may determine their fundamental convergences.  
A concise assessment of the necessity to think the limits of philosophy is found in 
the notes Merleau-Ponty wrote for his lectures at the Collège de France from 1958-1959 and 
1969-1961.1 In these notes Merleau-Ponty also carries out a general interpretation of 
Heidegger’s work.2 At the start of these notes, Merleau-Ponty argues that our times are of 
crisis for philosophy because these times challenge the classical ideal of rationality, as well as 
the metaphysical understanding of being as objectivity. For this reason, he suggests, it is 
imperative to think ontology anew.  
In these times of crisis, one major philosophical difficulty consists in not losing sight 
of the grounds: the lived body, perception, life and being. These grounds are always already 
there as constitutive dimensions of existence. But these grounds withdraw from 
philosophical language. Surely, in our lives, and even in our sciences, urges Merleau-Ponty, 
we are somehow in touch with a being that involves us, and cannot be conceptualized as 
1 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours au Collegè de France 1958-1959 et 1960-1961 (Paris: Gallimard, 1996). 
2 See ibid., 91-148. 
2 
“matter” or “spirit,” as if it were just a separate region of reality. Yet, he says, “our 
‘philosophical’ thinking remains spiritualist, materialist, rationalist or irrationalist, idealist or 
realist, if it is not silent.”3 Therefore, if we are to contemplate a renewal of ontology beyond 
metaphysics, if such a renewal is possible, it is necessary that philosophy learn to be silent. 
This silence, however, cannot be absolute, for that would be a renunciation of philosophy 
and thought.4  
Merleau-Ponty suggests, on the one hand, that the grounds of philosophy are 
concealed in silence, inaccessible to metaphysical, representational thinking. On the other 
hand, he indicates that if philosophy is to regain access to the grounds of existence, if it is to 
become a thinking and logos of being, it must follow an indirect path. It needs to yield its 
word to non-philosophy, to modes of thinking that are non-philosophical, and which may 
grant access to the being of things: art, poetry and literature, for instance. As Merleau-Ponty 
puts it, if philosophy is to speak, it must do it in order to preserve the silence of life and to 
remain open to it. It must become a language that speaks without becoming a metaphysical 
system, that is, without abandoning its performative, existential roots.  
Merleau-Ponty’s thought bears significant similarities to Heidegger’s thinking, whose 
work is, from the start, haunted by the questions of life and being: of a factical life and a 
being that are elusive to thinking, and which are imbricated in existence.5 Indeed, in the 
course of the aforementioned lecture-notes, Merleau-Ponty reads Heidegger’s work, 
3 Ibid., 37, my translation. “Notre pensée «philosophique» reste spiritualiste, matérialiste, rationaliste ou irrationaliste, idéaliste 
ou réaliste quand elle n’est pas silencieuse.” 
4 Françoise Dastur explains this point clearly in her article "La lecture merleau-pontienne de Heidegger dans les 
notes du "Visible et l'invisible" et les cours du Collège de France (1957-58)," Chiasmi International 2 (2000): 373-
88. She says: “la thése de Merlea-Ponty est claire: la décadence de la philosophie clasique est ‘inessentielle’, car elle est seulement
celle d’une certaine manière de philosopher” (376). 
5 As Françoise Dastur remarks, “la méthode ‘indirecte’ de Merleau-Ponty et sa ‘philosophie negative’ trouvent en effet leur 
anticipation chez Heidegger lui-même…” Ibid., 378.  
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considering particularly his turn towards a thinking of the truth of being, as an effort to think 
the verbal essence of being, “le Wessen verbal, indivise de l’existence.”6   
According to Mereleau-Ponty’s lecture-notes, Heidegger’s efforts to think the 
essential unity of existence, and the silence or withdrawal of being, is not a form of 
mysticism. That is to say, it is not a dogmatic denial of philosophy. On the contrary, the 
thinking of being is a primordial philosophical task: it is the task of pursuing the truth, the 
original truth that has us, which we experience from within our entanglement in the world.  
This idea is formulated, for instance, in the Introduction to Metaphysics (1935),7 which is a work 
Merleau-Ponty knew well. In this work Heidegger recalls the affinity between the notions of 
doxa, brilliance and glory, and the determination of doxa as that which is accepted in its 
appearing, in the way it comes to light, as Ansehen.8 According to Merleau-Ponty, Heidegger 
alludes here to the original openness to beings, the most primal access to a dimensionality of 
being, a region, which prearticulates our relation to beings.9 This dimensionality of being has 
physis as one of its structural moments.10 In this case, physis is understood as a being which 
comes out of itself, and which we do not posit or determine. This openness to the being of 
beings, this Offenheit, is prior to any distinction between subject and object, passivity and 
activity. Openness is presupposed as an initial displacement or movement of being, a 
clearing that lets things be. In what seems an echo of these formulations, as well as a 
6 Notes de cours, 95. 
7 Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, Vol. Gesamtausgabe Bd.40 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1976). English: Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: 
Yale Nota Bene, 2000). See also Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours, 111. The titles of Heidegger’s works that have 
been translated into English will be given in English. Hereafter cited with reference first to the German, then to 
the English translation. 
8 Introduction to Metaphysics, 110/108-109. 
9 See Notes de cours, 112-113. 
10 Ibid., 108. 
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reformulation of Husserl’s idea of Urdoxa,11 Merleau-Ponty speaks in his later works of Ur-
doxa, the perceptual faith that first gives us access to the nascent world of perception.  
Since we are not separate from the totality of being, we participate in the movement 
of disclosure of being, of physis. Such movement occurs in us, and with us, before any 
particular action from our part. Just being there, existing, we are already a site or place, a 
determinate emplacement of the event of disclosure –just as Silesius’ rose is without why.12 It 
is in this context that we must read Heidegger’s fascination for Socrates. Indeed, Heidegger 
refers to Socrates as the greatest thinker of the West, the thinker who wrote nothing. 
Socrates’ silence, his refusal to write, is for Heidegger a significant gesture that bears 
testimony to the depth of his thinking. The example of Socrates shows that the flight of 
thinking is inseparable from the being of the thinker: Socrates’ thought was inseparable from 
his presence, his body, his voice, his actions.    
Thus, the question is: How are we to understand this logos of silence, this voice of 
the ground? Throughout his work, Merleau-Ponty insistently argues that our bodies are the 
point of contact with the world and the earth. Yet, reading Husserl’s concept of earth, he 
also remarks that the earth does not move, for it is the fundamental ground of experience. 
This means that there is a relation to the lived body, and to the earth-ground, which precedes 
any reference to motion and rest and, therefore, cannot be understood in terms of objective 
11 Edmund Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinern Phänomenologie und Phänomenologischen Philosophie. Erstes Buch: Allgemeine 
einführung in die reine Phänomenologie, ed. Karl Schumann, Vol. Husserliana III/1 (Den Haag: Martinus Nijhoff, 
1976), 241. English: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General 
Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. F. Kersten, Vol. Second Book (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic 
Publishers, 1998), 252. With regard to the notions of Urglaube or Urdoxa, Husserl says the following,“We 
introduce the term primal belief [Urglaube] or protodoxa [Urdoxa], by which the intentional retrorelatedness 
[Rückbezogenheit], elaborated by us, of all ‘belief modalities’ is suitably expressed” (252). Thus, according to 
Husserl, the notion of primal belief alludes to our implicit belief in the existence of the objects of perception. 
In The Husserl Dictionary (New York: Continuum, 2012), Dermot Moran and Jospeh Cohen explain this point as 
follows: “Husserl stresses that our ‘fundamental belief’ or ‘basic belief’ (Urglaube) concerning the existence and 
actuality of the world is given by perception” (49).  
12 Notes de cours, 107. 
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relations. There is a contact with ourselves, and with the earth-ground, that is more 
fundamental than any objective relation and which, according to Merleau-Ponty, implies a 
horizon of humanity, an existential entanglement in the world. In this regard, he suggests 
that the lived body, in spontaneous gestures and comportments, in the world, is a threshold: 
the site of passage to the silent, mute ground of being, the absolute ground of the earth.   
In Being and Time (1927)13 Heidegger does not examine the problems concerning the 
beings of the earth and the body as such, but he sets the basis for approaching the question 
concerning the meaning of being in general. In this case, Heidegger determines our 
fundamental relatedness to being as a whole, our existential engagement with the world, in 
terms of the concept of comportment, Verhalten. Later, in the Zollikon seminars, Heidegger 
further specifies that our comportments are gestures, Gebärden. He shows that the bodying 
forth of the body, the existential unfolding of the body, is in each case the opening of a 
region, of a dimensionality within which we come to encounter things as they are. In this 
way, Heidegger hints at potential articulations between the phenomenon of the body and the 
work of art, for the work of art, too, in its earthly character, opens a site for the disclosure of 
beings. This intercrossing between the questions of art and bodiliness echoes the most 
fundamental philosophical insights present in Merleau-Ponty’s work, to which the 
problematic of gesture is also crucial.  
On the basis of this outline, let me summarily determine the scope and purpose of 
the present work: I shall investigate how do Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty articulate the 
problematic of gesture in relation to a non-metaphysical approach to the question of being. 
The themes of art and language are the two structural axes of my research. In this way, I 
13 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Vol. Gesamtausgabe Bd.2 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977). 
English: Being and Time, revised by Dennis J. Schmidt, trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany, NY: State University of 
New York Pres, 2010). Hereafter cited with reference first to the German, then to the English translation. 
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expect to show that the problematic of gesture is a pivotal question at the center of the 
problems of art and language and, therefore, of decisive importance for understanding the 
way in which Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty explore the limits of philosophy. 
I also expect to contribute to current scholarly debates concerning the correlations 
and differences between the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. For the most part, 
recent works on this topic take into consideration references to Heidegger that appear in 
major works such as the Phenomenology of Perception (1945)14 and The Visible and the Invisible 
(1964),15 but little is said about the notes and summaries from Merleau-Ponty’s later courses 
at the Collège de France. Current studies also tend to overlook the resonances between 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty arising from the problematic of the work of art, and the 
strategic importance of the question of art in a non-metaphysical thinking of being. In order 
to demarcate better the scope of the present work, let me move on to draw out an outline of 
some interpretations of the relation between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, those that touch 
on crucial points of our theme. 
Debate Concerning the Resonances between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
The publication of the Zollikon Seminars (1959-1969),16 edited by Medard Boss and 
published in 1987, marks the beginning of a debate concerning the correlations between 
Heidegger’s approach to the phenomenon of the body and Merleau-Ponty’s work. In his 
14 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phénoménologie de la perception (Paris: Gallimard, 1945). English: Phenomenology of 
Perception, trans. Donald A. Landes (New York: Routledge, 2012). The titles of Merleau-Ponty’s works that have 
been translated into English will be given in English. Hereafter cited with reference first to the French, then to 
the English translation.  
15 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le Visible et l'invisible (Paris: Gallimard, 1964). English: The Visible and the Invisible, 
trans. Alphonso Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968). Hereafter cited with reference first to 
the French, then to the English translation.  
16 Martin Heidegger, Zollikoner Seminare, ed. Medard Boss (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987). 
English: Zollikon Seminars. Protocols-Conversations-Letters, ed. Medard Boss, trans. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay 
(Evanston, Il: Northwester University Press, 2001). Hereafter cited with reference first to the German, then to 
the English translation.  
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article “Heidegger among the Doctors,” Fr. William Richardson indicates that there are 
important convergences between the works of both philosophers, and remarks that this 
point “cries out for a careful comparison.”17 Richard Askay, who worked on the translation 
of these seminars into English, points out that there are significant similarities between the 
works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and underscores that these similarities include: 
“their analysis of bodily being viz. (a) gesture and expression, (b) bodily being and spatiality, 
(c) refusing to see the body as merely a corporeal, self-contained object, and (d) phantom 
limb analysis.”18 Askay considers these questions particularly in relation to Being and Time, the 
Zollikon Seminars, and Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception.  
Regarding the differences between both philosophers, Askay points out that 
“Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the lived body essentially remains on the level of subjectivity,”19 
and thus suggests that Merleau-Ponty’s approach to the body does not take into 
consideration the ontological structure of existence, and remains within a philosophy of 
consciousness. In one of the working notes for The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty 
himself hints at this problem.  
This evaluation of Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is, however, partial. Askay does not 
take into account either Merleau-Ponty’s ontological turn or the internal tensions traversing 
the Phenomenology of Perception. Indeed, for Merleau-Ponty the lived body is determined by 
anonymous structures, so that it cannot be simply reduced to the level of subjectivity and 
consciousness. I should also note that in the Phenomenology of Perception there is a sustained 
17 See William Richardson, "Heidegger among the Doctors," in Reading Heidegger. Commemorations, ed. John Sallis, 
49-63 (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 52. 
18 Richard Askay, "Heidegger, the body, and the French philosophers," Continental Philosophy Review (Kluwer 
Academic Publishers), no. 32 (1999): 29-35, 31. 
19 Ibid., 33-34. 
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criticism of metaphysical dualisms, and the traditional approach to being as objectivity, and 
this position sets Merleau-Ponty’s work on the way to ontology.20 
Kevin Aho undertakes the task of exploring some of the similarities between the 
works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty mentioned above. He demonstrates, for instance, 
that for “Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, the spatial world is not a ‘receptacle’; rather, the 
body constitutes spatiality in its everyday movements.”21 Aho further indicates that there is 
coincidence “in the way the two interpret bodily movements, gestures, and expressions as 
already understood in terms of a meaningful social nexus.”22 In this sense, according to Aho, 
both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty develop an understanding of the self that is not reducible 
to self-enclosed consciousness. He further remarks that in both cases there is an approach to 
the body as something other than a material thing, and an understanding of our relation to 
things that is not based on a physicalistic paradigm. He concludes that both philosophers 
offer a “phenomenological description of embodied agency that applies to human acts and 
practices generally.”23 Yet, he qualifies their description of embodied agency as an example of 
regional ontology.  
Aho identifies four essential differences between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. 
First, Merleau-Ponty conceives the world as intentional “object” of an incarnated 
consciousness, whereas for Heidegger “Dasein is the world.”24 Second, Merleau-Ponty 
explains the articulation between world and meaning as if they were constituted by 
20 In Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 2003), John Sallis remarks, 
for instance, that already in the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty carries out “…a radical critique of that 
conception of being which, on Merleau-Ponty’s view, has dominated modern thought –namely, that conception 
according to which being is understood as objectivity. To this degree Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work is already 
directed at the ontological question”(54). 
21 Kevin Aho, Heidegger's Neglect of the Body (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009), 38. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid.  
24 Ibid., 45. 
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consciousness; Heidegger instead shows that meaning is somehow articulated in a “public 
context of intelligibility.”25 Third, Merleau-Ponty sets perception as a sort of natural contact 
with the world that grounds cultural meaning, whereas for Heidegger there is a preeminence 
of Dasein, such that “perception is always saturated with cultural meaning.”26 Fourth, 
Merleau-Ponty privileges the present of perception, and “Heidegger argues that our 
comportment in the present is derived from and made possible by a more primordial 
temporal structure that cannot be understood in terms of perception.”27 Based on these 
premises, Aho suggests that “Merleau-Ponty is unable to account for the conditions of 
possibility of meaning,”28 and that Heidegger’s philosophy remains for the most part abstract 
and formal –although, he remarks, this problem may be solved in part through Heidegger’s 
metontology.29  
In his article “Merleau-Ponty’s Criticism of Heidegger,”30 Douglas Low examines in 
detail the arguments given by both Askay and Aho. He refutes their interpretations of the 
differences between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, as well as their criticisms of Merleau-
Ponty’s approach to the body. According to Low’s argument, it is false that Merleau-Ponty 
disregards an ontological analysis of the body and that Heidegger’s account of being-in-the-
world supersedes Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of perception. Furthermore, he shows that 
Merleau-Ponty adopts Heidegger’s characterization of human existence as ekstasis, to the 
25 Ibid., 46. 
26 Ibid., 47. 
27 Ibid., 48. 
28 Ibid., 48. 
29 Aho explains this as follows: “Metontology is associated with the ontic sciences only insofar as it has ‘being 
as its subject-matter.’ In short, Dasein is now thematized as a being, but not in terms of its static, present-at-
hand attributes. Rather, it is thematized in terms of existence” (49). See also Martin Heidegger, Metaphysische 
Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, Vol. Gesamtausgabe Bd.26 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1978), 199-200. English: The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1984), 157. Hereafter cited with reference first to the German, then to the English 
translation. 
30 See Douglas Low, "Merleau-Ponty's Criticism of Heidegger," Philosophy Today 53, no. 3 (2009): 273-293. 
10 
extent that the body is not related to the world as intentional object, but as openness. He 
says: “in a Heideggerian spirit, Merleau-Ponty claims that the individual’s experience rest 
upon the body that opens to a world that includes it and other human bodies.”31  
Low carefully refutes Aho’s criticism of Merleau-Ponty –to which I referred above –, 
and points out that although both Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger give primacy to the 
ontological, in Merleau-Ponty there is a more balanced attention to the ontic and, thereby, 
his philosophical approach to the body is more encompassing. Low summarizes this position 
as follows: “It is the ontological understanding of human existence that guides Merleau-
Ponty’s studies, but it is the structure of the body (its emergent properties) that allows 
human ontological meaning to appear.”32 
Although Low’s reading, in my opinion, seems to be accurate, his interpretation of 
the correlation between the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty does not consider the 
influence Heidegger’s later works may have had on Merleau-Ponty’s ontology. This influence 
is especially recognizable in Merleau-Ponty’s later lecture-notes. As Merleau-Ponty remarks 
in these notes, in Being and Time Heidegger overemphasizes the centrality of Dasein, and this 
leads to what could be called the “the anthropological misunderstanding” [l’equivoce 
anthropologist].33 For in Being and Time the worldhood of the world is determined in light of 
Dasein’s ontological structure, and a proper understanding of the horizon of the world in 
terms of the truth of being, in terms of the fundamental openness of being, is left in 
abeyance. Consequently, Merleau-Ponty devotes more attention to examining Heidegger’s 
works from the 1930s and thereafter. Thus, one could say that Heidegger’s later works, in 
which the problem of the truth of being is central, are more influential on Merleau-Ponty’s 
31 Ibid., 273. 
32 Ibid., 279. 
33 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Notes de cours, 95. 
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phenomenological ontology than Being and Time. And this point deserves careful 
consideration. 
Thus, considering potential similarities between the works of Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, I shall follow closely Merleau-Ponty’s interpretations of Heidegger’s work. 
Concerning the debate mentioned above, I shall argue that Aho’s assessment of the 
problematic of the body as something restricted to a regional ontology conflicts with 
Heidegger’s qualification of the problem of the body as a pressing problem, which involves 
the problems concerning the meaning of being and the ontological difference. It seems to 
me that Aho’s interpretation overlooks the idea that for Heidegger the body may be 
interpreted as site of openness, as a setting of the truth, and as poetic gesture.  
The Problem of the Body and the Problem of the Truth of Being     
In the present research I follow, to some extent, the path opened up by Daniela 
Vallega-Neu’s interpretation of the problem of the body in Heidegger. It is worth noting that 
Vallega-Neu finds important resonances between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, specifically 
in relation to ontological questions. Let me review briefly one of her central arguments. 
Discussing the problem of bodily being, with a focus on Heidegger’s Contributions to 
Philosophy,34 and considering Merleau-Ponty’s ontological investigations in The Visible and the 
Invisible, Vallega-Neu says: 
In both cases the originary opening of the bodily dimension of being occurs through the 
finitude of being (in Heidegger articulated as withdrawal, in Merleau-Ponty as zero of being 
or nothingness). In both cases bodily being is thought as an opening, articulating event, 
although in different ways. A significant difference is found in the fact that Merleau-Ponty 
arrives at the bodily dimension of being through an analysis of perception, whereas in 
Heidegger we arrive at it through the disclosive power of an attunement to the withdrawing 
aspect of being. Further Merleau-Ponty’s focus always remains the plenitude of being/s, and 
34 Martin Heidegger, Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Vol. Gesamtausgabe Bd.65 (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1989). English: Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event), trans. Richard Rojcewicz and 
Daniela Vallega-Neu (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012). 
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the negativity of being is thought only as passage, as an invisible that belongs to the visible, 
whereas in Heidegger the withdrawal or abysmal opening of be-ing functions like an origin 
out of which a world and earth disclose.35    
The claim that for Merleau-Ponty the negativity of being is thought only as passage is 
controversial, for Merleau-Ponty thinks the negativity of being following to an important 
extent Heidegger’s own indications, as may be inferred from his later lecture-notes. Still, 
Daniela Vallega-Neu’s reading is remarkable because it fills out a gap in Heidegger’s account 
of the problem of the body, as it is developed in the Zollikon seminars. She articulates 
Heidegger’s understanding of bodily being and art, and remarks that Heidegger tends to 
consider being and beings as simultaneous, that is, as different dimensions of an original and 
unique event of disclosure, whereby being finds a shelter in beings, in works of art and the 
gestures of the body. For the purposes of the present introduction, I should note that 
Vallega-Neu’s interpretation demonstrates that Heidegger’s reflection on art would 
complement the analysis of bodily being from the Zollikon seminars, and links the problem 
of bodiliness and gesture to the cardinal question of the truth of being. This is something 
that remains implicit in Heidegger’s approach to the problem of the body in the Zollikon 
seminars, and it is a point of controversy. 
In the Zollikon seminars Heidegger approaches the problem of the body mainly on 
the basis of the existential analytic, with a renewed emphasis on the value of everydayness, 
and does not properly articulate this problem with the question of the truth of being and the 
event, which is in part what I shall attempt to do in the present work. David Farrell Krell 
accurately defines this problem, again in a contrast with Merleau-Ponty:  
That the body as being in the world is the cardinal ontological problem is no news to students of 
Merleau-Ponty, whose work Heidegger knew about, but who plays no role at all in the 
35 Daniela Vallega-Neu, The Bodily Dimension in Thinking (Albany: The State University of New York Press, 
2005), 100. 
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Zollikon seminars, even though the question of the body is the recurrent theme there. It is 
also worth noting that when the question of the body is raised, as it is throughout the 
Zollikon seminars, Heidegger reverts to the vocabulary of existential ontology, of In-der-Welt-
sein, whereas the aletheiological and topological language of the later Heidegger is left in 
abeyance: references to φύσις and to the open region are vague and indeterminate, references 
to appropriation and the granting are all but absent.36  
Krell’s reference to Merleau-Ponty calls attention to the fact that the body is the 
“cardinal ontological problem,” and criticizes Heidegger for bypassing a proper ontological 
analysis of such an important question. Developing this argument, Krell provides a very 
extensive and detailed account of the problem of the body in Heidegger, and its articulations 
with the question of life. His analysis shows that life is a haunting daimon Heidegger never 
manages to grasp, and that this daimon puts into question the distinctions between Dasein 
and animal, existence and pure life. In a sense, Krell’s study indirectly corroborates Merleau-
Ponty’s view on the problem of the body and sensible being, particularly considering what he 
says about the concept of earth in Husserl, and the main determinations of the notion of 
flesh: the earth is a non-object; rather, it is in some way a phantom that resists philosophical 
representations.  
 Based on this outline of some of the main positions and problems concerning the 
correlations between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, I may determine in a preliminary way 
the scope of the present work, and the points of view on the basis of which I may develop 
this research.  
Let me, then, recapitulate and conclude this section. As I have already indicated, it is 
widely assumed that there are essential philosophical convergences between Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, particularly concerning the problematic of the body. However, despite these 
36 David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 
53.
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similarities, it is also generally acknowledged that Heidegger neglected the question of the 
body, whereas Merleau-Ponty did not. The question, then, is whether this difference in 
“emphasis” compromises the possibility of a fundamental affinity between their 
philosophical projects. This question involves another one, that is, whether a radical 
ontological thinking, should relegate the problem of the sensible, and of the body, to a 
subordinate problem.  
My analysis of the problem of gesture should involve a response to these questions. 
This is clear if one takes into account the way Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty approach the 
problems of art and poetic language. Indeed, for both thinkers the work of art, and the 
poetic work in general, relates to the primordial experience of the truth, as it is implicated, 
too, in gestures and comportments. In line with this, one could say that art and poetry give 
us access to a living, dynamic truth that is imbricated in our embodied existence. In this way, 
art makes possible a thinking of the truth of being, and of ontology, that is foreclosed in 
metaphysical approaches. Still, since the trajectories of both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
are traversed by turns, and by inner tensions, one cannot help but recognize that the 
similarities between the two thinkers necessarily involve essential divergencies. The path of 
each thinker has a unique voice and tone, which cannot be assimilated to any other. For this 
reason, after drawing out some parallels, I shall focus on interpreting each path separately. 
Thus, a substantial part of this work will be devoted to tracing the motif of gesture within 
the more general problematics of art and language, as it is articulated in each individual path.  
Methodological Considerations  
As I have already indicated, in the present dissertation I shall investigate how the 
motif of gesture may be articulated with the more general problematics of art and language 
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in Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. This means that this work has an exegetic character, and 
that it covers a wide range of texts and problems. In covering this material, I focus on the 
constellation of concepts, themes and problems germane to the problem of gesture; for 
example: the concept of form, the concepts of hint and sign, the theme of comportment, the 
problem of the body, the problem of bodily expression –including the problematic of the 
voice and the tone in speech –, and the question of silence. In order to contain my research 
within reasonable limits, particularly regarding the Heideggerian corpus, I concentrate my 
research on texts in which there are explicit and substantial references to the problem of 
gesture or the body. In this sense, Heidegger’s essay on the work of art is an exception.    
Having said this, I should note that the most salient difficulties I encountered in the 
present work have to do with the issue of language. From a methodological point of view, 
this issue has multiple ramifications.  
Although it is quite obvious, I should note that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty speak 
different languages and they have very different styles of writing and philosophizing. 
Furthermore, I should recall that in the internal development of their works, the terminology 
and the style undergo significant transformations. For this reason, in my arguments I often 
digress in order to explain the evolution and genesis of terms and concepts. Sometimes, it is 
necessary, too, to trace links between problems and concepts that initially may seem 
disparate, but which illuminate the problem of gesture and the body.  
I should also note that the problem of gesture overlaps with other substantive 
questions in ways that are often implicit. In these cases, it seemed necessary to venture 
interpretations and to make explicit what the texts merely evoke, and to leap over different 
periods and texts to reveal trains of thought the authors themselves did not develop.   
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For example, in Being and Time, Heidegger uses the verb verhalten, which, in the 
context of the existential analytic is translated as “relate itself,” alluding to Dasein’s 
understanding relatedness to being, whereas the noun Verhalten translates as comportment or 
behavior. In Being and Time Heidegger uses the verb gebärden once in order to define the 
comportment or behavior of the they, das Man.  
Later, in the Bremen and Freiburg Lectures (1949/1957),37 Heidegger occasionally 
introduces a hyphen in the noun Ver-halten, and in this way he transforms the meaning of 
this term: Andrew Mitchell translates it as “restraint,”38 but one could also say that it refers to 
the way being has a hold on us, and the way we stand in relation to being. Or, one might also 
say that this hyphen calls attention to the way we carry our being, the way we bear our 
existence: our stance, our posture, Haltung.  
In the Zollikon seminars, Heidegger equates comportment in general, Verhalten, and 
gesture, Gebärde, for in both cases there is reference to the bearing or carrying of one’s entire 
being, that is, including one’s body. Gestures, in turn, are determinations of the bodying 
forth [Leiben] of the body [Leib], the existential dimensionality of the body. Heidegger alludes 
to this movement using the expression: “der Leib leibt.”  
These brief indications suffice to show that in Heidegger’s work the problems of the 
body, gesture, and comportment are intrinsically related. Moreover, one can see that 
Heidegger’s analysis of bodily being hinges on peculiarities of the German language, and that 
this characteristic makes his work somewhat untranslatable. This means that one cannot 
undertake an analysis of the problematic of gesture and the body without calling attention to 
37 Martin Heidegger, Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge, ed. Petra Jaeger, Vol. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 79 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005). English: Martin Heidegger, Martin Heidegger, Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 
Kindle Edition, trans. Andrew Mitchell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012). Hereafter cited with 
reference first to the German, then to the English translation.”  
38 See ibid., 170/159. 
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the terminological peculiarities of Heidegger’s work, and without calling attention to the 
limits imposed by language itself, which sometimes requires that one leave terms or 
expressions untranslated.   
Although Merleau-Ponty’s work rarely includes etymological analyses, and he does 
not play with language in the same way that Heidegger does, his philosophical insights are 
fundamentally determined by an attentive consideration of the ambiguity of concepts. For 
example, one can see that in The Structure of Behavior (1942),39 Merleau-Ponty starts his 
research calling attention to the characteristic ambiguity of the concept of comportment or 
behavior, which can be applied equally to describe physical and psychic phenomena, and 
which may also be characterized in terms of the concept of form. The ambiguities inherent 
to the concepts of form and comportment are decisive for understanding Merleau-Ponty’s 
analysis of the problem of the body in The Phenomenology of Perception. In this book he 
introduces the concept of “body schema” to name the implicit understanding of our bodies 
that is manifest in our posture, movements and gestures, and which may not be 
subordinated to objective determinations of the body. In this sense, the concept of “body 
schema” articulates meaning and bodily movement, and is a re-appropriation of the concepts 
of comportment and form. Along these lines, one may say that when Merlau-Ponty talks 
about the body he does not always refer to the body we touch and see as a material thing, 
and one needs to be attentive to these nuances when considering potential parallels with 
Heidegger’s analysis of the “lived body,” of Leib.   
Based on these premises, one could say that the works of Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty cannot be compared in general without somehow effacing the peculiarities of their own 
39 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La structure du comportment, 4e édition, Quadrige (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 2013). English: Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior (Boston, MA: Beacon Pres, 1963). 
Hereafter cited with reference first to the French, then to the English translation. 
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philosophical modes of inquiry. Yet, Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation, and appropriation of 
Heidegger’s work provides a standpoint for bridging these differences. For this reason, as I 
have already indicated, in my arguments I often follow Merleau-Ponty’s own interpretations 
of Heidegger’s works. 
Let me conclude this section by noting that Merleau-Ponty provides extensive 
analyses of bodily being and gesture in relation to art, whereas in Heidegger’s work there are 
few explicit references to this relation. This fact makes it difficult to determine in what sense, 
and to what extent, the problematic of gesture is central in Heidegger’s approach to art. For 
this reason I devote extensive sections of the present work to elucidating this relation, in 
order to make explicit how Heidegger understands the work of art, what type of action it is, 
and in what sense it involves the bodily character of gestures.  
Outline of the Project 
 This dissertation consists of three parts, but the first part differs substantially from 
the other two. In the first part I sketch out a general introduction to the problematics of the 
body and gesture, and I weave connections between Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty in which 
their approaches to the notion of gesture converge. In the second and third parts I examine 
the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty separately, and I explore the problem of gesture 
with a focus on the themes of art and language. In this sense, one could say that the second 
and third parts of the dissertation explore in depth the background of problems and 
arguments that is presupposed in the first part.   
 The first part of the dissertation comprises three chapters. In the first chapter I take 
up the concept of form as the basis to draw out a parallel between Heidegger and Merleau-
Ponty. I show that in the Phenomenology of Perception the concept of form –which Merleau-
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Ponty borrows from Gestalt theorists –evolves into Merleau-Ponty’s concept of body 
schema, and that the concept of body schema determines the body as openness to the world 
in a way that bears similarities with Heidegger’s existential analytic. Then I examine some 
basic correlations between Gestalt theory and Heidegger’s existential analytic. On the basis 
of this examination, I recall arguments from Being and Time that relate to the problem of 
sense perception and compare them with central theses from the Phenomenology of Perception. 
To conclude this chapter, I call attention to some differences between Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty, and then I introduce questions concerning specifically the problem of the 
body in Heidegger.  
 In the second chapter I examine Heidegger’s approach to the problem of the body as 
it is developed in the Zollikon seminars. I underscore that in these seminars Heidegger 
qualifies the problem of the body as the most difficult and, therefore, there may be strong 
reasons to think that Heidegger considers the problem of the body as a cardinal ontological 
problem. I argue that the essential difficulty pertaining to the problem of the body has to do 
with the fact that the phenomenon of the body is ambiguous, and I remark that Heidegger is 
deeply aware of this ambiguity. The phenomenon of the body is ambiguous because I am my 
body –the lived body, der Leib –and, at the same time, the body is a thing in the world, a 
body. I conclude by saying that Heidegger leaves the problem of the body in suspense, but 
this suspense is significant: it shows that the problem of the body is a genuine 
phenomenological challenge. 
 The third chapter is devoted to examining the problem of gesture and the 
articulations between gesture, language, and art. It continues the train of arguments sketched 
out in the second chapter –particularly in what concerns the phenomenon of the lived body  
–and sets up parallels with Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of gesture. I argue that the notion of 
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gesture sheds light on the problem of the body because gestures conjoin bodily movement 
and meaning, specifically the meaning that is entwined into affective dispositions. After a 
contrast with Husserl’s approach to gesture in the Logical Investigations,40 and considering 
some arguments from Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Heidegger, I conclude by showing that 
gestures stem from a pre-intentional openness to the world, in the same way as the work of 
art. 
 The second part of the dissertation is centered upon the themes of art and gesture, 
and it contains two chapters: chapters four and five. In this part of the dissertation I 
extensively discuss ontological questions –specifically in relation to the problems of nature, 
life and the earth –and show how they relate to the phenomenology of the body and art.  
In chapter four I investigate Heidegger’s approach to the bodily dimension in art. 
Initially, I argue that the motifs of the body and life, as they appear in Heidegger’s reading of 
Nietzsche (1936-40),41 resonate in the lecture The Origin of the Work of Art from 1936,42 
particularly in what concerns the concept of form and the earthly dimension of the work. 
Elaborating on this point, I draw some comparisons with Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh. 
I further argue that the work of art has a gestural character, for it is a sort of doing that stems 
from a primordial involvement in being, which is prior to the distinction between subject 
and object. In line with this, I suggest that one could characterize the work of art as the 
                                                
40 Edmund Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, Vols. Zweiter Band, I-II Teile (Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1913/1925). 
English: Logical Investigations, Vols. I and II,  trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Routledge, 2001). Hereafter cited 
with reference first to the German, then to the English translation. 
41 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, Vol. Gesamtausgabe Band 6.1 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996). 
English: Nietzsche I and II, trans. David Farrell Krell, Vol. I and II (New York: HarperCollins, 1991); Nietzsche 
III and IV, ed. David Farrell Krell, trans. Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi, Vol. III 
and IV (New York: HarperCollins, 1991). Hereafter cited with reference first to the German, then to the 
English translation. 
42 Martin Heidegger, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes (1935-36), Vol. Gesamtausgabe Bd.5, in Holzwege, 1-74 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977). English: "The Origin of the Work of Art," in Basic Writings, 
ed. David Farrell Krell, 139-212 (San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1993). Hereafter cited with reference first to the 
German, then to the English translation.  
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primordial work of a historical people, not of a subject, as the communal gesture that sets a 
rift in the earth. I conclude this chapter by establishing some connections between the 
problem of gesture and the motif of the “They,” as it is introduced in Being and Time. 
Chapter five is dedicated to examining the intercrossings between the problems of 
the body, art and gesture in Merleau-Ponty’s work. The introduction to this chapter is an 
extensive reflection on the motifs of nature and the earth, particularly in relation to Merleau-
Ponty’s reading of Husserl. I show that in Merleau-Ponty’s work the body appears as the 
pivotal element that connects us to the fundamental earth-ground or primordial nature, and 
that the problem of the earth-ground leads to questions concerning the negativity of being. 
With regard to this, I trace some connections between Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh 
and Heidegger’s thinking of being as no-thing. Continuing on from this point, I argue that 
the ontology of the flesh articulates the relation between lived body and being in such a way 
that the body appears eminently as a gestural body: a body that presupposes an affective 
milieu of significance, an attuned engagement with being. The last section of this chapter 
explores the resonances of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh in his meditations on the 
work of art, as he develops them in Eye and Mind (1961).43  
The third part of the dissertation deals with the problem of language, and includes 
chapter six and seven. In this part of the dissertation I continue exploring the themes of 
gesture and affectivity, and elucidate questions concerning both the bodily character of 
language and the linguistic and gestural nature of the body. 
43 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, "L'oeil et l'esprit," in Oeuvres, ed. Claude Lefort, 1591-1628 (Paris: Gallimard, 2010). 
English: "Eye and mind," in The Merleau-Ponty Reader, ed. Ted Toadvine and Leonar Lawlor, 351-378 (Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 2007). Hereafter cited with reference first to the French, then to the English 
translation. 
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 In chapter six I investigate the problem of gesture in relation to Heidegger’s 
meditations on language and attunement. To introduce this chapter, I elaborate on 
Heidegger’s approach to the problems of gesture and language in relation to the primordial 
notion of saying. Then I proceed to examine Heidegger’s critique of the metaphysical 
interpretation of gesture as expression and his approach to gestural signification as 
something that involves grounding attunements. In Being and Time Heidegger illustrates this 
point with a reference to poetic speech, and I meditate extensively on this indication and the 
way it shows the body as attunement. The central sections of this chapter trace the 
correlation between gesture and poetry in Heidegger’s lectures on Hölderlin from the 1930s, 
specifically in relation to the motifs of the hint and the sign. I further examine the motifs of 
the hint and the sign in Heidegger’s notes on language published as Zum Wesen der Sprache und 
Zur Frage nach der Kunst.44 I argue that essential signs and gestures are pervaded by the silence 
of attunements, and this leads to questions concerning the attunement of gratitude and its 
relation to thinking. Thus, I conclude this chapter by exploring Heidegger’s approach to 
thinking as handicraft in What is Called Thinking? (1951/52)45 and his reflections on gesture in 
“A Dialogue on Language” [Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache] (1953/54), text included in On 
the Way to Language.46 
                                                
44 See Martin Heidegger, Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst, ed. Thomas Regehly, Vol. 
Gesamtausgabe Bd.74 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2010), 92. This book has not been translated 
into English, thus, in the course of the present work I will provide my own translation of the passages I quote 
and the transcription of the original.  
45 Martin Heidegger, Was heisst Denken?, Vol. Gesamtausgabe Bd.8 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 
2002). English: What is Called Thinking?, trans. J. Glenn Gray (New York: HarperCollins, 2004). Hereafter cited 
with reference first to the German, then o the English translation.     
46 Martin Heidegger, Unterwegs zur Sprache, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, Vol. Gesamtausgabe Bd.12 
(Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985). English: On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz (New 
York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1982). Hereafter cited with reference first to the German, then to the English 
translation. 
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 Chapter seven is devoted to the themes of language and gesture in Merleau-Ponty’s 
work. This chapter is introduced with a discussion about the influence Heidegger’s ontology 
of language may have had on Merleau-Ponty’s view. Then, I move on to investigate Merleau-
Ponty’s approach to the problem of language and expression in the Phenomenology of Perception, 
and the distinction he establishes there between the spoken speech, which is sedimented 
language, and speaking speech, which is gestural. Reading Merleau-Ponty’s course summaries 
and lecture-notes, and expanding on the problematic of gesture, I examine Merleau-Ponty’s 
qualification of language as diacritical, and the way in which it leads to ontological questions. 
Along these lines, I argue that the notion of gesture serves to articulate different levels of 
meaning, the level that corresponds to ideality and sedimented significations and the level 
that corresponds to lived, affective significations. In this way, I show that the problem of 
gesture is intrinsically related to Merleau-Ponty’s idea of carnal generality, which in turn 
corresponds to the understanding of meaning as institution. At this point in the argument, I 
make reference to The Prose of the World and related texts.47 Based on Merleau-Ponty’s reading 
of the problem of ideality in Husserl, I conclude this chapter by exploring the idea of carnal 
generality in relation to the theme of nature and the earth, and showing how these themes 








                                                
47 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La prose du monde, ed. Claude Lefort (Paris: Gallimard, 1969). English: The Prose of the 
World, ed. Claude Lefort, trans. John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1981). Hereafter cited 
with reference first to the French, then to the English translation. 
Part One: The Problem of the Body and Gesture 
Chapter One: The Problem of the Body from Merleau-Ponty to 
Heidegger 
Phenomenology and the Roots of the Body 
Husserl’s philosophy is certainly the most salient influence on the works of both 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. Husserl’s phenomenological maxim “zu den Sachen selbst!” is 
perhaps the most significant imprint of this influence. But what, exactly, does this 
phenomenological return to the things themselves mean? The phenomenological imperative 
“to the things themselves” is a call to return to the beginnings of philosophy, to the grounds 
that determine thinking,48 what is given before articulated thought.49 But this is perhaps an 
impossible task, for how could thinking reflect on its own ground without misrepresenting it 
as an object? So, it seems, this task requires a transgression of the limits of objectifying, 
reflective thinking, and the passage towards a non-metaphysical thinking. As Merleau-Ponty 
points out in his lectures on Nature (1956-60)50 and also throughout his later lectures on 
Husserl (1959-60),51 Husserl’s pursuit of the bloße Sache leads him to the limits of 
phenomenology, the earthly roots of the body, the point of contact between body and earth. 
Merleau-Ponty explains that the earth is a very peculiar object, a non-object, for it silently 
48 With regard to this, John Sallis explains in Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings, “radical philosophy is a 
peculiar return to beginnings, a turning towards what already determines it” (17).  
49 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Merleau-Ponty: Notes de cours sur L'Origine de la géométrie de Husserl suivi de Recherches 
sur la phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty, ed. Franck Robert and Renaud Barbaras (Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1998), 11-18. English: Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, ed. Leonard Lawlor and Bettina Bergo, trans. 
Leonard Lawlor and Bettina Bergo (Evanston: northwestern University Press, 2002). 11-17. Hereafter cited 
with reference first to the French, then to the English translation. 
50 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, La nature. Notes, Cours du Collège de France, suivi des Résumés de Cours Correspondants 
(Paris: Gallimard/ Editions du Seuil, 1995). English: Nature. Course Notes from the Collège de France, Compiled and 
with notes by Dominique Séglard, trans. Robert Vallier (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2003), 109-
10/ 76-77. Hereafter cited with reference first to the French, then to the English translation. 
51 See Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 81-84/67-71.  
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moves with us and, at the same time, it remains at essential rest. The earth is the ground 
presupposed by our lived body, a ground that withdraws from any attempt at representation. 
Thus, one may say that the earth escapes the domain of intentional relations and encroaches 
on the domain of being. For the earth is the soil and source of all reflection, the ground that 
is present wherever we go; even if we were to go to other planets, the earth would remain 
present as that which constitutes the world we were thrown into, and which pre-figures all 
thought. As Merleau-Ponty suggests in his lecture-notes on Husserl at the Limits of 
Phenomenology, this is the constellation of problems underlying the convergences between the 
later Husserl and Heidegger. And as I shall demonstrate in the present work, this 
constellation of problems also determines the essential affinities between Merleau-Ponty, 
especially after his “ontological turn,” and Heidegger.52  
In Merleau-Ponty’s view, the problem of the body is fundamental to the questions 
concerning the pre-predicative grounds of thought, a problem that touches on the limits of 
philosophy and phenomenology. Indeed, from the very beginning of his career Merleau-
Ponty was haunted by the problematic of the body and its relations to the grounds of 
phenomenology, a problem that relentlessly demands him to explore new terms, new points 
of departure, new attempts at articulating the horizon of humanity and nature as a whole.      
Already in the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty carries out an extensive 
reflection on the problem of the body, and demonstrates that the body contains a pre-
predicative understanding of the world that is manifest in comportment. He introduces the 
52 Regarding the method Merleau-Ponty uses to draw out the convergences between Husserl and Heidegger, 
and which is highly indebted to Heidegger, Leonard Lawlor remarks that Merleau-Ponty interprets these 
convergences on the basis of a dialogue, set in a milieu between the extremes of subjective and objective 
thought, which assumes that the other’s presence remains open in my own interrogation, in such a way that we 
may think with him what remains unthought or unsaid in his thought. See Leonard Lawlor, “Verflechtung: The 
Triple Significance of Merleau-Ponty’s Course Notes on Husserl’s ‘The Origin of Geometry,’” in: Husserl at the 
Limits of Phenomenology, xi-xvi.  
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concept of “body schema” [schéma corporelle], which is borrowed from studies in psychiatry 
and neurology,53 in order to qualify this embodied understanding. This concept is set up as a 
re-interpretation of the concept of gestalt, which is the central concept in The Structure of 
Behavior. The body schema has, indeed, a strategic function analogous to that of gestalt, for it 
qualifies human comportment as intrinsically meaningful. In the pages that follow I will 
examine this conceptual development in detail. On the basis of this analysis I will sketch out 
some basic points of coincidence with Heidegger’s work.   
Gestalt and Comportment: Beyond Materialism and Idealism 
In The Structure of Behavior Merleau-Ponty develops an analysis of comportment that 
aims to overcome the division between idealism and materialism, and which would explain 
the relation between consciousness and nature independently of causal or mechanistic 
frameworks. As Merleau-Ponty explains, the initial problem consists in the impossibility of 
maintaining the opposition between reflex or automatic actions and intentional, intelligent 
activity. Such opposition is unsustainable not only because it leads to confusions and 
obscurities,54 but also because a proper explanation of comportment presupposes a 
configuration of the world as a unified whole, a gestalt or structure.55 With regard to this, as 
53 According to Emmanuel de Saint Aubert, Merleau-Ponty adopts this notion presumably on the basis of his 
reading of a book by Jean L’hermite, L’image de notre corps (Paris: Editions de la Nouvelle Revue Critique, 1939), 
wherein there is a synthesis of researches on the body developed at the time in disciplines such as neurology 
and psychiatry. Particularly, De Saint Aubert argues, the work of the neurologist and psychiatrist Paul Schilder’s 
had a decisive influence, for his concept of Körperschema will determine the evolution from the concept of body 
schema to the concept of the flesh. See Emmanuel de Saint Aubert, Être et chair. Du corps au désir: L'habilitation 
ontologique de la chair (Paris: Vrin, 2013), ch. 1. 
54 See The Structure of Behavior, 60/43. 
55 See Barry Smith essay, "Gestalt Theory: An Essay in Philosophy," in Foundations of Gestalt Theory, ed. Barry 
Smith, 11-81 (Munich and Vienna: Philosophia, 1988). Following the presentation of Barry Smith we can 
provide a general determination of the concept of Gestalt on the basis of Ehrenfel’s definition, which, 
according to Smith, is the seed of the various developments of this theory. He says the following: “Ehrenfel’s 
proposal, now, is that wherever we have a relation of this sort, between a complex of experienced elements on 
the one hand and some associated unitary experience of a single invariant structure on the other, we are to 
conceive this latter structure as a Gestalt, and to undestand the given unitary experience as structurally analogous to the 
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Merleau-Ponty argues, the concept of form works as a hinge articulating the spheres of 
nature and consciousness, for it can be applied to both spheres of experience: 
It is not a question of risking one hypothesis among others, but of introducing a new 
category, the category of ‘form’, which having its application in the inorganic as well as the 
organic domain, would permit bringing to light the ‘transverse functions’ in the nervous 
system of which Wartheimer speaks and whose existence is confirmed by experience without 
a vitalist hypothesis. For the ‘forms’ and in particular the physical systems, are defined as 
total processes whose properties are not the sum of those which the isolated parts would 
possess.56  
Merleau-Ponty underscores that the main contribution from Gestalt theorists is that 
they determine comportments as structured wholes, which cannot be explained in terms of 
discrete elements. He further suggests that Gestalt theory sets the grounds for understanding 
comportment beyond the dichotomies between freedom and determinism, for it shows that 
even our “least conscious reactions” appear always “guided by the internal and external 
situation itself and capable up to a certain point of adapting themselves to that which is 
particular to it…”57 In this way, Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the concept of form pinpoints 
two essential aspects of human comportment. On the one hand, comportments involve a 
meaningful apprehension of the world as a whole, that is, an embedded, pre-reflexive 
understanding of figures against a ground. On the other hand, comportments are 
spontaneous adaptations to particular situations, whose meaning is not reducible to physical 
experience of a spatial shape” (14). As Smith points out, what is remarkable in Ehrenfel’s approach is that it can be 
applied to the most diverse types of experience, even non-percepual ones: “The Gestalt concept is then 
generalized further to embrace also complex objects of experience founded on inner perceptions, that to say, on 
one’s presentations of one’s own elementary feelings, acts or mental states” (15). This general determination of 
the concept of Gestalt is also implied in Merleau-Ponty’s own approach, even though mostly the Berlin school 
influenced him.  
56 Merleau-Ponty, The Structure of Behavior, 66/47. “Il ne s’agit pas de risquer une hypothése parmi d’autres, mais 
d’introduire une nouvelle catégorie, la catégorie de «forme», qui ayant son application dans le domaine inorganique comme dans le 
domaine organique, permettrait de faire apparaître dans le système nerveux, sans hypothése vitaliste, les «fonctions transversales» 
dont avait parlé Wertheimer et dont l’ observation confirme l’existence.Car les «formes» se définissent comme des processus totaux 
dont les propriétés ne sont pas la somme de celles que posséderaient les parties isolées.” 
57 Ibid., 60/43. “Puisque nos reactions les moins conscientes ne sont jamais isolables dans l’ensemble de l’activité nerveuse, qu’elles 
semblent guidées dans chaque cas par la situation interne et externe elle-même et capables, jusqu’a un certain point, de s’adapter à 
ce qu’elle a de particulier:” 
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or physiological processes –a point that marks Merleau-Ponty’s distance from some main 
authors from Gestalt psychology.58  
On the basis of the insight that forms are indivisible unities, that they cannot be 
explained referring to “external,” separate elements,59 Merleau-Ponty shows that 
comportment “no longer has one signification, it is itself signification.”60 In this way, the 
concept of form implies a gestural understanding of comportment. He says: “…the reactions 
of an organism are not edifices constructed from elementary movements, but gestures gifted 
with an internal unity.”61 Along these lines, one may say that the notion of gesture defines 
human action and comportment out of the framework imposed by metaphysical dualisms, 
for gestures adumbrate a field of meaning that is prior to the voluntary, constitutive work of 
consciousness. It is worth noting, however, that in The Structure of Behavior Merleau-Ponty 
does not explore in depth the structure of the phenomenal body, nor the ontological 
grounds presupposed by his study of the concepts of form and comportment. This book is 
devoted to the characterization and analysis of the concept of form in the organic world, and 
it demonstrates that the concept of form is of decisive importance for understanding the 
functioning of bodies in general.62 Merleau-Ponty undertakes the task of exploring further 
the structure or form of the body, the phenomenal body and its existential relation to the 
world, later in the Phenomenology of Perception. 
58 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Le primat de la perception et ses conséquences philosophiques (Lagrasse: Verdier, 2014), 
53. English: "The Primacy of Perception," in The Merleau-Ponty Reader, 89-118 (Evanston, Ilinois: Northwestern
University Press, 2007), 99. Hereafter cited with reference first to the French, then to the English translation. 
59See The Structure of Behavior, 206/134.   
60 Ibid., 187/122. “Ici le comportment n’a plus seulement une signification, il est lui-même signification.” 
61 Ibid., 196/130.“…les réactions d’ un organisme ne sont pas des edifices de mouvéménts élémentaires, mais de gestes doués 
d’une unité intérieur.” 
62 According to De Saint Aubert, the passage from The Structure of Behavior to the Phenomenology of Perception can 
be characterized in terms of a passage from the exterior view of the body to the interior view of the 
phenomenal body. See Emmanuel Saint Aubert, Être et chair. Du corps au désir: L'habilitation ontologique de la chair 
(Paris: Vrin, 2013), 78. 
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The Concept of Form and the Notion of Body Schema          
In the Phenomenology of Perception the concept of form is re-interpreted in terms of the 
notion of body schema, schéma corporelle. Merleau-Ponty carries out this re-interpretation in 
three moments. The first moment defines this schema as a sort of summary (résumé) of our 
bodily experience. In this case, the body schema is presented as “capable of providing any 
momentary interoceptivity and proprioceptivity with a commentary and a signification.”63 
This initial approach characterizes the body schema as a work of unification that somehow 
sets the body apart, as if it were not intrinsically related to a context or environment. But this 
is just an initial approach to the form of the body. Hence, the second moment goes further 
and specifies that the body schema is more than a synthesis or summary of bodily 
associations because it displays significations contained in my entire situation. And this 
means that the body schema is a gestalt and a posture: “Thus we are making our way toward 
a second definition of the body schema: it will no longer be the mere result of associations 
established in the course of experience, but rather the global awareness of my posture in the 
intersensory world, a ‘form’ in Gestalt psychology’s sense of the word.”64 Here, Merleau-
Ponty remarks that the experience of my body presupposes a global awarenes of my stance 
in the world. This second definition, however, does not explain what is the type of relation 
to the world that gives unity to my posture or the conditions on the basis of which my global 
awareness of the world is constituted. Hence, Merleau-Ponty proceeds to characterize a 
third, deeper determination of the body schema, which may be understood in terms of the 
body’s dynamic entanglement in the world. At this level, the body schema is form or 
63 Phenomenology of Perceptioin, 115/101. “…capable de donner un commentaire et une signification à la interoceptité et à la 
proprioceptivité du moment” 
64 Ibid., 116/102. “On s’achemine donc vers une seconde définition du schéma corporelle: il ne sera plus le simple résultat des 
associations établies au cours de la experience, mais une prise de conscience globale de ma posture dans le monde intersensoriel, une 
«forme» au sens de la Gestaltpsychologie”  
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structure insofar as it reveals a practical and affective engagement with the world. Merleau-
Ponty introduces the final definition of body schema as follows: “If my body can ultimately 
be a ‘form,’ and if there can be, in front of it, privileged figures against indifferent 
backgrounds, this is insofar as my body is polarized by its tasks, insofar as it exists toward 
them, insofar as it coils up upon itself in order to reach its goal, and the ‘body schema’ is, in 
the end, a manner of expressing that my body is in and toward the world.”65  
Hence, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, the notion of body schema reveals the ecstatic 
character of the body, such that its form or gestalt is not simply the expression of an 
epistemic function or an static image of my being, but rather of an intimate connection to 
the world as a whole: polarization, directionality, a sense of existential meaning.66  
With regard to this, Emmanuel de Saint Aubert argues that the notion of body 
schema foreshadows Merleau-Ponty’s notion of carnal generality and the notion of flesh, for 
it reveals the body as a gestural body, whose spontaneous movements are reconfigurations 
of the world as a whole.67 De Saint Aubert further explains that the body schema is a system 
of equivalences, a symbolic and libidinal body whose gestures are, in a sense, shaped by 
desire.68  
We therefore see how Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of the concept of gestalt as 
perceptual unity, a unity structured in terms of the relation between figure and ground, leads 
to an interpretation of the lived body as gestural body. In line with this, one might say that 
65 Ibid., 117/103. “En dernière analyse, si mon corps peut être une «forme» et s’il peut y avoir devant lui des figures privilégiées 
sur des fonds indifférents, c’est en tant qu’il est polarisé par ses tâches, qu’il existe vers elles; qu’il se ramasse sur lui-même pour 
atteindre son but, et le «schéma corporelle» est finalement una manière d’exprimer que mon corps est au monde.”  
66 In relation to this point, in “The Primacy of Perception” Merleau-Ponty claims the following: “As Gestalt 
psychology has shown, structure, gestalt, meaning are no less visible in objectively observable behavior than in 
the experience of ourselves –provided of course, that objectively is not confused with what is measurable” 
(100). 
67 See De Saint Aubert, Être et chair, 108. He says: “Le schéma corporel déploie un space expressif et dessine le monde par 
ses gestes.” 
68 See ibid., 111-12. 
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the body is not primarily a physical body, and that the world is not primarily an objective 
world. Indeed, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, the carnal generality of the world, which is 
“schematized” by our bodies, is an affective milieu. In this regard, as will become clearer in 
subsequent sections of this dissertation, there are some important affinities with Heidegger’s 
existential analytic, particularly regarding the notion of attunement.  
And yet, at this stage Merleau-Ponty still struggles to find an appropriate way to 
define the complexities of the body schema. Even when Merleau-Ponty qualifies the body 
schema in terms of an affective engagement with the world, the world still appears, to some 
extent, to be an intentional object of incarnated consciousness. He remarks that my body “is 
in and toward the world,” “mon corps est au monde,” without specifying what grants unity to 
this articulation between body and world in ontological terms. Therefore, although the 
concept of body schema already prefigures the basic traits of Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of 
the flesh, as De Saint Aubert demonstrates,69 one can see that acknowledging the centrality 
of the problem of the body does not mean that its ontological status has been clarified. 
Indeed, although the body schema is not reducible to the body-thing or the body-image, 
neither can it be determined as a subjective body, a body that is incarnated consciousness.70 In 
short, the being of the body, and the nature of its connection to the world, remains as a 
pressing difficulty.  
In one of the working notes for The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty suggests 
that his earlier work remains caught in a “philosophy of consciousness” whose fundamental 
                                                
69 This is one of the central theses De Saint Aubert defends in Être et chair. 
70 See Shaun Gallagher, How the Body Shapes the Mind (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 20. Gallagher 
suggests that Merleau-Ponty’s concept of body schema denotes “a dynamic functioning of the body in its 
environment,” and is opposed to what he determines as “body-image,” which is a conscious representation of 
our own bodies. According to De Saint Aubert, Gallaguer’s interpretation of Merleau-Ponty’s concept of body 
schema is misleading, for part of Merleau-Ponty’s point is to show the difficulty to determine such distinction 
from a genuine phenomenological perspective. See Être et chair; 39-58.    
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premises still require “ontological explicitation.”71 This would explain in part why, after the 
Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty turns his attention to the problem of truth, and to 
the problem concerning the nascent logos of nature. As I shall argue later on, this turn sets 
the problematic of the body in relation to questions concerning the meaning of being in 
general. Elaborating on this problem, in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty will refer 
to the body as the redoubling of being, as the intertwining of the visible and the invisible. On 
this view, bodily movements and gestures reveal themselves as the primordial latencies of the 
nascent logos of the world.  
Let me conclude this section by noting that, in Merleau-Ponty’s earlier work, the 
problem of the body, and the distinction between lived body and body-object –or body 
schema and body-image –, already involves questions concerning the difference between 
being and beings. In fact, one can see that from the very beginning Merleau-Ponty’s work 
sets up an approach to the body that goes beyond any determination of the body as object. 
In the Phenomenology of Perception the body is dealt with in terms of the notions of form and 
comportment, as embodied understanding of the world. Merleau-Ponty develops a 
phenomenology of the body that challenges metaphysical dualisms, and which prepares the 
way for an ontological turn that coincides with Heidegger’s work in significant ways. Let me, 
then, explore some of the fundamental affinities between the works of Heidegger and 
Merleau-Ponty. In this task, I shall focus on central arguments from Being and Time, for this 
work had a direct impact on the Phenomenology of Perception.   
                                                
71 The Visible and the Invisible, 234/183. 
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Being and Time : Perception and Gestalt Theory 
As I have already indicated, in The Structure of Behavior, Merleau-Ponty introduces the 
concept of form, gestalt, as a concept that unifies the spheres of consciousness and nature, 
and he often returns to this concept to determine the ways in which perception immediately 
grants us access to the world as a structured whole, which is not divisible into discrete 
elements. Thereby, the concept of form provides a key for understanding perception away 
from traditional dichotomies between empiricism and intellectualism, materialism and 
idealism, granted that we read the notion of form from a phenomenological perspective, as 
Merleau-Ponty does, avoiding the assumption that forms are reducible in principle to 
physiological or physical processes.  
Heidegger’s analyses of perception and language, as well as his determinations of the 
constituents of existence, also introduce notions such as form or structure. Moreover, after 
Being and Time, the concept of form or figure becomes central to understanding the 
problematic of the work of art. Thus, analyzing the influence of Gestalt theory in 
Heidegger’s work may be fruitful for understanding significant coincidences with Merleau-
Ponty’s work.   
In Being and Time Heidegger does not use the concept of gestalt, perhaps because it is 
a concept that stems from particular disciplines like psychology and physiology and, 
therefore, may be essentially inadequate to characterize human comportment and perception 
from the perspective of the Fundamental Ontology. It is clear, however, that Heidegger 
knew gestalt theorists, and that they may have had a decisive impact on his work,72 especially 
                                                
72 Bernhard Radloff argues that Heidegger must have known about Gestalt theorists via his reading of Husserl’s 
Logical Investigations, but he also demonstrates that Heidegger was closely acquainted with some of them. See 
Bernhard Radloff, Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism: Disclosure and Gestalt (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press Incorporated, 2007), 22-23. 
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through his reading of Husserl.73 Bernhard Radloff explains this point clearly: “Through the 
early writing of Husserl in particular, Heidegger will have been led to an acquaintance with 
the works of gestalt theorists. The “Third Investigation” of Husserl’s Logical Investigations 
explicitly deals with the relation of part and whole, and the particular character of ontic and 
ontological wholes.”74 With regard to the resonances of gestalt theory in Husserl’s Logical 
Investigations, one should note that Husserl’s account is of remarkable clarity when it comes to 
distinguishing different types of unity accomplished between parts and wholes. Barry Smith 
summarizes Husserl’s contribution to the problem of Gestalt as follows: 
The Gestalt problem is, in effect, a problem of unity, and Husserl here argues that unity can 
come about in two distinct ways. Either given objects are such that –like nuts and bolts, or 
adjacent pieces in a jigsaw–they do not need any additional objects in order to fit together to 
make a unified whole. Or they are such that –like two pieces of wood which need to be 
nailed together –they are not in themselves sufficient to make a unity but can be unified only 
given the presence of some additional object (LU III, §§1f). Such unifying objects may be of 
two sorts: on the one hand they may be independent objects like a nail or a mass of glue, 
capable of existing in separation from a whole of the given sort. On the other hand however, 
and more interestingly, they may be dependent objects, capable of existing only in consort with 
the objects they serve to unify.75 
This brief reference to Husserl’s theory of wholes and parts may be relevant to 
understanding some central arguments in Being and Time, and the way in which Heidegger 
approaches the problem of bodily perception, for he understands perception on the basis of 
structures that unify the whole of existence and whose basic moments do not exist 
separately. That is to say, borrowing the language of Husserl’s “Third Investigation,”76 the 
different components of existence are not “pieces,” but rather moments founded on a 
unified whole. Heidegger shows, indeed, that things appear primordially in the context of a 
73 With regard to the correlations between Husserl’s thought and Gestalt theory see Barry Smith, “Gestalt 
Theory: An Essay in Philosophy,” 18-22. Smith remarks: “Thus as for Ehrenfels, so also for Husserl, we grasp 
the configuration and its quality in one glance –not by collecting together in intuition a sum or sequence of 
objects or relations…”(18). 
74 Radloff, Heidegger and the Question of Nationalsocialism, 22.
75 Smith, “Gestalt Theory: An Essay in Philosophy,” 21. 
76 See Husserl, Logical Investigations, Investigation III, Ch.1. 
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totality of signification, which is embedded in Dasein’s existence. He says: “We shall call this 
relational totality of signification significance [Bedeutsamkeit]. It is what constitutes the structure 
of the world, of that which Dasein as such always already is.”77 The totality of significance is 
determined by the interplay of the structural components of existence and the temporality of 
being-in-the-world.78 The structural components of existence are ontological disposition or 
attunement [Befindlichkeit], understanding [Verstehen], and discourse [Rede], and they are 
“equiprimordial” dimensions of being-in-the-world, of our thrownness in the world, which 
means that they determine beforehand our relations to things, and that they are in a relation 
of mutual correspondence.  
In this context, discourse is a primordial articulation of understanding that precedes 
linguistic expression or speech. Considering the problem of the primacy of the question in 
Heidegger, John Sallis explains this point as follows: “Before there is speech, earlier than any 
question Dasein may address to himself, there is the articulation of the Verstandlichkeit that 
belongs to Dasein’s disclosedness, a prearticulation that speech will always assume and 
express.”79 Let me be clear that the decisive argument is that a prearticulation of significance 
precedes particular acts of expression, and that this prearticulation is determined as openness 
77 Being and Time, 116-17/85.“Das Beszugsganze dieses Bedeutens nennen wir die Bedeutsamkeit. Sie ist das, was die Struktur 
der Welt, dessen, worin Dasein als solches je schon ist, ausmacht.” 
78 Bernhard Radloff articulates explicitly Heidegger’s analytic of Dasein with basic premises of Gestalt theory as 
follows: “Heidegger’s transformation of the question of intentionality, which grounds it in being-in-the-world, 
in effect integrates the problem of wholes into his analytic of Dasein’s temporality and historicity. The call of a 
bird, the approaching motorcycle, the glimpse of someone passing, is already given as such by the hermeneutic 
As of understanding, by Befindlichkeit, and by discourse (Rede), which together constitute Dasein in the 
temporality of its being-in-the-world. What is ‘perceived’ in this way already has gestalt in the sense that a 
determinate whole is grasped as such in its local and temporal specificity, as having particular qualities, and as 
standing-forth out of a context of significance (horizon or ‘background’) in which it is embedded. In its being, 
Da-sein is always already directed towards –he intends –the being of the thing (GA20, 40/31). Moreover, since 
Heidegger explicitly defines historicity as a more concrete working-out of Dasein’s temporality, the wholeness 
of entities within the world is ultimately constituted by the interpretive horizon of Dasein’s historicity. The 
‘gestalt’ of innerworldly beings is given by this horizon, and this is one way the gestalt as whole is distinct from 
the formal concept of the whole explained in the Logical Investigations.” Heidegger and the Question of National 
Socialism, 29.  
79 John Sallis, Double Truth (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 33. 
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to the world: disclosedness. That is to say, speech arises from a ground of lived 
significations. Heidegger emphasizes this point when he analyzes in particular the 
phenomena of language and meaning.  
Heidegger explains that the totality of significance involves an existential horizon 
that cannot be reduced to or subordinated to particular determinations of language, for 
instance, judgments or statements, nor to any particular function, for instance, the 
“expressive” function. Put differently, the particular “factors” [Momente] of language can only 
be articulated in light of ontological structures:  
Attempts to grasp the “essence of language” have always taken their orientation toward a 
single one of these factors and have understood language guided by the idea of “expression,” 
“symbolic forms,” communication as “statement,” “making known” experiences or the 
“form” of life. But nothing would be gained for a completely sufficient definition of 
language if we were to put these different fragmentary definitions together in a syncretistic 
way. What is decisive is to develop the ontological-existential totality of the structure of 
discourse beforehand on the basis of the analytic of Dasein.80   
 
 
In this passage, Heidegger claims precisely that particular moments of language are 
determined in relation to a prior apprehension of the structure of discourse, which is 
integrated in the totality of Dasein’s existing. In this sense, one can see that Heidegger’s 
argument refers to the totality of existence in a way that foreshadows Merleau-Ponty’s 
determination of the concept of body schema, which is determined as openness to the 
world. The convergence with Merleau-Ponty’s work becomes more evident if we take into 
consideration the overall argument of the passage just quoted. That passage precedes 
Heidegger’s explanation of understanding in relation to the phenomena of hearing and 
                                                
80 Being and Time, 216/157. “Die Versuche, das »Wesen der Sprache« zu fassen, haben denn immer auch die Orienterung an 
einem einzelnen dieser Momente genommen und die Sprache begriffen am Leitfaden der Idee des »Ausdrucks«, der «Symbolischen 
Form», der Mitteilung als »Aussage«, der »Kundgabe« von Erlebnissen oder der »Gestaltung« des Lebens. Für eine voll 
zureichende Definition der Sprache wäre aber auch nichts gewonnen, wollte man diese verschiedenen Bestimmungstücke synchretisch 
zusammenschieben. Das Entscheidende bleibt, zuvor das ontologisch-existentiale Ganze der Struktur der Rede auf dem Grunde 
der Analytik des Daseins herauszuarbeiten.”  
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hearkening. Heidegger suggests that Dasein’s understanding is embodied, for he claims that 
there is an intrinsic correspondence between bodily perception and understanding: “Dasein 
hears because it understands.”81 Although Heidegger does not allude expressly to the body, 
his analysis shows that sense perception relates to things as structured wholes, as forms, as 
expressions of the potentiality-to-be [Seinskönnen] of Dasein. That is to say, perception is 
integrated in a horizon of social practices and meanings. For this reason, Heidegger remarks, 
we never perceive complexes of qualities or elemental sensations: “‘Initially’ we never hear 
noises or complexes of sound, but the creaking wagon, the motorcycle. We hear the column 
of the march, the north wind, the woodpecker tapping, the crackling fire.”82 What Heidegger 
says here coincides in part with Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of perception in the Phenomenology of 
Perception, for Merleau-Ponty starts by arguing that perception gives us access to structured 
wholes that cannot be divided into elementary sensations, and which are not founded on 
conceptual determinations or judgments.    
Taking into account that sense perception is founded on being-in-the-world, 
Bernhard Radloff points out that our openness to the world prefigures what is seen or heard, 
and “consequently the thesis of gestalt theory, that we do not perceive sense data, but 
particular, meaningful forms, also follows for Heidegger, although on different premises.”83 
According to Radloff’s reading, Heidegger distances himself from gestalt theory insofar as he 
examines the ontological grounds of our relations to things, thus going beyond a merely 
“epistemological” view. As I have already argued, vestiges of this epistemological view 
persist in Merleau-Ponty’s concept of gestalt, and the notion of body schema, insofar as his 
                                                
81Ibid., 217/158.“Das Dasein hört, weil es versteht.”  
82Ibid. In German: “Zunächst hören wir nie und nimmer Geräusche und Lautcomplexe, sondern den Knarren den Wagen, das 
Motorrad. Man hört die Kolonne auf dem Marsch, den Nordwind, den klopfenden Specht, das knisternde Feuer.”  
83 Radloff, Heidegger and the Question of National Socialism, 29.  
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work remains caught in a “philosophy of consciousness.” As Heidegger’s existential analysis 
makes clear, the Fundamental Ontology must leave behind the opposition between subject 
and object and, thereby, any reference to consciousness or the cogito as constitutive 
grounds.   
One should note, however, that although Heidegger’s explanation of perception in 
Being and Time coincides with that of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception in significant 
respects, the overall picture and the basic premises of these two works differ. Let me 
recapitulate and explain the main coincidences and differences in question. 
The Body and the Limits of Being and Time  
In line with the views of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, one can say that bodily 
perception presupposes a holistic involvement in the world, and that the structures of 
significance or meaning are pervasive. Specifically, one can see that Heidegger’s 
understanding of bodily perception is intrinsically related to our potentiality-to-be, 
Seinkönnen, as a horizon of practical possibilities. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty’s analysis shows 
that perception involves a horizon of practical intentions, the horizon of an “I can.”  
Moreover, for Heidegger the totality of significance is linked to affective dispositions. 
Similarly, Merleau-Ponty remarks that the horizon of perception is pervaded by affectivity 
and desire. Indeed, in the Phenomenology of Percception, Merleau-Ponty takes up the “affective 
milieu” [milieu affectif]–the milieu of love and desire, for example –as the point of departure 
for understanding how beings can exist in general.84 And yet, Merleau-Ponty understands 
this affective milieu of the world of perception in terms of intentionality, without exploring 
its ontological structure. Heidegger, instead, explores grounding ontological attunements, for 
84 See Phenomenology of Perception, 180/156. 
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instance, in relation to the nothingness of existence and to death. He also identifies care as 
basic comportment that gives structure to existence, and which escapes the domain of 
practical or cognitive relations.  
Considering the totality of Dasein in relation to death, Heidegger recalls the 
difference between totality and sum briefly referencing Husserl’s Logical Investigations. He 
argues specifically that the unity of Dasein’s essence can never be understood in terms of a 
sum of parts,85 not even when it comes to grasping the fragmentariness or incompleteness of 
existence. “What constitutes the ‘unwholeness’ in Dasein, the constant being-ahead-of-itself, 
is neither a summative together which is outstanding, nor even a not-yet-having-become-
accessible, but rather a not-yet that every Dasein, as the being that its, has to be.”86 What 
Dasein is “not-yet” is already comprised in its being as a structural factor, as a modality of 
the nothingness of existence. Dasein is a totality such that, in its very existence as being-in-
the-world, it already contains a reference to what is not-yet as something that matters, as 
something that is intimated in terms of care. This concept of care goes beyond any practical 
or theoretical apprehension of my being and it may not be reduced to intentional structures.  
Having said this, however, one should note that when Heidegger introduces the 
concept of care in Being and Time, he does so through a fable, which shows that Cura, care, 
gives unity to the body [Leib], the earth [Erde], and spirit [Geist]. But Heidegger never 
determines explicitly in what sense care gives form to the lived body, and in what sense care 
is anchored to the earthly dimension of the body, nor how this anchorage put us in touch 
with earthly beings as such earthly beings. Some of these problems will be analyzed only later 
85 In a footnote, Heidegger explains that the distinction between totality and sum is familiar to us since the 
times of Plato and Aristotle, and mentions Husserl’s doctrine on whole and parts in the Logische Untersuchungen 
(see footnote, Being and Time, 324/234).  
86 Ibid., 325/235. “Was am Dasein die «Unganzheit» ausmacht, das ständige Sichvorweg, ist weder ein Ausstand eines 
summativen Zusammen, noch gar ein Noch-nicht-zuganglich-geworden-sein, sondern ein Noch-nicht, das je ein Dasein als das 
Seiende, das es ist, zu sein hat.” 
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on, particularly in relation to questions concerning the work of art. And yet, even then the 
problem of the body is not thematized as such. Thus, the necessary question is: Where is the 
body in Heidegger’s ontology?  
With regard to this, and considering Heidegger’s analysis of sense perception, let me 
recall that with similar premises about the nature of perception Merleau-Ponty is led to 
explore the being of the body and the carnal generality of the world. And this happens not 
only in the Phenomenology of Perception, but also in The Visible and the Invisible and the later 
lecture-notes, in which he deals with ontological questions and takes up important elements 
from Heidegger’s later works.  
Chapter Two: The Problem of the Body in Heidegger 
The Formulation of the Problem 
The Zollikon seminars contain Heidegger’s most explicit and extensive references to 
the problem of the body. In a conversation following these seminars, dated March 3, 1972, 
Medard Boss prompts Heidegger to respond to Jean Paul Sartre’s reproach that Heidegger 
“only wrote six lines about the body in the whole of Being and Time.”87 In this case, Sartre’s 
complaint sets up a contrast with the position of French existential philosophers and 
phenomenologists, for whom the body is a cardinal problem that deserves extensive 
analyses.88 To illustrate this point, I shall refer briefly to the position of Alphonse de 
Waehlens, for it has become a paradigmatic point of reference in comparisons with Merleau-
Ponty.  
In his preface to Merleau-Ponty’s The Structure of Behavior, De Waehlens affirms that 
Heidegger takes as evident our capacity of movement, perception and action, dismissing a 
concrete account of our bodily being, thus neglecting “…the world that for us is always 
already there.”89 Here, Merleau-Ponty’s work is presented as a counter-example, which 
demonstrates the possibility and advantages of an explicit phenomenological analysis of the 
body, on the basis of similar premises to those present in Heidegger’s existential analytic.   
Heidegger’s response is at the same time simple and thought provoking. He says: “I 
can only counter Sartre’s reproach by stating that the bodily is the most difficult [to 
87 Zollikon Seminars, 292/231. 
88 See Richard Askay, "Heidegger, the body, and the French philosophers," 29. See also Zollikon Seminars, 
156/120.
89 Alphonse de Waehlens, "A Philosophy of Ambiguity," in The Structure of Behavior, xix. 
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understand] and that I was unable to say more at the time.”90 Let me, then, examine in detail 
Heidegger’s response, considering primarily those indications given in the Zollikon seminars. 
Heidegger accepts implicitly that it may be necessary to say more about the body 
than he did in Being and Time,91 for to qualify the bodily as the “most difficult” [das Schwierigste] 
is to assert, in the superlative, that this phenomenon has the character of a fundamental 
philosophical problem, that is, a problem that deserves extensive and persistent 
examinations. Yet, apart from some sessions in the Zollikon seminars, some parts of his 
lectures on Nietzsche from the 1930s, and a session in the seminar on Heraclitus with Eugen 
Fink (1966-67),92 Heidegger never meditates expressly on the phenomenon of the body.93 
Hence, he acknowledges that he could not say “more” about the body in Being and Time, and 
that this is a central problem; however, in the years that followed he never undertook the 
task of meditating on the body as such, even though the themes of poetry and art, importantly 
influenced by his reading of Nietzsche, contain a reference to the bodily dimension of 
existence.94 Thus, two interrelated questions arise: Why is the problem of the body qualified 
here as the most difficult?95 And, why was Heidegger unable to say “more” about the body 
in Being and Time, and thereafter? For now, I will focus on the first question, for it produces 
90 Zollikon Seminars, 292/231. “Sartres Vorwurf kann ich nur mit der Feststellung begegnen, daß das Leibliche das 
Schwierigste ist und daß ich damals eben noch nicht mehr zu sagen wußte.” 
91 It is worth noting that despite this “implicit” acceptance, in general, in the Zollikon seminars, Heidegger 
rejects Sartre’s criticism, for it is based on a misunderstanding of his philosophy. With regard to this, see 
Richard Askay, “Heidegger, the body, and the French philosophers,” 29-35.  
92 Martin Heidegger and Eugen Fink, Heraklit Seminar Wentersemester 1966/67 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1970). English: Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67, trans. Charles H. Seibert (Alabama: University of 
Alabama Press, 1979). Hereafter cited with reference first to the German, then to the English translation. 
93 Heidegger’s silence in regard to the problem of the body has been widely discussed. For a general outline of 
the literature on the topic see Patrick Baur, Phänomenologie der Gebärden (Freiburg/München: Verlag Karl Alber, 
2013),11-19.   
94 Daniela Vallega-Neu elaborates on this point in The Bodily Dimension in Thinking (Albany: The State University 
of New York Press, 2005), Chapter Five.  
95 Regarding the first question, Vallega-Neu responds the following: “One reason why the question of the body 
is so difficult for Heidegger certainly resides in our tendency to see the body as an object, a thing, a living thing, 
certainly, that distinguishes itself from plants and animals insofar as it has a mind. We present (Vorstellen) the 
body to our mind as an entity, and presentational thoughtis exactly what, according to Heidegger, has 
prevented Western thought from asking the more fundamental question of being itself.” Ibid., 83.  
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the key to respond to the second one. Although these questions have been repeatedly 
examined in scholarly works on Heidegger and the problem of the body,96 I still need to 
reformulate them in order to set the basis for understanding the relation between gesture 
and art, as well as potential correspondences with the work of Merleau-Ponty. Heidegger’s 
position in relation to the problem of the body is ambiguous, and in some cases his 
explorations of the topic come close to those of Merleau-Ponty, yet in a way that remains 
unthought, more implicit than explicit. 
The Body: The “Most Difficult” Problem? 
In order to gain clarity regarding this first question I shall consider the intercrossings 
between the problem of the body and other eminent philosophical problems. In the context 
of the Zollikon seminars Heidegger refers to two of these philosophical problems. First, in 
one of the introductory sessions of the Seminar, he affirms the following: “Since being is not 
the same as beings, the difference between beings and being is the most fundamental and difficult 
[problem].”97 Second, in the context of a reference to Socrates as the “West’s greatest 
thinker,” Heidegger recalls Socrates words approvingly, according to which “To say the same 
thing about the same thing is the most difficult.”98 
The first statement is part of a discussion on the irreducibility of our understanding 
of being to the ontic level of our relations to things, and an examination of the way one must 
96 See, for instance, Kevin Aho, Heidegger's Neglect of the Body, 22; Baur, Phänomenologie der Gerbärden, 106-17; 
Emmanuel de Saint Aubert, Vers une ontologie indirecte (Paris: Vrin, 2006), 197-202; Vallega-Neu, The Bodily 
Dimension in Thinking, 83-87. 
97 Zollikon Seminars, 20-21/17. “Sofern Sein nicht seiendes ist, ist die Unterscheidung des Seienden vom Sein die 
fundamentalste und schwerste.” 
98 Ibid., 30/24, my italics. “…das allerschwerste: vom Selben das Selbe zu sagen.” 
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approach ontological questions.99 On this occasion, Heidegger remarks that catching a 
glimpse of being requires “proper readiness to receive-perceive” [eigene Bereitschaft des 
Vernehmens], a “distinctive act” [ausgezeichnete Handlung] that carries out a “transformation of 
existence [eine Wandlung der Existenz].”100 Accordingly, he suggessts, the distinction between 
being and beings hinges on a fundamental receptivity or openness to being, that is, a certain 
disposition. It is worth noting that here such “glimpse” of being is qualified as a sort of 
perception or apprehension, vernehmen, and that vernehmen is not sheer receptivity but a mode 
of action, Handlung.101 One can see, then, that the problematic of the ontological difference 
contains from the outset a reference to the problems of perception and action and, in this 
way, a reference to the question of embodied agency. 
With regard to the second statement, Heidegger explains that the difficulty in saying 
the same about the same has to do with a proper way, a proper method, to access 
phenomena, considering the presuppositions that in each case determine this access.102 
Furthermore, Heidegger points out that Socrates’ greatness resides in his having written 
nothing, indicating that his silence implies an effort to remain within the orbit of things 
themselves, preserving a saying that is tautological, which says always the same about the 
same in order to say nothing, revealing what is unsaid or presupposed in each case. In this 
way, Socrates’ greatness is assessed by his capacity to relate what is said to what is unsaid, to 
99 For an analysis of the difficulty inherent to the problem of the body in Heidegger, and its relation to the 
problem of the ontological difference see Vallega-Neu, The Bodily Dimension in Thinking, 83-86. Our examination 
of these questions is to some extent supported by her analysis. 
100 Zollikon Seminars, 21/18, modified.   
101 For a detailed discussion of the meaning of vernehmen, see Martin Heidegger, Einführung in die Metaphysik, Vol. 
Gesamtausgabe Bd.40 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976). English: Introduction to Metaphysics, 
trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (New Haven: Yale Nota Bene, 2000), 146-47/ 146-147.   
102 See Patrick Baur, Phänomenologie der Gebärden, 86. Here, Patrick Baur alludes to this Socratic “Tautismus” as an 
essential trait of Heidegger’s phenomenology, according to which the reference to a tautological saying of the 
same, of being itself, and things themselves, is fundamentally determined as difficult, as something that can 
only be understood with a sense, or attunement, of difficulty. He says: “Zum Tautismus der heideggerschen 
Phänomenologie gehört damit eine Strategie der Aufladung des Selben: Die Sache selbst –und damit immer auch: das Sein –zeigt 
sich in ihrer Selbigkeit im Pathos der Schwere, in der Übernahme seines Lastens auf dem Dasein.”   
46 
that which remains in silence and antecedes any particular act of showing or saying. And this 
is precisely what is “most difficult.”103   
Thus, in both statements the difficulty of the problem in question is related to a 
critical task, that is, to the possibility of disentangling or discriminating what is presupposed 
or accepted and what is posited or supposed,104 considering that what is accepted is that which 
remains essentially unsaid, and invisible, in that which is said or shown. With these premises, 
I suggest that the unique superlative difficulty that characterizes the problematic of the body 
is the same, and corresponds to the difficulty of distinguishing between that which is taken as 
essential to our bodily being, which corresponds to what is presupposed and remains 
invisible, and the visible, perceptible dimension of the phenomenon. Moreover, taking into 
account that the body conjoins visibility and invisibility, for it is at the same time a power of 
vision and thought and a visible thing with visible mechanisms, one might say that when it 
comes to the problem of the body the “most difficult” relates to the possibility of 
determining to what extent, or in what sense, the body shelters or preserves that which 
remains unsaid, that which is presupposed in our implicit understanding of beings.  
Thus, among the eminent, “superlative” problems, the problem of the body seems to 
have a particular status, for the difficulty concerning the body is in principle twofold, it 
combines two seemingly different problems. On the one hand, the problem consists in 
determining the existential dimension of the phenomenon of the body without treating the 
body as a body, without confusing the existential, lived body with the perceptible physical 
103  Heidegger discusses the silence of Socrates in different works, and different periods. I will analyze in greater 
detail the question concerning Socrates’ silence in the last part of the present work. 
104 Zollikon Seminars, 7/6. Considering the distinction between ontic and ontological phenomena, Heidegger 
claims here: “each supposition is always already grounded in a certain kind of acceptio” […jede Supposition gründet 
immer schon in einer bestimmten Weise der acceptio].   
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body, the body as “ontic phenomenon.”105 This perspective involves a paradox, for one must 
presume that to some extent the body is a non-body, a no-thing. On the other hand, the 
problem consists in assessing to what extent or in what sense our bodily being becomes part 
of the ground of our ontological understanding of things. There is another paradox here, for 
one must consider that what one may know about the being of the body presupposes the 
body; it is the body itself that somehow speaks and thinks when we are thinking and speaking 
“about” the body. These two interrelated problems reveal the phenomenon of the body as 
unique and paradoxical. One may say, then, that for Heidegger the body is an ambiguous 
phenomenon, which in each one of its manifestations as “lived body” involves the totality of 
our own being, in such a way that it can never be determined as a mere thing, a simply 
objective body.        
The Lived Body 
Heidegger elaborates further on this twofold, essential difficulty, in the Seminar on 
Heraclitus with Eugen Fink. In that seminar, the problem of the body is also qualified as the 
“most difficult” in the context of a discussion on the topics of sleep and dream, which 
involve some references to the problem of perception, touch and the darkness that 
presumably characterizes our relation to sensible being. On this occasion Heidegger claims: 
“a human is embodied [leibt] only when he lives [lebt],”106 thus suggesting that the “bodying 
forth” [leiben] of the body coincides with the unfolding of life, granted that life is understood 
existentially, ontologically, not as the domain of biology, nor as a life that is present to itself 
                                                
105 Ibid. In this regard, Heidegger explains that ontic phenomena are visible or perceptible, whereas ontological 
phenomena, such as “the existence of something,” are not.  
106 Heraclitus Seminar, 234/146.“Der Mensch leibt nur, wenn er lebt.” This sentence is difficult to translate because 
Heidegger uses the verb “Leiben,” which has not a direct correlate in English. Considering Askay’s translation of 
Leiben as “bodying forth” in the Zollikon Seminars, we propose to translate this sentence as follows: “The human 
being bodies forth insofar as it lives.”   
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as self-consciousness. He affirms again that “the body phenomenon is the most difficult 
problem,”107 and suggests that this problem is intrinsically related to the problem of 
language. He says precisely: “The adequate constitution of the sound of speech also belongs 
here. Phonetics thinks too physicalistically, when it does not see φωνή [speech] as voice in 
the correct manner.”108 To conclude this point, Heidegger corroborates that “the bodily in 
the human is not something animalistic,”109 and that a proper understanding of the bodily 
has not been reached by metaphysics.  
These series of interventions in the seminar on Heraclitus must be read carefully, for 
there is much that is said between the lines. Heidegger shows here that what determines our 
essential relation to the body is the fact that we live it, something already indicated in the 
correlations between life and body that resonate in the verb “leiben.”110 In a sense, one cannot 
see the body at a distance, for the body is in each case mine, it is myself, and cannot be 
objectified.111 But as the reference to the verb leiben indicates, the lived body remains open, in 
movement, in the world: it is not confined to the sphere of subjectivity. Thus, on one hand, 
the lived body should not be understood in terms of the metaphysical distinction between 
the sensible and the intelligible, which means that it cannot be identified with the “sensible” 
skin, with the physical limits of my body.112 With regard to this, in the Zollikon seminars, 
Heidegger cautiously remarks: “perhaps one comes closer to the phenomenon of the body 
by distinguishing between the different limits of a corporeal thing [Körper] and those of the 
107Ibid.“Das Leibphänomen ist das schwierigste Problem.” 
108Ibid. “Hierher gehört auch die adaequate Fassung des Sprachlautes. Die Phonetik denkt zu sehr physikalisch wenn sie φωνή 
als Stimme nicht in der rechten Weise sieht.”  
109Ibid., 235/146.    
110 See the entry corresponding to the term “Leib” in Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, Deutches Wörterbuch.  
111 This point is emphasized in the Zollikon Seminars: “The bodying forth [Leiben] of the body is determined by 
the way of my being. The bodying forth of the body, therefore, is a way of Dasein’s being” (113/86). 
112 See William Richardson, "Heidegger among the Doctors," 52. 
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body [Leib].”113 On the other hand, the limits of the body change and unfold with my 
sojourn in the world, and have a poetic –in the sense of disclosive –character. As I shall 
argue in subsequent sections of the present work, this means that the lived body is 
intertwined with the world, entangled in things. For, as Heidegger expresses it, the body is 
primordial spatiality, visibility, and openness, in any case, not self-presence, contrary to what 
Derrida’s reading of the concept of Leib in Husserl suggests.114 And although the body is, in 
a sense, expression, what it “expresses” is its very sojourn in the world, which is to say that, 
considered in this way, the body is primordial language: saying, showing.  
In the aforementioned passage from the seminar on Heraclitus, Heidegger alludes in 
passing to the complex relation between body and speech, both in the sense of the bodily 
dimension of speech, and the “linguistic” dimension of the body. In both cases what is at 
stake is our ecstatic involvement in the world. He intimates that just as the voice is not 
something physical, as phonetics presumes, the lived body in general is not something 
animalistic, that is, something that could be understood on the basis of “biological” 
premises. But this does not mean that the voice is something spiritual, animated by a 
subjective consciousness. In subsequent sections of this work I will examine these 
indications in greater detail. For now I can anticipate that Heidegger’s brief reference to the 
relation between body and language may bear special significance, for it suggests that the 
lived body, the ontological body, is the body that we experience as Stimmung: attunement, 
tune and voice.115 
113 Ibid., 112/86.
114 Since Heidegger’s analysis of the body touches on classical problems of Husserlian phenomenology, such as 
the preeminence of speech, of the voice, as spiritualized expression in contraposition to involuntary gestures, 
this distinction seems pertinent here. See Jacques Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, and Other Essays on Husserl's 
Theory of Signs, trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 33-37. 
115 In The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1994), Michael Haar claims that “Stimmung maintains a privileged relation with the 
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The Body as the Threshold between Being and Beings  
Let me recapitulate and emphasize that what is problematic about the body has to do 
with a proper distinction between the ontological and the ontic levels of the phenomenon, 
and the fact that the ontological phenomenon of the body is somehow a non-body, an 
invisible or unperceivable body, an atmosphere, an attuned body. Indeed, in an effort to 
preserve this distinction, Heidegger never fully “touches” upon the physical body, he always 
keeps it at some distance, as if this were a necessary tactic to touch the core of the 
phenomenon.116 Therefore, borrowing Daniela Vallega-Neu’s words, one could probably say 
that the body remains as a “threshold between be-ing and beings,”117 and between being and 
not-being, which is to say that it is an intrinsically problematic phenomenon hovering 
between two different levels of existence. From this perspective, following Vallega-Neu’s 
reading, a proper understanding of the body implies, on the one hand, an effort not to think 
being as “an open horizon that transcends beings, an open horizon that analogously to 
beings would be understood as a higher being beyond beings,”118 and, on the other hand, it 
requires that we think the body “more originally from within the opening of the truth of 
being.”119  
Thus we see how the problem of the body involves the questions concerning the 
meaning of being, that is, metaphysical presuppositions concerning what “being” is, and its 
                                                                                                                                            
body” (38), suggesting that “Stimmung is like the spirit that envelops the body” (ibid.). Here we shall suggest 
something different, that is, that the body itself is Stimmung, once we consider the gestural dimension of the 
body, rather than its merely physical or physiological status.  
116 Some authors have read Heidegger’s “prudence” as a veiled refusal or neglect of the problematic of the body 
and the flesh, rather than as a proper phenomenological approach to it. See Emmanuel de Saint Aubert, Vers 
une ontologie indirecte, 197-202.  
117 Daniela Vallega-Neu, The Bodily Dimension in Thinking, 95. Following Parvis and Maly’s translation of “Seyn,” 
Vallega-Neu translates “Seyn” as “be-ing,” with the hyphen, to underscore the temporal character of the verb. I 
will follow the more recent practice of translating “Seyn” as “beyng,” and “Sein” as “being.”  
118Ibid., 84.  
119Ibid., 85.  
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relation to beings. One cannot come close to the problematic of the body without 
questioning the metaphysical concepts and categories traditionally ascribed to the body, for 
the lived body exists, it “is,” in a way that escapes the determination of the body as sheer 
presence, as a thing. Accordingly, we can probably say that for Heidegger the body, “der 
Leib,” marks a limit to the possibilities of phenomenology, for in trying to determine it we 
risk dissolving it as a metaphysical nothingness, or we risk reifying it, which is the most 
inminent threat. In a sense, it is necessary to preserve silence in relation to the body because 
the expression itself, the “body,” probably distorts in a too physicalistic way what we 
experience as our bodies, the “body” does not preserves the traces of “life,” of the essentially 
elusive factical life that grounds our existence.  
Having said this, it seems that a proper approach to the body would require the 
exploration of a non-metaphysical thinking of the sensible and of life, and a non-
metaphysical language that would preserve the “lived” dimension of our bodily being 
without understanding it in “animalistic” or biological terms,120 that is, as the encircled 
captivation in an environment wherein there is no relation with beings as such.121 Indeed, 
what is decisive for Heidegger in relation to an ontological approach to the body is a 
determination of the body in light of what being-in-the-world means. Consequently, the 
primordial dimension of the body is determined as openness to the world, which means that 
                                                
120 See Martin Heidegger, Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik (1929/30), Vol. Gesamtausgabe Bd. 29/30 (Frankfurt am 
Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983). English: Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, trans. William McNeill and 
Walker Nicholas (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995). Hereafter cited with reference first to the 
German, then to the English translation.  
121 The question of the difference between he human being and the animal in Heidegger is a difficult one, 
which requires an extensive exploration of its own. Heidegger himself claims that the problematic of the 
essence of the animal remains a problem, which can only be properly discussed after examining the concept of 
world (see Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 396/273). For now, suffice it to say that for Heidegger the ring of 
an environment and a species captivates the animal, and although the animal may be related to beings, it does 
not relate to beings as such. Explaining the thesis “the Animal Is Poor in World” Heidegger says precisely: “The 
animal certainly has access to…and indeed to something that actually is. But this is something that only we are 
capable of experiencing and having manifest as beings” (269/390).   
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it is primordially given in an indirect manner: the body bodies forth as I deal with things in 
the world, and as I relate to others. In this sense, it seems, the life of the body is a life in 
need, traversed by negativity, by a fundamental sense of limit and, thereby, an essential loss 
or withdrawal.  
The Body at the Limits of Phenomenology 
 
In the Zollikon seminars, Heidegger indicates that the phenomenon of the body can 
only be properly determined on the basis of a fundamental analysis of existence, in light of 
our involvement with the world as a whole. He says: “All existing, our comportment, is 
necessarily a bodily comportment, but not only [bodily comportment]. It is bodily [leiblich] in 
itself. However, existing must be determined beforehand as relationship to the world.”122 In 
this sense, as Richard Askay expresses it, “bodily being presupposes being-in-the-world.”123 Indeed, if 
one takes into account that the notion of Dasein alludes to the way in which human beings 
relate to being in the “there” of existence, and beyond the metaphysical distinction between 
subject and object,124 it is clear that from the point of view of the Fundamental Ontology our 
bodily being appears as a modulation of existence, a modality of being-in-the-world that is 
not object-like, for in that case the lived body would no longer be my body, the body that 
dwells in the clearing. In this regard, Heidegger says “If the body as body is always my body, 
then this is my own way of being. Thus, bodying forth is co-determined by my being human 
in the sense of the ecstatic sojourn amidst the beings in the clearing [gelichtet]. The limit of my 
bodying forth (the body is only as it is bodying forth: “body”) is the horizon of being within 
                                                
122 See Zollikon Seminars, 258/206. “Alles Existieren, unser Verhalten ist notwendig leiblich, aber nicht nur. Es ist in sich 
leiblich. Nur muß man vorher das Existieren als Weltbezug bestimmen.” 
123 Richard Askay, “Heidegger, the body, and the French philosophers,” 32. 
124 See Being and Time, §§9 and 10. 
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which I sojourn [aufhalten].”125 Heidegger, thus, suggests that the body is a structural 
dimension of existence, whose limits are opened through my entanglement in the world.   
Hence, it seems, in Being and Time Heidegger cannot say “more” about the body 
because a proper determination of the lived body hinges on a preliminary determination of 
human existence and its relation to being, and this relation is ultimately structured in terms 
of care, beyond any reference to bodily phenomena as such. In a sense, however, this implies 
that the phenomenon of the body is not a crucial point of departure for developing an 
analysis of existence, which means that in order to understand the fundamental structures of 
existence the problematic of the body comes as a derivative or secondary one. This explains 
why Kevin Aho concludes that “Heidegger was not, at bottom, interested in giving an 
account of embodied agency,”126 but rather of the structures of meaning on the basis of 
which we make sense of things. Presumably, it is in this context that one should understand 
the essential distinction between the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. 
Partly in line with Aho’s position, Richard Askay points out that bodily being is 
subordinated to being-in-the-world because particular modes of embodiment always 
presuppose a prior understanding of being. In this sense, bodily being is a necessary but not 
a sufficient condition for existence, that is, “bodily being is ‘founded upon’ Dasein’s 
responsiveness to the clearing.”127 Askay further explains Heidegger’s stance as follows: 
“Bodily being is necessary for us to be related to the world in any situation. Being-in-the-
world is necessary for there to be any relations at all since it is primarily an understanding of 
being in which anything else is possible, i.e., existence is ontologically more primordial than 
125 Zollikon Seminars, 113/86-87. “Wenn der Leib als Leib je mein Leib ist, dann ist diese Seinsweise die meinige, so ist das 
Leiben mitbestimmt durch mein Menschsein im Sinne des ekstatischen Aufenthaltes inmitten des gelichteten Seienden. Grenze des 
Leibens  (der Leib ist nur insofern er leibt: Leib) ist der Seinshorizont, in dem ich mich aufhalte.” 
126 Kevin Aho, Heidegger's Neglect of the Body, 6.  
127 Richard Askay, “Heidegger, the body, and the French philosophers,” 32. 
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bodily being.”128 On these premises, according to Askay, Merleau-Ponty’s work, which takes 
the body as a cardinal phenomenological problem, is misleading.      
In sum, both Askay and Aho would agree that for Heidegger the problematic of the 
body is secondary, subordinated to the problematic of being-in-the-world and the question 
concerning the meaning of being. And there are good reasons for endorsing this position, 
for Heidegger occasionally makes this claim. For instance, in the Zollikon seminars, while 
explaining that we can only have eyes because we are able to see, and not the other way 
around, Heidegger emphatically remarks that “we would not be bodily [Leiblich] the way we 
are unless our being-in-the-world always already fundamentally consisted of a 
receptive/perceptive relatedness to something which addresses us out of the openness of 
our world, from out of that openness as which we exist.”129 This passage complements the 
one quoted above, according to which bodiliness presupposes being-in-the-world, and 
reinforces Askay’s point.  
Yet, Heidegger also says “more.” Sometimes he suggests that the phenomenon of 
the body is a primordial dimension of being-in-the-world. One should not underestimate this 
ambiguity in Heidegger’s position, particularly because he often suggests that the lived body 
has an affective dimensionality, and the problem of attunements is crucial for ontology. In 
addition, if it were clear that the problem of the body is just a derivative one, it is unlikely 
that Heidegger would have qualified the problem of the body as a pressing problem.  
Indeed, if Heidegger considers the problem of the body as the “most difficult,” it is 
because this phenomenon has an ontological dimension, it is a constitutive structure of our 
                                                
128 Ibid. 
129 Zollikon Seminars, 293-94/232. “So könnten wir auch nicht leiblich sein, wie wir es sind, wenn unser In-der-Welt-sein nicht 
grundlegend aus einem immer schon vernehmenden Bezogen-sein auf solches bestünde, das sich uns aus dem offenen unserer Welt, 
als welches Offene wir existieren, zuspricht.” 
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understanding of being. Otherwise, Heidegger would not have said that “bodying forth is co-
determined [mitbestimmt] by my being human,” as was mentioned above, but rather that my 
being human simply “determines” my bodying forth. And this is not an occasional remark, 
for Heidegger expressly shows that the phenomenon of the body entwines into fundamental 
ontological phenomena such as space and time.    
In the Zollikon seminars, while discussing the relationship between body and space, 
and after claiming that bodiliness is only possible because we are already spatial, Heidegger 
immediately remarks that he is simply trying to come close to the phenomenon of the body 
and, in so doing, “…we are not speaking of a solution to the problem of the body. Much has already 
been gained merely by starting to see this problem.”130 Heidegger shows that one cannot 
approach the problem of the body without presupposing the phenomenon of space. In this 
sense, the question of space seems more fundamental than the question of bodiliness. Yet, 
this approach is problematic because the lived body, the body that is the ground-basis of my 
own existing, is also a fundamental structure on the basis of which I may have a sense of 
nearness and distance and, in this way, the lived body precedes space.  
Thus, although there is a certain preeminence of the problem of spatiality in relation 
to the question of bodiliness, this preeminence alludes to a way of seeing the body, a 
direction or way to approach the problem of the body. Heidegger suggests that in 
approaching the body we always presuppose space, and we experience the body initially in 
terms of space -although not only in this way.131 For one could only claim in a definite way 
                                                
130 Ibid., 105/81.  
131 I interpret what Heidegger says about the relationship between bodiliness and space as follows: the 
phenomenon of space, understood existentially, as a sense of nearness and distance, determines in a 
fundamental way our approach to the body, that is, we cannot see or conceive the body without presupposing 
space. Yet, this is only a point of departure, a tentative one, which intends to introduce us to the complexities 
of the “existential” dimension of the body, and which intends to show that bodiliness cannot be reduced to 
what is sensed physically, just as we cannot first understand space in terms of “bodily” properties. 
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that the phenomenon of the body is subordinated to the phenomenon of space if one 
presupposes that the body is only “spatial.” But this is not the case if the limits of the lived 
body are not the limits of a corporeal thing, if the nature of space is not determined by 
objective coordinates, and if the nature of the body is “co-determined” with the limits of our 
existence. Let me explain this argument in more detail.  
Indeed, if the limits of the lived body [Leib] are not the limits of a corporeal thing, 
but rather coincide with the horizons of my sojourn in the world, then, it seems incorrect to 
say that bodily being is a necessary but not sufficient condition of existing, or that being-in-
the-world is more primordial than bodily being, for we cannot determine the lived body 
from the outside. With these considerations, we cannot subordinate the body to spatiality, 
for there is also an essential temporality of the body, as well as a temporal and a linguistic 
dimensionality of the body. One could extend this argument to prove the originality or 
equiprimordiality of the phenomenon of the “lived body” in relation to other ontological 
phenomena, but this point will become clearer only later, in the next chapter, in the context 
of an analysis of the body as gesture.     
I want to suggest, then, that Heidegger is aware of the inherent difficulties and 
paradoxes pertaining to the problem of the body, and that these paradoxes constitute the 
core of this phenomenological problematic. Precisely after saying that “existing must be 
determined beforehand as relationship to the world,” Heidegger says the following: “To 
speak of bodiliness as ‘condition’ is not a phenomenological interpretation, but rather is said 
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from the outside. If I speak of condition, I objectify both bodiliness and existing. If I speak 
of condition, I am already outside, actually separated from existing.”132 
Heidegger’s stance in relation to the problem of the body is, in this sense, related to 
the limits of the phenomenon; it has to do with the fact that the body is both a phenomenon 
and a non-phenomenon. The body is, on the one hand, inscribed in a phenomenological 
region as an entity and, on the other hand, it is a “dark thing” that withdraws from thinking. 
Without expressly articulating this ambiguity, Heidegger oscillates between these two limits 
of the phenomenology of the body. Let me clarify this point by contrasting two passages 
from the Zollikon seminars.  
First, discussing the distinction between corporeal things and the body, which is 
presumably difficult for French philosophers because the expression “le corps” conflates the 
two dimensions, Heidegger says the following: “This is to say that for them [the French] it is 
very difficult to see the real problem of the phenomenology of the body.”133 Later, in a 
conversation with Medard Boss, Heidegger further explains this point, expanding on his 
response to Sartre’s criticism, when he says that “a sufficiently useful description of the 
phenomenon of the body has not emerged,” and that “such a ‘phenomenology of the body’ 
can only proceed as a description. Any attempt at ‘explanation,’ that is, of derivation from 
something else, is meaningless.”134 Heidegger suggests here that a phenomenology of the 
body is still missing, yet to come, and that it can only be determined as a description of the 
phenomenon of the body itself, from within its existential dimensionality. In this way, 
Heidegger implies that a phenomenology of the body is possible in principle.  
                                                
132Zollikon Seminars, 258/207. “Das Reden vom Leiblichen als Bedingung ist keine phänomenologische Interpretation, sondern 
ist eher von außen her gesprochen. Wenn ich von Bedingung spreche, vergegenständliche ich beides, das Leibliche und das 
Existieren. Wenn ich von Bedingung spreche, bin ich schon draußen, aus dem Existieren eigentlich herausgefallen” 
133 Zollikon Seminars, 116/89.  
134 Ibid., 202/157. 
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Second, in another conversation with Medard Boss, Heidegger claims: “There is 
actually no phenomenology of the body because the body is not a corporeal thing [Körper]. 
With such a thematic approach, one has already missed the point of the matter.”135 
Heidegger further remarks that the “potentiality-to-be” [Seinkönnen] depends on our 
relationship with things, and the body is not among them. Therefore, one might say that 
there is not actual phenomenology of the lived body, of der Leib, and that there may never 
be, because we never have an intentional relation to the lived body, it never gives itself as a 
thing. This is precisely what Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the earth in Husserl makes clear: the 
body is part of the constitutive background that is presupposed in our relations to things, 
and which may not be reduced to the phenomenal level. 
From the Lived Body to Gesture    
Thus, in the Zollikon seminars, when relating the body to space, or to being-in-the-
world, Heidegger is introducing us to the problem of the body, bringing us closer to it, 
without pretending to have solved the problem. Heidegger further suggests that a proper 
existential determination of the phenomenon of the body requires a view from within the 
“phenomenon” itself. This would only be possible if one were to see the body from out of 
the truth of being, if one were to let the lived body speak from its own relation to being, its 
dimensionality as an original mode of disclosure. But in that case, the lived body would 
already have withdrawn, disappeared as body. In this way, it seems, one can only say “more” 
about the body by letting the body speak from itself. As Patrick Baur explains, “saying more 
would not mean saying much, it is not a saying of what is new,”136 but rather to keep open 
                                                
135 Ibid., 231/184. 
136 Patrick Baur, Phänomenologie der Gebärden, 114, my translation. “Das Mehr-Sagen wäre kein Viel-Sagen, kein Sagen 
des Neuen.”   
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the possibility of thinking and saying, and of preserving the intensive force of the saying.137 
Then, the necessary questions are: How can we let the body, der Leib, speak from itself? In 
what way can we determine the language of the body? And, what exactly does “der Leib” say 
about the body and its relation to life, and being in general, that would corroborate its 
ontological importance? Responding to these questions, I will show that both the works of 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty address the ontological problematic of the body through the 
notion of gesture, which articulates the withdrawal of the body as something essential to the 
body. In this way, I want to suggest that one must look for the body in its intersections with 
language and art, for in these intersections the body displays its performative possibilities, 
and in this way the body is experienced as the “site” of disclosure: primordial saying or 
showing, poetry. 
137With regard to this, Patrick Baur says precisely: “Das »Mehr« eines Mehr-zu-sagen-Wissens wäre also nicht das viele 
der πολυµαθἰα. Im Merh des Sagens würde sich für Heidegger gerade das Sagen nicht vermehren. Es wäre demnach nicht 
extensive, sondern intensive: Dem Mehr-zu-Sagen-Wissen wäre ein eindringlicheres Sprechen zuzuordnen” (Ibid.). 
Chapter Three: The Gestural Body 
How to Talk about the Body: Preliminary Remarks on the Rapports between Gesture 
and Language 
As I have already argued, Heidegger’s existential analytic accounts for the 
fundamental structures of being-in-the-world without subordinating this analysis to a 
physicalistic point of view. Accordingly, he interprets bodily perception and practical 
comportments in terms of fundamental structures of existence, which are unified in care. He 
says precisely: “The whole of the constitution of Dasein is not simple in its unity, but shows 
a structural articulation which is expressed in the concept of care.”138 As Heidegger expresses 
it, the fable of Cura reveals care as a structural unity that somehow supersedes the traditional 
definition of the human as a compound of body and spirit. He says: “This pre-ontological 
document becomes especially significant not only in that ‘care’ is here seen as that to which 
human Dasein belongs ‘for its lifetime,’ but also because this priority of ‘care’ emerges in 
connection with the familiar interpretation of the human being as a compound of body 
(earth) and spirit.”139 The fable of Cura shows that care gives form to the human life, 
between birth and death, bearing testimony to a somewhat mythical union, a unity that 
precedes particular determinations of life in terms of body and spirit. Still, despite the 
significance of this problem, in Being and Time Heidegger does not explore the correlations 
138 Being and Time, 265/192. “Das Ganze der Daseinsverfassung selbst ist daher in seiner Einheit nicht einfach, sondern zeigt 
eine strukturale Gliederung, die im existenzialen Begriff der Sorge zum Ausdruck kommt”  
139 Ibid. 263/191.“Dieses vorontologische Zeugnis gewinnt dadurch eine besondere Bedeutung, dasß es nicht überhaupt die 
»Sorge« als das sieht, dem das menschliche Dasein »zeitlebens« gehört, sondern daß dieser Vorrang der »Sorge« im Zusammenhang 
mit der bekannten Auffasung des Menschen als des Kompositums aus Leib (Erde) und Geist heraustritt.”  
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between care, body [Leib], and earth [Erde], but rather shows that the structural unity of 
existence is determined by an affective engagement with the world as a whole, by care. With 
regard to this, Heidegger gives additional indications in the Zollikon seminars.  
In these seminars, Heidegger remarks that the existential analytic sets the basis for a 
proper understanding of the problematic of the body.140 He further explains that one cannot 
provide a proper determination of the existential dimension of the body without a constant 
vigilance to the difference between being and beings. In this context, the issue of 
terminology, and of language generally, is a decisive one. The term “body,” for instance, 
relates primarily to a being, and in this way it may hinder a proper view of the ontological 
phenomenon. In fact, responding indirectly to Sartre’s criticism, Heidegger indicates that 
French philosophers may be unable to access properly the phenomenon of the body, for 
examining questions concerning the body they count solely on the expression “le corps,” and 
lack another term to characterize the existential, living dimension of the body, which 
corresponds to the German Leib. The passage in question is the following: 
One often hears the objection that there is something wrong with the distinction between a 
corporeal thing and a body. This is raised, for instance, because the French have no word 
whatsoever for the body, but only a name for a corporeal thing, namely, le corps. But what 
does this mean? It means that in this area the French are influenced only by the Latin corpus. 
This is to say that for them it is very difficult to see the real problem of the phenomenology 
of the body. The meaning of the Greek word σῶμα is quite manifold. Homer uses the word 
merely for the dead body. For the living body, he uses the term δέμας, meaning 
“figure”[Gestalt]. Later on, σῶμα refers to both the body and the lifeless, corporeal thing, 
then also to the serfs, to the slaves. Finally, it refers to the mass of all men.141 
140 Furthermore, if we take into account that Medard Boss actually “applies” fundamental premises of 
Heidegger’s existential analytic to the fields of psychiatry and medicine, we can assume with more certainty that 
Being and Time indeed contained important references to bodiliness, without making explicit reference to the 
body. See Medard Boss, Existential Foundations of Medicine and Psychology, trans. Stephen Conway and Anne 
Cleaves (New York: J. Aronson, 1979). 
141 Zollikon Seminars, 116/89.“Man hört gegen die Unterscheidung von Körper und Leib des öftern den Einwand, da könne 
doch etwas nich stimmen, weil zum Beispiel die Franzosen überhaupt kein Wort für Leib hätten, sondern nur einen Namen für 
den Körper, nämlich: le corps. Was aber heißt das? Es heißt, daß die Franzosen nur von lateinischen corpus her bestimmt sind in 
diesen Bereich; die heißt daß ihnen sehr erschwert wird, die eigentliche Problematik der Leibesphänomenologie zu sehen. Die 
Bedeutung des griechischen Wortes σῶμα ist sehr mannigfaltig. Homer gebraucht σῶμα  nür den toten Leib, für den lebenden 
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Considering the distinction between the Greek words σῶμα and δέμας Heidegger 
emphasizes the importance of the distinction between the German terms Körper and Leib. 
The term Körper refers to the merely physical dimension of the body, to the body as an 
object, “le corps.” On the contrary, Leib is the lived body, the body as Gestalt, the “bodying 
forth of the body.”142 One can see, therefore, that these terminological specifications are not 
secondary, but rather determine from the outset the phenomenal region in question. If one 
sees the body as Leib, then the body emerges as a structural modality of being-in-the-world, 
not as a separate thing. That is to say, the lived body is figure, Gestalt, insofar as it is 
openness to the world. Put differently, der Leib is the body that cannot be sectioned or torn 
apart from our own being, the body that is intensive or qualitative, not extensive or 
quantitative. Heidegger explains this point as follows: 
The difference between the limits of the corporeal thing and the body, then, consists in the 
fact that the bodily limit is extended beyond the corporeal limit. Thus, the difference between the 
limits is a quantitative one. But if we look at the matter in this way, we will misunderstand the 
very phenomenon of the body and of bodily limit. The bodily limit and the corporeal limit 
are not quantitatively but rather qualitatively different from each other. The corporeal thing, 
as corporeal, cannot have a limit which is similar to the body at all. Of course, one could 
assume in an imaginative way that my body qua corporeal thing extends to the perceived 
window, so that the bodily limit and the corporeal limit coincide. But just then the qualitative 
difference between the two limits becomes clear. The corporeal limit, by apparently 
coinciding with the bodily limit, cannot ever become a bodily limit itself. When pointing with 
my finger toward the crossbar of the window over there, I [as body] do not end at my 
fingertips. Where then is the limit of the body? “Each body is my body.” As such, the 
proposition is nonsensical. More properly, it should say: “the body is in each case my body.” 
This belongs to the phenomenon of the body. The “my” refers to myself. By “my,” I refer to 
me. Is the body in the “I,” or is the “I” in the body? In any case, the body is not a thing, nor 
is it a corporeal thing, but each body, that is, the body as body, is in each case my body. The 
bodying forth [Leiben] of the body is determined by the way of my being.143   
das Wort δέμας, was soviel besagt wie ›Gestalt‹. Später meint σῶμα sowohl den Leib view den leblosen stofflichen Körper, dann 
wieder  die Leibeigenen, die Sklaven; dann überhaupt die Menschenmasse.”  
142 Ibid., 113/86. 
143 Zollikon Seminars, 112-13/86.“Der Unterschied der Grenzen von Körper und Leib bestünde hiernach darin, daß die 
Liebgrenze weiter hinausgeschoben wäre als die Körpergrenze, so daß der Unterschied der Grenzen quantitativer wäre. Aber wenn 
wir die Sache so nehmen, so verkennen wir gerade das Leibphänomen und die Leibgrenze. Die Leibgrenze ist gegenüber der 
Körpergrenze nicht quantitative, sondern qualitative verschieden. Der Körper kann als Körper eine solche Grenze wie der Leib gar 
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Heidegger argues that the body bodies forth, der Leib leiben, but in so doing it has a 
peculiar relation with the “I,” and with language.144 The body that bodies forth is in each case 
my body, and this means that the body has itself an ecstatic character, it brings me out of 
myself. That is to say, the lived body unfolds Dasein’s existence, for as Merleau-Ponty 
remarks “the Jemeinigkeit of Dasein is but the fleeing away from itself.”145 Saying “I,” showing 
myself, I efface myself, I am already away, adrift in the world. Therefore, one could say that 
the lived body is figure, Gestalt, because it is traversed by the presence of the others, 
pervaded by attunements, Stimmungen and, in a fundamental sense, by care. Heidegger 
clarifies this point further through an analysis of the movement of someone’s hand in 
contrast to the movement of a watch on the table. The watch is moved, transported, in a way 
that can be measured, quantified, it can be isolated or posited as a visible thing: it is a piece 
of equipment. On the contrary, the movement of the hand is inseparable from the person, 
this movement is never just an abstract movement, but rather the shining of someone’s 
presence. A thing can be moved or transported without its relation to myself coming to the 
fore, whereas I cannot move my hand without at the same time manifesting a certain 
involvement of my entire being, a certain attitude or mode of being: a posture, a stance. 
                                                                                                                                            
nicht haben. Man könnte sich nämlich denken, rein als theoretische Möglichkeit, daß mein Leib qua Körper sich ausdehnt bis zum 
whargenommenen Fenster, so daß die Leibgrenze und die Körpergrenze sich decken. Aber gerade dadurch wird die artmäßige 
Verschiedenheit der beiden Grenzen deutlich. Die Körpergrenze wird dadurch, daß sie sich dem Anschein nach mit der Leibgrenze 
deckt, niemals selber zu einer Leibgrenze. Beim Zeigen mit dem Finger auf das Fensterkreuz dort drüben höre ich nichtbei den 
Fingerspitzen auf. Wo ist denn die Grenze des Leibes? »Jeder Leib ist mein Leib.« An sich ist der Satz unsinnig. Genauer müßte 
es heißen: der Leib ist je mein Leib. Das gehört zum Leibphänomen. Das ›mein‹ ist bezogen auf mich selbst. Mit dem ›mein‹ 
meine ich mich. Ist der Leib im ›Ich‹ oder ist das ›Ich‹ im Leib? Der Leib ist jedenfalls kein Ding, kein Körper, sondern jeder 
Leib, das heißt der Leib als Leib ist je mein Leib. Das Leiben des Leibes bestimmt sich aus der Weise meines Sein.”  
144Ibid., 114/87.  
145 Notes de cours, 117, my translation. “La Jemeinigkeit du Dasein n’est autre chose que sa fuite hors de lui-même.” 
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Based on these premises, Heidegger specifies the movement of my body, the 
bodying forth of the body, as comportment or “gesture” (Gebärde).146 The term “gesture” 
reveals the existential dimension of the body in a way that may not be as clear in the 
determination of the body as Leib. The notion of gesture captures as a unity the structural 
duplicity of my living body: the bodying forth of the body unifies physical movements or 
actions and a field of significance that initially emerges as Stimmung: an attunement, 
understood as a tune or voice, which pervades as an atmosphere the entirety of my being 
and my relatedness to the world.147 In a sense, gesture plays a role analogous to the concepts 
of form and comportment in Merleau-Ponty’s early works, for these concepts articulate 
meaning and movement beyond causal or mechanistic paradigms. Indeed, for both 
Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, genuine gestures are spontaneous adumbrations of meaning, 
not “reflex,” automatic movements.148  
Concluding the Freiburg lectures from 1957, Heidegger distinguishes between 
gestures [Gebärden] and gesticulations [Geste], between attuned or saying gestures and mere 
gestures. He says: “Gestures are not at first mere gestures that subsequently express 
something and then become a language, rather gestures are in themselves what they are 
through saying, wherein their bearing, enduring, and conveying each time remain already 
gathered. Gestural bearing is determined by saying and is thereby constantly the resonance of 
restraint [Ver-halten]. The gestural first attunes all movements.”149 As Heidegger expresses it, 
146Zollikon Seminars, 115/89.  
147 As Baur remarks, one of the particularities of the notion of gesture is that it illuminates the phenomenon of 
the body as an inseparable unity of psychic and bodily elements (Phänomenologie der Gebärden, 20). 
148 With regard to this, see The Prose of the World, 78/56. Here, Merleau-Ponty distinguishes sharply between the 
improvisation of a child prodigy and a true artist, in order to show that genuine gestures imply a concentrated 
or thoughtful involvement in the world.  
149 Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 170/159. “Die Gebärden sind nicht zuvor bloße Gebärden, drücken dann etwas aus und 
werden demzufolge eine Sprache, sondern die Gebärden sind in sich, was sie sind, aus dem Sagen, darin ihr Tragen, Ertragen und 
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the bodying forth of the body is a gestural movement insofar as it is attuned, inasmuch as 
the gesture reveals the body as a tune, a voice, a modulation of saying and showing which is 
pervaded by affective, ontological dispositions. One may also say that gestures bear and 
retain the echoes of what has been said as something that resonates in the self-abandonment 
of comportments and postures, a complex relation that is synthesized in the expression 
“Ver-halten.” Along these lines, one might say that genuine gestures are embodied 
articulations and “interpretations” of our implicit understanding of the world. In short, 
gestures gather as a unique and simultaneous event the structural components of existence, as 
they are defined in Being and Time: attunement or ontological disposition, understanding, and 
discourse.  
Indeed, explaining the articulation of the structural components of existence, and 
discussing what relating to human beings mean, Heidegger says in the Zollikon seminars: 
“Ontologically disposed understanding in itself is a ‘saying’ [discourse], a showing of 
something.”150 Heidegger does not mention the concept of interpretation here, yet it is 
implied. In Being and Time, the aforementioned structural components are described as 
fundamental conditions of interpretation. Interpretation, in turn, is defined as the revealing 
of understanding. As Carman Taylor explains: “Interpretation, as Heidegger intends it, then, 
is literally a kind of exhibiting or showing.”151 Taylor further demonstrates that interpretive 
showing is, basically, a practical comportment that unfolds in bodily gestures our implicit, 
ontological understanding of things: “Bodily postures and facial expressions are primitive 
                                                                                                                                            
Zutragen je schon versammelt bleiben. Das Tragen nach der Weise der Gebärden wird be-stimmt aus dem Sagen und ist darum 
stets ein Schwingen des Ver-haltens. Das Gerbärdenhafte stimmt erst alle Bewegungen.”  
150 Zollikon Seminars, 211/263. “Das befindliche verstehen ist in sich ein Sagen, ein Zeigen.”  
151 Taylor Carman, Heidegger's Analytic. Interpretation, Discourse and Authenticity in Being and Time (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 211. 
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instances of the elaboration and appropriation of understanding in overt demonstrative 
form, for they point up something understood as understood.”152  
We therefore see how the problematic of gesture may be traced back to fundamental 
arguments from Being and Time, and how it relates to the more general question of language. I 
shall examine the relation between gesture and language in subsequent chapters of the 
present work. For now, let me remark that in the aforementioned passage from the Freiburg 
lectures Heidegger claims that “the gestural first attunes all movements,” thus suggesting that 
gestures have a grounding character, and articulate as a unity, in Stimmung, our primordial 
relation to language. Hence, Heidegger’s approach to gesture intimates that gestures are 
primordial phenomena, original articulations of language. They yoke together action and 
meaning. 
 Already in Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty introduces the problematic of 
gesture, and its relation to language, in a similar way. He suggests that gestures determine in 
some way the essence of humanity, and declares that the origins of language may be found in 
“gestural signification.” With regard to this, he says: “Speech is a gesture, and its signification 
is a word.”153 The gestural signification –which Merleau-Ponty defines, eventually, as a 
breach in silence –is the atmospheric signification that is felt intimately in our affective 
engagement with others, and pervades comportment as a whole. As Merleau-Ponty 
expresses it, gestures accomplish the decisive step of expression or communication, for they 
reveal a domain of significance that is prior to cognition, which is not mediated by 
representations. He says precisely:   
152 Ibid., 212. 
153 Phenomenology of Perception, 214/190. “Notre vue sur l’homme restera superficielle tant que nous ne remonterons pas à cette 
origine, tant que nous ne retrouverons pas, sous le bruit des paroles, le silence primordial, tant que nous ne décrirons pas le geste qui 
rompt ce silence. La parole est un geste et sa signification un monde.”  
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Consider an angry or threatening gesture. In order to understand these gestures, I have no 
need of recalling the feelings I experienced while I myself performed these same gestures. I 
have from the inside, quite a limited knowledge of the gesture of anger, and so an association 
through resemblance or a reasoning by analogy would be missing a decisive element. And 
moreover, I do not perceive the anger or the threat as a psychological fact hidden behind the 
gesture, I read the anger in the gesture. The gesture does not make me think of anger, it is the 
anger itself.154   
Hence, one can see that both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty find in the phenomenon 
of gesture a grounding dimension of language, which is structurally related to human 
existence as a whole: a conjunction of body and spirit. As Dennis Schmidt expresses it, 
analyzing the notion of gesture in Gadamer: “What a gesture expresses is the ‘there’ in the 
gesture itself. A gesture is something wholly corporeal and wholly spiritual at one and the 
same time. The gesture reveals no inner meaning behind itself.”155 The question is, then: 
How do we distinguish primordial gestures from bodily movements in general?  
One could probably say that all bodily movement presupposes a gestural 
understanding of being, a fundamental comportment or stance, but comportments or 
gestures cannot be determined as sheer bodily movements. As I have already indicated, a 
bodily movement that is set apart from the totality to be exhibited as a sheer bodily form, or 
as a conventional sign with an extrinsic meaning, would lose the melodic unity of a proper 
gesture, of a proper saying or showing. In this sense, just as there is a relevant distinction 
between Leib and Körper, there is an essential difference between gestures and mere 
gesticulations, in such a way that, as Heidegger puts it, “the nonessence of the gesture is the 
154 Ibid., 215/190. “Soit un geste de colère ou de menace, je n’ai pas besoin pour le comprendre de me rappeler les sentiments que 
j’ai éprouvés lorsque j’exécutais pour mon compte les mêmes gestes. Je connais très mal, de l’interieur, la mimique de la colère, é 
manquerait donc à l’association par resemblance  ou au raisonement par analogie, un element decisif –et d’ailleurs, je ne perçois pas 
la colère ou la menace comme un fait psychiche caché derrière le geste, je lis la colère, dans le geste, le geste ne me fait penser à la 
colère, il est la colére elle-même.” 
155 Dennis Schmidt, Between World and Image: Heidegger, Klee and Gadamer on Gesture and Genesis, Kindle Edition, 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013), 131. 
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gesticulation.”156 In order to delimit with more accuracy the domain of the problematic of 
gesture, and to identify what is essential to gestures, in the section that follows I draw a 
contrast with a classical metaphysical view, namely, Husserl’s interpretation of gesture in the 
Logical Investigations.     
Gesture and Expression: Differences with Husserl 
Let me define Heidegger’s understanding of “Gebärde” against the background of 
Husserl’s approach to “gesture” [Geste] in the Logical Investigations. Husserl’s approach to 
gesture, and more precisely to the relation between language and gesture, presupposes an 
understanding of language as expression, specifically as the expression of voluntary 
intentions. As Derrida points out, interpreting the concept of expression in Husserl, “the 
explicit teleology that commands the whole of transcendental phenomenology would be at 
bottom nothing but a transcendental voluntarism. Sense wants to be signified; it is expressed 
only in a meaning [vouloir-dire] which is none other than a wanting-to-tell-itself proper to the 
presence of sense.”157 
In the Logical Investigations, Husserl distinguishes between “meaningful signs” or 
“expressions,” and gestures [Geste], which are meaningless insofar as they do not express a 
voluntary intention, and have a merely indicative character. In this context, Husserl defines 
speech as expression, and remarks that “such a definition excludes facial expression and the 
various gestures which involuntarily accompany speech without communicative intent, or 
those in which a man’s mental state achieve understandable ‘expression’ for his environment, 
156 Ibid. “Das unwessen der Gebärde ist die Geste.” 
157 Derrida, Speech and Phenomena, 34-35. 
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without the added help of speech.”158 Although Husserl aims at separating indication and 
expression, he admits that there is, in general, a certain interweaving of gesture and 
expression. As Derrida demonstrates, what separates genuine expressions from the mixed 
expressions that include gestures is an explicit, voluntary act of consciousness, which stems 
from the solitary life of the mind. This solitary life of the mind is to be expressed in speech. 
Indeed, as Husserl explains, without the added help of speech gestures are meaningless. 
Hence, according to Husserl, communicative actions are not intrinsically related to 
our bodily stance and our relation to the world as a whole. He specifies this point as follows: 
“Such ‘utterances’ [referring to gestures] are not expressions in the sense in which a case of 
speech is an expression, they are not phenomenally one with the experiences made manifest 
in them in the consciousness of the man who manifests them, as is the case with speech.”159 
In this respect, gestures are spontaneous comportments that lack meaning as they are devoid 
of the ideal unity of an expression. In other words, Husserl suggests that gestures do not 
involve an interpretive apropriation of things or others, but rather a vague sense of 
familiarity: 
In such manifestations one man communicates nothing to another: their utterance involves 
no intent to put certain ‘thoughts’ on record expressively, whether for the man himself, in 
his solitary state, or for others. Such ‘expressions’ in short, have properly speaking, no 
meaning. It is not to the point that another person may interpret our involuntary 
manifestations, e.g., our ‘expressive movements’, and that he may thereby become deeply 
acquainted with our inner thoughts and emotions. They ‘mean’ something to him in so far as 
he interprets them, but even for him they are without meaning in the special sense in which 
verbal signs have meaning: they only mean in the sense of indicating.160  
158 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Investigation I, 31/187-88; my italics. “Dagegen schließen wir das Mienenspiel und die 
Geste aus, mit denen wir unser Reden unwillkürlich und jedenfalls nicht in mittheilender Absicht begleiten, oder in denen, auch 
ohne mitwirkende Rede, der Seelenzustand einer Person zu einem für ihre Umgebung verständlichen “Ausdrücke”kommt.” 
159 Ibid., 31/188. “Solche Außerungen sind keine Ausdrücke im Sinne der Reden, sie sind nicht gleich diesen im Bewußtsein des 
sich Außernden mit den geäußerten Erlebnissen phenomenal Eins.” 
160 Ibid.“In ihnen theilt der Eine dem Anderen nichts mit, es fehlt ihm bei ihrer Außerung die Intention, irgendwelche 
“Gedanken” in ausdrücklicher Weise hinzustellen, sei es für Andere, sei es auch für sich selbst, we er mit sich allein ist. Kurz, 
derartige “Ausdrücke” haben eigentlich keine Bedeutung. Daran wird nicths geändert dadurch, daß ein Zweiter unsere 
unwillkürlichen Außerungen (z.B. die “Ausdrucksbewegungen”) zu deuten, und daß er durch sie über unsere inneren Gedanken 
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In contrast to the views of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Husserl’s account is 
significant in multiple respects. Let me, then, review Husserl’s argument concisely. First, he 
claims that the essential function of speech is to express voluntary intentions. Second, he 
says that gestures lack a proper representational content and, therefore, they should be 
sharply distinguished from expressive actions and speech. Departing from these premises, he 
remarks that gestures communicate nothing. Yet, he admits, through gestures the others can 
become “deeply acquainted with our inner thoughts and emotions.” This means that 
gestures say something about our stance in a situation, but something that is not meaningful, 
as Husserl intends it. In this respect, the proper, voluntary, communicative action is 
disconnected from the existential, bodily grounds in which it is given “involuntarily.” And 
this is, in my opinion, the most controversial point in Husserl’s account.  
As I have already indicated, according to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, gestures 
contain an existential meaning –they are pre-predicative interpretations of the world –, and 
they are intertwined with language. This means, in a sense, that gestures are “involuntary” 
movements that may reveal deep thoughts and emotions. Regarding this specific point, one 
could say that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty would not be at odds with Husserl. Yet, the 
problem is that Husserl separates the spheres of language, meaning, and gesture, and he 
restricts meaning to the sphere of the solitary life of consciousness. 
Thus, one may say that the main problem in Husserl’s view is that it reduces meaning 
to voluntary intentions and separates speech, understood as expression of consciousness, 
from the phenomenal field of gestures. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, on the contrary, 
un Gemüthsbewegungen mancherlei zu erfahren vermag. Sie “bedeuten” ihm etwas, sofern er sie eben deutet; aber auch für ihn 
haben sie keine Bedeutungen im prägnanten Sinne sprachlicher Zeichen, sondern bloß im Sinne von Anzeichen.”  
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understand gestures as ecstatic. In this sense, gestures are comportments that articulate a 
horizon of signification prior to singular acts of expression –or even gesticulation. In order 
to clarify this point, let me examine the semantic field of the notion of gesture.    
The Semantic Correlations between the terms “Gebärde”  and “Gesture” 
Although gestures are usually understood as rhetorical ornaments accompanying 
speech or physical movements “expressing” meanings,161 Heidegger understands the notion 
of gesture, Gebärde, in relation to the etymology of the word. He remarks that the notion of 
gesture contains the sense of a bearing, the enduring of something, and a sense of collecting 
or gathering. This constellation of meanings also corresponds to the Latin origins of the 
term “gesture,” in French “geste.”  
In the Zollikon seminars, Heidegger examines in detail the etymology of Gebärde. He 
points out that the prefix “Ge-” alludes to the act of gathering and, thereby, to primordial 
determinations of logos and being. He says that the verb “comes from bären [cf. Latin ferre: to 
carry, to bring],”162 which means the carrying or bringing forth of something: “gebären.” The 
entry to Gebärde in the Grimm Wörterbuch, which is a point of reference in Heidegger’s 
etymological analysis, includes links to verbs such as gebaren, which refers to doings, 
comportments, and gesticulations –also in the sense of dissimulation or pretense –, and 
gebären, which contains references to the generation of fruits or the bearing of a child –that 
is, modes of generation of life in general–, or the bringing forth of something with a certain 
sense of pain and endurance.  
161 It is important to bear in mind that Heidegger insistently underscores that gestures do not “express” 
anything; they have no expressive or communicative function as it is ordinarily understood. I will analyze this 
problem later, in the last part of the present work. 
162 Zollikon Seminars, 117/90. “»bären« = tragen, bringen.”
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Hence, one can see that the German word for gesture, Gebärde, preserves a reference 
to poetic capacities of the body, and a sense of receptivity and fertility. One may find similar 
indications in the English term “gesture,” which originates from the Latin gestus, and relates 
to the bearing of the body. This term is linked to the verb “gestate,” from the Latin gesta, 
which denotes deeds or achievements, and may also refer to the bearing of a child in 
pregnancy –in the same way as the German gebären –, and gerere, to perform or to carry on.  
Analyzing the notion of gesture, and considering some of the aforementioned 
semantic indications, Giorgio Agamben remarks: “What characterizes gesture is that in it 
nothing is being produced or acted, but rather something is being endured and supported. 
The gesture, in other words, opens the sphere of ethos as the more proper sphere of that 
which is human.”163 Agamben further explains that what is endured or supported in gesture 
is the means-character of the body, “it is the process of making a means visible as such. It allows the 
emergence of the being-a-medium of human beings and thus it opens the ethical dimension 
for them.”164 According to Agamben, one cannot conceptualize gesture in terms of the false 
alternative between praxis, understood as an action that has an end in itself, and techne, 
interpreted as an action that has an extrinsic end.165 As Agamben expresses it, gesture is a 
type of action that is ethical insofar as it embraces human finitude, and reveals our 
dependance upon a sensible milieu: the body. 
On the views of Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, gesture, too, is intrinsically related 
the proper sphere of human acting, of finitude. For example, Heidegger says in the Zollikon 
163 Giorgio Agamben, Means without End. Notes on Politics, trans. Vincenzo Binetti and Cesare Casarino 
(Minneapolis: University of Minesota Press, 2000), 57. 
164 Ibid., 58. 
165 Agamben considers here the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and techne, as it is carried out in the 
Nicomachean Ethics.  
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seminars that gesture is “one’s gathered [gesammelt] bearing and comportment,”166 that is, it is 
the comportment that bears or endures our being-in-the-world. Let me recall a passage I 
referred to previously, in which Merleau-Ponty declares: “Our view of man will remain 
superficial so long as we do not return to this origin, so long as we do not rediscover the 
primordial silence beneath the noise of words, and so long as we do not describe the gesture 
that breaks this silence. Speech is a gesture, and its signification is a word.”167  
Along these lines, one may say that gesture brings us back to the ground of the 
sensible world, to the moment of disclosure: the rupture of silence. Or, as Heidegger would 
put it, in gesture one is gathered in being, one is colligated to the world as a whole.  
Gesture, Region, Intentionality 
As I have already indicated, gesture is a kind of acting, of Handeln, which is not an 
end in itself. It bears or carries the world that is already there as a field of possibilities. In this 
sense, Heidegger suggests that gestures reveal the “ecstatic” meaning of bodiliness,168 to the 
extent that they set up a region wherein we may encounter something or someone. He says 
precisely: “Each movement of my body as a ‘gesture’ and, therefore, as such and such a 
comportment does not simply enter into an indifferent space. Rather, comportment is always 
already in a certain region [Gegend] which is open through the thing to which I am in a 
relationship, for instance, when I take something into my hand.”169  
166 Zollikon Seminars, 118/90. “Vom Menschen her heißt Gebärde ein gesammeltes Sich-Betragen.” 
167 Phenomenology of Perception, 214/190. “Notre vue sur l’homme restera superficielle tant que nous ne remonterons pas à cette 
origine, tant que nous ne retrouverons pas, sous le bruit des paroles, le silence primordial, tant que nous ne décrirons pas le geste qui 
rompt ce silence. La parole est un geste et sa signification un monde.”  
168 Zollikon Seminars, 118/90. Explaining this point, Heidegger alludes to the phenomenon of blushing, and 
remarks that bodiliness has an ecstatic meaning insofar as it is the immediate testimony of an exposure to 
others.  
169 Ibid., 118/91. “Jede Bewegung meines Leibes geht als eine Gebärde und damit als ein sich so und so Betragen nicht Einfach 
in einen indifferenten Raum hinein. Vielmehr hält sich das Betragen schon immer in einer Bestimmten Gegend auf, die offen ist 
durch das Ding, auf das ich bezogen bin, wenn ich zum Beispiel etwas in die Hand nehme.” 
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As Merleau-Ponty explains in his Notes de cours, Heidegger’s notion of region, Gegend, 
involves something more than an intentional relation to things. He says precisely: “before 
intentionality has taken place, it is necessary an openness, a leeway [Spielraum], a region 
[Gegend] wherein it can be displayed. This region is time. It is that margin that is not nothing 
whereby the ek-stasis can occur.”170 I take this to mean that intentional comportments 
presuppose our involvement in a historical world, a world whose depth impregnates the 
being of things.171 
Thus, one might say, on the one hand, that gesture is receptivity to the being of 
things and others. Heidegger says that blushing, for example, “is a gesture insofar as the one 
who blushes is related to his fellow human beings.”172 On the other hand, that gesture is a 
way of being out of one’s body, involved in the world. In order to explain this point, let me 
recall a passage from “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” one that complements what was said 
above about the qualitative limits of the body: “When I go toward the door of the lecture 
Hall, I am already there, and I could not go to it at all if I were not such that I am there. I am 
never here only, as this encapsulated body; rather, I am there, that is, I already pervade the 
space of the room, and only thus can I go through it.”173 As Heidegger explains, the relation 
between the door and me is not a relation between physical things. The door is pervaded by 
my presence and spatiality, which is also the spatiality I share with others in a common world 
of meanings, practices and affects. In this way, my gestures reveal an all-encompassing 
170 Notes de cours, 136, my translation. “Avant qu’une intentionnalitè ait lieu, il faut une ouverture, un Spielraum, un Gegend 
où elle puisse se déployer. C’est ce Gegend qui est le temps. Il est cette marge qui n’est pas rien où l’ek-stase pourra avoir lieu.” 
171 With regard to this, Françoise Dastur explains that Heidegger uses the term region as a redefinition of the 
notion of horizon, in order to emphasize that the horizon is a milieu common to being and nothingness, a field, 
not a limit that is far in front of us. See Dastur, “Le lecture merleau-pontienne de Heidegger…,” 381. 
172 Zollikon Seminars, 118/91. “Es ist auch eine Gebärde, insofern der Errötende auf die Mitmenschen bezogen ist.” 
173 “Building, Dwelling, Thinking,” 159/359.“Wenn ich zum Ausgang des Saales gehe, bin ich schon dort und könnte 
niemals hingehen, wenn ich nicht so wäre, daß ich dort bin. Ich bin niemals nur hier als dieser abgekapselte Leib, sondern ich bin 
dort, d.h. den Raum schon durchstehend, und nur so kann ich ihn durchgehen.” 
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awareness of my situation: the door is not just an objective door, but the door of a lecture 
hall that may or may not be familiar to me, pervaded by an emotional atmosphere and a 
personal history. 
According to Merleau-Ponty, after Being and Time Heidegger thinks our ecstatic 
rapport with being in terms of a transversal relation, which is not centered in Dasein’s 
projection onto the world. This means that Dasein is a site of passage, a clearing in which 
things may appear: “There is not Dasein but in its openness to being, which comes to the 
fore in an ontological arrangement wherein Dasein is but the ‘site.’”174 Accordingly, one may 
say that gestures reveal the disclosive character of the body, namely, the body as poiesis.  
In the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty develops very similar ideas. For 
example, he says: “Places in space are not defined as objective positions in relation to the 
objective position of our body, but rather they inscribe around us the variable reach of our 
intentions and gestures.”175 In this regard, Merleau-Ponty repeatedly underscores that we 
move through a phenomenal body, driven by goals and tools, through “intentional 
threads.”176  
At this point, I should recall that essential gestures are not merely intentional. To the 
extent that they are silent, with no particular meaning, they disclose a pre-intentional ground. 
As I have already argued, fundamental comportments or gestures are entwined into an 
affective milieu, which may not be reduced to intentional structures. This is why Heidegger 
says that gestures move in a determinate region. Moreover, as Merleau-Ponty puts it, 
gestures break the “..silence beneath the noise of words.” For gestures emerge against the 
174 Notes de cours, 98; my translation. “Il n’est Dasein que de son overture à l’ Être, dans un fonctionnement ontologique dont 
il n’est que le «lieu», et qui passé au premier plan.” 
175 Phenomenology of Perception, 168/144.“Les lieux de l’espace ne se définissient pas comme des positions objectives par rapport 
à la position objective de notre corps, mais ils inscrivient autour de nous la portée variable de nos visées et de nos gestes” 
176 Phenomenology of Perception, 123/132. 
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silent ground of significance that we inhabit, and relate us to the nascent and inexhaustible 
logos of the world of perception. In this sense, one might say that gestures are not 
meaningful but rather pregnant with meaning. For a gesture, insofar as it is just a gesture, 
remains open, enigmatic, in the same way that a work of art does. 
Gesture, Comportment, and the Artistic Work 
Referring to Cézanne’s paintings of Mount St. Victoire, Heidegger suggests that the 
mountain motivates the painting and guides the artist’s comportment: “…what he saw 
determined the way and manner of his action [Handeln] and of his procedure in painting. The 
mountain he saw in this or that way is the determining ground [motive] –that by which the 
painter’s comportment is determined in this way or that.”177 Heidegger says precisely that the 
mountain determines [Bestimmt] Cézanne’s comportment, meaning that the mountain is 
disclosed through an attunement, Stimmung.178 One may say, then, that the mountain 
impregnates and affects the artist in a qualitative, intensive way. For the artist must be 
concerned about the being of the mountain if he is to paint it, willing to dedicate his time to 
this task. Thus, the necessary question is: How can a mountain affect an artist, a person? 
In order to respond to this question, let me start by referring to Jacques Taminiaux’s 
reading of Heidegger’s essay on the work of art.179 In his article “The Origin of ‘The Origin 
of the Work of Art,’” Taminiaux examines the passage from the Fundamental Ontology to 
177 Ibid., 262/209. “…das gesehene als solches bestimmt die Art und Weise des Handelns, seines Vorgehens beim Malen. Der 
Berg ist qua so und so von ihm Gesehenes der Bestimmungsgrund, das, wovon her der Maler zu einem so oder so sich Verhalten 
bestimmt wird.”  
178 In another passage from the Zollikon seminars, Heidegger mentions Cezanne’s painting of Mont St. Victoire 
in order to show that we “intuit” the painting as an emotional-sensible unity that is felt more than seen 
objectively. See ibid., 103-04/79. 
179 Jacques Taminiaux, "The Origin of "The Origin of the Work of Art"," in Reading Heidegger, ed. John Sallis, 
392-404 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993). Jacques Taminiaux demonstrates that Being and Time 
was decisively influenced by Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, and that “Heidegger’s Fundamental Ontology is 
both a reappropriation and a critique of Aristotle’s views,” 394.   
77 
the lectures on art from 1936. Specifically, he calls attention to the transformation in 
Heidegger’s approach to the being of things. With regard to this, Taminiaux says: “In the 
frame of Fundamental Ontology, paying attention to the being of things was clearly not a 
central issue for the task of thinking. Things did not deserve interrogation since their Being 
had nothing enigmatic. It was defined either by presence-at-hand or by readiness-to-hand.”180 
Continuing on from Taminiaux’s reading, one may say that in the essay on the work of art 
Heidegger is deeply concerned about the enigmatic being of things, in such a way that they 
are not simply pieces of equipment or objects. 
As Taminiaux expresses it, Heidegger’s turn in thinking involves a new approach to 
everydayness, a renewed vision on the being of things, in contrast to the predominant 
perspective in Being and Time. Along these lines, one might say that after the turn he values 
differently what “being absorbed by the world” means. At this point, the world is an enigma 
to be explored from within, just as it happens in artistic comportment. For the work of art 
sets itself amidst sensible things. In this regard, what is remarkable about the work of art is 
that it sheds light on the essence of comportment in general, understood as rapturous 
engagement with the world.     
In relation to this problem, Merleau-Ponty explains in the Phenomenology of Perception 
that comportments or behaviors may only be properly understood from within. He says: 
“Behaviour can only be grasped by another type of thought [different to causal thought] that 
takes its object in its nascent state, such as it appears to him who lives it, with the 
atmosphere of sense by which it is enveloped…”181 As Merleau-Ponty expresses it, 
180 Ibid., 403. 
181 Phenomenology of Perception, 140/122. “il [le comportment] n’est saisible que pour un autre sorte de pensée –celle qui prend 
son objet à l’état naissant, tel qu’il apparaît à celui qui le vit, avec la atmosphère de sens don’t il est alors enveloppé, et qui cherche 
à se glisser dans cette atmosphère…”  
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comportments are concrete modes of being entangled in the world, in such a way that one 
cannot see things at distance, nor with clarity: the atmosphere of meaning enshrouds 
comportments and things. 
To supplement this point, let me examine the following passage from the Zollikon 
seminars: 
Comportment”[Verhalten], the “comportments,” refer to the interconnected ways of relating 
to beings as a whole, wherein most of them [beings] are not noticed expressly in each case. 
Sojourning  with is the same…and at the same time as the letting come to presence  of beings. 
This constitutes my Da-sein in the present situation, at any given time. Nothing more can be 
said about it. One cannot ask about this comportment’s “porter,” rather the comportment 
carries itself. This is precisely what is wonderful about it. “Who” I am now can be said only 
throughout this sojourn, and always at the same time in the sojourn lies that with which and 
with whom I sojourn, and how I comport myself toward [them]. “To be absorbed” by 
something…does not mean “to be dissolved” like sugar in the water, but rather “to be totally 
preoccupied by something,” as for instance, when one says: He is entirely engrossed in his 
subject matter. Then he exists authentically as who he is, that is, in his task.182       
Heidegger asserts that comportments are ways of relating to things in which they 
become, to some extent, inconspicuous. As he expresses it, this inconspicuousness is not 
blindness to the being of things, but rather a way in which one lets them be. Along these 
lines, one may say that in letting things be one is, at the same time, letting oneself go with 
them, just as it happens when one is fully involved in a task. Thus, in comportment there is 
no subject, no “porter”: one loses oneself. Following this argument, one might say that 
insofar as one is absorbed by the world one is essentially lost. In comportment one is not 
present, not even as body.  
182 Zollikon Seminars, 205/160.“›Das Verhalten‹, die ›Verhältnisse‹ meinen die zusammengehörigen Weisen des Bezuges zum 
Seienden im Ganzen, wobei das meiste jeweilen nicht eigens beachtet wird. Dasselbe ist der Aufenthalt bei…und zugleich das 
Anwesenlassen von Seiendem. Mein Dasein ist jeweils in der gegenwärtigen Situation dadurch konstituiert. Mehr läßt sich gar 
nicht darüber sagen. Man kann nicht nach einem ›Träger‹ des Verhaltens fragen, sondern das Verhalten trägt sich selbst. Das ist 
gerade das Wunderbare daran. Das ›Wer‹ ich jetzt bin, läßt sich nur sagen durch diesen Aufenthalt, und in dem Aufenthalt liegt 
immer zugleich auch das, wobei ich mich aufhalte und mit wem und wie ich mich dazu verhalte. ›Aufgehen‹ bei…heißt nicht ›Sich-
auflösen‹, wie sich der Zucker im Wasser auflöst, sondern ›benommen werden von etwas‹, wie z.B. wenn man sagt: er geht ganz in 
seiner Sache auf. Dann existiert er eigentlich als der, der er ist, d.h. in seiner Aufgabe.” 
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Heidegger explains this point by analyzing what “being lost in space” means, and 
recalling a famous anecdote about Thales: “Thales, lost in thought, walked along a road, fell 
into a ditch, and was ridiculed by some servant girl, his body was in no way ‘lost in space.’ 
Rather, it was not present. As in the case above, precisely when I am absorbed in something 
‘body and soul,’ the body is not present. Yet this ‘absence’ of the body is not nothing, but 
one of the most mysterious phenomena of privation.”183 At this point, one cannot help but 
think that this mysterious phenomenon of privation determines the being of the body, and 
the relation between body and being. In this regard, one might say that the body withdraws 
in order to let beings be.  
To strenghten this argument, let me recall here Merleau-Ponty’s reading of 
Heidegger’s reflections on the historical dimension of being. In the Notes de cours, he says: 
The Seinsgeschichte would then be the way in which being conceals or dissimulates itself; the 
presentation of the entity is in principle Verborgenheit of being. These “withdrawals” are not 
constructive explanations based on an In-itself: they are founded in our experience of the 
being and the entity that we ourselves are. Heidegger: we do not know what we are but after 
having lost it, each one is for himself the most distant; that is, the presence to oneself is non-
perception, perception is of that which we no longer are, we were. The being that is in us 
does so remaining beyond our perception: all perception is non-perception. Such is the true 
nothingness, which is not nichtiges Nichts, but Sein.184   
Elaborating on a similar idea, Merleau-Ponty explains in the Phenomenology of Perception 
that the essential paradox of perception consists in the fact that we know something insofar 
as we ignore it. When I am properly involved in something, in a task, my body and my 
183 Ibid., 111/85.“Als der Philosoph Thales nachdenklich einhergehend in eine Grube fiel und dabei von den Mägden ausgelacht 
wurde, da war gerade sein Leib nicht in den Sternen, dieser war vielmehr weg. Gerade wenn ich –wie im gennanten Falle –mit der 
Leib und Seele in einer Sache aufgehe, ist der Leib weg. Dieses Weg-sein des Leibes ist aber nicht nichts, sondern eines der 
geheimnisvollsten Phänomene der Privation.” 
184 Notes de cours, 137, my translation. “La Seinsgeschichte sera donc (les) manières don’t l’Être se dérobe ou se détourne: 
la presentation de l’etant est par principe Verborgenheit de l’ Être. Ces «retraits» ne sont pas explication constructive par un En 
Soi: Ils sont constatés dan notre experience de l’ Être et de l’ Etant même que nous sommes; Heidegger: nous ne savons ce que nous 
sommes qu’après l’avoir perdu; chacun est pour lui-même le plus éloigné; i.e.: la presence à soi est imperception, la perception est de 
ce que nous  ne sommes plus, nous étions; l’être qui este en nous ne le fait qu’en restant en deçà de notre perception, toute 
perception est imperception. Tel est le vrai néant, celui qui n’est pas nichtiges Nichts, mais Sein.”  
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consciousness become anonymous.185 Along these lines, Merleau-Ponty remarks that insofar 
as I become anonymous the experience of perception fades away.  
In this way we see how the problem of the lived body, of gesture, challenges the 
limits of phenomenology. For bodily comportments and gestures withdraw from perception 
in order to let perception occur. In this sense, one may say that gestures are elusive, 
phantasmagoric. And yet, gestures are “determined,” they are precisely the initial point of 
contact with the world that is “there,” and the earth that supports us,186 with the being of 
things and others.   
 As I have already mentioned, concerning Cézanne’s painting of the mountain, 
Heidegger says that the mountain is the determining ground (Bestimmungsgrund) that guides 
the gestures of the painter. This means that Cézanne relates to the mountain through an 
attunement, a Stimmung. Thus, one may say that the painter, as he paints the mountain, must 
let the mountain touch him as something that concerns him.  
Based on this analysis, let me try to elucidate the enigmatic reference to Cézanne that 
closes Heidegger’s last Freiburg lecture from 1959. The passage in question reads as follows: 
“There is a conversation about painting that discusses to what extent what is painted in color 
only contains a sketch and outline of the image that it forms, but is supposed to contain 
these in such a manner that the sketch in the image does not properly show itself. In this 
conversation Cézanne says:/ ‘One must not take people by the sleeve.’”187 According to 
Heidegger, the sketch, the outline, the Riß, are not shown in the painting. They are as absent 
185 See Phenomenology of Perception, 99-101/ 87-91. 
186 Zollikon Seminars, 224/178. In relation to the earth, Heidegger says: “‘Before’ the human being, the earth too 
comes into the presence of the clearedness as such, of which the human being is the guardian” [“Auch die Erde 
›vor‹ dem Menschen west an in die Gelichtetheit, die der Mensch hütet, als solche”].  
187Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 176/165. “Es gibt ein Gespräch über Malerei, das erörtert, inwiefern das Gemalte der Farben 
eerst die Zeichnung und den Riß eines Bildes bildet und enthält, jedoch so enthalten soll, daß sich die Zeichnung im Bild nicht 
eigens zeigt. Bei diesem Gespräch sagt Cézanne:/»Man muß die Leute nicht am Ärmel ziehen«.”  
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or “untouchable” as the artist himself.188 He further suggests that the sketch withdraws and 
opens a space for something to appear.189 Along these lines, one might say that the trace, the 
gesture in the work of art, reveals an essential commonality between things and us. It shows 
that things withdraw in what is visible or sensible, as we ourselves do through our bodies. 
And this means that we may lose things in the same way in which we lose ourselves. For this 
reason, they can touch us or move us, intensively, as a Stimmung: they are in memory. 
Merleau-Ponty examines a similar problematic in relation to what he calls “secret 
visibility.” In the context of a central argument from Eye and Mind, he says: “Since things and 
my body are made of the same stuff, it is necessary that my body’s vision be made somehow 
in the things, or yet that their manifest visibility doubles itself in my body with a secret 
visibility. ‘Nature is on the inside,’ says Cézanne. Quality, light, color, depth, which are over 
there before us, are there only because they awaken an echo in our bodies and because the 
body welcomes them.”190 In short, Merleau-Ponty suggests, the body and things keep a 
secret or invisible communication, and the depth of things echoes the depth of our own 
being.     
Let me recapitulate and conclude. My analysis of gesture has shown, on the one 
hand, that the lived body is essentially gestural, absorbed comportment, and, on the other 
hand, that the work of art reveals essential characteristics of comportment, specifically 
regarding ontological questions. I have also demonstrated that Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty 
have very similar points of view with regard to the problem of gesture and comportment. In 
188As Andrew Mitchell remarks in a note to the aforementioned passage, Heidegger provides a “free” 
translation of Cézanne’s words: “Personne ne me touchera ne me mettra le grappin dessus. Jamais! Jamais!” Ibid., 166. 
189 See ibid., 176/165.  
190 Eye and Mind, 1596/355. “Puisque les choses et mon corps sont faits de la même étoffe, il faut que sa vision se fasse de 
quelque manière en elles, on encore aue leur visibilité manifeste se double en lui d’une visibilité secrete: «la nature est à l’interieur», 
dit Cézanne. Qualité, lumière, couleur, profondeur, qui sont là-bas devant nous, n’y sont que parce qu’elles éveillent un echo dans 
notre corps, parce qu’il leur fait accueil.”  
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what follows, I will continue to explore the problematic of gesture and art. Specifically, I will 
investigate in what sense the problem of gesture and the lived body is integrated in the 
philosophical trajectories of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, and the most significant 
ramifications of this problem.  
Part Two: Gesture and Art 
Chapter Four: Body, Gesture and Art in Heidegger’s Work 
Preliminary Remarks on the Body in Heidegger’s Reading of Nietzsche 
Between Being and Time and the Zollikon seminars, around the time of the so-called 
turn in the 1930s, Heidegger has a decisive encounter with Nietzsche –I am referring to 
Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche from 1936-37. He finds in Nietzsche a significant voice 
that puts into question the limits of metaphysics, overturning the traditional opposition 
between the sensible and the intelligible. As David Farrell Krell expresses it, Nietzsche’s 
thought culminates the metaphysical tradition, for in Nietzsche there is a new interpretation 
of sensuousness that strives to overcome nihilism “…in a creative thinking of being as 
φὐσις.”191 In this sense, for Nietzsche, sensible being expresses a relentless power of 
creation.  
Krell examines in detail this point in Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche, and remarks 
that life is in itself perspective, knowing, interpreting or schematizing in response to practical 
need,192 not mere biologism, as Heidegger sometimes indicates in the course of these 
lectures.193 Thus, Krell continues, the stream of life is the stream of chaos, but chaos in turn 
is related to the bodying forth of the body, to a primordial poetizing capacity.194 Here, as 
Krell expresses it, Heidegger’s reading overlaps with Nietzsche’s voice, and the identity of 
191 David Farrell Krell, Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 
221. 
192 Krell, Daimon Life, 232. 
193 This is a point explicitly emphasized by Krell in opposition to Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche: “Human 
being is the being of some body who is alive. Yet the bodying forth of life cannot be reduced to sheer 
humanization, anthropomorphism, organicism, or biologicism.” Ibid., 230. 
194 Ibid., 231; 233.   
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the speaker remains undetermined.195 For Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche appears, to an 
important extent, a voicing of his own thought, yet with a focus on the problem of 
bodiliness that seems more befitting of Nietzsche’s work. The point is that, on this occasion, 
Heidegger takes up the problem of bodily being, and he does so in a way that foreshadows 
the analysis of the body from the Zollikon seminars, as well as his approach to the work of 
art.    
Following the impetus of Nietzsche’s thought, Heidegger delves into the problem of 
life and its relation to the phenomenon of the body. He says precisely: “life lives in that it 
bodies forth.”196 Taking into account this essential correlation between life and body, 
Heidegger acknowledges that the problem of the lived body has not been studied with the 
seriousness it requires: “We know by now perhaps a great deal –almost more than what we 
can encompass –about what we call the body, without having seriously thought what 
bodying is.”197 Heidegger further explains that the bodying forth of the body is a constitutive 
phenomenon underlying our knowing [Erkenntnis] of living things: “It may be that bodying is 
initially an obscure term, but it names something that is immediately and constantly 
experienced in the knowledge of living things, and it must be kept in mind.”198 He remarks 
that the meaning of “bodying forth” remains obscure. Yet, this obscurity is indicative of the 
depth and pervasiveness of the phenomenon, for this phenomenon announces itself “first” 
and “constantly” in our experience of things, as part of the background in which they appear 
195 Ibid., 232. 
196 Nietzsche III and IV, 509/79.“Das Leben lebt, indem es leibt.”  
197 Ibid. “Wir kennen bisher vielleicht sehr Vieles und fast schon Unübersehbares von dem, was wir den Leibskörper nennen, 
ohne uns ernstlich darauf besonnen zu haben, was das ist, das Leiben.”   
198 Ibid. “Vielleich ist das Leiben zunächst noch ein dunkles Wort, aber es nennt etwas, was bei der Erkenntnis des Lebendigen 
zuerst und ständig erfahren und in der Besinnung gehalten werden muß.”  
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as such. In sum, bodying forth is a basis of an affective knowing, a basis that withdraws as 
something opaque, and is given transversally through the things we encounter.199      
Heidegger develops this point further by showing that the “bodying forth” of life 
cannot be determined by the physical properties of the body-object, the“Körper.” He suggests 
that the obscurity of the phenomenon of the lived body is essential, more fundamental than 
any bodily opaqueness. Yet, he also admits that the obscurities of physical nature are 
fundamentally inscrutable. “As simple and as obscure as what we know as gravitation is, 
gravity and the falling of bodies, the bodying of a living being is just as simple and just as 
obscure, though quite different and correspondingly more essential.”200 The “simple” 
phenomena of gravity and the falling of bodies are already obscure and mysterious, but the 
obscurity of the bodying forth of life is even more fundamental, a type of gravity that one 
cannot measure or calculate: it has to do with a qualitative falling and a qualitative weight, 
and an existential sense of grounding.  
How is this understanding possible? How do we know that the falling of physical 
bodies is essentially different from the bodying forth of the lived body? In line with 
Heidegger’s analysis, one can say that the bodying forth of life is more fundamental than 
“physical” gravity because it is a more encompassing phenomenon. It is an ontological 
phenomenon that involves our own being, not only the being of things. It cannot be 
encapsulated as a thing: it passes through us and moves us. Heidegger says precisely: “The 
bodying of life is nothing separate by itself, encapsulated in the ‘physical mass’ [Körper] in 
which the body can appear to us; the body [der Leib] is transmission and passage at the same 
                                                
199 For a detailed account of Heidegger’s interpretation of the bodying forth of the body as affectivity, see 
Diego D'Angelo, "Die Schwelle des 'Lebe-Wesens': Überlegungen zur Leibinterpretation Heideggers in der 
Nietzsche-Abhandlung," Studia Phaenomenologica. Romanian Journal for Phenomenology 12 (2012): 61-83, 70-71. 
200 Nietzsche III and IV, 509/79. “So einfach und so dunkel jenes ist, was wir Gravitation, Schwerkraft und Fallen der Körper 
kennen, so einffach und so dunkel, aber ganz anders und entsprechend wesentlicher ist das Leiben eines Lebewesens.”   
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time.”201 One can see, then, that the body as Körper is a fleeting and minimal modulation of 
the stream of life, of the bodying forth of life, of Leib. And one may glimpse at it in an 
instant, in inconspicuous gestures. As Heidegger puts it: “Through this body flows a stream 
of life of which we feel but a small and fleeting portion, in accordance with the receptivity of 
the momentary state of the body.”202 The lived body is, then, supported by the more general 
dimensionality of life and, thereby, it is essentially vulnerable, it may be carried away 
[fortgetragen] and enraptured [hingerissen]: “Our body itself is admitted into this stream of life, 
floating in it, and is carried off and snatched away by this steam or else pushed to the 
banks.”203 Heidegger finishes this rapturous passage by unexpectedly establishing a 
correlation between life and world. He says, “that chaos of our region of sensibility which we 
know as the region of the body is only one section of the great chaos that the ‘world’ itself 
is.”204 The region of our lived body corresponds to the region of sensibility, a sectioning or 
fissure that opens up chaos within chaos, a world within the “world.”  
This conclusion calls attention to the intrinsic complexities of the concept of “world,” 
which are indicated through the quotations marks. To explain this, let me recall Krell’s 
analysis of the concept of world in Heidegger. Krell points out that Heidegger understands 
the concept of world following at least three paths, the first one takes up the world as the 
referential totality of existence, the second interprets it as cosmos, and the third path, 
introduced in Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, alludes to an essential duplicity, according to 
201 Ibid.“Das Leiben des Lebens ist nichts Abgesondertes für sich, verkapselt in den »Körper«, als welcher uns der Leib erscheinen 
kann, sondern der Leib ist Durchlaß und Durchgang zugleich”. 
202 Ibid.“Durch diesen Leib strömt ein Strom von Leben, davon wir je nur rein Geringes und Flüchtiges und dieses wieder je nur 
gemäß der Empfängnisart des jeweiligen Leibzustandes spüren.”  
203 Ibid. “Unser Leib selbst ist in diesen Strom des Lebens zu einer Schwebe in ihm eingelassen und durch diesen Strom 
fortgetragen und hingerissen oder auch and den Rand gedrängt”.  
204 Ibid., my italics. “Jenes Chaos unseres Empfindungsbezirkes, den wir als Leibbezirk kennen, ist nur ein Ausschnitt aus 
dem großen Chaos, das die »Welt« selbst ist.”  
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which human beings both have a world and are part of the world.205 Indeed, one might say  
that this essential duplicity underlies Heidegger’s determination of the world as chaos within 
chaos, as reduplication of the primordial openness of life in the bodying forth of the body.  
With regard to this, Krell further remarks that “Heidegger’s third way reminds us of 
Merleau-Ponty’s attempt to define the reversible flesh of the world –the element with respect 
to which existence is never wholly free yet never entirely subservient.”206 I will address this 
parallel with Merleau-Ponty later. For now, suffice it to show that for Heidegger the world 
itself is chaos and life, insofar as it has a chiasmatic structure, as is the case with the structure 
of the flesh of the world in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology. After all, Heidegger suggests already 
in Being and Time that Dasein’s falling in the world could also be read as a falling into the 
stream of life and things, and that this falling manifests our deeper involvement in being, an 
ontological connection that is essentially inconspicuous, invisible. And all these motifs are 
present also in his reading of Nietzsche, though implicitly. 
Thereby, one might say that there is an intercrossing between the problems of 
sensible being and the body and the fundamental question of being. Krell explains this point 
as follows: “…the bodying forth of life conducts Heidegger back to the fundamental 
challenge of ‘Will to Power as Art,’ to wit, the still-outstanding ‘new interpretation of 
sensuousness.’ For in his very first lecture course on Nietzsche, which concludes with a 
reading of Plato’s Phaedrus, Heidegger agrees with Socrates that human beings “cannot body 
forth” as “living being”(ζωον) unless they have already caught sight of being, as though 
being itself were somehow bound up with life.”207      
205 Daimon Life, 113, n.11. 
206 Ibid. 
207 Ibid., 230. 
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As Heidegger expresses it, life bodies in our body, and this bodying is a knowing that 
stamps [aufprägen] a form in chaos. That is to say, the bodying forth of the body is a 
sectioning of chaos, a reduplication of the chaos that is the stream of life, which is the world 
we live in. In line with Plato’s Phaedrus, Heidegger suggests that we catch sight of being in 
losing ourselves in the world. In this way, Heidegger adumbrates a new interpretation of 
sensuousness according to which the sensible is conceived in itself as latency of meaning, of 
being, which is already there, in the “world.”   
Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche shows that we come to know things from within 
the openness of chaos and life before they appear as pieces of equipment or “theoretical” 
objects, and this primordial dimensionality relates to the idea of beauty, understood as 
radiation or shining of the being of things. For if things did not shine in being, how could we 
come to grasp their singularity? As Heidegger puts it, beauty somehow recalls the existential 
depth of things: their belonging to being. Moreover, one could say that beauty reveals the 
poetic character of existence, the fact that existence is openness to the world, to chaos and 
its “forms.” In this sense, Heidegger’s approach does not contain a sort of nihilism, 
according to which being is sheer metaphysical nothingness, an indeterminate vapor. Rather, 
as Merleau-Ponty says, it means that “there is a thought that is not reflection 
(=thematization, objectivation, light coming from the one who thinks, and not from 
thought), but precisely the very fact of thought (that is, of that ‘leap,’ of that call of being 
(heißen, Geheiß), of that setting in correlation with the Bedenklich, with what ‘gives itself to 
thought,’ of that light that clears itself).”208 As I shall argue in the section that follows, 
                                                
208 Notes de cours, 146; my translation. “Il y a une pensée qui est; non réflexion (=thématisation, objectivation, lumière venant 
de celui qui pense, et non du penser) mais précisement du fait même du Denken ([c’est-à-dire] de ce «saut», de cet appel de l’Être 
(heißen, geheiß), de cette mise en correspondance avec le Bedenklich, avec ce qui «donne à penser», de cette lumière qui s’éclaire elle-
même).” 
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reading the essay on the work of art, Heidegger determines this non-reflective thought as a 
poetic thought, and as a gestural comportment.  
The Being of Things and the Work of Art 
In The Principle of Reason (1957),209 Heidegger counterposes Silesius’ verse, “the rose is 
without why,” to Leibniz’ principle of reason, according to which “nothing is without a 
why.”210 Heidegger remarks that “obviously the rose is an example for all blooming things, 
for all plants and all growth,”211 which, reposing in their own grounds, do not ask whether 
one looks at them. Heidegger points out that the rose is without why, but not without a 
ground: the rose blooms because it blooms.212  
With regard to this, Merleau-Ponty remarks that, for Heidegger, “being is its own 
possible, i.e., there is a continuous self-creation of the rose, and there we find the Rose-
sein.”213 What is remarkable in this approach to the being of the rose is that it reveals an 
essential difference with the being of human beings. Closely following Heidegger’s 
arguments, Merleau-Ponty says that human beings set up a relation to their own presence, to 
their own visibility, to the possibility of being seen,214 which is to say, human beings care 
about their being. In existing they cannot help but consider the way in which they are in the 
world.215    
209 Martin Heidegger, Der Satz vom Grund, Vol. Gesamtausgabe Bd.10 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio 
Klostermann, 1997). English: The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1991). Hereafter with reference first to the German, then to the English translation.  
210 Ibid., 55/36. 
211 Ibid. “. Dir Rose steht hier offenbar als Beispiel für alles Blühende, für alle Gewächse, für jegliche Wachstum.” 
212 See Notes de cours, 108. 
213 Ibid., 107-08, my translation. “Chez Heidegger, l’être est son propre possible, i.e., il y a une auto-création continuée de la 
rose et c’est là le Rose-sein.” 
214 Ibid., 108. 
215 See The Principle of Reason, 56-57/37-38. 
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Thus, Heidegger argues, there is a decisive element “unsaid” in Silesius’ poem: 
“What is unsaid in the fragment –and everything depends on this –instead says that humans, 
in the concealed grounds of their essential being, first truly are when in their own way they 
are like the rose –without why.”216 Heidegger does not explain this claim here. Yet, he 
suggests that humanity is essentially related to all that grows and blooms insofar as it shines 
forth. This shining, however, is different to the silent shining of the rose. For humans shine 
through language, their presence is in a way a saying or showing. In a sense, humans are like 
the rose insofar as they are who they are, precisely insofar as they are not identical to the 
rose, and live in the aletheic truth, disclosing their grounds: poetizing. One might say, then, 
that it is through the work of art that humans shine as what they are.  
This idea is sketched out already in Being and Time, yet in an enigmatic and 
fragmentary way. In section 34 from Being and Time Heidegger claims: “the communication 
of the existential possibilities of attunement, that is, the disclosing of existence, can become 
the true aim of ‘poetic’ speech.”217 Hence, Heidegger suggests that this “communication” 
stems from the bodily dimension of speech, the modulation of the voice, the “way” of 
speaking. The facticity of the there, the fact that we are thrown in the world, in Befindlichkeit, 
reveals its own possibilities through the “sensible” dimension of language. Allegedly, poetic 
speech communicates these possibilities precisely because it discloses the sensible in its 
musical tonality. It is a movement that leads us and involves us as a whole,218 in unison, 
                                                
216 Ibid., 57-58/38. “Das ungesagte des Spruches –und darauf kommt alles an –sagt vielmehr, daß der Mensch im 
verborgensten Grunde seines Wesens erst dann wahrhaft ist, wenn er auf seine Weise so ist wie die Rose –ohne Warum.” 
217 Being and Time, 216/157. “Die Mitteilung der existenzielen Möglichkeiten der Befindlichkeit, das heißt das Erschließen von 
Existenz, kann eigenes Ziel der  »dichtenden« Rede werden.” I will analyze in detail this passage later on, in chapter six, 
which is devoted to language. 
218 Heidegger gives further indications on the importance of tone, and the existential unity of hearing and 
seeing in The Principle of Reason, particularly from lectures six to eleven.  
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demanding a concentrated or gathered response, just like the movement that, according to 
Goethe –specifically, Heidegger’s interpretation of Goethe –, leads the musician.219  
In Being and Time Heidegger does not explain in detail the implications of this 
approach to “poetic speech,” but one can see that this brief reference to poetry foreshadows 
the analysis of poetry and art carried out later in the lecture on The Origin of the Work of Art. 
In this lecture, Heidegger indicates that the setting of the work, its form or Gestalt, reveals 
our musical attunement with the earth. One may say, then, that the form reveals the way in 
which we establish our own existence amidst things, in attuned correlation with their sensible 
being.220 Let me explore this argument in detail.  
In this lecture Heidegger approaches the concept of form or figure in light of his 
interpretation of truth as disclosure, and he shows that the structural moments of the setting 
of the truth may be determined as the strife between world and earth. Specifically, he says: 
“The strife that is brought into the rift and thus set back into the earth and thus fixed in 
place is the figure [Gestalt]. Createdness of the work means truth’s being fixed in place in the 
figure.”221 Heidegger defines the figure as a “fixing” [festgestellt] of the strife, which is a 
retrieval of the interplay between truth and untruth, set back [zurückgestellt] in the earth. Put 
differently, the figure reveals the earth as ground and limit of disclosedness. I take this to 
mean that, being in the clearing, we can only relate to the ground as limit. For without the 
                                                
219 See The Principle of Reason, 132/89. 
220 With regard to the problems concerning the concept of form, and its relation to the work of art, Heidegger 
may have had in mind not only Nietzsche’s work, but also Schiller’s, which also occupied him around that time. 
See Martin Heidegger, Übungen für Anfänger. Schillers Briefe über die äesthetische Erziehung des Menschen. Wintersemester 
1936/37, ed. Ulrich von Bülow (Marbach am Neckar: Marbacher Bibliothek. Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 
2005). I make reference to this lecture course here because, as Maria del Rosario Acosta points out, these 
lectures are the result of Heidegger’s work on the problem of art during the 1930s (see Maria del Rosario 
Acosta, ""The secret that is the work of art": Heidegger's Lectures on Schiller," Research in Phenomenoloy 39 
(2009): 135-163, 135). 
221 The Origin of the Work of Art, 51/189. “Der in den Riß gebrachte und so in die Erde zurückgestellte und damit festgestellte 
Streit ist die Gestalt. Geschaffensein des Werkes heißt: Festgestelltsein der Wahrheit in die Gestalt.” 
 93 
resistance of the earth there would be no clearing, things would have no contour, no outline. 
Concerning this, Heidegger says: “In the earth, however, as essentially self-secluding, the 
openness of the open region finds that which most intensely resists it; it thereby finds the 
site of its constant stand, the site in which the figure must be fixed in place.”222 The earth is 
resistance and, in this sense, it offers the constant locus or support to the openness of the 
world, to history. One may say, then, that we are not like the rose because we do not rest in 
the ground. Rather, we are in departure, violently separated from the ground. We have a 
voice that somehow drives us out of being and, thereby, we dwell in the strife, in the rift: as a 
breach.223  
As Heidegger explains, the moment of disclosure is manifest in the “createdness of 
the work” [Geschaffensein des Werkes], and this distinguishes the work of art from the 
productions of “handicraft.” Presumably, the work of art makes salient the self-secluding 
character of the earth, whereas in handicraft the earth as such is neglected in its 
subordination to functionality.224 Distinguishing between art and handicraft, Heidegger 
underscores that the earth shall not be understood as matter in opposition to form. Along 
these lines, one can say that the form of the work is the outline, the limit that is set in the 
earth. It, the form, brings the secluding dimension of the earth to the foreground, and 
                                                
222 Ibid. 57/194. “An der Erde als der wesenhaft sich verschließenden findet aber die Offenheit des Offenen seinen höhsten 
Widerstand und dadur die Stätte seines ständigen Standes, darein die Gestalt festgestellt werden muß.”  
223 With regard to the essential strife that sets humans into limits, into an existence determined by forms and 
limits, and technical violence, see Introduction to Metaphysics, 153/153 and 169/171. See also Merleau-Ponty, Notes 
de cours, 121.    
224 It is worth noting that at the very beginning of the essay on the work of art Heidegger defines thinking as a 
craft, thus suggesting that in crafts there may be already a certain relatedness to being that is analogous to the 
relatedness to being that characterizes the work of art, but which is missing in mechanical, industrial work. See 
also the first three sessions from What is Called Thinking?    
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reveals a fundamental comportment, namely, poetry: a primordial way in which human 
beings are colligated to beings as a whole.225    
Createdness: A Contrast with Nietzsche 
What is proper of the work of art, in contrast to the work of handicraft, for instance, 
is that one sees it as a work and as strife. That is to say, in the work of art the movement of 
creation becomes explicit. With regard to this, it seems that Heidegger takes up, at least in 
part, a central thesis from Nietzsche’s “aesthetics,” namely, that the work of art shows itself 
as metaphor and translation. Moreover, I should note that Nietzsche qualifies the work of 
art as the expression of poetic drives that are primordial, ontological, in a way that 
foreshadows, to some extent, Heidegger’s view.  
And yet, when affirming the primordial significance of art, Nietzsche often does so 
by opposing art and truth, leaving unquestioned the metaphysical understanding of truth and 
knowledge. And Heidegger is particularly concerned about this point. As John Sallis explains, 
“Heidegger’s lectures on Nietzsche put into question the tautological bond between truth 
and knowledge, marking that bond as one that even Nietzsche has in common with 
Plato.”226 Thus, the necessary question is: To what extent, and in what sense, does Heidegger 
go beyond both Nietzsche’s idea, and that of the metaphysics of art in general? Before 
responding this question, let me succinctly review Nietzsche’s perspective.   
In several of his works Nietzsche remarks that the work of art is the metaphysical 
activity par excellence insofar as it manifests its creation-character, and makes salient the 
225 See Martin Heidegger, Übungen für Anfänger. Schillers Briefe…, 91-92. 
226 John Salis, Double Truth, 68-69. 
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creative drives at the basis of human existence. For instance, in The Birth of Tragedy,227 
Nietzsche claims: “only as an aesthetic phenomenon do existence and the world appear 
justified,”228 which means that art is a metaphysical activity insofar as it reveals the creative 
essence of existence.229 And in “On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense”230 he remarks 
that art shows itself as a lie or metaphor, so that it makes manifest a fundamental impulse to 
create metaphors [Metapherbildung],231 an “art of dissimulation” [Verstellungskunst] that finds its 
culmination in humanity.232 Hence, the work of art reveals the will to appearance and illusion 
as something even more primordial than truth. Following this, in The Will to Power, in his 
notes on The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche asserts: “The will to appearance, to illusion, to 
deception, to becoming and change (to objectified deception) here counts as more profound, 
primeval, ‘metaphysical,’ than the will to truth, to reality, to mere appearance:  –the last is 
itself a mere will to illusion.”233  
Yet, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche’s perspective on art hinges on a reversal of 
Platonism that privileges the sensible in contraposition to the intelligible. He remarks that 
Nietzsche’s view harbors a metaphysical biologism. He further indicates that Nietzsche’s 
227 Friedrich Nietzsche, Die Geburt der Tragödie. Schriften zur Literatur und Philosophie der Griechen (Frankfurt am 
Main und Leipzig: Insel Verlag, 1994). English: "The Birth of Tragedy," in The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, 
ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, trans. Ronald Speirs, 1-116 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999). Hereafter with reference first to the German, then to the English translation.  
228 Ibid., 133/113. “…nur als äesthetisches Phänomen ist das Dasein und die Welt ewig gerechtfertig.” 
229 Nietzsche suggests that we are essentially just forms or images emerging out of a more original creative 
source, nature and life itself, and art is a way of turning our eyes to see ourselves.  
230 Friedrich Nietzsche, "Über Wahrheit und Lüge in Außermoralischen Sinn," in Erkenntnis-Theoretische Schriften 
(Frankfurt am Main: Surkamp Verlag, 1968). English: "On Truth and Lying in a Non-Moral Sense," in The Birth 
of Tragedy and Other Writings, ed. Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs, trans. Ronald Speirs, 139-153 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999). Hereafter cited with reference first to the German, then to the English 
translation. 
231 Ibid., 108-09/150. 
232 Ibid., 98/141. 
233 Friedrich Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht. Versuch einer Umwerthung aller Werthe (1884/88), Kindle Edition 
(project.gutenberg.de), Vol. II (Leipzig: Alfred Kröner Verlag, 1922), Section 853, III. English: The Will to Power, 
trans. Walter Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1968), 453.“Der Wille zum Schein, zur 
Illusion, zur Täuschung, zum Werden und Wechseln (zur objektivirten Täuschung) gilt hier als tiefer, ursprünglicher, 
»metaphysischer« als der Wille zur Wahrheit, zur Wirklichkeit, zum Schein: -letzterer ist selbst bloß eine Form des Willens zur 
Illusion.” 
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aesthetics is a “masculine aesthetics” that sees the work of art as expression of an active 
creative will. It is contrary to Kant’s aesthetics, in which the experience of beauty is passive, 
based on the experience of the spectator.234 Thus, Heidegger concludes, insofar it is still 
dominated by metaphysical dualisms, and perpetuates the domain of “aesthetics,” 
Nietzsche’s approach to the work of art is questionable. As Heidegger explains in the 
“Epilogue” to the essay on the work of art, a proper approach to the essence of the work of 
art must challenge aesthetics –which is an extension of metaphysics –, and inscribe the 
problematic of art within the more general question of being.   
In his lectures on Nietzsche, however, Heidegger argues that Nietzsche’s aesthetics 
reveals an important aspect of the work of art: “rapture” [Rausch].235 For Nietzsche, art 
carries out a rapturous movement, whereby there is a feeling of excess and intensification of 
the powers of life.236 And yet, as John Sallis remarks, the problem is that Nietzsche considers 
only one side of the rapture, which has to do with the forming or ordering of the “chaos 
within oneself.”237 Nietzsche’s onesidedness is problematic because he ignores the proper 
ontological dimension of the work of art, which is related to the other side of rapture, the 
movement beyond oneself into the domain of the sensible.238 As I have already indicated, 
Heidegger notes that the rapture of the work is a rapture of the beautiful. It is the shining of 
being, just as Plato claims in the Phaedrus. Heidegger expresses Plato’s view as follows: “The 
beautiful is what advances most directly upon us and captivates us. While encountering us as 
                                                
234 See Nietzsche I and II, 67-68/70-71.   
235 See ibid., 91-100/92-101. 
236 With regard to this point, Diego D’Angelo explains that one may be related to beings as a whole, exposed in 
the “there” of existence, thanks to the rapture of bodily attunements. See "Die Schwelle des 'Lebe-Wesens': 
Überlegungen zur Leibinterpretation Heideggers in der Nietzsche-Abhandlung," 76.  
237 John Sallis, Transfigurements (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), 168. 
238 For a detailed interpretation of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche and Plato’s Phaedrus in relation the notion 
of rapture see John Sallis (Transfigurements, Chapter Eight).  
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a being, however, it at the same time liberates us to the view upon Being.”239 Thus, 
Heidegger insists that our comportment towards the beautiful is an ecstatic rapture that 
draws us beyond ourselves, as a view upon being.  
In the Introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger gives some important indications in 
relation to this point. He says that “the Being of all beings is what is most seemly [das 
Scheinedste] –that is, what is most beautiful, what is most constant in itself, what the Greeks 
meant by ‘beauty’ is discipline.”240 Thus, one can see that the rapture of beauty, as a view 
upon being, is a “disciplined” rapture that remains within what is constant: the utmost 
shining that exceeds all visibility. It is the clearing that underlies the appearing of things, and 
which encompasses our own grounds. Along these lines, some pages after this reflection on 
the Greek concept of beauty as discipline, in the context of a meditation on Parmenides’ 
poem, Heidegger notes that an apprehension of being comes along with the appearance of 
beings, and remarks the following: “Furthermore, if appearing belongs to Being as physis, 
then the human as a being, must belong to this appearing. And since Being-human amid 
beings as a whole obviously constitutes a distinctive way of Being, the distinctiveness of 
Being-human grows from the distinctive way of belonging to Being as the apprehending that 
holds sway.”241 I take this to mean that things and my own being shine or appear through a 
certain understanding of being, which is impossed upon us as we both belong to physis, but 
that in humans implies a sense of withdrawal, not mere continuity with nature.  
In relation to this point, one can see that there are significant intersections with 
Merleau-Ponty’s approach to the notion of flesh. For Heidegger shows that we come to 
239 Nietzsche I and II, 199196. “Das Schöne ist jenes, was am unmittelbarsten auf uns zukommt und uns berückt. Indem es uns 
als Seiendes trifft, entrückt es uns zugleich in den Blick aus das Sein.”  
240 Introduction to Metaphysics, 140/140.  
241 Ibid., 148/148. “Wenn jedoch zum Sein als φύσις das Erscheinen gehört, muß der Mensch als Seiender disem Erscheinen 
zugehören. Da wiederum das Menschsein inmitten des Seienden im Ganzen offenbar ein eigenes Sein ausmacht, wird die eigenheit 
des Menschseins aus der Eigenart seiner zugehörigheit zum Sein als dem waltenden Erscheinen erwachsen.” 
 98 
encounter beings in the primordial openness of nature, of being, which is, in fact, a 
withdrawal of being: no-thingness. Accordingly, as I shall argue in the next section, what is 
essentially sensible, what belongs to physis, to primordial nature, is not a “physical” plane of 
pure visibility –a metaphysical substrate –, as opposed to the intelligible, but rather a sensible 
being with dimensionality and depth.   
The Shining of the Earth and Its Limits      
Beauty is the utmost shining of being: an intensive shining, whose intensity traverses 
us. It reveals our belonging to the world, as well as our departure from being, from the 
ground. This shining of being is somehow preserved in the work of art. For the work of art 
lets what is visible occur as dis-closure, as primordial truth. Along these lines, one might say 
that the work of art is a display of visibility in general. It is itself not-visible, not-manifest: 
no-thing. One may also say that the work is beautiful insofar as it is an outline of visibility, 
which may not be reduced to something visible in particular. In The Origin of the Work of Art, 
Heidegger articulates this relation between beauty and truth –as disclosure –as follows: 
Thus in the work of art it is truth, not merely something true, that is at work. The picture 
that shows the peasant shoes, the poem that says the Roman fountain, do not simply make 
manifest what these isolated beings as such are –if indeed they manifest anything at all; 
rather they make unconcealment as such happen in regard to beings as a whole. The more 
simply and essentially the shoes are engrossed in their essence, the more directly and 
engagingly do all beings attain a greater degree of being along with them. That is how self-
concealing Being is cleared. Light of this kind joins its shining to and into the work, is the 
beautiful. Beauty is one way in which truth essentially occurs as unconcealment.242   
 
              
                                                
242The Origin of the Work of Art, 43/181. “Im Werk ist die Wahrheit am Werk, also nicht nur ein Wahres. Das Bild, das 
die Bauernschuhe zeigt, das Gedicht, das den römischen Brunnen sagt, bekunden nicht nur, was dieses vereinzelte Seiende als dieses 
sei, falls sie je bekunden, sondern sie lassen Unverborgenheit als solche im Bezug auf das Seiende im Ganzen geschehen. Je einfacher 
und wesentlicher nur das Schuhzeug, je ungeschmückter und reiner nur der Brunnen in ihrem Wesen aufgehen, um so unmittelbarer 
und einnehmender wird mit ihnen alles Seiende seiender. Dergestalt ist das sichverbergende Sein gelichtet. Das so geartete Licht fügt 
sein Scheinen ins Werk. Das ins Werk gefügte Scheinen ist das Schöne. Schönheit ist eine Wiese, wie Wahrheit als 
Unverborgenheit west.”       
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This passage indicates that it is truth itself that is at work in the work of art. The 
work of art is the event of unconcealment and is not sheer manifestation. Fundamentally, 
this means that no particular being, no particular truth, is manifest in the work. Rather, what 
is manifest is an inextricable relation to the totality of the world, i.e., to being in general. As 
Heidegger puts it, what shines as beautiful is dis-closure, un-concealment, Unverborgenheit, the  
“opening” of the “closure” of things. Does this mean that the uniqueness of the being that is 
“manifest” in the work evaporates? It does not. As I have already indicated, things have their 
own limits precisely insofar as they set themselves against the grounds of life, of the earth. 
Whatever appears in the work is preserved in its ground, in the earth, in a unique, “non-
representable,” relation. 
Heidegger suggests that “the self-concealing Being” [das sichverbergende Sein] shines in 
the work in the simplest presencing of the thing: the peasant shoes shine through the colors, 
the Roman fountain appears through the sounding of the poetic word. The earthly 
dimension of things comes into the open as that which closes itself off, as something set 
within limits. Yet, this does not mean that the thing is contained as a thing in itself. Rather, 
this means that the limits of things emerge as foldings of the earth that remain within a 
common element. Indeed, Heidegger defines the earth as closed off, but also as an element 
that allows things to flow together in reciprocal accord, in “unison” [Einklang], just as if the 
earth were the invisible milieu of primordial nature, of being.243 He says:  
All things of earth, and the earth itself as a whole, flow together into a reciprocal accord. But 
this confluence is not a blurring of their outlines. Here there flows the bordering stream, 
restful within itself, which delimits everything present in its presencing. Thus in each of the 
self-secluding things there is the same not-knowing-of-one-another. The earth is essentially 
                                                
243 On the multiple meanings of the concept of earth in Heidegger, see Michael Haar, The Song of the Earth: 
Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1994). Michael Haar shows that Heidegger’s concept of earth has multiple meanings, and entails references 
both to the concrete support of the work of art, and the ontological dimension of nature, physis, and the 
withdrawal of being. See also Vallega-Neu, The Bodily Dimension…, 150, n.27. 
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self-secluding. To set forth the earth means to bring it into the open region as the self-
secluding.244 
As Heidegger explains, the earth is the “bordering stream” that preserves the flowing 
or circulation of things, and sets up the limits of things. One might say that this flowing of 
things and earth occurs as a simultaneous movement of imbrication and difference, in what 
may be characterized as a polyphonic milieu. For things are like mirrors of the earth, second 
level grounds. They set up new modes of self-seclusion against the fundamental, absolute 
ground that is the earth. In this sense, the earth appears as an ambiguous element, one that is 
both primordial ground and the principle of individuation of things, at once absolutely 
general and absolutely singular. Indeed, earthly things may be brought to accord because 
they are rooted in the same earth. And yet, having roots in the earth, things are never fully 
present: they have depth, and shadows.  
Thus, as was suggested above, Heidegger’s characterization of the earth bears 
important similarities to Merleau-Ponty’s concept of flesh. Indeed, the structure of the flesh 
involves the reciprocal intertwining of the visible and the invisible. It makes possible the 
exchange or circulation of things, without effacing their differences. The flesh is, in this 
sense, the primordial element or milieu of the world, which Merleau-Ponty occasionally 
describes as a magma that constitutes men and nature, space and time.245 This element is 
vicariously revealed, for example, in Proust’s “sensible ideas:” musical ideas opaque to 
intelligence, tenebrous, with shadows.246 This element names the reversibility of things, their 
244 Ibid., 33/172-173. “Alle Dinge der Erde, sie selbst im Ganzen, verströmen sich in einem wechselweisen Einklang. Aber 
dieses Verströmen ist kein Verwischen. Hier strömt der in sich beruhte Strom des Ausgrenzens, das jedes Anwesende in sein 
Anwesen begrenzt. So ist in jedem der sichverschließenden Dinge das gleiche Sich-nicht-kennen. Die Erde her-stellen heißt: sie ins 
Offene bringen als das Sichverschließende.”  
245 Notes de cours, 211. 
246 Ibid., 193. The importance of Proust’s “sensible ideas” in Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of the flesh, also in 
relation with Heidegger’s work, is analyzed by Mauro Carbone in The Thinking of the Sensible. 
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hollowness, which is at the same time pregnancy of meaning. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty 
says: “This mixture is chaos, but it is also the proliferation of meaning.”247  
I will examine Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh later, for now suffice it to show that, 
for Heidegger, the earth works as a grounding element that resonates in things, in such a way 
that they are preserved within what we should call “radiant” limits, the limits that shelter 
things amidst the open.248 Along these lines, one could say that things shine as things insofar 
as they carry the earth, their own shadow, granted that we understand that shadows are not 
opposed to light like terms in a dialectical relation.249 The earth emerges, in this sense, as that 
which remains constant in the appearing of things. Heidegger occasionaly refers to this 
earthly dimension of things as a will to remain the same, to persevere in being. He says, for 
example, that “color shines and wants only to shine.”250  
One should note, however, that the strife between earth and world, which to some 
extent may also be understood as the intertwining of the visible and the invisible, light and 
shadow, is not to be thought in dialectical terms precisely because light and shadow are 
structural dimensions of the truth,251 of the historical movement of the truth of being; that is 
to say, they are both in being.252  
                                                
247 Ibid., 213, my translation. “Le melange, c’est le chaos, mais c’est aussi la prolifération du sens.” 
248 As John Sallis suggests, the earth is the secluding dimension of the truth, which provides a shelter for beings 
and, thereby, is the support of the there in which things come to be in the open (See Transfigurements, 186).  
249 See Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 138/129.   
250 The Origin of the Work of Art, 33/172; my italics. “Die Farbe leuchtet auf und will nur leuchten.” 
251 Considering his own determination of dialectic as an essentially unstable thinking, Merleau-Ponty suggests, 
however, that Heidegger’s thought is dialectical insofar as it remains “on the way,” for Heidegger rejects 
dialectique only insofar as it privileges the light. See Notes de cours, 146-147. 
252 As Vallega-Neu points out, “Heidegger maintains that in order to be sheltered in a true entity, the original 
strife of truth must be transformed into the strife between world and earth”(The Bodily Dimension…, 92). She 
further explains that although initially Heidegger insists on distinguishing “between the strife between world 
and earth on the one hand and concealmet and unconcealment on the other hand,” throught the thinking of 
the fourforld he “moves toward a thinking that incorporates more and more the simultaneity of being and 
beings” (150, n.23). 
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In fact, two decades after writing his essay on the work of art, in the Bremen and 
Freiburg Lectures, Heidegger returns to these themes. He underscores that disclosure and 
concealment are yoked together in the being of things. He refers to Leonardo’s saying, “light 
reveals, shadow conceals,”253 and remarks that when one experiences things in a thoughtful, 
“commemorative” [andenkend] way, “they hint at a world out of which they are what they 
are.”254 This point is further illustrated in relation to Cézanne’s work: “when, for example, 
Cézanne lets the montagne St. Victoire appear in his paintings again and again and the 
mountain presences as the mountain ever more simply and powerfully, then this does not lie 
solely, nor even primarily, in that Cézanne discovers himself ever more decisively through 
his painterly technique, but rather in that the ‘topic’ moves, i.e., speaks, ever more simply.”255  
Heidegger shows, thus, that things have a dynamic and qualitative depth: their 
shining is already a primordial logos. That is to say, the meaning of things cannot be 
exhausted in just one frame, one vision, because their being constantly renews itself. And, 
one may add, being, as primordial nature, is every day just as it was on the first day.256 Along 
these lines, one might say that the artist’s work speaks the truth insofar as it follows the 
inexhaustible “claim” of the enigma of the visible, the enigma of the being of things. This 
enigma of the visible is each time inaugural: a recurrent beginning.257 In relation to this point, 
                                                
253 Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 138/129-30. “Das Licht zeigt, der Schatten verbirgt.” 
254 Ibid., 139-130. “…sie winken in eine Welt, aus der sie sind was, sie sind.” 
255 Ibid., 139/130-31. “Wenn z.B. Cézanne immer wieder die montagne St Victoire auf seinen Bildern erscheinen läßt und der 
Berg als der Berg immer einfacher und machtiger anwest, dann liegt dies nicht nur und nicht in erster Linnie daran, daß Cézanne 
immer entschiedener in seiner Maltechnik findet, sondern daran, daß das »Motiv« immer einfacher bewegt, d.h. spricht…” 
256 This is an idea that will have important resonances in Merleau-Ponty’s thought, and which in the Introduction 
to Metaphysics is expressed as follows: “Everything has always already been said. And yet this ‘same’ possesess, as 
its inner truth, the inexhaustible wealth of that which on every day is as if that day were the first.” “Alles ist 
immer schon gesagt. Aber dieses »dasselbe« hat allerdings den unausschöpfbaren Reichtum dessen zur inneren Wharheit, was jeden 
Tag so ist, als sei es sein erster Tag” (104/102-03). 
257 In Heidegger's Philosophy of Art (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), Julian Young points out that 
Heidegger’s view on art correctly assess that material things possess an “unlimited plenitude,” but he tends to 
identify the earthy dimension of the work, which gives self-subsistence to things and makes them inexhaustible, 
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Heidegger says in the Zollikon seminars: “The artist is capable of hearing this claim more 
purely each and every time such that this claim guides the brush for him and even proffers 
the colors to him. The painter paints what he hears as the appeal of the essence of things.”258 
Hence, one may say that the gestures of the artist follow the movement of things, the 
latencies dormant in their outline, in their figure: the Gestalt. 
Gestalt and Contemplation in the Work of Art    
Beauty is the shining of the form of things, which is also the shining of the Gestalt 
that is set back in the earth, the figure or outline that guides the gestures of the artist. The 
Gestalt is the fixing in place that remains in the state of “not-yet” disclosed. One may say that 
the form or Gestalt of the work of art retrieves the primordial, more primitive shining of 
things: a primordial openness that cannot be inscribed in physical, objective limits.259 It is in 
this context that one should understand the work of art as poetry: Dichtung. Heidegger 
suggests that, in poetizing, humans bring things out of un-concealment in an originary way. 
In this regard, he says that poetry is a mode of comportment that consists in letting the open 
occur and set itself in things: “What poetry as clearing projection, unfolds of unconcealment 
and projects ahead into the rift-design of the figure, is the open region which poetry lets 
happen, and indeed in such a way that only now, in the midst of beings, the open region 
                                                                                                                                            
with merely “tactile,” material qualities (48-49). As we have argued, insofar as the earth remains self-secluded, it 
cannot be characterized as matter, as it is usually understood, for instance, in relation to the work of handicraft.  
258 Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 139-131. “…der Kunstler es vermag, diesen Anspruch je und je reiner zu hören, so daß dieser 
Anspruch ihm den Pinzel führt und die Farben zureicht. Der Maler malt, was er hört, als den Zuspruch des Wesens der Dinge.” 
259 Considering the roots of the problematic relation between visibility and truth in Being and Time, we could 
probably say that the “artistic” form reveals what Diego D’Angelo calls the essential “touch” [Berühren], which 
implies an attuned, concernful relatedness to things, that shines in the truth, in the fundamental truth Dasein 
lives in, and which precedes and makes possible any express manipulation of things or any explicit reference to 
them. See Diego D'Angelo, "Zeigen und Berühren: Der Pragmatische Sinn der Rede bei Heidegger im Hinblick 
auf Aristoteles Auffasung der Wahrheit," Bulletin d'analyse phénoménologique VIII, 6 2012, 
http://popups.ulg.ac.be/bap.htm (accessed 02 01, 2013), 12-13. 
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brings beings to shine and ring out.”260 Heidegger defines the poetic comportment as a 
movement toward the origins of the world. In this movement, what is decisive is an 
abandonment of the will, a “letting-be” that precludes any explanation in terms of passivity 
and activity. The necessary questions, then, concern the determination of this poetic work: 
What type of human action is it? And, in what sense is poetizing a bodily comportment, a 
gesture?  
In the “Addendum” to the essay on the work of art, written in 1956, Heidegger 
clarifies how the term “Ge-Stell” is to be understood in the context of the lecture. He points 
out that it must be distinguished from the meaning this term has in his essay on technology. 
In this case, the term “Ge-Stell” is intrinsically related to the concept of Gestalt, which in turn 
is read in line with the Greek μορφή. He says precisely: “In accordance with what has so far 
been explained, the meaning of the noun Ge-Stell [enframing] used on page 189, is thus 
defined: the gathering of the bringing-forth, of the letting-come-forth-here into the rift-
design as bounding outline (peras). The Greek sense of morphê as Gestalt is made clear by Ge-
Stell so understood.”261  
Heidegger makes reference to the Greek μορφή in order to show that the notion of 
form or Gestalt should not be understood as a sort of objective, material limit that “closes 
off” the thing, but rather as the limit that is present in the thing as an Umriß (πέρασ), an 
outline. That is to say, the Gestalt sets a qualitative or affective limit, just as it happens with 
the lived body, understood as δέμας, another Greek word that Heidegger translates as Gestalt 
260 The Origin of the Work of Art, 60/197.“Was die Dichtung als lichtender Entwurf an Unverborgenheit auseinander faltet 
und in den Riß der Gestalt vorauswirft, ist das Offene, das sie geschehen läßt und zwar dergestalt, daß jetzt das Offene erst 
inmitten des Seienden dieses zum Leuchten und Klingen bringt.”  
261 Ibid., 72/209.“Gemaß dem bisher Erläuterten bestimmt such die Bedeutung des auf S.51gebrauchten Wortes »Ge-stell«: die 
Versammlung des Her-vor-bringens, des Her-vor-ankommen-lassens in den Riß asl Umriß (πέρασ). Durch das so gedachte »Ge-
stell« klärt sich der griechische Sinn von μορφή als Gestalt.” 
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in the Zollikon seminars.262 Thereby, one may say that Heidegger’s reference to the Greek 
notion of form also contains a reference to gestures, that is, to the forms of our actions and 
comportments.263 In line with this, I suggest that the proper forms of things can only be 
given as such to a lived body, a body that bodies forth and gestures. Let me develop this 
argument in more detail.   
Heidegger suggests that the work of art is a privileged instance of the most proper 
mode of human acting, what he calls the “highest doing” ”[höchstes Tun].264 This “highest 
doing” is qualified as such because it is essential, a purely human doing, which does not 
pretend to be more than that. Thereby, what is “highest” is, in a sense, a minimum: the 
doing that is set within the limits of humanity, within the horizon of human temporality. As 
Heidegger expresses it, this essential doing unfolds as pure form: hint, gesture, outline. This 
is what Heidegger suggests when he defines the work of art as “the setting-into-work of 
truth” [Ins Werk-Setzen-der Wahrheit]. To understand this, it is crucial to define “setting.” 
In the lecture on the work of art Heidegger defines the truth as a “setting” into work, 
that is, a fixing in place. Still, the nuances of this definition are explained in detail only in the 
“Addendum.” Indeed, at the beginning of the “Addendum” Heidegger remarks that any 
attentive reader of the lecture must face an “essential difficulty” [wesentliche Schwierigkeit] 
interpreting what the “establishing of the truth” [Feststellen der Wahrheit] means. The difficulty 
has to do with the meaning of “fixing” or “setting.” He says that one should understand this 
setting as an action that lets something happen. As Heidegger explains, the difficulty is 
resolved if we remember that the verb setzen translates the Latin ponere and the Greek θέσις.  
262 See supra., 65-66; and Zollikon Seminars, 116/89. 
263 The Greek μορφή refers to the shape and form of things, the outward appearance, but also to the shapes of 
the body in gestures or gesticulations (see Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, Perseus Project, Kindle 
Version by Handleclassics.com).  
264 The Origin of the Work of Art, 71/208. 
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By means of these terminological specifications Heidegger makes clear that the 
“setting” refers to what is  “admitted into the boundary (peras), brought into the outline.”265 
Indeed, in drawing an outline one lets something appear in its proper limits. As was 
mentioned above, Heidegger qualifies this action as the “highest doing.” He further refers to 
a passage of his lecture “Science and Reflection” [Wissenschaft und Besinnung] (1953),266 in 
which this “highest doing” is determined as a type of life, an ethical possibility: the Greek 
Βίος θεωρητικός.  
Hence, one may say that the setting that takes place in the work of art involves a 
“theoretical” mode of life, in the original Greek sense of the word. As Heidegger explains, 
the concept of theory originally implies a reverential attention to the unconcealment of 
something that presences:267 “If now we think the word theôria in the context of the 
meanings of the words just cited [referring to the terms thea and oraô], then theôria is the 
reverent paying heed to the unconcealment of what presences.”268 Thus, for Heidegger the 
setting of the work of art is dependent on what presences in its presencing, what is not-yet 
present, but is hinted at. Heidegger strenghtens this argument by referring to the original 
Greek meaning of the “temple.” It is the place elevated from the earth, from which one 
could read the signs of the birds and interpret the future. This meaning is partly preserved in 
the Latin “Contemplatio.”   
                                                
265 Ibid., 71/208. “umrissen, in die Grenze eingelassen (πέρασ), in dem Umriß gebracht.”   
266 Martin Heidegger, "Wissenschaft und Besinnung (1953)," in Vorträge und Aufsätze, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von 
Hermann, 37-66 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000). English: "Science and Reflection," in The 
Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lowitt (New York: Harper & Row (Garland 
Publishing), 1977). Let me note that the translation of the title should read “Science and Meditation,” because 
the term “reflection” distorts what Heidegger actually means by “besinnung,” and “meditation” corresponds to 
current translations of this term.  
267 With regard to this, Julian Young examines the sense of holyness that transpires through the work of art, 
underscoring the fact that in the work of art the mysterious, self-secluding dimension of the earth, is that which 
makes something appear as holy, or ‘awesome.’ See Heidegger’s Philosophy of Art, 42.  
268 “Science and Reflection,” 51/164. “Denken wir das Wort θεωρία jetzt aus den zuletzt gennanten Wort bedeutungen, 
dann ist die θεωρία das verehrende Be-achten der Unverborgenheit des Anwesenden.” 
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But, what exactly is present in the work of art? Heidegger responds to this question in 
the course of the essay: the “factum” that the work is, just the “impulse” [Anstoß] of the work 
to remain in the open.269 The τέχνη of the creator is in this sense just a mode of seeing the 
truth, an occasion for the truth to occur, and the will of the preservers [die Bewahrenden] is to 
keep this truth in the open. In both cases, what is at stake is something different to the 
“performance”[leisten] carried out by an individual subject who intends to accomplish 
something in particular. For the work of art is not an object, what one sees is not there in the 
physical surface of the work. Rather, the work of art is a unique event that needs to be 
continuously re-interpreted, for its presence is singular, and it withdraws at any attempt at 
representation or conceptualization.  
Precisely, Heidegger defines τέχνη as a mode of knowing [Wissen] in the original 
Greek sense of “having seen” or apprehending [vernehmen]. He says: “The word technê denotes 
rather a mode of knowing. To know means to have seen, in the widest sense of seeing, 
which means to apprehend what is present as such.”270 Thus, the work of art is a particular 
mode of knowing whereby one lets “oneself be involved” [sicheinlassen] in what comes to 
presence, a peculiar will that is also needed by the preservers of the work. Hence, Heidegger 
remarks, the work of art is a “will to know”, or a will that is itself knowing, and brings us 
down to the grounds of the original contact with the truth, with the world that emerges in 
front of us: “Knowing that remains a willing, and willing that remains a knowing, is the 
existing human being’s ecstatic entry into the unconcealment of being.”271 The work of art is, 
furthermore, a work that is rapturous. It implies the sober “resolution [Ent-Schlossenheit] to go 
269 See The Origin of the Work of Art, 52-53/192. 
270 Ibid., 46/184. “Das Wort τέχνη nennt vielmehr eine Weise des Wissens. Wissen heißt: gesehen haben, in dem Sinne von 
sehen, der besagt: vernehmen des Anwesenden als eines solches.”  
271 Ibid., 55/192. “Das Wissen, das ein Wollen, und das Wollen, das ein Wissen bleibt, ist das ekstatische Sicheinlassen des 
existierenden Menschen in die Unverborgenheit des Seins.”  
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beyond one’s self” [Übersichhinausgehen].272 I take this to mean that in the work of art one lets 
oneself go. In this regard, one may also say that in the work of art one reaffirms one’s 
sensible being, one’s gestural body. In order to further clarify this point, the question that we 
now must ask is: who is the “one” whose “self” is left behind with resoluteness in this case? 
Heidegger gives hints at responding to this question in the course of the “Addendum,” 
referring to some central difficulties from Being and Time. 
Between Being and Human Being: The Ambiguous Character of the Poetic Work 
At the end of the “Addendum” Heidegger indicates that the whole essay on the work 
of art moves “on the path of the question of the essence of being,”273 and it takes up the 
essential question from Being and Time.  Accordingly, he continues, the definition of the work 
of art as “the setting-into-work of truth” must be understood in relation to the fundamental 
“ontological” question of the meaning of being. Heidegger thereby remarks that art belongs 
to the event determining the meaning of being: “It belongs to the appropriate event [Ereignis] by 
way of which the ‘meaning of being’ (see Being and Time) can alone be defined.”274  
If art belongs to the primordial event that sets up the meaning of being, then the 
work of art is the foundation of the world. This means that the work of art is both the origin 
of the world and a part of the world. In short, it is essentially ambiguous. Elaborating on this 
problem, Heidegger gives some indications [Fingerzeugen] –still inadequate, fragmentary 
formulations of this problematic –, underscoring two ambiguities involved in the expression 
“the setting-into-work of truth.”  
                                                
272 Ibid. 
273 Ibid., 73/210.“…auf dem Weg der Frage nach dem Wesen des Seins.” 
274 Ibid., “sie gehört in das Ereignis, aus dem sich erst der »Sinn vom Sein« (vgl. »Sein und Zeit«) bestimmt.”  
109 
The first ambiguity alludes to the “subject” and “object” of the setting.275 On the one 
hand, the work of art is a “setting-into-work of truth” because the truth itself is the “subject” 
producing the work. Heidegger remarks that this is a consideration of the work in terms of 
the Ereignis. Yet, considering that art is a summoning or claim [Zuspruch] to human beings, 
which cannot be without them, the truth is in a sense the “object” of the setting. The truth 
emerges through the work of human beings.276  
The second ambiguity stems from the first one, and is characterized as an ambiguity 
arising from the human relation to art. This ambiguity is that in the “setting-into-work of 
truth” it remains “undecided” [unbestimmt] but “decidable”[bestimmtbar] “who does the setting 
or in what way it occurs.”277 Hence, although in a certain sense human beings produce works 
of art, in another sense it is rather a historical event that is appropriated by human beings. 
This fundamental ambiguity constitutes the work of art as the call for a decision, as an 
interrogation. As Heidegger explains, the ambiguity characteristic of the work of art echoes 
the way in which the relation between humans and being conceals itself. And this constitutes 
a pressing difficulty since Being and Time, which, according to Heidegger, is still in need of an 
adequate formulation. 
  Still, Heidegger’s analysis suggests that historical decisions take place within a 
primordial openness to the world, and a primordial relation to the earth. Along these lines, 
one may say that the origins of historical decisions remain essentially hidden because they 
cannot be inscribed in particular modes of saying or showing. Strictly speaking, no human 
275 Heidegger qualifies his own formulations are mere “indications” [Fingerzeugen], and at the end of the 
“Addendum” he acknowledges that the problem concerning the question of meaning of being, and the relation 
between being and human beings, have not been yet formulated in adequate terms. It is clear, therefore, that 
formulating the problem using terms such as “subject” and “object” is still inadequate, and they must be read 
as formal indications with a tentative character.   
276 See ibid., 74/211. 
277 Ibid., 74/211. “…wer oder was in welcher Weise »setz«.”   
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being has witnessed the origin of a historical world, for this origin cannot be ascribed to 
particular historical facts –any “fact” already presupposes a history. Therefore, the 
primordial saying and showing that gives impulse to history may only be preserved as an 
implicit understanding of being, in such a way that we can never set it forth objectively.  
Based on these premises, one might say that the origin of the world should be 
understood as a mythical, poetic origin, as a leap out of ordinary time. It is, in a sense, a 
somewhat divine, non-mortal, origin. It is in this context that one shall understand the work 
of art as poiesis, and as foundation. And, it seems, these are the reasons why Heidegger 
characterizes the setting of the work of art as a Riß, a “rift-design” that delimits a historical 
world, and which resonates in human actions as an outline, a form, Um-riß. Let me proceed 
to examine this argument.  
The Foundational Gesture of the Work of Art 
The semantic field of the term “Riß” refers to meanings such as “delineatio, scissura, 
fissura, rima,”278 the verb reißen alludes to the action of tearing apart, including actions such 
as the opening of furrows in the land, the drawing of lines or of scriptural characters, the 
projection of signs, or even the accomplishing of rapid and violent movements.  
As Heidegger puts it, the rift-design [Riß] sets itself in the strife between world and 
earth. It is a movement in which a historical people mirrors its own being and, at the same 
time, brings forth the “face” of things. The work of art is a project, an outline that somehow 
shapes the world in establishing separations and divisions of the earth: furrows. The work of 
art is, so to speak, an action that sketches traits in the sensible world, and calls for a public, 
communal response. This is, for example, what Heidegger suggests in the following passage:   
278 See the entry to the term Riß (Risz) in the Grimm Wörterbuch. 
111 
The temple, in its standing there, first gives to things their look and to men their outlook on 
themselves. This view remains open as long as the work is a work, as long as the god has not 
fled from it. It is the same with the sculpture of the god, a votive offering of the victor in the 
athletic games. It is not a portrait whose purpose is to make it easier to realize how the god 
looks; rather, it is a work that lets the god himself be present and thus is the god himself. The 
same holds for the linguistic work. In the tragedy nothing is staged or displayed theatrically, 
but the battle of the new gods against the old is being fought. The linguistic work, 
originating in the speech of the people, does not refer to this battle, it transforms the 
people’s saying so that now every living word fights the battle and put up for decision what 
is holy and what unholy, what great and small, what lofty and what flightly, what master and 
what slave (see Heraclitus fragment 53).279  
This passage describes two main scenarios of the strife: the temple and the tragedy, 
for the sculpture belongs to the sacred space of the temple. What these two “works” have in 
common is the call for a collective ritual, set in a space torn apart from the ordinary space of 
everydayness. And yet, these rituals transfigure the ordinary, becoming part of the “living 
word” and, also, we might say, of our living movements and actions, our gestures. Along 
these lines, one may distinguish two basic levels of the setting of the strife, two different 
moments of the rift-design. On the one hand, there is the primordial setting of the strife 
between world and earth that occurs in a somewhat mythical time, the time of the work of 
art. This time is essentially past, for it recalls a primordial appropriation of the truth: the first 
and renewed presencing of the world of the work. The second level is a redoubling and 
279 The Origin of the Work of Art, 29/168-69.“Der Temple gibt in seinem Dastehen den Dingen erst ihr Gesicht und den 
Menschen erst die Aussicht auf sich selbst. Diese sicht bleibt so lange offen, als das Werk ein Werk ist, so lange als der Gott nicht 
aus ihm geflohen. So steht es auch mit dem Bildwerk des Gottes, das ihm der Sieger im Kampfspiel weiht. Es ist kein Abbild, 
damit man an ihm leichter zur Kenntniss nehme, wie der Gott aussieht, aber es ist ein Werk, das den Gott selbst anwesen läßt 
und so der Gott selbst ist. Dasselbe gilt vom sprachwerk. In der Tragödie wird nichts auf –und forgeführt, sondern der Kampf der 
neuen Götter gegen die alten wird gekämpft. Indem das Sprachwerk im Sagen des Volkes aufsteht, redet es nicht über diesen 
Kampf, sondern verwandelt das Sagen des Volkes dahin, daß jetzt jedes wesentliche Wort diesen Kampf führt und zur 
Entscheidung stellt, was heilig ist und was unheilig, was groß und was klein, was wacker und was feig, was edel und was flüchtig, 
was Herr und was Knetch (vgl. Heraklit, Fragm. 53).”   
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appropriation of the first, a continuation and response whereby the strife is set in living 
words and gestures, in everyday saying and showing.280  
One might say that this appropriation of the work of art in everyday speech and 
gestures is a redoubling that preserves the impulse, the transformative potentialitites of the 
first. It is not a dead imitation or copy. This means that the two moments are not two 
separate spheres of reality, for the second moment preserves in a dormant way the poetic 
transformative dimension of the first, it is dormant poetry. And the work of art preserves 
vividly this poetic potentiality insofar as it is kept alive in a tradition. Along these lines, one 
might say that the work of art bears testimony to the original institution of meaning in 
history. This is why Heidegger understands the work of art as poetic foundation of the 
world.  
Indeed, at the end of the essay on the work of art, Heidegger declares that the work 
of art is fundamentally poetic: “Art as the setting-into-work of truth, is poetry.”281 In this 
case the notion of poiesis is understood in a wider sense as a fundamental comportment that 
determines our relation to the truth: “Not only the creation of the work is poetic, but equally 
poetic, though in its own way, is the preserving of the work; for a work is in actual effect as a 
work only when we remove ourselves from our common place routine and move into what 
is disclosed by the work, so as to bring our own essence itself to take a stand in the truth of 
beings.”282  
280 In the passage in question, Heidegger does not talk about gestures, but the reference to theatre indicates that 
the gestures of theatre may be preserved in everyday life, just as the words of poetry are preserved in living 
speech.   
281 Ibid., 199/62. “Die Kunst ist als das Ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit Dichtung.”  
282 Ibid.“Nicht nur das Schaffen des Werkes ist dichterish, sonder ebenso dichterich, nur in seiner eigenen Weise, ist auch das 
Bewahren des Werkes; denn ein Werk ist nur als ein Werk Wirklich, wenn wir uns selbst unserer Gewöhnlichkeit entrücken und 
in das vom Werk Eröffnete einrücken, um so unser Wesen selbst in der Wahrheit des Seienden zum Stehen zu bringen.”  
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As Heidegger explains, the work of art is poetic inasmuch as it removes the ground 
of what is customary for us, bringing us back to the primordial, unsettling truth underlying 
our familiar bonds with the world. Borrowing Merleau-Ponty’s vocabulary, one can explain 
this by saying that the work of art stirs the grounds of our “perceptual faith” in the world, to 
such an extent that the world as a whole is somehow re-instituted or re-appropriated. In this 
sense, according to Heidegger, the work of art is foundation, Stiftung. He says: “The essence 
of art is poetry. The essence of poetry in turn, is the founding of truth.”283 Through the 
concept of foundation Heidegger dovetails the notions of poiesis and history, understood as 
Geschick, as destiny, showing that the work of art is artistic or poietic insofar as it institutes a 
world within the world. In this regard, as Heidegger remarks, the poetic dimension of the 
work of art hinges on language: the inaugural language constituting a tradition. Heidegger 
underpins the historical potential of poetry, in its primordial relation to language, in light of 
three basic meanings of the concept of foundation, Stiftung: “founding as bestowing, 
founding as grounding, and founding as beginning.”284 
Elaborating on the concept of Stiftung, Heidegger first remarks that the work of art is 
donation or bestowing, which undermines what is taken for granted as real, unquestionable 
and evident. He says precisely: 
The setting-into-work of truth thrusts up the awesome and at the same time thrust down the 
ordinary and what we believe to be such. The truth that discloses itself in the work can never 
be proved or derived from what went before. What went before is refuted in its exclusive 
actuality by the work. What art founds can therefore never be compensated and made up for 
by what is already at hand and available. Founding is an overflow, a bestowal.285  
283 Ibid., 63/199.“Das Wesen der kunst ist die Dichtung. Das Wesen der Dichtung aber ist die Stiftung der Wahrheit.” 
284 Ibid., “Stiften als Schenken, Stiften als Gründen, Stiften als Anfangen.”  
285 Ibid., 63/200.“Das Ins-Werk-Setzen der Wahrheit stöß das Un-geheure auf und stöß zugleich das Geheure und das, was 
man dafür halt, um. Die im Werk sich eröffnende Wahrheit ist aus dem Bisherigen nie zu belegen und abzuleiten. Das bisherige 
wird in seiner Ausschließlichen Wirklichkeit durch das Werk widerlegt. Was die Kunst stiftet, kann deshalb durh das 
Vorhandene und Verfügbare nie aufgewogen und wettgemacht werden. Die Stiftung ist ein Überfluß, eine Schenkung.”   
114 
The setting of the work is described as a hermeneutic movement that comes upon 
what is un-familiar and turns around what is familiar. In this sense, it may appear as a shock, 
a rapturous or excessive movement, Überfluß. Although the work of art has the character of a 
gift and is excess with respect to anything given before, this gift is not to be understood as a 
new thing or a new particular meaning. What the work bestows is not a “present” that now 
becomes available, rather a region of fundamental significations that was already there, 
though veiled. Heidegger indicates this as follows: “Truly poetic projection is the opening up 
of that into which human being as historical is already cast.”286 In a sense, this means that the 
work of art reveals the limits of what is sensible as sensible support, as ground and territory 
that sustains a mode of living. It is a way of working and drawing outlines on the earth, 
whereby a historical people determines the outlook of the world, strives to make a living 
through that which is already set or given: 
This is the earth and, for a historical people, its earth, the self-secluding ground on which it 
rests together with everything that it already is, through still hidden from itself. But this is 
also its world, which prevails in virtue of the relation of human beginning to the 
unconcealment of Being. For this reason, everything with which man is endowed must, in 
the projection, be drawn up from the closed ground and expressly set upon this ground. In 
this way the ground is first grounded as the bearing ground.”287  
Here, Heidegger remarks that the work makes salient the ground as ground by 
actually carrying it, bearing it, that is, by exposing its own limits as work. On the basis of this 
recognition of the limit as limit, the work foreshadows the possibility of death, the relentless 
opaqueness of existence. In a word: finitude. As I have already indicated, the work of art sets 
a rift in the earth and, in so doing, the work reaffirms its belonging to the ground.  
286 Ibid.“Der Wahrhaft dichtende Entwurf ist die Eröffnung von Jenem, worein das Dasein als geschichtliches schon geworfen ist.” 
287 Ibid. “Dies ist die Erde und für ein geschichtliches Volk seine Erde, der sich verschließende Grund, dem es aufruht mit all 
dem, was es, sich selbst noch verborgen, schon ist. Es ist aber seine Welt, die aus dem Bezug des Daseins zur Unverborgenheit des 
Seins waltet. Deshalb muß alles dem Menschen Mitgegebene im Entwurf aus dem verschlossenen Grund heraufgeholt und eigens 
auf diesen gesetz werden. So wird er als tragende Grund erst gegründet.”  
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This latter point is further emphasized in the determination of Stiftung as beginning 
[Anfangen]. Heidegger points out that the work of art is a beginning, understood as a “head 
start” [Vorsprung] that gives a preliminary vision of its own end: “A genuine beginning, as a 
leap, is always a head start, in which everything to come is already leaped over, even if as 
something still veiled. The beginning already contains the end latent within itself.”288 The 
world pre-figured in the work of art, in the poetic event, is historical, and as such it has an 
anticipatory vision of the end to come, it emerges within spatio-temporal limits. In short, the 
work of art projects the end insofar as it draws the outline of a people, it shapes them and 
“individualizes” them.    
     I want to suggest, then, that the concept of foundation defines the comportment 
of a historical people, as it relates understandingly to its own being. A people shapes its own 
being through communal rites and behaviors that have the ambiguous character of gestures 
or outlines stampted in the earth: actions that belong to a self that is always to come, yet to 
be decided. Along these lines, one could say that the different moments of the concept of 
foundation determine the way a people relates to being, to temporality and historicity, in 
analogy to the way Dasein assumes its own situation in resoluteness [Entschlossenheit].  
Specifically, in Being and Time Heidegger describes summarily this point as follows: 
“Coming back to itself, from the future [Zukünftig], resoluteness brings itself to the situation 
in making it present. Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that 
has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself.”289 
Hence, in resoluteness Dasein comes back to its situation as the ecstatic “making present” 
288 Ibid., 64/201. “Der echte Anfang ist als Sprung immer ein Vorsprung, in dem alles kommende schon übersprungen ist, 
wenngleich als ein Verhülltes. Der Anfang enthällt schon verborgen das Ende.”  
289 Being and Time, 431-32/311.“Zukünftig auf sich zurückkommend, bringt sich die Entschlossenheit gegenwärtigend in die 
Situation. Die Gewesenheit entspringt der Zukunft, so zwar, daß die gewesene (besser gewessende) Zukunft die Gegenwart aus sich 
entläßt.” 
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already determined by the “having been” of its thrownness in the world, and the anticipatory 
projection towards the end.  
As I argued above, the work of art appears as the resolute movement of going 
beyond oneself, whereby a people expressly assume their own ground as ground, the site 
wherein they have been thrown historically, and wherein they gain an anticipatory vision of 
their own end. In this way, it seems, through the work of art Heidegger elucidates what the 
resolute comportment of a people means, and how it anticipates or makes possible the 
resolute comportment of the individual Dasein. If this assumption is correct, one can also 
say that Heidegger develops implicitly, in the lecture on the work of art, a revaluation of the 
ontological possibilities of the they. In the section that follows, concluding the present 
chapter, I will elaborate upon this point by venturing a reading of the poetic dimension of 
the they, which remains “unthought” in Being and Time. 
The Poetic Gestures of the They  
The public world of the they is the basis of the self of Dasein. This world constitutes 
the ground of significance, of directives according to which Dasein first determines its own 
self: “The world of Dasein frees the beings encountered for a totality of relevance which is 
familiar to the they in the limits which are established with the averageness of the they. 
Initially, ‘I’ ‘am’ not in the sense of my own self, but I am the others in the mode of the 
they.”290 Heidegger points out that “initially” [Zunächst] we are in the world discovered with 
others. Thus, one may say that the question addressed in the essay on the work of art, which 
                                                
290 Ibid., 172/125. “Die Welt des Daseins gibt das begegnende Seiende auf eine Bewandtnisganzheit frei, die dem Man vertraut 
ist, und in den Grenzen, die mit der Durchsnichtlichkeit des Man festgelegt sind. Zunächst ist dsa faktische Dasein in der 
durchschnittlich entdeckten Mitwelt. Zunächst »bin« nicht »ich« im sinne des eigennen Selbst, sondern die Anderen in der Weise 
des Man.”  
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is about the origin of the work of art, alludes precisely to the structure of this beginning: How 
is it that the public world of the they, the world of a historical people, shapes itself?  
To what extent the initial character of the world of the they relates to the poetic 
disclosure of the world in the poetic work of a people remains unsaid in the essay on the 
work of art, despite the express references to Being and Time. Yet, as was shown above, in 
Being and Time there is a brief mention of poetic speech as the communication of the 
existential possibilities of attunement, which indicates that already in Being and Time 
Heidegger acknowledges the importance of poetry for establishing affective bonds with 
others.291  
One should note, however, that it is questionable whether “a people” could be 
simply identified with the they, particularly because the “They-self” is essentially dispersive, 
and the notion of people implies unity. However, the two notions are closely related, to the 
extent that the notion of a people gives a sense of unity and form to the public world we 
share with others, and which in Being and Time was characterized in terms of the they. For if 
the work of art is the sober resolution to go beyond “oneself,” and the work of art involves 
the totality of a people, then it seems that in the work of art there is the possibility of an 
“authentic,” resolute existence pertaining to a people. And yet, Heidegger says in Being and 
Time that authenticity presupposes the domain of the they, the public world of visibility and 
opinion. Thus, let me explore particularly how the domain of the they prefigures the 
possibility of a poetic comportment.  
Despite being inconspicuous, somehow invisible, the they functions as a “self” 
whose comportment undergoes historical transformations, without being a “collectivity” 
291 Regarding the intrinsic relation between attunement and art, Heidegger also gives important indications in 
Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, wherein he defines creativity as the freedom that supports a burden “that 
weighs upon man’s overall mood, so that he comes to be in a mood of melancholy” (270/182). 
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understood as an aggregation of individual Daseins. In Being and Time Heidegger says: “Of 
course, the they is as little objectively present as Dasein itself. The more openly the they 
behaves, the more slippery and hidden it is, but then too the less it is nothing at all.”292 What 
is remarkable in this passage, which argues that the they is eminently real, is that the 
“comportment” of the they is determined as gebärden. Heidegger states “…das Man gebärdet,” 
using the verb gebärden as counterpart of the verb verhalten, which in Being and Time generally 
refers to the comportment whereby Dasein relates understandingly to its own being.  
Although my emphasis on this point may seem arbitrary, for Heidegger does not 
emphasize expressly the “gestural” dimension of the comportment of the they, there are 
significant reasons that explain why the verb gebärden may have been used in this particular 
case. Indeed, Heidegger remarks that the they behaves in a way that makes ungraspable and 
hidden its own being the more manifest or public [offensichtlich] it is. That is to say, the they, 
just as Poe’s purloined letter, becomes invisible precisely because of its direct, frontal 
visibility.  
As I have explained previously, in the Zollikon seminars Heidegger points out that 
the etymology of the verb gebärden comes from bären, related to the verbs gebären and gebaren, 
which according to the Grimm Wörterbuch, allude to comportments, modes of production, but 
also gesticulations understood as mimic, disguise or dissimulation, Verstellung.293  
Analyzing the mode of being of the they, Heidegger remarks that it covers up or 
disguises Dasein’s authentic possibilities of disclosure, and does so precisely by constituting 
the common public world of things, the openness of sheer visibility. In explaining the 
292 Ibid., 171/124. “Allerdings ist das Man so wenig vorhanden wie das Dasein überhaupt. Je offensichtlicher sich das Man 
gebärdet, um so unfaßlicher und versteckter ist es, um so weniger ist es aber auch nichts.”   
293 These are some of the meanings of the verbs gebaren and gebären, given in the Grimm Wörterbuch, which also 
refers gebaren and verhalten as synonymous.   
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aforementioned reference to the comportment of the they, Heidegger notices that the simple 
unprejudiced everyday  “vision” reveals the they as “the most real subject,”294 even if the 
they never has the solidity of a stone. He thus suggests that our most transparent and 
immediate perceptions and gestures, the perceptual field of what is taken for granted in 
everyday life, hinges on a comportment of this impersonal self. And this comportment, I 
may add, is somehow poetical. 
Indeed, if the they discloses the world in such a way that it conceals its own being,295 
then it has a complex productive or generative capacity. The possibility of disguising and 
deluding presupposes the power to multiply forms, the possibility of transformation, and 
pregnancy. These are all different meanings that, as I have often remarked, belong to the 
semantic field of the verb gebärden.296 In this sense, the world of the they vibrates and seems 
alive; it is a world of light and shadows. 
One might say, then, that Dasein comes to the world, falls into the world of the they 
that was already there, just as falling into life. And this life is pregnant of hidden posibilities 
and forms, in such a way that Dasein’s own self may be constituted through the work that 
unveils them and, at the same time, perpetuates their shadows. For the public world of the 
294 See Being and Time, ibidem. The passage in question, which is the continuation of the previous quotation, is 
the following one: “Dem unvoreingenommenen ontisch-ontologischen »sehen« enthüllt es [das Man] sich als das »realste 
Subjekt« der Alltäglichkeit. Und wenn es nicht zugänglich ist wie ein vorhandener Stein, dann entscheidet das nicht im mindesten 
über seine Seinsart” “To the unprejudiced ontic-ontological ‘eye,’ it reveals itself as the ‘most real subject’ of 
everydayness. And if it is not accessible like an objectively present stone, that is not the least decisive with 
reagard to its kind of being.”  
295 Precisely, the possibility of an authentic disclosure is opened to Dasein against the ground of Verstellungen 
constituted by “das Man”, as is clearly stated in the following passage: “Zunächst ist das Dasein Man und zumeist 
bleibt es so. Wenn das Dasein die Welt eigens endeckt und sich nahebringt, wenn es ihm selbst sein eigentliches Sein erschließt, 
dann vollzieht sich dieses Entdecken von »Welt« und Erschließen von Dasein immer als Wegräumen der Verdeckungen und 
Verdunkelungen, als Zerbrechen der Verstellungen, mit denen sich das Dasein gegen es selbst abriegelt” “Initially, Dasein is the 
they and for the most part it remains so. If Dasein explicitly discovers the world and brings it near, if it 
discloses its authentic being to itself, this discovering of ‘world’ and disclosing of Dasein always comes about 
by clearing away, covering and obscurities, by breaking up the disguises with which Dasein cuts itself off from 
itself” (172-173/125). 
296In Daimon Life, David Farrell Krell also calls attention to this relation between gesturing and giving birth 
entailed in the term gebärden (see Daimon Life, 258). 
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they outlines a world of perception that appears as what is most real. Specifically, Heidegger 
says that the world of the they is real even if it is not as solid as a stone, and the comparison 
with the stone indicates that the they imposses a limit to one’s vision or perception, just as 
natural beings do. In a sense, then, the domain of the they constitutes a ground of 
perception that somehow presupposes the impenetrability of nature, the impossibility of full 
transparency.  
This explains, in my opinion, why Heidegger would define the notion of a people in 
correlation to the notion of earth, for the earth names that which is essentially secluded, and 
may not be fully disclosed, as we stand in the world. What the lecture on the work of art 
would show is that this poetic dimension of the they may not be so ethereal as it may initially 
appear. It is rooted in the earth, it is set within the limits of sensible being: the earth that 
supports the world of visibility and perception. 
Chapter Five: Nature, Art and Gesture in Merleau-Ponty 
The Earth and the Impossible Concept of Nature 
As I argued in the introductory chapter of this dissertation, Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy relentlessly endeavors to return to its living ground, the living world (Lebenswelt), 
the world of perception that founds our acts of reflection and which may be characterized 
also as the “earth” (terre) of thinking.297 In his presentation at the “Société française de 
Philosophie” in 1946, “The Primacy of Perception,” Merleau-Ponty declares that perception 
cannot be determined in light of the classical distinction between matter and form, for in 
perception matter is itself “pregnant (prégnante) with its form.”298 Furthermore, he shows that 
perception constitutes the ground of thinking, for perception functions as the “nascent 
logos”299 on the basis of which we determine the meaning of things in general.300 He says, 
therefore, that “the experience of perception is our presence at the moment when things, 
truths, values, are constituted for us.”301 This nascent logos of perception is not to be 
relinquished in more elevated experiences of science and rationality. As Merleau-Ponty 
expresses it, perception remains as the ground supporting the virtual, ideal world that 
appears to be purely human. In the discussion following the aforementioned presentation, 
Merleau-Ponty clarifies that although the ultimate roots of science and thinking lie on the 
297 In the presentation at the “Société française de Philosophie,” published as “The Primacy of Perception”, 
Merleau-Ponty expressly claims that he intends to bring rationality “down to earth.” See “The Primacy of 
Perception,” 34/90. See also Ammar Zeifa, "Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty; The Sense of the Earth and the 
Earth of the Sense," Phenomenology and the human positioning in the cosmos; the life-world, nature, earth, 2013: 255-289, 
257).  
298 Ibid, 39/92. 
299 Ibid., 56/101. 
300 Developing further this idea, and referencing Husserl, in his lectures on nature, Merleau-Ponty makes 
reference to the ground of the Lebenswelt as a “logos of the aesthetic world” (Nature, 104/72). We will examine 
this point in more detail in subsequent sections of the present work.     
301 The Primacy of Perception, 56/101. “…la experience de la perception nous remet en presence du moment où se constituent 
pour nous les choses, les vérités, les biens…” 
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perceived world, this does not imply that our experience is restricted to it. He explains this 
point by saying: “I did not mean to say that the perceived world, in the sense of the world of 
colors and forms, is the totality of our universe. There is the ideal or cultural world. I have 
not diminished its original character; I have only tried to say that it is somehow created on 
the face of the earth.”302 Thus, Merleau-Ponty suggests, although one may inhabit the ideal 
worlds of culture as if it were independent of  “material” conditions, the world emerges in 
fact against the ground of the earth, the background of a “nonhuman nature.”303 In other 
words, one may say that thinking can fly into ideal worlds because it carries within it an 
earthly ground that supports it, which is its fundamental basis. The questions that arise here 
are: how does Merleau-Ponty articulate the relationship between thinking and the nonhuman 
ground of nature? How does he overcome a philosophy of consciousness? What are the 
links he finds between human gestures and actions and the earth?  
Already in the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty intends to bring knowledge 
back to its beginning, its moment of birth in “the sensible as sensible,”304 and he also 
acknowledges that nature constitutes a fundamental ground of thinking, one that is 
inherently opaque. Indeed, at the time, Merleau-Ponty was already familiar with Husserl’s 
1934 text “Foundational Investigations on the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of 
Nature: The Originary Ark, the Earth does not Move,”305 which is also a decisive reference 
302 Ibid., 76/111. “Je n’ai pas voulu dire pour autant que le monde perçu, au sens de monde des couleurs et des formes, fût la 
totalité de notre univers. Il y a le monde idéal ou culturel: je n’ai pas diminué l’originalité, j’ai seulement voulu dire qu’il se fait en 
quelque sorte à ras de terre.” 
303 Ibid., 56/101. 
304 Ibid. 
305 Edmund Husserl, „Umsturz der kopernikanischen Lehre in der gewöhnlichen weltanschaulichen 
Interpretation. Die Ur-Arche Erde bewegt sich nicht. Grundlegende Untersuchungen zum 
phänomenologischen Ursprung der Körperlichkeit der Raumlichkeit der Natur im ersten 
naturwissenschaftlichen Sinne. Alles notwendiges Anfangsuntersuchungen (1934),“ in Philosophical Essays in 
Memory of Edmund Husserls, 307-325 (New York: Greenwood, 1968). English: "Foundational Investigations on 
the Phenomenological Origin of the Spatiality of Nature: The Originary Ark, the Earth does not Move," in 
Husserl at the Limits of Philosophy. Including Texts by Edmund Husserl, ed. Leonard Lawlor and Bettina Bergo, trans. 
123 
in his lectures on Nature ten years later. In the Phenomenology of Perception, making a brief 
reference to this Husserlian fragment,306 Merleau-Ponty counterpoises the Husserlian earth, 
which is obscurely imbricated in our being, to Brunchwig’s transparent ideal of universe.307 
Yet, on this occasion, the problematic of the earth and nature receives little attention, and it 
is not thematized as part of an ontological research. Is it, perhaps, because such a research 
on nature would shatter the grounds of the Phenomenology of Perception? Or is it because at the 
time Merleau-Ponty may have endorsed without criticism one of the problematic outcomes 
of Husserl’s fragment, the one that, as John Sallis remarks, leaves the earth “…suspended 
from transcendental life, from constituting subjectivity”?308 I will not attempt to respond 
these questions specifically, but rather use them as guidelines for understanding Merleau-
Ponty’s turn towards the ontology of the flesh.  
As I have often indicated, the sensible as “moment du naissance” draws phenomenology 
toward the limits of an obscure region, the sphere of the earth, nature and what Merleau-
Ponty sometimes calls wild being. This means that the world of perception has a dark side 
that is irreducible to the world of consciousness: the side that is rooted in nature. Thus, the 
problem of perception leads to the question concerning the being of nature as such. For this 
reason, it seems, if thinking were to explore this dark side of perception, the roots of 
perception in nature, it must necessarily tread upon the question concerning the meaning of 
being in general. In this sense, one could probably say that once Merleau-Ponty embarks on 
the exploration of the world of perception, he is already on the path to ontology. Let me, 
Leonard Lawlor and Bettina Bergo (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2002). Hereafter I will refer to 
this text as “Foundational Investigations.” 
306 In his Introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry, Derrida explaines that this text is, indeed, a fragment. See 
Jacques Derrida, Edmund Huserl's Origin of Geometry: An Introduction, trans. John P. Leavy Jr. (Lincoln and 
London: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 85, n.88. See also John Sallis, Double Truth, 43-44. 
307 See Phenomenology of Perception, 85/73. See also Emmanuel de Saint Aubert, Le scénario cartésien (Paris: Vrin, 
2005), 64. 
308 John Sallis, Double Truth, 52. 
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then, start by exploring this movement towards ontology in the trajectory of Merleau-Ponty’s 
work.   
In his earlier work Merleau-Ponty admits that the phenomenology of perception is a 
paradoxical task, for perception involves both immanence and transcendence. Despite the 
fact that he acknowledges the complexities of this paradoxical task, at the time Merleau-
Ponty investigates only one side of the paradox, the one that corresponds to incarnated 
consciousness. Specifically, he considers the way in which the world is integrated in 
perception, and he does not delve into the “outside” of consciousness. Nevertheless, as 
Merleau-Ponty indicates years later in one of his lecture-notes on Nature, the analysis of 
perception and its cardinal paradoxes requires an exploration of the counterpart of 
subjectivity and consciousness. For philosophy is “…a will to confront human artifice with 
its outside, with nature.”309  
Merleau-Ponty undertakes the study of the concepts of earth and nature in his 
lectures at the Collège de France (1956-1959) some ten years after the Phenomenology of 
Perception. His historical analyses show that the idea of nature has been predominantly 
developed within the frameworks of causality and finalism. Against this tendency, and in line 
with thinkers such as Schelling and Husserl, Merleau-Ponty argues that nature resists any 
attempt at conceptualization. For nature cannot be posited as an object: it is behind us, 
working in us through the body.310 This means that the thinking of nature as such must begin 
with the body, for it is our body that remains closer to the fundamental level of nature as 
ground. Merleau-Ponty finds a decisive articulation of this point in Husserl, particularly in 
309 Nature, 119/85. “…une volonté de confronter l’ artifice humaine à son dehors, à la Nature.”   
310 See ibid., 117/83. Rejecting a teleological enframing of nature, Merleau-Ponty will also underscore the fact 
that nature resists representation to such an extent, that it is not even comparable to the vision we gain of it in 
the work of art, just as Kant intended to do (117/87). 
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Ideas II (1928)311 and the  “Foundational Investigations.” Let me now move on to examine 
Merleau-Ponty’s reading of these texts. 
Body and Nature in Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Husserl 
As Merleau-Ponty expresses it, Husserlian phenomenology looks for an original 
contact with the world, prior to the constitution of the I-subject.312 In this way, Merleau-
Ponty continues, Husserl is led to investigate the intentional structures of an original 
passivity preceding the secondary passivity of habit. This original passivity is encrypted in the 
primordial world of perception that is essentially embodied, Leibhaft.313 Thus, the 
phenomenological analysis of the body is of most importance in determining the 
foundations of intentionality. In Merleau-Ponty’s words: “So that there be something, it 
must be presented to an incarnated subject, Subjecktleib.”314  
What does being an incarnated subject mean? Merleau-Ponty explains this problem 
recalling a central argument from the Phenomenology of Perception. He says that once I perceive 
an object there is consciousness of the possibilities of action or movement that belong to 
it.315 He remarks that my own body is never given solely as an object and, thereby, that my 
awareness of my own body cannot be fixed. That is to say, my body is essentially felt as a 
fleeting power or capacity: “The awareness that I have of my body is a sliding awareness, the 
feeling of a power, of a being-able-to.”316 This “sliding awareness” reveals the body as a site 
311 Edmund Husserl, Ideen zur einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie. Zweites Buch: 
Phänomenologische Untersuchungen zur Konstitution, ed. Marly Biemel, Vol. Husserliana IV (The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1952). English, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, trans. Richard 
Rojcewicz and André Schuwer, Vol. Second Book (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000). Hereafter 
cited with reference first to the German, then to the English translation.  
312 See Nature, 103/72. 
313 Ibid., 105/73. See also Husserl’s Ideas II, 61.  
314 Ibid., 106/74. “Pour qu’il y ait une chose, il faut qu’elle soit présentée à un sujet incarné, Subjektleib.” 
315 Ibid. 
316 Ibid. 107/74. “La conscience que j’ai de mon corps est une conscience glissante, le sentiment d’un pouvoir.” 
126 
of passage, the basic structure enabling the transit or circulation of appearances: “My body is 
that organizer of a ‘transitional synthesis.’ I organize with my body an understanding of the 
world, and my relationship with my body is not that of a pure I, which would successively 
have two objects, my body and the thing, but rather I live in my body, and by means of it I 
live in the things.”317  
As Merleau-Ponty explains, the body is not a central organizer of things that may be 
reified, as the body carries out a “transitional synthesis” it makes me live in things. Thus, 
following on from his reading of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty suggests that things are just a 
moment of the carnal unity between my body and the world. And, therefore, the “incarnated 
subject,” the Subjektleib, is a paradoxical subject whose being should not be restricted to the 
sphere of subjectivity, for it is, essentially, openness to the world. 
One could probably say, then, that the body is the reduplication or redoubling of the 
fabric of things, a fold in the sensible. This redoubling of the sensible, however, can by no 
means be schematized in terms of the division between mind and body. Rather, the 
redoubling of the sensible implies that my body is itself sensitive (excitable), before potential 
interventions of the mind, of consciousness. Explaining this point, and foreshadowing a 
cardinal argument further developed in The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty calls 
attention to Husserl’s analysis of touch from Ideas II.318 He summarizes Husserl’s analysis as 
317 Ibid. “Mon corps, c’est celui qui est capable de passer de telle apparence à telle apparence, comme l’organisateur d’une »synthese 
de transition«. J’organise avec mon corps une compréhension du monde, et le rapport avec mon corps n’est pas celui d’un je pur, qui 
aurait successivement deux objets, mon corps et la chose, mais j’habite mon corps et par lui j’habite les choses.”  
318 The passage in question from Husserl’s Ideas II reads as follows: “‘Touch’-sensations” belong to every 
appearing Objective spatial position on the touched hand, when it is touched precisely at those places. The 
hand that is touching, which for its part again appears as a thing, likewise has its touch-sensations at the place 
on its corporeal surface where it touches (or is touched by the other). Similarly, if the hand is pinched, pressed, 
pushed, stung, etc., touched by external bodies or touching them, then it has its sensations of contact, of being 
stung, of pain, etc. And if it happens by means of some other part of one’s Body then the sensation is doubled in 
the two parts of the Body, since each is then precisely for the other an external thing that is touching and acting 
upon it, and each is at the same time Body”(152-53). 
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follows: “When I touch my left hand with my right, my touching hand grasps my touched 
hand as a thing. But suddenly, I perceive that my left hand becomes the sensing. The relation 
is reversed.”319 Merleau-Ponty concludes that the body is itself an anonymous subject, whose 
spontaneous activity is constituted from within the sphere of sensible being. Husserl’s 
example shows, indeed, that there is in the body an initial movement of reflection. With 
regard to this, Merleau-Ponty adds that the body has the capacity to grasp the form of 
things, and to detect the moment of completion or perfection of an object, “optimal forms,” 
which Husserl qualifies as the best aspect of things that is given in normal perception.320  
Merleau-Ponty points out, however, that this sentient reflexivity of the body is still 
lacunary, for it does not account for the primordial constitution of the unity of my body, 
which is presupposed in the perception of unitary objects. This lacuna may be filled up with 
a reference to the others, to the body of others. As Merleau-Ponty explains, the body of 
others works as a mirror that gives form to my own body, individualizing it and, thereby, 
making possible the experience of separate objects.321 Merleau-Ponty does not provide a 
detailed explanation of this point here, so I will expand on his account.  
319 Nature, 107/74-75.“Quand je touche ma main gauche avec ma main droite, ma main touchante saisit ma ma main touchée 
comme un chose. Mais soudain, je m’avise que ma main gauche se met à sentir. Les rapports se renversent.”  
320 See ibid., 108/75. See also Husserl, Ideas II, 61-65. The passage in which Husserl introduces the idea of this 
“optimum” of perception is the following: “Now the process of perception, in virtue of which one and the 
same external world is present to me, do not always exhibit the same style; instead, there are distinction which 
make themselves noticeable. At first, the same unchanged Objects appear, according to the changing 
circumstances, now this way, now in another way. The same unchanged form has a changing appearance, 
according to its position in relation to my Body; the form appears in changing aspects, which present ‘it itself’ more or 
less ‘advantageously.’ If we disregard this and instead consider real properties, then we find that one and the same 
Object, maintaining an identical form, does have different color appearances (the form as filled), according to 
its position relative to an illuminating body; furthermore, the color appearances are different when it stands 
under different illuminating bodies, but all this happens in an ordered fashion, one which may be determined 
more precisely in regard to appearances, At the same time, certain conditions prove to be the ‘normal’ ones: 
seeing in sunlight, on a clear day, without the influence of other bodies which might affect the color-
appearance. The ‘optimum’ which is thereby attained then counts as the color itself, in opposition, for example, 
to the red light of the sunset, which ‘outshines’ all proper colors” (64). 
321 It seems to me that Merleau-Ponty’s argument echoes some basic formulations from the Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation, and a discussion of this text would be fruitful, yet he does not make reference to this text in the 
context of the present discussion. 
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One can say, indeed, that the experience of the body of others is the first experience 
of the redoubling of my body, whereby a distance, a gap is introduced. The body of others 
appears, then, as a primordial outside, an unreachable object of desire whose unity is 
indirectly captured through affective threads, and whose presence reveals a structural 
hollowness within my own being: when encountering others I experience my body as the 
object of the gaze of the other, and the distance that separates the other from me. 
Presumably, it is in this way that the unity of my body as object may be constituted. Thus, 
Merleau-Ponty indicates, the bodily experience of the other is a constitutive dimension of the 
unity of my body and, thereby, turns to be the condition of possibility for thinking things as 
such, the pure thing, “the bloße Sache.”322 Paradoxically, this conclusion implies that the pure 
thing is not so pure. It is not given directly. It presupposes a passage through the others and, 
moreover, a libidinal ground, a carnal generality, in which our bodies are imbricated through 
pores and hollows, just as Emmanuel de Saint Aubert has indicated in his analysis of the 
body schema and the phenomenon of the mirror.323 Thus, the question arises: What is the 
nature of this fundamental ground that unites me to the others, and to things in the world?  
With regard to this, one can find fruitful indications in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of 
Husserl’s concept of earth. As Merleau-Ponty explains, Husserl’s “Foundational 
Investigations” carry out a shift towards the primordial ground that is the earth, away from 
the focus on questions concerning the essence of the pure thing. In this Husserlian fragment 
the earth is described as a quasi-object, an object sui generis that is not an object among 
others, but rather the soil wherefrom objects emerge, including our own bodies: the earth is 
                                                
322 Nature, 109/76. 
323 See De Saint Aubert, Être et chair; 183-93. 
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beyond categories of movement and rest, the cradle that, as primordial origin, contains the 
possibilities of all things.324  
Following on from Husserl’s analysis, Merleau-Ponty points out that modern science 
has mistaken the nature of the earth-ground, for it considers the earth plainly as a planet 
among others. Yet, this scientific view on the earth as relative ground has become 
predominant, even though it contradicts our more intuitive experience of the earth. Merleau-
Ponty emphasizes this point saying: “We have forgotten the notion of Boden (‘ground’), 
because we have generalized it, situating the Earth among the planets. But, Husserl says, 
imagine a bird capable of flying to another planet: it would not have a double ground. 
Wherever I go, I make a ground there and attach the new ground to the old where I lived. 
To think two Earths is to think one same Earth.”325  
On Husserl’s view, the earth, the one and same Earth, which is absolute ground, 
Boden, appears as the site of originary synthesis, which cannot be exhibited or disclosed at the 
level of a relative basis-body, that is, as a relative ground or as a Copernican earth that could 
be displaced by another earth. Sallis explains this originary synthesis as follows: “Such –one 
could add –is the power of originary synthesis that, beneath the level at which the two 
[earths] would alternate reciprocally between basis and body, they would –despite a certain 
spatial separation –be unified into a single basis, a single earth, older, in a sense, than the 
others.”326   
                                                
324 See Nature, 77/110. With regard to Husserl’s concept of earth, and its relation to Heidegger, in 
“Verflechtung,” the preface to Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, Leonard Lawlor points out that “The 
Husserlian earth is equivalent to what Heidegger calls Being, and the earth understood as Being beings about, 
for Merleau-Ponty, a clarification of the notion of the ‘possible’” (xvii). 
325 Ibid.“Nous avons oublié la notion de Boden, parce que nous l’avons généralisée, situant la Terre parmi les planets. Mais, dit 
Husserl, imaginons un oiseau capable de voler sur un autre planète, il n’aurait pas un double sol. Du seul fait qu’il est le même 
oiseau, il unit les deux planètes en un seul sol. Où que j’aille; j’en fais un Boden. Je rattache le nouveau sol à l’ancient que j’ai 
habité. Penser deux Terres, c’est penser une même Terre.”  
326 John Sallis, Double Truth, 49. 
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As Merleau-Ponty explains, the originary earth is a unifying ground that, being in 
essential rest, is the point of departure that makes it possible for us to be in the world.327 That 
is to say, the earth-ground is the origin, the place of birth, and the unique and absolute basis 
that is presupposed in all movement and all rest, and which constitutes the historicity of our 
being.328 For the site of origin, the territory of one’s birth –even if such territory were a 
vessel, or a spaceship travelling to other earths –remains as the decisive point of reference in 
the movement and temporality of one’s life, and the fundamental reference to the unique, 
single earth. No matter how far away one imagines such surrogate earths to be, they can be 
earths only insofar as they rest in the ground, in the Earth that does not move.  
What is remarkable in Husserl’s analysis of the earth is that it reveals an ontological 
foundation that challenges the limits of phenomenology. Even if at the end of the 
“Foundational Investigations” Husserl attempts to bring the earth back to the transcendental 
ego, such an attempt is undermined by the singular character of the earth as the root of 
thought, as the principle that is older than all thought. With regard to this, Merleau-Ponty 
points out that the earth is the “root” (racine) of all history, foundation of the world,329 thus 
showing that the exploration of the being of the earth lead us to the foundations of 
                                                
327 See Husserl’s “Foundational Investigations,” 316/125. The passage in questions reads as follows: “My carnal 
flight-vessel is based upon a mobile body (the car). ‘I can fly so high that the earth seems like a sphere.’ The 
earth can also be so small that I could traverse it from all sides and indirectly arrive at the idea of asphere. I 
therefore discover that it is a large spherical body. But the question is whether and how I would arrive at 
corporeality in the sense that the earth is ‘astronomically’ just one body among others, among the celestial 
bodies. One could hardly say how, even if I imagine the bird at any altitude and intend that it can experiencethe 
earth as one body among others. Why not? For us human on the earth, the bird or the flying machine moves, 
and that is valid for the bird and the people on the flying machine insofar as they experience the earth as the 
source ‹Stamm› ‘body,’ as the ground ‘body.’ But can the flying-machine not function as ‘ground’? Can I 
exchange or conceive the exchange of, as the primordial land of my movements, the ground and body with the 
ground in motion? What would that be in terms of a change in apperception and what would its demonstration 
be? Must I not conceptually transfer to the flying-machine in constitutive validity (according to the form) what 
in general endows the earth with the sense as my ground, as the ground of my flesh?” Husserl’s point is that we 
carry the earth with ourselves, as that which always remains in rest, producing a single kinesthetic system on the 
basis of which we can perceive movement and repos (see also Merleau-Ponty, Nature, 316/124).   
328 See John Sallis, Double Truth, 49. 
329 Nature, 111/77. 
131 
humanity in general. Indeed, if one is to explore the earth-ground, whose being constitutes 
us, one cannot remain within the limits of transcendental phenomenology. Departing from 
Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Husserl, one could say that, after deciding to explore the ground-
earth, it becomes imperative to make a leap towards ontology, and examine the question 
concerning the meaning of being in general.330   
Based on this reading of Husserl, and examining the transition from questions 
concerning the body to the problem of the earth, Merleau-Ponty lays out the background of 
his own approach to primordial nature, describing his own concept of nature in the 
summary of the course on “The Concept of Nature I.”331 He explains that nature is the 
enigmatic ground, a mythical and somehow phantasmagoric object that pervades the 
horizons of subjectivity, spirituality and history.332 Nature, he continues, is phantasmagoric 
because it cannot be objectified as it predetermines our being: it provides the support and 
“materials” (materiaux) of existence.333 Indeed, Merleau-Ponty suggests, the silent and 
anticipatory work of nature pervades every single level of existence, interlacing being and 
human being in such a way that makes it impossible to draw sharp distinctions between 
subject and object, consciousness and nature, the sphere of the being in itself (en soi) and the 
sphere of the being for itself (pour soi). He says precisely: “Whether in the case of the 
individual fact of birth, or the birth of institutions and societies, the originary relation 
between man and being is not that between something for itself and something in itself.”334 
330 On the influence of Husserl’s “Foundational Investigations” on Merleau-Ponty’s thinking of the flesh see 
Mauro Carbone, “Flesh: Towards the History of a Misunderstanding,” Chiasmi International 4 (2002): 49-64. 
331 Translated in to English in In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays. This text is attached to the French edition 
of the course notes La Nature, but is not included in the English translation of these notes. Hereafter with 
reference first to the French, then to the English translation. 
332 See Nature, 355-57/133-34. 
333 Ibid., 356/133. 
334 Ibid., 356/132-33. “Qu’il s’agisse du fait individual de la naissance, ou de la naissance des institutions et des sociétés, le 
raport originaire de l’homme et de l’être n’est pas celui du pour soi à l’en soi.”   
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In this way, Merleau-Ponty recalls the Husserlian motif of the earth, the earth that is 
fundamental ground and originary synthesis, prior to all distinction between the ideal and the 
real.  
The problem of nature involves, therefore, the enigmatic rapport between being in 
general and humanity. Nature not only supports the basic operations of perception, but also 
determines the constitution of “historical significations.”335 Merleau-Ponty declares that this 
overlapping of nature and history, this correlation between the “immemorial” and the 
“newest present,” “disorients reflexive thinking.”336 And, he remarks, this is a difficulty that 
Husserl’s work does not fully explore.  
According to Merleau-Ponty, nature is at work before the body: it is the basis of a 
synthesis that is prior to the “passive synthesis” and the “synthesis of transition.” Nature, he 
suggests, is the “presence” that connects the diverse fragments of space and the different 
moments of the world.337 For this reason, the being of nature brings reflection to the limits 
of an ontological foundation, a wild being prior to any appearing object and any work of 
consciousness: “If we are not to be resigned to saying that a world from which 
consciousness is cut off is nothing at all, that a nature without witnesses would not be, then 
in some way we must recognize primordial being, which is not yet being-subject nor being-
object and which in every respect baffles reflection.”338 Merleau-Ponty remarks that 
reflection is disoriented by primordial nature because the grounds of nature lead us to 
335 Ibid., 356/133. 
336 Ibid., modified. The passage in question reads: “…cet appel en lui au présent le plus neuf désoriente la pensée 
réflexive.”  
337 Ibid., 357. It is worth noticing, as Lawlord does, that in the case of Merleau-Ponty “his attempt to make 
universal dimensionality converge with the present does not imply that he is relapsing into some sort of 
‘metaphysics of presence’”(“Verflechtung,” xv), for this present is not a visible objectifiable present, but a present 
with depth, a present grounded in a self-secluded earth.   
338 Ibid., 357/133-34; translation modified. “Si nous ne nous résignons pas à dire qu’un monde d’où seraient retranchées les 
consciences n’est rien du tout, qu’une Nature sans témoins n’aurait pas, il nous faut reconnaître de quelque façon le être primordial 
qui n’est pas encore le être-sujet ni l’être-objet; et qui déconcerte la réflexion à tous égards…”  
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consider the more fundamental question of being. For the essence of nature as ground 
cannot be determined on the basis of a regional ontology. Yet, this means that the 
philosophical exploration of the being of nature is necessarily ambiguous: it follows a 
phantom that is fundamentally absent and elusive, one which is never objectively present. 
For when thought is confronted to the vastness of being, it can no longer rely on conceptual 
determinations that would exhibit objects with fixed outlines. At the level of this ontological 
foundation, reflective thinking finds itself entangled in its bodily roots. As Merleau-Ponty 
expresses it, from a radical, ontological point of view, there is no way to posit a relation 
either of continuity or of total separation, which means that nature is an impossible “object,” 
just like being: 
From this primordial being to us there is not derivation, nor any break; it has neither the 
tight structure of the mechanism, nor the transparency of a whole which precedes its parts. 
We can neither conceive of primordial being engendering itself, which would make it 
infinite, nor think of it being engendered by an other, which would reduce it to the condition 
of a product and dead result. As Schelling has remarked, there is in nature something which 
makes it such that it would impose itself upon God himself as an independent condition of 
its operation.339  
This problematic sets the basis for understanding the questions guiding Merleau-
Ponty’s ontological investigations in his later and unfinished work The Visible and the Invisible, 
wherein he takes up some ideas present in Heidegger’s work, putting into question the 
possibilities of Husserlian phenomenology. Leonard Lawlor clarifies this point by comparing 
Merleau-Ponty and Derrida: “…the limit of Husserlian phenomenology lies in Heideggerian 
ontology. For both [Merleau-Ponty and Derrida] this limit is the Heideggerian conception of 
339 Ibid., 357/134. “…de lui [primordial being] à nous il n’y a pas derivation et pas de casure; il n’a ni la texture serrée d’un 
méchanisme, ni la transparence d’un tout antérieur a ses parties; on ne peut concevoir ni qu’il s’engendre lui-même, c’est qui le ferait 
infini, ni qu’il soit engendré par un autre, ce qui le ramènerait à la condition de produit et de résultat mort. Comme disait 
Schelling, il y a dans la Nature quelque chose qui fait qu’elle s’imposerait à Dieu même comme condition indépendante de son 
opération.” 
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negativity.”340 Indeed, the originary earth and primordial nature are themes that challenge the 
limits of phenomenological thought, and necessitate the search for an indirect, alternative 
path, whereby the negativity of being, the essential withdrawal of being, may be elucidated. 
Thus, in what follows, I shall explore Merleau-Ponty’s turn toward ontology taking into 
account some references to Heidegger’s work in order to determine the fundamental 
relations between the problematics of gesture and art.    
Nature and Perceptual Faith: Preliminaries to the Ontology of the Flesh 
   In his later lecture-notes on nature, Merleau-Ponty argues that primordial nature 
shatters the frameworks of classical ontology and reflective thinking. The phenomenon of 
nature baffles reflective thinking because nature is at the same time the ground, the earth 
that supports us, and the “substance” of the world that appears in front of us. Otherwise 
put, nature is at the same time immanent and transcendent, and therefore irreducible to the 
planes of immanence and transcendence. As I have often indicated, this paradoxical tension 
between immanence and transcendence is already present in the problematic of perception. 
For perception is the operation that links thinking to the world, the phenomenon that brings 
thinking “down to earth,” to its origins.  
In his later work, The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty interrogates the grounds 
of perception expanding on its internal paradoxes. He starts by examining the sphere of 
“perceptual faith,” which is the point of departure for the criticism of science and 
objectivism that prepares the way to the ontology of the flesh. The notion of “perceptual 
faith” is quite complex, for this faith is an adherence to the truth I live in, a structural 
openness to the being of things, which takes place before any conscious intervention on my 
340 Leonard Lawlor, “Verflechtung,” xxxi. 
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part. This perceptual faith is not mere belief because it imposes itself upon me as self-
evident. As John Sallis argues: “The perceptual faith expresses our way of comportment, 
always already established and taken for granted, within the pre-objective dimension of 
perceptual experience which Merleau-Ponty sought to uncover in the Phenomenology of 
Perception.”341  
The perceptual faith constitutes a comportment that takes place at a pre-objective 
level. For this reason, perceptual faith must be understood from “within,” as it resonates in 
our bodily experience, and as it unfolds in lived thought.342 This means that perceptual faith 
cannot be expressed by reflective thinking. This faith exists prior to the movement of 
reflection. Let me elaborate on this point and examine how Merleau-Ponty defines the 
relation between reflection and perceptual faith.  
In what seems a tacit reference to Heidegger’s criticism of metaphysics in Being and 
Time, Merleau-Ponty criticizes classical ontology for determining being in terms of beings, of 
entities, thus neglecting the question concerning “the meaning of being.”343 He further 
remarks that classical ontology is based upon a philosophy of reflection. This type of 
philosophy tends to divide up the world into the realms of natura naturans and natura naturata, 
and to determine the relation between them in terms of a continuous system of causal 
relations. As Merleau-Ponty expresses it, reflection necessarily posits an external and static 
341 John Sallis, Phenomenology and the Return to Beginnings, 60. 
342  With regard to this problem, it is worth noting that Heidegger’s lecture on “Hegel’s Concept of 
Experience” seems to have had a decisive influence on Merleau-Ponty’s later thought, for he follows it closely 
in his own reading of Hegel, in his lectures from 1960-61, “Philosophie et non-philosophie depuis Hegel.” See Notes de 
cours, 275-320, published in English as: “Philosophy and Non-Philosophy Since Hegel,” trans. Hugh J. 
Silvermann, in Philosophy and Non-Philosophy Since Merleau-Ponty, ed. Hugh Silvermann (New York and London: 
Routledge, 1988), 9-83. See Martin Heidegger, "Hegels Begriff der Erfahrung (1942/43)," in Holzwege, ed. 
Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, 115-208 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977). English: "Hegel's 
Concept of Experience (1942-43)," in Off the Beaten Track, ed. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes, trans. Julian 
Young and Kenneth Haynes, 86-156 (New York: CAmbridge University Press, 2002).  
343 The Visible and the Invisible, 33/16. “…la question du sense d’être.” 
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view of nature and being, because to reflect is to be already outside the flux: reflection is 
from the outset separation and division.344  
The problem, then, is to turn to reflection to see from the outside, in terms of causal 
relations, the grounds of our perceptive world. This applies, too, to the “natural attitude,” 
which sees things within a unified world of objective relations precisely because it has already 
been involved in the primordial world of perception. That is to say, when it is a matter of 
thinking the grounds of perceptual faith one cannot turn to the natural attitude in order to 
overcome the problems arising from reflective thinking. Specifically, Merleau-Ponty’s 
argument is that neither the natural attitude nor reflective philosophy can determine the 
structure of perceptual faith, for that would be to assume that they can take up a panoramic 
view, from above, of the grounds that constitute them. Even the transparency and naturality 
that is usually ascribed to reflective thinking, which determines the objectivity of science, is 
but an indirect proof of our faith in perception. Merleau-Ponty explains this problem as 
follows: “Because perception gives us faith in a world, in a system of natural facts rigorously 
bound together and continuous, we have believed that this system could incorporate all 
things into itself, even the perception that has initiated us into it.”345  
Merleau-Ponty’s analysis has shown that nature is a somewhat impossible object, 
essentially elusive and opaque. Now, he suggests, we may explore the obscure grounds of 
nature through perceptual faith: Ur-doxa. This primordial faith would leap over the gaps of 
nature without effacing them, without picturing nature as homogeneous ground. For even 
science has demonstrated that the ground of perception is not necessarily a continuous, 
homogeneous field. For this reason, Merleau-Ponty claims that “[t]oday we no longer believe 
344 Ibid., 69/45. 
345 Ibid., 46/26-27. “Parce que la perception nous donne foi en un monde, en un système de faits naturels rigureusement lié et 
continu, nous avons cru que ce système pourrait s’incorporer toutes choses et jusqu’à la perception qui nous y a initiés.” 
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nature to be a continuous system of this kind; a fortiori we are far removed from thinking 
that the islets of “psychism” that here and there float over it are secretly connected to one 
another through the continuous ground of nature.”346 Thus, Merleau-Ponty demonstrates, on 
the one hand, that even contemporary science undermines the ideal of a transparent and 
objective nature and, on the other hand, that perceptual faith shall not be used to restore a 
metaphysical conception of nature, that is, perceptual faith should not be taken as 
coincidence with nature, it is not dogmatic faith.  
Let me, then, recapitulate these considerations and pinpoint Merleau-Ponty’s initial 
problematic. The problem is the following: If nature is not a continuous ground fully visible, 
and yet it is the ground of the world of perception –the world disclosed in perceptual faith –
then one ought to determine how the essential invisibility of the ground is inscribed in 
perception. This amounts to questioning our own relation to what is visible and invisible in 
general, as well as the ontological presuppositions that make possible our understanding of 
the world as a unified whole. Merleau-Ponty formulates these questions as follows: “We 
have then imposed upon us the task of understanding whether, and in what sense, what is 
not nature forms a “world,” and first what a “world” is, and finally, if world there is, what 
can be the relations between the visible world and the invisible world.”347  
In order to resolve this problem, Merleau-Ponty must interrogate the world 
encrypted in perceptual faith, the world that precedes the distinction between essences and 
their conditions of possibility, between the that and the what of perception.348 He indicates 
that this interrogation must depart from “what is not nature.” This seemingly innocuous 
346 Ibid., 46/27. “Aujourd’hui, nous ne croyons plus que la nature soit un système continu de ce genre; à plus forte raison sommes 
nous bien éloignés de penser que les îlots de «psychisme» qui flottent ici et là sur elle soient secrétement reliés par le sol continu de la 
nature:” 
347 Ibid. “La tâche s’imposse donc à nous de comprendre si, et en quel sens, ce qui n’est pas nature forme un «monde», et d’abord 
ce que c’est qu’un «monde»,et enfin, si monde il y a, quels peuvent être les rapports du monde visible et du monde invisible.” 
348 Ibid. 
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remark suggests that in exploring the grounds of nature we must direct our sight first toward 
what is derived from it, what is seemingly opposed to it: the already formed world of things 
and essences, which appears at this side, the positive side of being. One must be careful not 
to read this indication as a slippage into dualism, for Merleau-Ponty is not suggesting that we 
take “ideas” or objective things as point of departure for interrogation, nor that we adopt a 
detached, neutral, merely theoretical point of view. Instead, the task is to investigate the 
point of contact with the world without leaping dogmatically into the world itself.  
Consequently, Merleau-Ponty calls attention to the most immediate and ambiguous 
“object” of our experience, the quasi-object that is the body, and which constitutes our own 
being: “…it is necessary to re-examine the definition of the body as pure object in order to 
understand how it can be our living bond with nature.”349 This examination should not be 
“scientific” because it is related to my “own” body, not to an objective body. For this reason, 
echoing a Heideggerian motif, Merleau-Ponty points out that a radical philosophical 
interrogation of perceptual faith would follow a path different to that of traditional science, 
for “…philosophy is the set of questions wherein he who questions is himself implicated by 
the question.”350  
Sensible Being and the Lived Body 
As Merleau-Ponty argues, it is the perceptual life of my body that “…accomplishes 
the primary openness to the world.”351 Thereby, he suggests, one should investigate the lived 
body in order to understand the emergence of the world as a structured whole. Following 
this train of thought, one could say that the lived body carries out a synthesis between the 
349 Ibid. 
350 Ibid. 
351 Ibid., 59/37. “…c’est elle qui accomplit l’ouverture première au monde.” 
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earth-ground and the human world, not only the “synthesis of transition” from one 
“appearance” to another within the world. One might say that Merleau-Ponty takes the body 
as an instance of primordial nature, a sort of ground, a fragment of the earth. For the lived 
body is, in a sense, the structural fragment of the earth we carry ourselves, the ground of the 
perceptive world that is intrinsically tied to our personal history, one that is openness to the 
world.  
But the lived body is traversed by a peculiar negativity, for the body is a being that 
has already detached itself from the originary earth, from the roots. The lived body is not the 
earth itself, the ground, but neither is it a temporary basis, that is, a relative ground. In a 
sense, one could say that the lived body is a basis in between the deepest level of the 
originary earth and the superficial level of a relative ground-basis, a ground-vessel. And yet, 
one should note that the lived body is closer to the earth than to a ground-vessel. As Husserl 
indicates, the lived body is in essential unity with the earth,352 for it does not move, it is 
essentially at rest. He says precisely: “Consider my flesh. In primordial experience, the flesh 
has no moving away and no rest, only inner motion and inner rest, unlike the outer 
bodies.”353  
Most probably, Merleau-Ponty has this Husserlian analysis of the lived body in mind 
when he remarks that embodied perception challenges Sartre’s dichotomy between the “in-
itself” and the “for-itself.”354 He explains that the life of my perceptive body reveals a space 
352 See Edmund Husserl, “Foundational Investigations,” 121. 
353 Ibid., 123. 
354 See Jean Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness (New York : Washington Square Press, 1956). Regarding the 
relation between the For-itself and the In-itself, concluding Being and Nothingness, Sartre summarizes his own 
position as follows: “the For-itself and the In-itself are reunited by a synthetic connection which is nothing 
other than the For-itself itself. The For-itself, in fact, is nothing but the pure nihilation of the In-itself; it is like 
a hole of being at the heart of Being” (617). Here, we see that for Sartre the only positive being is that of the 
In-itself, and the For-itself is defined as a negation of the first, which synthesizes precisely because it is not, 
because it is only as negation of the In-itself, which is to say that the synthesis of the For-itself is not a real 
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of circulation, a unifying ground that involves the self and the world in general. He also 
notes that the body opens a gap both in the essence of things and of the self.355 In this sense, 
the lived body appears as a site of passage, a pivot and threshold, a being in between being 
and nothingness.  
Merleau-Ponty deconstructs the Sartrian dichotomy between being and nothingness 
by showing that my visible being transfigures itself to become the other, “… I feel at the 
surface of my visible being that my volubility dies away, that I become flesh, and that at the 
extremity of this inertia that was me there is something else, or rather an other who is not a 
thing.”356 Moreover, he explains, if I am essentially embodied, and if my embodied self is 
constantly drawn toward the other, then the lived body is in each case an “other,” which 
implies that I myself am nothing. And yet, as Merleau-Ponty explains, I am not sheer 
nothingness; rather, I am a nothingness that is opened to being, that is inscribed in being: “I 
knew very well that I was nothing and that this nothing swept itself away in favor of being.”357 
In this way, as Merleau-Ponty indicates, the nothingness that I am is not opposed to being, 
nor to the positive pole of a being “In-itself.”  
Thus, Merleau-Ponty suggests that our bodily being carries out the impossible 
passage from the invisible to the visible, from nothingness to being, from myself to the other 
and from my body to the world. In this sense, the lived body appears as a dual being, a 
paradoxical synthesis. This dual character is clearly illustrated by the phenomenon of vision, 
for the body is, at the same time, power of vision and a visible thing. And this duality is at 
the same time synthesis, for the redoubling of vision and visibility implies that there is 
synthesis, is nothing. Merleau-Ponty shows, therefore, that the problem in Sartre’s position is that it sees the In-
itself as pure positivity, and the For-itself as pure negativity, thus remaining within a dualistic thinking.  
355 See The Visible and the Invisible, 106-07/77. 
356 Ibid., 88/61. “…je sens à la surface de mon être visible que ma volubilité s’amortit, que je deviens chair, et qu’au bout de 
cette inertie qui était moi, il y a autre chose, ou plutôt un autre qui n’est pas une chose:” 
357 Ibid. “Je savais bien que je n’étais rien et que ce rien s’emportait lui-même au profit de l’être.” 
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entanglement in the world. The relation between body and world is, thus, quite complicated. 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty qualifies this entanglement in the world as a madness: “There is a 
sort of madness in vision such that with it I go unto the world itself, and yet at the same time 
the parts of that world evidently do not coexist without me (the table in itself has nothing to 
do with the bed a yard away); the world is the vision of the world and could not be anything 
else. Being is bordered along its whole extension with a vision of being that is not a being, 
that is a non-being.”358 As a result of this madness of vision, one is led to recognize the 
positive side of nothingness. As Merleau-Ponty expresses it, before being a power of vision, 
or a visible thing, the body is “no-thing”: nothingness as openness onto the world, 
nothingness as potentiality to be. It is at this level of the analysis of the body that Merleau-
Ponty takes up most decisively the Heideggerian problematic of negativity and ontology.  
In Being and Time, Heidegger shows that, strictly speaking, the chair can never touch 
the wall, for there is no possible relatedness between the chair and the wall that would make 
possible an encounter.359 As Diego D’Angelo explains, for Heidegger, bodily contact and 
touch presuppose disclosure of the world, involvement in the world, Being-in.360 Merleau-
Ponty develops a similar idea, for he suggests that vision, bodily vision, is from the start 
involvement in being. And my own being, which is both vision and visibility, is out of itself, 
embodied in things. One may say, therefore, that the lived body is pervaded by a transversal 
significance that impregnates things, one type of significance that comes from being itself, 
from the general stream of life and, indeed, passes through us. For this reason, as Merleau-
                                                
358 Ibid., 104/75. “Il y a une sorte de folie de la vision qui fait que, à la fois, je vais par elle au monde même, et que, cependant, 
de toute évidence, les parties de ce monde ne coexistent pas sans moi: la table en sui n’a rien à voir avec le lit à un mètre d’elle, -le 
monde est vision du monde et ne saurait être autre chose:” 
359 See Being and Time, 74/55. 
360 See D’Angelo, “Zeigen und Berühren,” 12.  
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Ponty indicates, the lived body is a condensation of life, and that life involves things and us 
in an “atmosphere,” in the astronomical sense of the word.361 
Merleau-Ponty describes life and its process of individuation and “embodiment” in a 
way that foreshadows the entire problematic of the ontology of the flesh. He remarks, for 
instance, that life involves us and exposes us to multiple horizons, in what may be called 
essential promiscuity: 
Life is constantly enshrouded by those mists we call the sensible world or history, the one of 
the corporeal life and the one of the human life, the present and the past, as a pell-mell 
ensemble of bodies and minds, promiscuity of visages, words, actions, with, between them 
all, that cohesion which cannot be denied them since they are all differences, extreme 
divergences of one same something.362  
Life is understood here as an atmospheric milieu, “one same something,” which is 
the prepersonal ground that keeps things –ideas, words, and actions –together, without 
effacing their differences. In this sense, it seems to me, life is another name for the 
primordial earth, for primordial nature. Indeed, in his reading of Husserl’s concept of earth, 
in the context of his lectures on nature, Merleau-Ponty remarks that primordial nature is the 
unifying ground that supports all levels of experience, and which unifies humanity. He says: 
“Nature envelops everything, my perception and that of others, insofar as these can be for 
me only a divergence of my world.”363 
With regard to this, one can see that there is an intersection with Heidegger’s 
approach to the concept of earth in the essay on the work of art. In this essay, Heidegger 
describes the earth as part of the stream of life, part of the ground that makes possible the 
circulation between things. As I have indicated already, considering one of Heidegger’s 
361 See The Visible and the Invisible, 115/84. 
362 Ibid., “Elle est constamment enveloppée de ses brumes que l’on appelle monde sensible ou histoire, l’on de la vie corporelle et 
l’on  de la vie humaine, le présent et le passé, comme ensemble pêle-mêle des corps et des sprits, promiscuité des visages, des paroles, 
des actions, avec, entre eux tous, cette cohésion qu’on ne peux pas leur refuser puisqu’ils sont tous des différences, des écarts extrêmes 
d’un même quelque chose.” 
363  Merleau-Ponty, Nature, 112/78.
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interpretations of the concept of earth, the earth is a stream that keeps things together, in 
unison, without becoming indeterminate matter. On the contrary, for Heidegger the earth 
works as a principle of individuation, which gathers different “forms” of life, remaining 
always the same, self-secluded ground.  
However, in what concerns the problem of the earth one can only find vague 
moments of convergence between the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. A more 
precise assessment of their similarities may only be possible in light of the fundamental 
question concerning the meaning of being. Let me, then, examine Merleau-Ponty’s approach 
to the question of being, and to the negativity of being. In examining these questions, I shall 
sketch out some potential correspondences with Heidegger’s work on the basis of Merleau-
Ponty’s Notes de cours.364  
In the passage from The Visible and the Invisible quoted above, Merleau-Ponty does not 
refer directly to Heidegger’s works. And yet, he describes the impersonal “one” in a way that 
recalls crucial arguments from Being and Time. Furthermore, he conceives primordial being as 
an atmosphere, an ethereal presence, in a way that echoes some passages from the Introduction 
to Metaphysics, a work Merleau-Ponty knew well at the time of his later work. Specifically, one 
can find resonances of those passages in the Introduction to Metaphysics that discuss Nietzsche’s 
critique of the concept of being. In them Heidegger considers, not without a certain irony, 
whether being may be nothing, just a vapor. I will examine this reference in more detail later. 
For now, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty undertakes the task of exploring the negativity of 
being by taking up one of Heidegger’s fundamental questions.  
364 Merleau-Ponty’s later lectures at the Collège de France make it clear that Heidegger’s Introduction to 
Metaphysics decisively influenced him. See, for instance, Notes de cours.  
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Indeed, Merleau-Ponty investigates in what sense being is nothing, and in what sense 
its vaporous and elusive “presence” is not sheer indeterminacy, metaphysical obscurity. 
Concerning this point, he suggests that the one of life is the milieu of a carnal generality that 
cannot be grasped “in itself,” and which pervades our bodily being as a phantasmagoric 
presence.  
As I have indicated already, in his lectures-notes on nature Merleau-Ponty qualifies 
nature as phantasmagoric because it cannot be brought up in consciousness as a thing. In a 
sense, however, he also shows that nature is a phantom that is eminently real, more real and 
concrete than any “real thing,” for it belongs to the general and fundamental structure of life 
and being. Elaborating on this idea, Merleau-Ponty indicates that life is a general 
“something” that is at the basis of the one of embodied life and the one of history, i.e., spirit.  
Merleau-Ponty qualifies the life of history and the life of the body as an atmospheric 
pre-individual one, but this pre-individual one is not determined by transcendental, ideal 
structures. Rather, as Merleau-Ponty expresses it, he takes up the point of view of “…our 
involving in Being.”365 On this view, our embodied being is first of all constituted as a 
general body, that is, an expression of the carnal generality of the world. Now, if the lived 
body is initially experienced as part of an atmospheric milieu, the question becomes: How 
does one end up perceiving solid things, and thinking objective essences and ideas?  
Merleau-Ponty responds to this question by undermining the assumption that things 
are primordially solid. He suggests that things appear as solid and fixed objects only to a 
“pure spectator” who produces ideas, and who is in turn convinced of “touching being” 
precisely because it is surrounded by “actual Being.”366 The expression “actual Being” alludes 
365 The Visible and the Invisible, 115/85. “c’est notre implication dans l’Être.” 
366 Ibid., 146/110. “l’Être actuel.” 
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here to the “actuality” of my engagement with the world. Specifically, Merleau-Ponty’s 
argument is that the experience of objectivity and solidity presupposes an involvement in 
being as a whole. For being prearticulates the possibilities of my existence and is the source 
of the “facticity” of the facts.367  
At this point one must recall the distinction between Fakticität and Tatsächlichkeit, as it 
is defined in Being and Time, for Merleau-Ponty explains that the fixation of the idea or of the 
essence of things hinges on the factical ground of existence, which is irreducible to the 
objective actuality of mere facts. In this way, he suggests that things are inscribed within the 
limits and possibilities into which we are thrown, the limits of existence that are constituted 
by an ecstatic temporality. Merleau-Ponty says precisely: “Under the solidity of the essence 
and of the idea there is the fabric of experience, this flesh of time, and this is why I am not 
sure of having penetrated unto the hard core of Being…”368  
Merleau-Ponty underscores that we can never be sure of having disclosed the “hard 
core of Being.” In this case, he is not suggesting that there is such thing as a hard core of 
being, an impenetrable and solid being behind the appearances.369 He suggests exactly the 
opposite: that radical being, the grounding being that involves us, relentlessly withdraws 
from direct contact. In fact, Merleau-Ponty claims that the fabric of experience is the flesh of 
time because my finite existence is projected into horizons exceeding the limits of my 
perception and my possibilities of action. That is to say, I live in a world whose possibilities 
can never be restricted to the possibilities of individual agency: “my incontestable power to 
367 Ibid. 
368 Ibid., 148/111-112. “Sous la solidité de l’essence et de l’idée, il y a le tissu de l’experiénce, cette chair du temps, et c’est 
pourquoi je ne suis pas sûr d’avoir percé jusqu’au noyau dur de l’être...” 
369 With regard to this question, in her article "World, Flesh, Vision," in Chiasms, Merleau-Ponty's Notion of Flesh, 
ed. F., Lawlor, L. Evans, 23-49 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000), Françoise Dastur remarks: 
“Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty pose the same question to Husserl concerning the right of the 
phenomenological reduction to be completed and the status of the subjectivity which with it leaves us” (27).  
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give myself leeway (prendre du champ), to disengage the possible from the real, does not go as 
far as to dominate all the implications of the spectacle and to make of the real a simple 
variant of the possible; on the contrary it is the possible worlds and the possible beings that 
are variants and are like doubles of the actual world and the actual Being.”370 Let me 
emphasize that here Merleau-Ponty uses the expressions “actual Being” and “actual world” 
in order to qualify them as grounds of my factical life, not as actual beings. It seems that 
Merleau-Ponty employs the adjective “actual” to point out that the generality of being, and 
the world, is necessarily imbricated in my living present, and that it constitutes the depth of 
my present.371 As I have often remarked, the solidity of things presupposes the depth of 
being. Or, one might say, the visibility of things is the counter-side of depth. And this means 
that the actuality of visible being is traversed by the horizons of space and time, which 
pervade the present of my embodied existence: “For the visible present is not in time and 
space, nor, of course, outside of them: there is nothing before it, after it, about it, that could 
compete with its visibility. And yet it is not alone, it is not everything. To put it precisely, it 
stops up my view, that is, time and space extend beyond the visible present, and at the same 
time they are behind it, in depth, in hiding.”372    
In sum, Merleau-Ponty shows that possible worlds and possible beings, ideas, and 
essences are in each case “variations” of the actual or present visible world, which are rooted 
in the facticity of my embodied being. Yet, my embodied being is not inscribed in a punctual 
here and now; it is rather traversed by a carnal generality with depth and horizons. In this 
370 The Visible and the Invisible. “…mon incontestable pouvoir de prendre du champ, de dégager du réel le possible, ne va pas 
jusqu’à dominer toutes les implications du spectacle et à faire du réel une simple variante du possible; ce sont au contraire les mondes 
et les êtres possibles qui sont des variantes, et comme des doubles, du monde et de l’Être actuels.” 
371 With regard to this, see also, Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 20/19. 
372 The Visible and the Invisible, 150/113. “Car le présent visible n’est pas dans le temps et l’space, ni, bien entendu, hors 
d’eux: il n’y a rien avant lui, aprés lui, autour de lui, qui puisse rivaliser avec sa visibilité. Et pourtant, il n’est pas seul, il n’est 
pas tout. Exactement: il bouche ma vue, c’est-à-dire, à la fois, que le temps et l’space s’étendent au-delà, et qu’ils sont derrière lui, 
en profondeur, en cachette:” 
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sense, the visible present is not simply visible, simply present, for it is constituted by ecstatic-
horizonal temporality.373 On this view, the thickness or depth of the spectacle we inhabit 
does not presuppose a hidden reality behind the “appearances,” but rather the encompassing 
generality of being, the atmospheric involvement in being. Therefore, one could say that the 
analysis of my lived body reveals my own visibility as extension of the general visibility of 
things, and the depth of things as a prolongation of my own depth. Merleau-Ponty 
formulates this conclusion as follows:  “The visible can thus fill and occupy me only because 
I who see it do not see it from the depths of nothingness, but from the midst of itself; I the 
seer am also visible.”374 Ultimately, Merleau-Ponty will articulate this insight through the 
notion of flesh. Let me, then, move on to examine specifically the problematic of the flesh.  
Flesh and Gesture 
Merleau-Ponty initially characterizes the flesh as the milieu, the fundamental element, 
of the carnal generality of the world. Yet, Merleau-Ponty declares, this is a tentative name, a 
name for something that has no name in philosophy.375 The flesh refers to the sensible 
milieu that is “thickness” and not just a physical or material surface, the element things and I 
have in common. Within this element, Merleau-Ponty remarks, the one who perceives things 
373 Later on, Merleau-Ponty comes back to this point and explains what the ecstatic-horizonal temporality of 
the thing means taking into consideration the notion of “flesh.” Consider, for instance, the following passage, 
which is extracted from the already classical chapter “The Chiasm”: “A certain red is also a fossil drawn up 
from the depths of imaginary worlds. If we took all of these participations into account, we would recognize 
that a naked color, and in general a visible, is not a chunk of absolutely hard, indivisible being, offered all naked 
to a vision which could be only total or null, but is rather a sort of straits between exterior horizons and interior 
horizons ever gaping open, something that comes to touch lightly and makes diverse regions of the colored or 
visible world resound at the distances, a certain differentiation, an ephemeral modulation of this world –less a 
color or a thing, therefore, than a difference between things and colors, a momentary crystallization of colored 
being or of visibility. Between the alleged colors and visibles, we would find anew the tissue that lines them, 
sustains them, nourishes them, and which for its part is not a thing, but a possibility, a latency, and a flesh.” 
Ibid., 173/132-33. 
374 Ibid., 150/113. “Le visible ne peut ainsi me remplir et m’occuper que parce que, moi qui le vois, je ne le vois pas du fond du 
néant, mais du milieu du lui-même, moi le voyant, je suis aussi visible…” 
375 See ibid., 191/147. 
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“…feels that he is the sensible itself coming to itself and that in return the sensible is in his 
eyes as it were his double or an extension of his own flesh.”376  
The term “flesh” is, therefore, a hint, an indication, not a concept with a determinate 
content. Since the flesh is the element of our own temporal existence, it cannot be identified 
with a continuous, extended material ground beneath the perceived world. One might say 
that this element is secrecy: the flesh keeps things together establishing invisible bonds, 
which dislocate or shatter the “natural” emplacements of thing. In this regard, Merleau-
Ponty says: “The things –here, there, now, then –are no longer in themselves, in their own 
place, in their own time; they exist only at the end of those rays of spatiality and of 
temporality emitted in the secrecy of my flesh.”377  
One can say, then, that the flesh names a turn in vision whereby things reveal their 
essence as forms, as imbrications of my own being, as correlates of my gestures and 
actions.378 In this regard, the flesh is an impossible notion at the limits of phenomenology. 
For the flesh is a “notion” that is experience, whose “content” is an event, essentially 
dynamic, not something manifest or visible. 
Indeed, what makes the thinking of the flesh fundamentally difficult and obscure is 
that it somehow dislocates the familiar and stable junctures of space and time. The thinking 
of the flesh is, as Merleau-Ponty often suggests, something like a mad vision in which the 
distinction between subject and object, myself and the others, world and I are challenged. To 
put it more precisely, one could say that the thinking of the flesh is a radical return to the 
376 Ibid., 114/150-51. “se sent…qu’il est le sensible même venant à soi, et qu’en retour le sensible est à ses yeux comme son 
double ou une extension de sa chair.” 
377 Ibid., 114/151. “Les choses, ici, là, maintenant, alors, ne sont plus en soi, en leur lieu, en leur temps, elles n’existent qu’au 
bout de ces rayons de spatialité et de temporalité, émis dans le secret de ma chair…”   
378 In this regard, Françoise Dastur underscores that “Being is not a plenitude into which one would have to 
sink and dissolve oneself,” but rather it is a background that is fragmentarily and indirectly experienced through 
our creations. See Dastur, "World, Flesh, Vision," 31. 
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world. Indeed, the madness of this thinking of the flesh is not supposed to drive us out of 
the world. It aims, on the contrary, at turning one’s sight towards sensible being and the 
“there” of existence, the ground in which “…the objective body and the phenomenal body 
turn about one another or encroach upon one another.”379 
Although the flesh names the encroachment between objective and phenomenal 
body, this encroachment should not be interpreted as a sort of fusion. The madness of this 
return to the sensible is neither the attempt at fusion with being nor the madness of 
indifferentiation and pure homogeneity. Rather, this return is a repetition that happens in 
time, and which contains a melodic variation of the same, a displacement or retardation. 
Merleau-Ponty elaborates on this point, saying that:   
There is an experience of the visible thing as pre-existing my vision, but this experience is 
not a fusion, a coincidence: because my eyes which see, my hands which touch, can also be 
seen and touched, because therefore, in this sense they see and touch the visible, the tangible 
from within, because our flesh lines and even envelopes all the visible and tangible things 
with which nevertheless it is surrounded, the world and I are within one another, and there is 
no anteriority of the percipere to the percipi, there is simultaneity or even retardation.380  
The reversibility of percipere and percipi does not imply the conflation of these two 
moments because this event is inscribed in spatiality and temporality. This means that 
perception opens up a delay or retardation, it is not an immediate apprehension of 
something. My right hand can touch my left hand, but the hand touching and the hand 
touched are never the same, the eye perceived is never the eye perceiving, there is always an 
insurmountable gap separating these two moments. This essential absence or lack is what 
gives dimensionality to the visible. 
379 The Visible and the Invisible, 155/117. “…corps objectif et corps phenomenal tournent l’un autour de l’autre ou empiètement 
l’un sur l’autre. ” 
380 Ibid., 162/123. “Il y a une expérience de la chose visible comme préexistant à ma vision, mais elle n’est pas fusioon, 
coïncidence: parce que mes yeux qui voient, mes mains qui touchent, peuvent être aussi vus et touchés, parce que, donc, en ce sens, ils 
voient et touchent le visible, le tangible, du dedans, que notre chair tapisse et même enveloppe toutes les choses visibles et tangibles 
don’t elle est pourtant entourée, le monde et moi sommes l’une dans l’autre, et du percipere au percipi il n’y a pas d’anteriorité, il 
y a simultanéité ou même retard.” 
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Merleau-Ponty suggests, in this way, that all visible inscription, any gesture or any act 
of vision is in itself the trace of an absence, just as the furrows in the land that are pregnant 
or generative. And this tracing of furrows in the visible is what renders the “carnal texture” 
of ideas. He says precisely: “Their carnal texture [of ideas] presents to us what is absent from 
all flesh, it is a furrow that traces itself out magically under our eyes without a tracer, a 
certain hollow, a certain interior, a certain absence, a negativity that is not nothing…”381 
Even though ideas are essentially invisible, they pervade the visible as that which is 
necessarily missing, lacking in the visible, they are the emptiness that surrounds visibility.382  
One could say, therefore, that ideas are transfigurations of the flesh insofar as they 
are not the invisible of an indeterminate and static visibility. That is to say, ideas are not the 
expression of a metaphysical nothingness; instead they are in each case the invisible inscribed, 
stamped, in the vision of things.383 Ideas appear, then, as traces of the temporal unfolding of 
visible things, traces weaving a subtler, transparent flesh, the flesh of meaning and 
language.384  
The furrows of ideas are inscribed in the visible and, thereby, preserved in time. 
Specifically, examining the temporal dimensionality of being, Merleau-Ponty indicates that 
the weight and thickness of the world is the weight of the past, the past that is not left 
behind in a linear sequence, but rather the past that incises vertically on my present: “When I 
find again the actual world such as it is, under my hands, under my eyes, up against my body, 
381 Ibid., 195/151. “Leur texture charnellenous présente l’absence de toute chair; c’est un sillage qui se trace magiquement sous 
nos yeux, sans aucun traceur, un certain creux, un certain dedans, une certain absence, une négativité qui n’est pas rien...” 
382 It seems that Merleau-Ponty outlines this idea on the basis of his reading of Husserl’s text, “The Origin of 
Geometry,” particularly considering the concept of foundation and its relation to writing. See Lawlor, 
“Verflechtung.” 
383 For some considerations about the Flesh as communicability, and its relation to language, see Mauro 
Carbone, "Flesh: Towards the History of a Misunderstanding," Chiasmi International 4 (2002): 49-64, 50. 
384 Ibid., 198/153.  
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I find much more than an object: a Being of which my vision is a part, a visibility older than 
my operations or my acts.”385  
As Merleau-Ponty remarks, my vision expresses an immemorial past, a visibility that 
belongs to being, whereby the visible world emerges in front of me as something more than 
what it “actually” is. One can say, therefore, that there is in actual perception a gestural, 
inconspicuous recognition of a horizon of virtualities, of ideas. Perception is primordial 
memory, for it contracts the past and transforms it into concrete comportments. Merleau-
Ponty describes this primordial memory as a certain visibility, a power of vision. He indicates 
that the invisible layer of my perceptual field is a modulation or qualitative tonality of the 
visible itself. It is not opposed to the plane of the visible like a layer juxtaposed to the ground 
of the sensible world, and separated from it. That is to say, the virtualities of perception, its 
qualitative doublings, unfold with the body’s movements and actions: the body that is vision 
and the body that is visible are in each case imbricated. If metaphors were necessary to 
clarify this point, says Merleau-Ponty, “it would be better to say that the body sensed and the 
body sentient are as the obverse and the reverse, or again, as two segments of one sole 
circular course which goes above from left to right and below from right to left, but which is 
but one sole movement in its two phases.”386  
In this regard, Merleau-Ponty insists that the experience of touch, whereby my own 
body is redoubled, is the trace of a redoubling of being. As I have indicated already, Merleau-
Ponty’s characterization of the flesh as ontological element hinges on this insight: 
“everything said about the sensed body pertains to the whole of the sensible of which it is a 
385 Ibid., 162/123. “Quand je retrouve le monde actuel, tel qu’il est, sous mes mains, sous mes yeux, contre mon corps, je retrouve 
beaucoup plus au’un objet: un Être dont ma vision fait partie, une visibilité plus vieille que mes opérations ou mes actes.” 
386 Ibid., 179-80/138. “Si l’on veut des métaphores, il vaudrait mieuxdire que le corps senti et le corps sentant sont comme 
l’envers et l’endroit, ou encore, comme deux segments d’un seul parcours circulaire, qui, par en haut, va de gauche à droite, et, par 
en bas, de droit à gauche, mais qui n’est qu’un seul mouvement dans ses deux phases.” 
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part, and to the world.”387 Accordingly, another fundamental premise underlying the analysis 
of the flesh is that what I experience through my body compresses the history of the world. 
This means that my gestures are never only my gestures, and my perception is never simply 
my perception. The limits “separating” my body from the world are not the limits of two 
separate planes of reality and, to be precise, one should say that my own body moves with 
the world. Merleau-Ponty remarks, then, that my body and the world are intertwined:  
“There is reciprocal insertion and intertwining of one in the other. Or rather, if, as once 
again we must, we eschew the thinking by planes and perspectives, there are two circles, or 
two vortexes, or two spheres, concentric when I live naively, and as soon as I question 
myself, the one slightly decentered with respect to the other...”388  
Moving on from these “metaphors,” one may understand reflection, the possibility 
to question ourselves, to distance ourselves from ourselves and the world, and our capacity 
to “produce” ideas of ourselves and the world, as a slight movement, an inconspicuous 
displacement, whereby we lose sight of our general involvement in being and, thereby, turn 
to see ourselves as subjects. But, in any case, the element of the flesh remains there as the 
general milieu we live in.  
Specifically, in what is perhaps the most straightforward definition of the flesh, 
Merleau-Ponty says:  “The flesh is not matter, is not mind, is not substance. To designate it, 
we should need the old term “element,” in the sense it was used to speak of water, air, earth, 
and fire, that is, in the sense of a general thing, midway between the spatio-temporal individual 
387 Ibid., 180/138. “Or, tout ce qu’on dit du corps senti rentit sur le sensible entier dont il fait partie, et sur le monde.” 
388 Ibid. “il y a insertion réciproque et entrelacs de l’un dans l’autre. Ou plutôt, si, comme il le faut encore une fois, on renonce à la 
pensée par plans et perspectives, il y a deux circles, ou deux tourbillons, ou deux sphères, concentriques quand je vis naïvement, et, 
des que je m’interroge, faiblement décentrés l’un par rapport à l’autre. ” 
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and the idea, a sort of incarnate principle that brings a style of being wherever there is a 
fragment of being. The flesh is in this sense an “element” of Being.”389 
This definition of the flesh as a general thing, i.e., as an “etwas,” resonates with 
Merleau-Ponty’s reading of texts such as The Principle of Reason or Introduction to Metaphysics.390 
As Merleau-Ponty points out in his Notes de cours, for Heidegger being withdraws in the 
ground of things as openness, as the primordial pivot in between the objective thing and the 
metaphysical nothingness, as something that gathers things without becoming one of 
them.391 
Similarly, Merleau-Ponty indicates that the flesh is the constituent of a “style” of 
being, a principle that supports the visibility of things, their form. But, he insists, this 
element of being cannot be compared to things, for the flesh is an ontological constituent of 
existence. This is why no metaphor would be appropriate to describe what the flesh is, and 
this is the reason that Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the flesh goes vis-a-vis the phenomenology 
of the lived body. Thus, when Merleau-Ponty says that the flesh is an element, one should 
have in mind a primordial, ontological element like the elements thought by Presocratic 
thinkers, or like the primordial earth, not a physical one. The flesh is, therefore, the 
qualitative element in which our movements take place, the milieu of the lived body, not of 
the objective one. Having said this, it may be possible to determine more precisely some 
articulations between the problematic of the flesh and the problem of gesture. 
The flesh is the element midway between the idea and the concrete individual. Thus, 
when Merleau-Ponty says that the flesh is a general thing this does not mean that it is an idea 
389 Ibid., 181-82/139. “La chair n’est pas matiére, n’est pas sprit, n’est pas substance. Il faudrait, pour la désigner, le vieux 
terme d’«element» au sens où on l’employait pour parler de l’eau, de l’air, de la terre et du feu, s’est-à-dire au sens de un chose 
générale, à mi-chemin de l’individu spatio-temporel et de l’idee, sorte de  principe incarné qui importe un style d’être partout où il 
s’ en trouve une parcelle. La chair est en ce sens un «élément» de l’Être.” 
390 See Notes de cours, 103.  
391 See ibid., 102-104. 
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attached to things, but rather, it is the generality that constitutes the thing as a determinate 
thing. To put it more precisely, one should say that this generality of the flesh is the element 
that relates me to the thing existentially, that is, as extension of my vision, affections and 
actions. Since the flesh is the milieu of our existential engagement with things, one could say 
that the flesh is the sensible milieu of gestures. Indeed, in the Phenomenology of Perception, 
Merleau-Ponty defines gestures as conjunctions of meaning and movement, in which a 
particular style of being becomes manifest. As I indicated in an earlier chapter, for Merleau-
Ponty gestures carry out the decisive step of communication, as they display a meaning that 
is itself sensible and that unfolds with our movements. In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-
Ponty retrieves this problematic of gesture in terms of what he calls, inspired by Proust, 
“sensible ideas.” 
In The Visible and the Invisible Merleau-Ponty indicates that his ontological project 
intends to think the world of perception from within. He claims, for instance: “Before the 
essence as before the fact, all we must do is situate ourselves within the being we are dealing 
with, instead of looking at it from the outside…”392 Consequently, for Merleau-Ponty a 
proper ontological view requires a mode of thinking that becomes itself experience, which 
comes down to the level of “sensible ideas.” One can therefore say that the ontology of the 
flesh hinges on a mode of thinking that is itself gesture, performance. For the conjunction of 
the visible and the invisible, of the idea and the body, corresponds to the unfolding of our 
actions qua gestures, circumscribed in a horizon of meaning that has not been solidified in 
consciousness. This is, precisely, what Merleau-Ponty suggests when he talks of “sensible 
ideas” in the context of The Visible and the Invisible. 
392 Ibid., 155/117. “À l’égard de l’essence comme du fait, il n’est que de se placer dans l’être dont on traite, au lieu de le regarder 
du dehors...” 
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Merleau-Ponty explains that sensible ideas are not invisible abstractions separate 
from tangible realities, but rather invisible forces producing sensible configurations: “We do 
not possess the musical or sensible ideas, precisely because they are negativity or absence 
circumscribed; they posses us. The performer is no longer producing or reproducing the 
sonata: he feels himself, and the others feel him to be at the service of the sonata; the sonata 
sings through him or cries out so suddenly that he must “dash on his bow” to follow it.”393  
The example of the sonata not only shows that the idea is a power guiding our 
bodies in the instant of the performance, but also indicates that our individual being 
somehow dissolves its proper limits and becomes spectral in the embodiment of the idea: in 
performing or listening to the sonata we are possessed by the idea. In this way, Merleau-
Ponty indicates, on the one hand, that in artistic performances we may have a primordial 
grasp on the invisible depth of the flesh; on the other hand, that in the course of a 
performance our sensible flesh is inherently porous and prompt to become an idea. And this 
happens also when our bodily flesh migrates to the flesh of language as something is said.394  
Indeed, if the idea can take possession of us this means that our own being is 
pervaded by invisibility, it is intrinsically porous. This porosity reveals the reversibility and 
essential promiscuity of the flesh as a fundamental trait of our experience in general, a 
fundamental dimension of our relation to being, according to which there is no singular 
determination of the sensible that would not be inscribed in a more general horizon of 
meaning. Merleau-Ponty underscores this point in the context of a reference to Heidegger’s 
understanding of Wesen as a verbal expression. Merleau-Ponty says:      
393 Ibid., 196/151. “Les idées musicales ou sensibles, précisément parce qu’elles négativité ou absense circonscrite, nous ne les 
possédons pas, elles nous possèdent. Ce n’est plus l’exécutant qui produit ou reproduit la sonate: il se sent, et les autres le sentent, au 
service de la sonate, c’est elle qui chante à travers lui, ou qui crie si brusquement qu’il doit «se précipiter sur son archet» pour la 
suivre.” 
394 See ibid., 198/153. 
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There is no emplacement of space and time that would not be a variant of the others, as they 
are of it; there is no individual that would not be representative of a species or of a family of 
beings, would not have, would not be a certain style, a certain manner of managing the 
domain of space and time over which it has competency, of pronouncing, of articulating that 
domain, of radiating about a wholly virtual center –in short, a certain manner of Being, in the 
active sense, a certain Wesen, in the sense that, says Heidegger, this word has when it is used 
as a verb.395 
Merleau-Ponty underscores that we should not reify particular emplacements or 
modalities of existence because we always move in a dynamic understanding of being. Our 
dealings with things are set in a historical world that is projected towards the future, and that 
condensates the past as a horizon of virtualities that were never present. For this reason, as I 
have often indicated, things are never restricted to a punctual here and now: things have 
depth when they are encountered within the element of the flesh.  
Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty points out that in each case our own being is 
constituted by experiences and thoughts that “have about themselves a time and a space that 
exist by piling up, by proliferation, by encroachment, by promiscuity –a perpetual pregnancy, 
perpetual parturition, generativity and generality, brute essence and brute existence, which 
are the nodes and antinodes of the same ontological vibration.”396 Put differently, beings 
move within the element of the flesh, a sensible element that redoubles them by touch, that 
makes them sensitive to touch, even the subtle touch of “thinking.” Grasping things, 
thinking them, presupposes the ontological openness to the flesh, which integrates things 
into larger wholes. Based on these premises, let me move on to examine in more detail how 
395 Ibid., 152/114-15. “Il n’est pas un emplacement de l’espace et du temps qui ne tienne aux autres, ne soit une variante des 
autres, comme eux de lui; pas un individu qui ne soit représentatif d’une espèce ou d’une familie d’êtres, n’ait, ne soit un certain 
style, une certain manière de gérer le domaine d’espace et de temps sur lequel il a compétence, de le prononcer, de l’articuler, de 
rayonner autour d’un centre tout virtuel, bref, une certain manière d’être, au sens actif, un certain Zesen, au sens, dit Heidegger, que 
le mot a quand il est employé comme verbe.” 
396 Ibid., 152-53/115. “…ont autour d’elles un temps et un space d’empilement, de prolifération, d’empiétement, de promiscuité, 
-perpétuelle prégnance, perpétuelle parturition, générativité et généralité, essence brute et existence brute, qui sont les ventres et les 
noeuds de la même vibration ontologique.” 
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this determination of the “gestural” dimension of the flesh incorporates elements of 
Heidegger’s work. 
Being and the Flesh: Reflections on Merleau-Ponty’s Reading of Heidegger 
Evoking Proust and Heidegger, combining them in what seems to be an impossible 
composition, Merleau-Ponty offers an interpretation of this Wesen, this verbal being that 
makes things vibrate with historical depth, in a footnote referring to Heidegger’s Introduction 
to Metaphysics. This footnote is remarkable because it elucidates potential convergences 
between Heidegger’s approach to the question of being and the thinking of the flesh. The 
passage in question is as follows: 
The highschool building, for us who return to it, thirty years later, as for those who occupy it 
today, is not so much an object which it would be useful or possible to describe by its 
characteristics, as it is a certain odor, a certain affective texture which holds sway over a 
certain vicinity of space. This velvet, this silk, are under my fingers a certain manner of 
resisting them and of yielding to them, a rough, sleek, rasping power, which respond for an 
X-spot of my flesh, lend themselves to its movement of muscled flesh, or tempt it in its 
inertia.397  
Here, Merleau-Ponty alludes to the sections from Introduction to Metaphysics in which 
Heidegger recalls the analysis of perception developed in Being and Time, according to which 
we never hear pure noises, see pure abstract forms, nor touch pure rough materials, but 
rather totalities with meaning. In the Introduction to Metaphysics Heidegger also touches on 
arguments that resonate in the essay on the work of art. He refers to van Gogh’s painting of 
the peasant shoes, claiming that without representing anything the painting puts us in front 
of the shoes and their respective existential possibilities, disclosing the shoes in an immediate 
correspondence with a world that embraces us. He also alludes to the question of being and 
397 Ibid., 152/115. “Le lycée, pour nous qui y revenons, trente ans après, comme pour ceux qui aujourd’hui l’habitent, n’est pas 
tant un objet qu’il soit utile ou qu’il soit possible de décrire par ses caractères, au’une certaine odeur, une certaine texture affective 
qui a puissance sur un certain voisinage d’espace. Ce velours, cette soie, sont sous mes doigts une certain manière de leur résister et de 
leur céder, une puissance rugueuse, lisse, crissante, qui répondent d’un lieu X à ma chair, se prêtent à son mouvement de chair 
musclée ou la tentent dans son inertie.” 
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wonders whether being is in all the things that “are.” Clearly, he remarks, all sensible “solid” 
things “are,” they have a certain relation to being. But being itself withdraws from these 
singular things and seems to be sheer nothingness.  
After considering these questions, and in a puzzling reference to Nietzsche, 
Heidegger admits that in a certain sense being is a vapor, a phantasmagoric and evanescent 
atmosphere. He says: “But Being remains undiscoverable, almost like Nothing, or in the end 
entirely so. The word “Being” is then finally just an empty word. It means nothing actual, 
tangible, real. Its meaning is an unreal vapor.”398 The meaning of being, just as the meaning 
of the term “art,” is no longer actual, nothing real corresponds to it. Yet, the “vapor” of 
being pervades every single instance of my actual perception of things, it surrounds things 
perceived as a sensible configuration of meaning, even if it is ungraspable and resists any 
objective definition.  
Heidegger intimates that being is the nothingness that impregnates things and keeps 
them alive, the affective atmosphere that determines their historical essence, and which is 
forgotten in metaphysics. The reference to van Gogh’s painting, as well as the reference to 
the highschool building, calls attention to the historical texture of things, the horizon of 
significance within which things appear as what they are. Perhaps this historical texture is the 
ground of the affinity between “art” and “being,” as words that no longer name anything 
actual or real, but rather something forgotten and left behind in the past, the original past 
that repeats itself in every single perception and gives relief or salience to things.  
Thus, it seems, what is forgotten in reflective, objectifying thinking is the essential 
depth of things, their roots in a general dimensionality of life and being. Within the orbit of 
similar questions Merleau-Ponty says that “one forgets that this frontal being before us –
398 Introduction to Metaphysics, 26/38. 
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whether we posit it, whether it posits itself within us qua being-posited –is second by 
principle, is cut out upon a horizon which is not nothing, and which for its part is not by 
virtue of composition.”399   
As I have already indicated, in the “Addendum” to the essay on the work of art 
Heidegger indicates that the work of art is the setting into work of the truth of being, that 
the question of art is intrinsically related to the question of the meaning of being and the 
questions concerning the relation between human being and being. Throughout the essay, 
Heidegger remarks that the essence of the thing is given in the work of art, not in 
philosophical theories. Heidegger suggests that there is in art a primordial experience of 
things, just as the one we could have in our everyday encounter with things in the world if 
we were attentive to their affective depth.  
In line with Merleau-Ponty’s reading of the Introduction to Metaphysics, one can say that 
art brings thinking back to the flesh of the world, reactivating indirectly our primordial 
relation to sensible being, just as it happens with the velvet that reacts to my touch and that 
is awakened by my movements. In short, art offers an indirect path for thinking to return to 
sensible being, it retrieves the gestural dimension of thinking.  
Particularly, in his lecture-notes on Husserl, Merleau-Ponty remarks that philosophy 
would escape the false alternative between objectivity and mystic silence if it followed the 
indirect path of art, the gestures of art, poetry, and life: “There would really be indirect 
language. The one which would not try to objectify the Gesagte <‘the said’>, but which gives 
399 The Visible and the Invisible, 167/127. “On oublie que cet être frontal, devant nous, soit que nous le posions, soit qu’il se 
pose en nous en tant qu’être-posé, est, par principe, second, decoupé sur un horizon qui n’est pas rien, et qui lui n’est pas par 
composition.” 
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it through gestures = poetry –And we could generalize: history, life, Passions.”400 Philosophy 
can retrieve its sensible grounds, recall the living and spontaneous body, if it thinks through 
art and poetry, through life and passions, not primarily through concepts or categories that 
annul the distance and dimensionality of things. Merleau-Ponty remarks that the question 
concerning our relation to being depends on a delicate balance of proximity and distance: 
“Infinite distance or absolute proximity, negation or identification: our relationship with 
Being is ignored in the same way in both cases. In both cases, one misses it because one 
thinks one will ensure it more effectively by approaching the essence or the thing as closely 
as possible.”401 Thus, it seems, art would keep thinking at a proper distance, different to the 
distance of objective thinking. Accordingly, in what follows, I will explore Merleau-Ponty’s 
approach to the relation between being and art. Specifically, I will examine in what sense art 
provides an experience of touch and vision that keeps things at a proper distance, and 
whether this experience of touch may be characterized as a gestural imbrication in the flesh 
of the world.  
Art and the Gestures of Being 
Being is not a being, but rather the nothingness that permeates things, which 
withdraws its own presence. As Merleau-Ponty explains, being is like an “atmosphere” 
pervading our relations with things. For things are intertwined with the flesh of our bodies –
of our being –and they are inscribed in the horizons of practical possibilities.402 And 
400 Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 60/49. “Il y aurait bien langage indirect. Celui qui n’essaie pas de objectiver le 
Gesagte, mais le donne comme par geste = poesie –Et l’on pourrait généraliser: histoire, vie, Passions.” 
401 Ibid. “Or, distance infinie ou proximité absolue, négation ou identification, notre rapport à l’Être est ignoré de la même façon 
dans les deux cas. Dans les deux cas, on le manque parce qu’on croit mieux l’assurer en s’approchant au plus près de l’essence de la 
chose.” 
402 In his notes on Husserl, in a passage that explains the openness in between ideality and thing as a general 
thing, an etwas, Merleau-Ponty remarks that this invisible being, is a vertical being that corresponds to the being 
of praxis. See Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 27/24.  
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continuing on from this point, Merleau-Ponty suggests that there is in things an implicit 
reference to my own flesh, even to the movement of my muscles. Let me recall, again, the 
passage in question: “This velvet, this silk, are under my fingers a certain manner of resisting 
them and of yielding to them, a rough, sleek, rasping power, which respond for an X-spot of 
my flesh, lend themselves to its movement of muscled flesh, or tempt it in its inertia.”403  
Things outline potential actions and, thus, a world that we inhabit. In this way, as 
Merleau-Ponty points out in his lecture-notes on Husserl, “what is at issue is to remain in 
our sojourn,”404 to remain immersed in the spectral presencing of being, Wesen, and 
enraptured in the madness of perception. Merleau-Ponty finds, indeed, that perception itself, 
even in the phenomenon of touch, opens up an insurmountable gap, a communication at 
distance and a “vision,” whereby things radiate beyond their limits. Thus, rather than fusion, 
the limits of touch reveal a crossing, a chiasm in the sensible. When I touch things there is, at 
the same time, a touching that comes from the things, which displaces me. Exploring an 
example excerpted from Husserl’s work, Merleau-Ponty describes this experience of touch as 
follows:       
Already in the “touch” we have just found three distinct experiences which subtend one 
another, three dimensions which overlap but are distinct: a touching of the sleek and of the 
rough, a touching of the things –a passive sentiment of the body and of its space –and finally 
a veritable touching of the touch, when my right touches my left hand while it is palpating 
the things, where the “touching subject” passes over to the rank of the touched, descends 
into the thing, such that the touch is formed in the midst of the world and as it were in the 
things.405  
403 Ibid., 152/115. “Le lycée, pour nous qui y revenons, trente ans après, comme pour ceux qui aujourd’hui l’habitent, n’est pas 
tant un objet qu’il soit utile ou qu’il soit possible de décrire par ses caractères, au’une certaine odeur, une certaine texture affective 
qui a puissance sur un certain voisinage d’espace. Ce velours, cette soie, sont sous mes doigts une certain manière de leur résister et de 
leur céder, une puissance rugueuse, lisse, crissante, qui répondent d’un lieu X à ma chair, se prêtent à son mouvement de chair 
musclée ou la tentent dans son inertie.” 
404 Ibid., 48. 
405 The Visible and the Invisible, 174/133-34. “Déjà dans le «toucher», nous venons de trouver trois expériences distinctes qui se 
sous-tendent, trois dimensions qui se recoupent, mais sont distinctes: un toucher du lisse et du rugueux, un toucher des choses –un 
sentiment passif du corps et de son espace –, et en fin un véritable toucher du toucher, quand ma main droite touche ma main 
gauche en train de palper les choses, par lequel le «sujet touchant» passe au rang de touché, descend dans les choses, de sorte que le 
toucher se fait du milieu de monde et comme en elles.” 
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There exists an encroachment between my phenomenal body and the body object 
because the experience of perception is not unidirectional. Perception also comes from 
things, just as if things had in each case imposed a range of visibility upon us: they see us 
while we see them. Touch is somehow formed in the midst of the world because the world 
itself is constituted as the logos we inhabit rather than as bloße Sache: touch is already pervaded 
by meaning, but a meaning that is sensible, that is a peculiar mode of shining, which involves 
the openness that allows things to move us while we reach them. This apparently simple 
experience cannot be easily captured through reflective philosophy or science because they 
renounce the possibility of inhabiting things and they turn things into artifacts to be 
manipulated. This experience is also inconspicuous to “profane vision,” which has become 
too metaphysical, overcharged with common sense.  
In Eye and Mind Merleau-Ponty explores alternatives to reflective thinking and its 
predominant metaphysics of the body. He takes up arguments developed in The Visible and 
the Invisible and shows that our primordial experience of sensible being may be incorporated 
in philosophy and thinking once thinking returns to the origins of sensible life. This return 
requires that philosophy relinquish the pretense of universality, the perspective of the 
kosmotheoros: “it is necessary that the thought of science –surveying thought, thought of the 
object in general, be placed back in the “there is” which precedes it, back in the site, back 
upon the soil of the sensible world and the soil of the worked upon world such as they are 
for our lives and for our bodies…”406 This re-placing of philosophy and thinking in the soil 
of the world is, in a sense, a re-immersion in the opacity of the body. But the opacity of the 
                                                
406 Eye and Mind, 1592/352. “Il faut que la pensée de science –pensée de survol, pensée de l’objet en general –se replace dans un 
«il y a» préalable, dans le site, sur le sol du monde sensible et du monde ouvré tels qu’ils sont dans notre vie, pour notre corps.” 
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body is not simply a limit to thinking, as it was for Descartes, but rather an enigmatic 
territory to be explored in a new mode of philosophizing.  
Specifically, in Eye and Mind, Merleau-Ponty envisages this philosophy to come, this 
new metaphysics of the body beyond metaphysics, in the experience of art. Particularly, he 
calls attention to painting. He says: “This philosophy, which is still to be made, is what 
animates the painter –not when he expresses opinions about the world but in that instant 
when his vision becomes gesture, when, in Cézanne’s words, he ‘thinks in painting’”407  
The instant in which vision becomes gesture is the fleeting instant of transfiguration, 
when vision touches, moves, and is responsive to things, moved by them. As Merleau-Ponty 
explains, the painter explores the enigma of vision as an invisible movement that, coming 
from things, passes through the lived body. Thus, the painter guides his movements and his 
vision through the way things give themselves in primordial perception. What becomes 
manifest in art, in painting, and what is missing in reflective thinking, is a deep awareness of 
the lived body. For the painter displays the enigmatic “knowledge” that belongs to the body, 
the one that unfolds in its immediate relation to things, in gestures.  
Although Merleau-Ponty does not focus on gesture here, as he does in the 
Phenomenology of Perception or The Prose of the World, and there are only few mentions of this 
notion, there are good reasons to think that the notion of gesture plays an important role 
articulating this new metaphysics of painting. In fact, painting is essentially gestural: it 
follows the directives of the lived body, which is intertwined with the world. And, as I have 
argued already, gestures express the bodying forth of the body, they “express” our existential 
engagement with the world. Specifically, in a passage that echoes Heidegger’s own analysis of 
                                                
407 Ibid. 1612/367-58.“Or, cette philosophie qui est à faire, c’est elle qui anime le peintre, non quand pas il exprime des 
opinions sur le monde, mais a l’instant où sa vision se fait geste, quand, dira Cézanne, «il pense en peinture».”  
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the bodying forth of the body and of gesture in the Zollikon seminars, Merleau-Ponty 
remarks: “I say of a thing that it is moved, but my body moves itself; my movement unfolds 
itself. It is not in ignorance of itself, blind to itself, it radiates from a self…”408 The body 
radiates from a self means: it knows itself and what it can do in relation to things, before 
explicitly formulating this knowledge. In short, the body itself knows how to interpret the 
world.  
Thus, what is remarkable in the bodily experience of the artist is that the vision of 
things unfolds itself as a meaningful movement, as an articulated comportment guided by a 
holistic vision of the world. It is well known that someone experienced in the art of drawing, 
for instance, does not look at the canvas but rather at the thing he draws, as if the hands 
already knew what the eyes see, and what distance the hands themselves traverse through 
their traces.409 This simple example illustrates the enigmatic overlapping of vision and 
movement that constitutes the body. It illustrates, too, the reversal in which a thing seen at a 
distance is incorporated as a trace guiding our actions and, in turn, becomes a vision. In this 
way, the lived body manifests itself as a power of reduplication of things. Recalling in passing 
the notion of flesh, Merleau-Ponty explains this as follows: 
Things are an annex or prolongation of my body; they are incrusted in its flesh; they are part 
of its full definition; the world is made of the very stuff of the body. These reversals, these 
antinomies, are different ways of saying that vision is caught or is made in the middle of 
things, where something visible undertakes to see, becomes visible for itself and through the 
vision of all things, where the indivision of the sensing and the sensed persists, like the 
original fluid within the crystal.410  
408 Ibid., 1594/352. “Je dis d’une chose qu’elle est mue, mais mon corps, lui, se meut, mon mouvement se déploie. Il n’est pas 
dans l’ignorance de soi, il n’est pas aveugle pour soi, il rayonne d’un soi…” 
409 This is, for instance, what Betty Edwards’ exercise of “pure contour drawing” demonstrates. See Betty 
Edwards, The New Drawing on the Right Side of the Brain (New York: jeremy P. Tarcher/Putnam, 1999), 85-96. 
410 Ibid., 1595/354. “...elles sont une annexe ou un prolongement de lui-même, elles sont incrustées dans ma chair, elles font 
partie de sa définition pleine et le monde est fait de l’étoffe même du corps. Ces renversements, ces antinomies sont diverses manières 
de dire que la vision est prise ou se fait du milieu des choses, là où un visible se met à voir, devient visible pour soi et par sa vision 
de toutes choses, là où persiste, comme l’eau mére dans le cristal, l’indivision du sentant et du senti.” 
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The moment of indivision of the sensing and the sensed, of course, implies a 
transformative leap rather than a mystical fusion, for it corresponds to the reversal of the 
flesh. This moment reveals that things are a prolongation of my body and that we are made 
of the same stuff, thrown together into the open realm of visibility. Yet, this visibility is 
never fully crystallized in the images of things, and it never constitutes a static and solid 
ground, neither in the images of art nor in the images of perception. Visibility is understood 
here as dynamic, a modulation of the flesh of things. The moment of vision is never a static 
moment, for it preserves within “the indivision of the sensing and the sensed,” that is, it 
contains an encrypted enigmatic power of reduplication, a movement or tendency to 
repetition and difference. Put differently, every moment of vision, every image, is pregnant 
with multiple fields of action. The painting, for example, resonates in my body, at the same 
time as “light, color, depth.”411 This pregnancy of the visible constitutes the world. That is to 
say, to exist, to come into existence, means to bear the world of perception: its weight, its 
thickness, and its possibilities.  
Painting, as well as art in general, propagates a visibility that was at work in things, 
and in the body. In other words, painting shows that perception is never just a passive 
engagement with something given once and for all, but rather a relentless movement of 
disclosure. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty discovers with Cézanne that vision carries within itself an 
invitation to movement, to action, to painting, because bodily perception is already burdened 
with the uncountable traces of things, and our body alone cannot contain them.  
Merleau-Ponty suggests, then, that visible things, things given in perception in the 
apparent inertia of “pure things,” contain a tendency to reduplication that, while passing 
through our bodies, germinates in new spirals of visibility, new outlines or sketches of things, 
411 Eye and Mind, 1596/355. 
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adumbrating new worlds. Merleau-Ponty elucidates this point as he asks: “Why would this 
internal equivalence, this carnal formula of their presence that the things arouse in me not 
arouse an outline that is again visible, in which every other gaze would find again the motifs 
that support their inspection of the world? Thus, there appears a visible to the second 
power, a carnal essence or icon of the first.”412   
Merleau-Ponty determines the emergence of things as an outline (tracé), and art as a 
redoubling of visibility, a carnal essence or icon that reduplicates the “first” outline or trace 
inscribed in the flesh of things. The redoubling of the sensible that takes place in art is, in a 
sense, mimesis and mimicry. Yet, art’s reduplication of the visible is not sheer copy, precisely 
because the work of art preserves the “tracing” of the visible, its movement, not a dead 
“image.” Merleau-Ponty explains this point by analyzing the case of the mural paintings in 
Lascaux, for these paintings may initially appear as a very simple example of imitative 
painting. Merleau-Ponty indicates that if one considers attentively these paintings one can see 
that they are not dead images, like fissures in the rocks. Rather, they have an enigmatic 
presence that cannot be fixed, they appear like ghosts animating the walls: “Pushed forward 
here, held back there, supported by the wall’s mass they use so adroitly, they radiate about 
the wall without ever breaking their elusive moorings.”413  With the painting of the animals, 
the protuberances and fissures of the walls acquire a new life and, at the same time, the 
animals themselves are invested with new layers of significance: they may evoke strength, 
fear, or convey new meanings to sexual desire. Thus, these murals re-awaken the enigma of 
the visible, they carry out a redoubling of the visible. And this power is essential to painting. 
412 Ibid. “Cet équivalent interne, cette formule charnelle de leur présence que les choses suscitent en moi, pourquoi à leur tour ne 
susciteraient-il-pas un tracé, visible encore, où tout autre regard retrouvera les motifs qui soutiennent son inspection du monde? 
Alors paraît un visible à la deuxième puissance, essence charnelle ou icône du premier.”  
413 Ibid. “Un peu en avant, un peu en arrière, soutenus par sa masse dont ils se servent adroitement, ils rayonnent autour d’elle 
sans jamais rompre leur insaissable amarre.” 
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Presumably, painting arouses my sight and enraptures it in such a way that it cannot be put 
to rest or fixed. “For I do not gaze at it [the painting] as one gazes at a thing. I do not fix it 
in its place. My gaze wanders within it as in the halos of Being. Rather than seeing it, I see 
according to, or within it.”414 
Although the painting is set in place, limited by a physical surface, it makes my gaze 
vibrate with the visible, wander within the visible. In this sense, the painting preserves the 
spontaneous life of a gesture, of the living gesture that brought it to life. For the painting 
does not remain fixed in place as a thing, nor is it the production of purely mechanical 
effects. What Heidegger says about the “fixing” in place of the truth in the work of art may 
also count here: rather than being emplaced as a thing, the work of art is a setting that draws 
something to one’s vision, and in this sense the painting works as an outline, a trace to be 
reactivated in future works and visions. For how could something be given in painting, to 
the future, if the painting did not preserve the tentative, fragmentary, sketchy or projective 
dimension of a gesture, rather than the determinate, finished, complete character of an act of 
imposition, restricted to a punctual time and space? Precisely, the work of art clears a 
sensible, visible space, allowing things to appear, to become present, without imposing the 
presence of the thing as an object. That is to say, the work of art emerges as the rhythmical 
response to a movement initiated as an outline or project in the things themselves, just as if 
they were from the very beginning gestures indicating the paths one must follow.  
As I have indicated in an earlier chapter, Merleau-Ponty notes that, in Cezanne’s 
work, “[i]t is the mountain itself which from over there makes itself seen by the painter; it is 
414 Ibid. “Car je ne le regarde pas comme on regarde une chose, je ne le fixe pas en son lieu, mon regard irre en lui comme dans les 
nimbes de l’Être, je vois selon ou avec lui plutôt qui je ne le vois.” 
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the mountain that he interrogates with his gaze.”415 Indeed, the painter asks the mountain to 
show itself, he invokes the specter or ghost of the mountain, the veil that lets us capture the 
mountain as that visible mountain. “What exactly does he asks of it? To unveil the means, 
which are nothing but visible, by which the mountain makes itself into a mountain before 
my eyes.”416 I should note that, employing similar arguments, Heidegger refutes the 
interpretation of art as imitation in the essay on the work of art.  
As I have already argued, for Heidegger the work of art is a work yielding to an 
impulse coming from the truth itself, from the primordial disclosure of the world, in such a 
way that things themselves come to presence. Yet, the truth sets itself as a rift, as an outline, 
to such an extent that what appears in the work is somehow the specter of the thing: the 
pure shining of its being, the testimony of its seclusion, its belonging to the closing of the 
earth. In this way, Heidegger suggests that the essence of the thing reveals itself only in a 
rapturous movement, a movement that takes us out of ourselves and brings us back to the 
rift, i.e., the limit of pure visibility as visibility, form as form. This abyssal edge of visibility is 
what emerges in the quasi-automatic, delirious movements of the artist.  
Merleau-Ponty describes painting as a delirious and somewhat mad gesture that 
responds to the impacts coming from the world with a countermovement, be it a trace of the 
hand or the eye.417 Although in a quite unperceivable manner, the eyes move with the world, 
and this movement restores the thickness or dimensionality that remains invisible in the 
visible dimension of things. It is this dimensionality imprinted on the surface of the visible 
that painting makes visible. The work of art makes visible what is invisible in customary 
415 Ibid., 1599/357. “C’est la montagne elle-même qui, de là-bas, se fait voir du peintre, c’est elle qu’il interroge du regard.”  
416 Ibid. “Que lui demande-t-il au juste? De dévoiler les moyens, rien que visibles, par lesquels elle se fait montagne sous nous 
yeux.” 
417 See ibid., 1596-97/356-7. 
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vision, or as Heidegger would say, the radiance of being in beings: “Painting gives visible 
existence to what profane vision believes to be invisible; thanks to painting we do not need a 
‘muscular sense’ in order to possess the voluminosity of the world. This voracious vision, 
reading beyond the ‘visual givens,’ opens upon a texture of Being of which the discrete 
sensorial messages are only the punctuations or the caesura. The eye dwells in this texture as 
man dwells in his house.”418 At this point, the following questions arise: How is it that this 
“voracious vision” opens upon a “texture” of being? And how can the gestures of painting 
help us to characterize what is gesture as such? 
One may attempt a response to these questions by elaborating on the passage just 
quoted. As I suggested above, what is invisible in profane vision is the very visibility of 
things as pure visibility, which constitutes the spectral structure of the way things give 
themselves. Merleau-Ponty explicitly clarifies this point when alluding to Cezanne’s 
interrogation of the mountain, in the context of the passage mentioned above. He says: 
“Light, lighting, shadows, reflections, color, all these objects of his investigation [the 
investigation of the visible carried out by the painter] are not altogether real beings; like 
ghosts, they have only visual existence. In fact they exist only at the threshold of profane 
vision; they are not commonly seen.”419 Thus, painting gives existence to ghosts, to objects 
that are not objective beings. What painting does, what determines the gesture of the painter 
as an action of painting, is the fact that it restores what is given in vision, the ghosts or 
specters of things, their visibility. In this sense, painting is delirious because it inhabits, at the 
same time, the dimension of specters and the dimension of tangible things. Painting is, in 
418 Ibid., “…elle donne existence visible à ce que la vision profane croit invisible, elle fait que nous n’avons pas besoin de «sens 
musculaire» pour avoir la voluminosité du monde. Cette vision dévorante, par-delà les «données visuelles», ouvre sur une texture de 
l’Être dont les messages sensoriels discrets ne sont aue les ponctuations ou césures, et que l’oeil habite, comme l’homme sa maison.” 
419 Ibid.,1599/357. “Lumière, éclairage, ombres, couleur, tous ces objets de la recherche ne sont pas tout à fait des êtres réels: ils 
ont, comme les fantômes, d’existence que visuelle, ils ne sont même que sur le seuil de la vision profane, ils ne sont commnément pas 
vus.”  
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this sense, a pure gesture that does not accomplish anything “real” but, on the contrary, 
makes of the real a caesura, a rift, openness, void, a “no-thing.” Following this argument, 
one can say that the voracious vision of painting gives voice to one’s affective engagement 
with things. Painting replicates in a sensible, tangible landscape what, according to 
Heidegger, characterizes the elusive structure of being: Es gibt Sein, Being gives, “it” gives 
being, rather than “being something.” Indeed, Merleau-Ponty says, “the painter’s vision is an 
ongoing birth”420 and, in this sense, the rapture of the artist, the delirium of painting, is an 
“inspired” vision that reestablishes our exposure to the world. The notion of “inspiration” is 
fundamental in this case: “What we call ‘inspiration’ should be taken literally. There really is 
inspiration and expiration of Being, respiration in Being, action and passion so slightly 
discernible that we no longer know who sees and who is seen, who paints and what is 
painted.”421  
The allusion to breathing recalls the element of the flesh and reveals the visible as a 
milieu we inhabit, a milieu charged with an atmospheric significance, which is “felt” or 
intimated rather than known. Merleau-Ponty is familiar with Heidegger’s reflections on 
dwelling and language, as well as with the famous formula, according to which “language is 
the house of Being,” which is mentioned in The Visible and the Invisible, and examined in some 
of his later lecture-notes. Giving the visible as visible implies, in this context, reinstating what 
was already there in the grounds of our existence, what remains in the background as an 
implicit understanding of things: the intimate, somehow instinctive, understanding of being 
that is disclosure of the world, the air of meaning we breath while sojourning in the world.   
420 Ibid., 1600/358. “La vision du peintre est une naissance continuée.” 
421 Ibid. “Ce qu’on appelle inspiration devrait être prés à la letre: il y a vraiment inspiration et expiration de l’Être, action et 
passion su peu discernables qu’on ne sait plus qui voit et qui est vu, qui paint et qui est paint.” 
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Let me, then, recapitulate and conclude. Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of painting shows 
that things act upon us following the logic of spectrality, of imbrication and intertwining, 
rather than the logic of causality and mechanics. That is to say, sensible things, as sensible, 
evoke and suggest, rather than cause and determine. Things give themselves by giving up 
their solidity, their manipulability, so that they may radiate as pure presencing, as unfolding 
essences, as affectivity and meaning. In this way, what is given in things is a weight of a 
different sort than that of a solid object. It is the weight of history, and of the past of nature. 
In short: things act upon us as suggestive outlines that resonate in our “gestures.” In order to 
receive things as they give themselves, one must give up one’s solidity as subject and let the 
very exteriority or visibility of perception, of the lived body take the lead. That is to say, one 
must migrate to the realm of pure form: “The painter lives in fascination. The actions most 
proper to him –those gestures, those outlines of which he alone is capable and which will be 
revelations to others because they do not have the same lacks as he does –they seem to 
emanate from the thing themselves, like figures emanating from constellations.”422 This 
passage indicates, precisely, that the actions most proper to the artist are gestures, outlines, 
i.e., actions that embrace the visible dimension of things as the trace of an invisibility, of a
history and an understanding whose density and weight is out of all measure. Painting is a 
gesture, a phantasmagoric event, like a gesture of friendship: when I give my hand in a 
gesture of friendship, what is given is not the hand, and what is received is not the hand, and 
who receives is not the hand. The giver, the gift, and the receiver are behind the scenes, 
behind or before the hand, and yet, they are also in the hands in the form of the gesture, 
which is itself the friendship.  
422 Ibid. “Le peintre vit dans la fascination. Ses actions les plus propres –ces gestes, ces tracés dont il est seul capable, et qui seront 
pour les autres révélation, parce qu’ils n’ont pas les mêmes manques que lui –il lui semble qu’ils émanent des choses mêmes, comme 



































Chapter Six: Gesture and Language in Heidegger 
Language, Gesture and Expression  
Previously, in the third chapter of the present work, I argued that gestures pertain to 
the open or public dimension of our bodily comportments, and that gestures are for 
Heidegger modalities of primordial saying or showing. Along these lines, I mentioned briefly 
that gestures are not to be understood as expressions, nor as indications in Husserl’s sense, 
for gestures open up a region or domain of significance that is prior to consciousness. In this 
regard, I suggested that gestures disclose in each case one’s implicit understanding of being, 
which is grounded on attunements. This means that gestures are poetic, they are a work of 
disclosure, similar to what happens in the work of art. That is to say, gestures give a body to 
our attuned understanding of the world.  
Accordingly, in the present chapter I will investigate to what extent Heidegger’s 
approach to the problem of gesture articulates both the bodily or sensible dimension of 
language, and the “linguistic” dimension of the body. To develop this idea I will focus on 
texts in which Heidegger refers to the problem of gesture, or themes in the orbit of the 
problem of gesture, such as the motif of the hint and the sign. But first I will clarify 
Heidegger’s position in relation to the problem of expression.  
In the Zollikon seminars Heidegger introduces the notion of gesture as a way to 
characterize the bodying forth of the body. Accordingly, Heidegger determines the lived 
body as form [Gestalt], namely, as an existential structuration of meaning. Specifically, the 
notion of gesture accounts for the experience of meaning as attuned relatedness to the 
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world. In this sense, as was indicated already, Heidegger’s position challenges the Husserlian 
account of gesture and meaning that is developed in Husserl’s earlier works.423  
In a conversation with Medard Boss, dated March 5-9, 1966, Heidegger suggests that 
attunements disclose the world as a whole, they disclose an atmospheric totality of 
significance that is not grounded in the solitary mental life of consciousness, as the 
Husserlian view on the concept of expression implies.424 With regard to this, Heidegger 
remarks: “According to Husserl, the constitution of an object of consciousness occurs in 
such a way that the hyletic data, pure sensations, are given as primary and then receive a 
meaning as noemata [intentional objects of consciousness]. In other words, a meaning [noema] 
is ascribed to the [sensory] stimulus by a psychical [notetic] act. Nevertheless, the whole is a 
pure construct.”425  
Although in the Logical Investigations Husserl understands expression as “a unitary 
total act,”426 a whole in which the apperceived thing and the “sense-giving” act come 
together, for him this whole is constituted in consciousness, it is an intentional experience 
with “objective” content to be communicated. And, as Derrida points out, these premises 
continue to be present in later developments of Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology.427 
423 At this point, I should note that, despite Husserl’s Cartesianism, Heidegger was decisively influenced by 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations, as it is widely known, particularly by Investigation VI, and found there important 
indications to formulate properly the question concerning the meaning of being. The intricacies of Heidegger’s 
appropriation of the Logical Investigations are accurately explained by Françoise Dastur in her article „Heidegger 
und die 'Logischen Untersuchungen',“ Heidegger Studies 7 (1991): 37-51. 
424 Following on from Derrida’s reading of Husserl, one can specify the Husserlian view in question as follows: 
“Expressions as meaningful signs are a twofold going-forth beyond itself of the sense (Sinn) in itself, existing in 
consciousness, in the with-oneself or before-oneself which Husserl first determined as ‘solitary mental life.’ 
Later, after the discovery of the transcendental reduction, he will describe this solitary life of the soul as the 
noetic-noematic sphere of consciousness.” Speech and Phenomena, 32-33. 
425 Zollikon Seminars, 261/208.  “Die Konstitution eines Gegenstandes des Bewußtseins vollzieht sich nach ihm so, daß primar 
die hyletischen Daten, reine Sinnesempfindungen, gegeben sind und daß diese Daten dann noematisch, das heißt, durch das 
Denken, eine Bedeutung bekommen. Dem reiz wird mit anderen Worten eine Bedeutung zugesprochen durch einen psychischen 
Akt. Das Ganze ist indessen eine reine Konstruktion.” 
426 Logical Investigations, Vol. 2, 117.  
427 See Speech and Phenomena, 3. 
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Thus, contrary to Husserl’s view, which is taken here as an instance of the metaphysical 
subjectivism inaugurated by Descartes,428 Heidegger suggests that our comportments display 
an existential significance, an embodied meaning, which is pervaded by ontological 
dispositions and, thereby, is not founded on hyletic data or given sensations. That is to say, 
gestures and bodily comportments are not “expressions,” nor are they mere indications in 
Husserl’s sense. 
In the dialogical context of the Zollikon seminars, during the session that took place 
in May 14, 1965, and which is part of an ongoing discussion concerning the problematic of 
the body, Heidegger suggests that the experience of significance is essentially gestural, and 
criticizes explicitly the understanding of gesture as “expression.” He elucidates this point 
examining a simple movement of the hand: 
I just saw how Dr. K, was ‘passing’ his hand over his forehead. And yet I did not observe a 
change of location and position of one of his hands, but I immediately noticed that he was 
thinking of something difficult. How should we characterize this movement of the hand? As 
a movement of expression? Admitedly, if it is a movement that expresses something which is 
internal, then this characterization only states the effect of the movement. But nothing 
whatsoever is said yet about the kind of movement itself as a hand movement. We specify 
this hand movement as a ‘gesture’ [Gebärde]. Even when I place the watch on the table, I 
move within a gesture. And the hand? How does it belong to me? The hand belongs to my 
arm. Putting the watch away is not only a movement of the hand, but also of the arm, the 
shoulder. It is my movement. I moved myself.429   
Specifically, Heidegger qualifes the movement of the hand as gesture, but then he 
suggests that they involve my entire body and, ultimately, my entire being. For the 
movements of my body carry my being in the world. As Heidegger expresses it, gestures are 
428 See Zollikon Seminars, 185/142. 
429 Ibid., 115/89. “Eben sah ich, wie Herr Dr. K. mit der Hand über seine Stirne >fährt<. Allein: ich habe nicht eine Orts –
und Lageveränderung einer seiner Hände beobachtet, sondern ich habe ihm unmittelbar angesehen, daß er sich etwas Schwieriges 
überlegt. Wie sollen wir diese Handbewegung kennzeichnen? Als Ausdrucksbewegung? Zugegeben, es sei eine Bewegung, die etwas 
Inneres ausdrückt, dann ist mit dieser Kennzeichnung allenfalls festgesttellt, was die Bewegung leistet; aber damit ist noch gar nichts 
über die Art der Bewegung selbst als Handbewegung gesagt. Wir bestimmen die Handbewegung als Gebärde. Auch wenn ich die 
Uhr auf den Tisch lege, bewege ich mich in einer Gebärde. Und die Hand? Wie gehört sie zu mir? Die Hand gehört zu meinem 
Arm. Das Uhrablegen ist nicht nur eine Bewegung der Hand, sondern auch des Armes, der Schulter. Es ist meine bewegung. Ich 
bewegte mich.” 
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themselves an exposure of the way we stand in relation to the world and others. I take this to 
mean that in gesturing one somehow retrieves the moment of birth, one’s being-thrown in 
the world, namely, the intensive passage from nothingness to being, from invisibility to 
visibility. For, as I have often indicated, the “self” of my body is in each case openness, 
exposure to the world. 
Heidegger remarks, indeed, that in Dr. K’s movement it is manifest that he is 
thinking something difficult. And this remark suggests that even a simple, quite ordinary 
movement, is a gesture that cannot be restricted to an objective time and place. That is to 
say, the gesture is fundamentally a hint, a trace. In this case, the gesture is itself the trace of 
an invisibility, a thought, and an attunement: a sense of difficulty. Most probably, this 
reference to the relation between hand and thinking is not incidental, for already in 1951, in 
What is Called Thinking?, Heidegger claims that “...thinking guides and sustains every gesture 
of the hand,”430 implying that the body, in each movement, circumscribes an invisibility, a 
withdrawal that calls for thinking.431  
In the Zollikon seminars Heidegger discusses the theme of gesture in relation to 
psychic problems such as stress, and their “manifestation” in behavior. He argues, then, that 
the so-called mental or psychic states are dependent upon our primordial encounter with 
others in the world.432 In this context, he suggests that gestures reveal an affective 
engagement with others: when the other cries we see tears, and sadness, not a composite of 
water plus something else, and when someone blushes we immediately see it as 
430 What is Called Thinking, 26/23. “Das Denken leitet und trägt jede Gebärde der Hand.” 
431 As Stephen Mulhall argues, in this case the hand is a metonymic figure for the whole human body. See 
Stephen Mulhall, Inheritance and Originality: Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Kierkegaard (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2001), 298.  
432 Heidegger’s analysis, thus, implies premises essentially different to those of Husserl’s analysis of “intentional 
feelings” in the Logical Investigations (Vol. 2), Investigation V, 106-12.   
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embarrasment, fever, or heat, never just a sheer, red surface.433 Heidegger emphasizes this 
point in the analysis of blushing, which I mentioned in an earlier chapter. Indeed, Heidegger 
claims that blushing is not expression but gesture, “... insofar as the one who blushes is related 
to his fellow human beings. With this you see how bodiliness has a peculiar ‘ecstatic’ meaning. I 
emphasize this to such a degree in order to get you away from the misinterpretation of 
‘expression’!”434      
One may think, mistakenly, that Heidegger opposes the activity of expression to the 
passivity of gesture, for Heidegger presents gestures as traces of the way the others and the 
world affect us. But the point Heidegger wants to emphasize is that gestures are not actions 
that we initiate and dominate, but rather events that we carry or endure. For this reason, as I 
have often indicated, gestures cannot be properly qualified in terms of the binary opposition 
between passivity and activity. For the receptivity of gestures is also a certain doing, an active 
openness, a response to the claim of being. In this context, it is important to remember the 
distinction between essential gestures, or the essential dimension of gestures, and voluntary 
actions or passions. For gestures take place before we apprehend ourselves as subjects, they 
contain a depth that cannot be reduced to the level of ontic phenomena.  
With regard to this, in the Zollikon seminars Heidegger recalls the difference 
between ordinary feelings, and “psycho-somatic” phenomena in general, and what in Being 
and Time is defined as “ontological disposition” [Befindlichkeit]. He remarks that “ontological 
dispositions” are  Dasein’s attuned “relationship to the world, to the Da-sein-with [Mitdasein] 
                                                
433 See Zollikon Seminars, 78-82. 
434 Ibid., 118/91; my emphasis. “…insofern der Errötende auf die Mitmenschen bezogen ist. Damit sehen Sie, wie die 
Leiblichkeit diesen eigentümlichen ekstatischen Sinn hat. Dies betone ich so sehr, um sie von der Ausdruck-Mißdeutung 
wegzubringen.”It is worth noticing that Heidegger concludes this passage accusing “French psychologists” of 
understanding psychic phenomena on the basis of the idea of “expression,” that is, relating them to internal 
states and, thereby, overlooking the ecstatic dimension of the body as relationality and affectivity.  
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other humans, and to itself.”435 Futhermore, he continues, ontological dispositions hinge on 
the claim of being, that is, on “....the human being’s being exposed [Ausgesetzheit] toward 
beings as a whole [des seiende im Ganzen].”436 Based on these distinctions, one might say that 
gestures are simultaneous to the primordial disclosure of beings. 
Gestures respond to the original event of disclosure in such a way that the co-
dependence between being and human beings become manifest. For in gesturing I show 
myself, I say myself, I become word, as I am thrown into a tradition, a destiny, and a horizon 
of intelligibility. At this point, I should recall that Dasein’s particular way of finding itself in 
the world, its thrownness, is structurally articulated with understanding and language. In this 
regard, Heidegger says: “Thrownness [Geworfenheit] and understanding [Verstehen] mutually 
belong together in a correlation whose unity is determined through language. Here language 
is to be understood as a [primordial] ‘saying’ [Sage], in which beings as beings, that is, in view 
of their being, show themselves.”437 In this particular case, Heidegger refers to language 
[Sprache] as saying, and determines it as the original event of disclosure that yokes together 
thrownness and understanding. In this way, Heidegger reinterprets and reformulates the 
relation between the different constituens of existence, as they are described in Being and 
Time, in light of a more fundamental unity.  
In a conversation with Medard Boss, dated March 9, 1966, Heidegger makes express 
reference to the structural components of existence pointing out that attunement or 
ontological disposition [Befindlichkeit], understanding, and discourse [Rede] are equiprimordial. 
He also indicates that “ontologically disposed understanding  in itself is a saying, a showing 
435 Ibid., 182/139. “Sie ist die das Dasein be-stimmende Gestimmtheit seines jeweiliges Bezugs zur Welt, zum Mitdasein der 
Mitmenschen und zu sich selbst.” 
436 Ibid. “…ist jedoch ihrerseits wiederum fundiert in der Ausgesetzheit des Menschen an das Seinede im Ganzen.” 
437 Ibid., 182-83/139; modified. “Geworfenheit und Verstehen gehören wechselweise zusammen in einer 
Zusammengehörigkeit, deren einheit duch die Sprache bestimmt ist. Sprache ist here zu denken als Sagen, in dem Seiendes als 
Seiendes, das heißt aus dem Hinblick auf Sein sich zeigt.” 
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of something.”438 Contrasting this remark with the passage quoted above, one can infer that 
saying unifies different moments of language in such a way that “attuned understanding” is 
taken as a modality of saying.   
Let me, then, reformulate this transition from language as articulation of discourse, 
of Rede, to language as Sage, which is developed in the Zollikon seminars. In Being and Time 
language [Sprache] is grounded on discourse [Rede], which is equiprimordial with 
understanding and attunement. These structural components of existence are co-originary 
moments of Being-in, wherein language appears as a moment of articulation. In the Zollikon 
seminars, following the trajectory of his works after the so-called turn, Heidegger revises his 
initial position and refers to “saying” [Sage] as the most primordial moment of openness to 
the claim of being. This primordial moment is itself the initial articulation of a trace, a 
primordial word that is a gesture, an attuned responsiveness to others and the world. Hence, 
Heidegger understands the structural components of existence in terms of a more primordial 
unity, to the extent that language appears as ground and, thereby, as ungrounded, as Ab-
grund. As Heidegger explains, this means that the word is not a term in the relationship with 
something external to it, nor the expression of a pre-established meaning, but rather the very 
movement of disclosure. In the Zollikon seminars, in the context of a discussion on 
bodiliness, Heidegger formulates this idea as follows: 
A word is not a relationship. A word discloses [erschliesst]. It opens up. The decisive moment of 
language is significance [Bedeutung]. Sounds also belong to language, but they are not the 
fundamental [characteristics]. I can understand the same meaning in different languages. The 
essential character of language is the ‘saying,’ that a word says something, not that it sounds. 
A word shows something. Saying means showing. Language is the showing [of 
something].”439  
438 Ibid., 263/211; modified. “Das befindliche Verstehen ist in sich ein Sagen, ein Zeigen.” 
439 Ibid., 233/185. “Das Wort is keine Beziehung; das Wort erschließt, öffnet. Das Entscheidende der Sprache ist die 
Bedeutung. Das Lautliche gehört auch zur Sprache, ist aber nicht das Fundamentale. Ich kann in verschiedenen Sprachen 
sprachlich dasselbe meinen. Das wesentliche der Sprache ist das Sagen, daß ein Wort etwas sagt, nicht daß es lautet. Daß ein Wort 
etwas zeigt. Sagen = zeigen. Die Sprache ist das Zeigende.”  
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Heidegger claims that the word is not a relationship, indicating that the word is 
significance at work; it is not a static term, but rather an essential gesture, a fundamental 
comportment: showing. It is the notion of signification or meaning that is important in this 
context, for it alludes to the movement of the word as saying, as primordial openness. 
Precisely, immediately after this passage on the word as showing, Heidegger remarks that we 
stand in the clearing of being, to the extent that in dealing with something we are always 
simultaneously opened to the world as a whole.  
In this way, Heidegger suggests that the word appears as word only insofar as it is 
itself a region, an existential space: openness. It is not sound but, as Merleau-Ponty would 
say, “an absolute emptiness.”440 Indeed, one cannot grasp the word as word, as significant 
word. One can only catch a glimpse of it indirectly, while following its spacings and 
deferrals. Adding to Merleau-Ponty’s reading, one could say here that language is kept alive 
as “said” insofar as it gives itself through gestures, insofar as it preserves a performative 
dimension.441   
Let me recapitulate and conclude this section by saying that the emptiness or 
essential silence of the word, and of gesture, is set as a claim one must respond to: a 
significant and pressing silence. Taking into account Heidegger’s qualification of all human 
comportment as gestural,442 one could say that if gesture is the immediate saying or showing of 
something, and if showing presupposes the openness to what has primordially been given 
and said, then it follows that all gestural showing, all essential comportment is responsive, 
the resonance of the originary truth of being, the truth we dwell in. Heidegger sketches out 
440 Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 60/49. 
441 See ibid. 
442 As was indicated in one of our initial reflections on Heidegger’s definition of gesture, in the course of the 
Zollikon seminars Heidegger claims that all human comportment is gestural.  
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this argument as follows: “The existential relationship cannot be objectified. It’s basic 
essence is one’s being concerned and letting oneself be concerned. [It is] a responding, a 
claim, an answering for, a being responsive on grounds of the clearedness of the relationship. 
‘Comportment’ is the way I stand in my relationship to what concerns me in each case, the 
manner one responds to beings.”443  
The “existential relationship” cannot be objectified because it is grounded in 
openness, thrownness, a pre-objective receptivity. The example of blushing is of particular 
significance, for it indicates that our entire being allows itself to be affected by things before 
any direct intervention on our part. This comportment cannot be reduced to the level of 
merely ontic phenomena because it stems from Grund-Stimmungen. As I have often remarked, 
fundamental moods and attunements have the atmospheric character of a voice [Stimmung] 
pervading the totality of our living space, and preceding our particular understanding of 
beings. In this way, the gestural articulation of language and the body, which implies our 
openness to an inextricable ground of significations, involves a comprehension of our bodily 
being as Stimmung. Indeed, the way the body announces its own presence to us has the 
character of a feeling, a resonance or a tremor, whose being may be characterized as a voice.  
One may say that “having” a body means, fundamentally, to have a voice, to have 
the gift of the word. But what it means to have a voice is not simply to be able to utter 
words; rather, to be attuned, to be able to hear, to be exposed to or opened to a world that 
transcends us and traverses us. I shall consolidate this argument by exploring the genesis of 
443 Zollikon Seminars, 232/185. “Die existentiale Beziehung läßt sich nicht vergegenständlichen. Ihr Grundwesen ist das 
Angegangensein und Sichangehenlassen, ein Entsprechen, ein Anspruch, ein Antworten, ein Verantworten auf Grund des in sich 
Gelichtetseins des Bezuges. >Verhalten< = die Weise, wie ich jeweils in meinem Bezug zum mich Angehenden stehe, die Weise, 
wie man dem seiendem entspricht.” 
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the relation between language and Stimmung, and its articulations within Heidegger’s 
reflections on gesture.    
Gesture, Voice and Stimmung in the Orbit of Being and Time 
The sensible dimension of the voice, and its intrinsic relation to our ontological 
dispositions and attunements, is a problem Heidegger briefly hints at in Being and Time while 
examining the themes of language and discourse in §34. He shows that discourse is 
essentially double, that it does not communicate something univocally, in one direction; 
rather, it always “voices itself” [Sichaussprechen], in saying something “else,” in pointing to 
something. Thus, it seems, the indicative and the sensible character of language are gathered 
in the melodic unity of the voice. Thereby, Heidegger indicates that discourse articulates 
itself in the sensible modulations of language as the harmonic structuring of the voice. 
Although Heidegger talks of speaking, or voicing “out,” as if he were talking of expressions 
in the Husserlian sense, he underscores the fact that the voice does not express something 
internal, something different to its own sensible being, as happens paradigmatically in poetic 
language. He suggests that the exteriority of the voice is not an objective exteriority, but 
rather the unfolding of existential possibilities. He says precisely:     
All discourse about…which communicates in what it says has at the same time the character 
of voicing itself. In talking, Da-sein expresses itself not because it has been initially cut off as 
“something internal” from something outside but because as being-in-the-world it is already 
“outside” when it understands. What is expressed is precisely this being outside, that is, the 
actual mode of attunement (of mood) which we showed to pertain to the full disclosedness 
of being-in. Being-in and its attunement are made known in discourse and indicated in 
language by intonation, modulation, in the tempo of talk “in the way of speaking.” The 
communication of the existential possibilities of attunement, that is, the disclosing of 
existence, can become the true aim of “poetic” speech.444  
444 Ibid., 215-16/157, modified: the English version translates Sichausprechen as “expression,” which is correct, 
but in the context of our argument this translation may be misleading, for this reason we decided to translate it 
with the verb “to voice.” “Alle Rede über…, die in ihrem Geredeten mitteilt, hat zugleich den Character des 
Sichausprechens. Redend spricht sich Dasein aus, nicht weil es zunachst als »Inneres« gegen ein Draußen abgekapselt ist, 
sondern weil es als In-der-Welt-sein westehend schon »draußen« ist. Das Ausgesprochene ist gerade das Draußensein, das heißt die 
jeweilige Weise der Befindlichkeit (Der Stimmung), von der gezeigt wurde, daß sie die volle Erschlossenheit des In-Seins betrifft. 
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This is the only passage in Being and Time that refers to “poetic speech.” And, as I 
indicated in earlier chapters, it foreshadows some of the cardinal questions developed in 
Heidegger’s essay on the work of art. Now I suggest that this passage reveals the way in 
which Heidegger approaches the gestural dimension of language and its relation to the 
problem of attunement. One can see, indeed, that Heidegger qualifies the sensible dimension 
of speech other than as mere noise, without underestimating the importance of bodiliness. 
Specifically, Heidegger qualifies the sensible character of discourse in terms of the intonation 
of the voice, the way of speaking. For in poetic speech the “indicative” character of speech is 
not referred to as an extrinsic element, but rather to what could be called its own presencing. 
That is to say, the voice presents itself as pure voice, as the event of saying or showing in its 
ongoing state: dis-closure. Thus, the attuned understanding pervading the tonality of the 
voice is just a possibility or latency of meaning: a meaning still to come. Or rather, one may 
say, the attuned signification of speech is the unfolding of meaning as possibility. This means 
that, in calling attention to itself, speech undergoes a transfiguration and becomes something 
other than sheer “material” vibration, it appears precisely as voice, as my voice.  
Presumably, poetic speech interlaces language and factical existence, for in poetic 
speech language resonates with existential, not merely conceptual, significance. In poetic 
speech we are thrown in language as something we live from within, not as an external 
means of communication. Heidegger does not explain this point here, yet the context of the 
passage indicates that poetic speech does not simply use language, making it dissappear as 
means of communication; rather, poetic speech experiences language. Poetic speech plays 
Der sprachliche Index der zur Rede gehörenden Bekundung des befindlichen In-Seins liegt im Tonfall, der Modulation, im Tempo 
der Rede, »in der Art des Sprechens«. Die Mitteilung der existenzialen Möglichkeiten der Befindlichkeit, das heißt das 
Erschließen von Existenz, kann eigenes Ziel der »dichtenden« Rede werden.” 
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with the sounding of the words, their peculiar espaciality such as it is adumbrated in a verse, 
and their rhythm, that is, their capacity to harmonize with each other. In short, one might 
say that poetic speech reveals the word as the latency of an attunement, an accord. 
In his lecture course from 1929-30, The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger 
takes up the problem of attunement again and, eventually, applies it to poetry and art. 
Already in the introductory reflections on the nature of philosophy, Heidegger calls art, 
including poetry, the “sister” of philosophy, because they both involve our relatedness to 
being as a whole, that is, they involve fundamental attunements.445 Thus, although Heidegger 
does not explore specifically the problem of art and poetry in the course of these lectures, 
what he says on boredom reveals indirectly the bonds between philosophy and art or poetry. 
Let me examine this point in more detail.  
As Heidegger explains, the crucial step in philosophy has to do with the possibility of 
being “within the whole.”446 Heidegger explains this point by showing that we cannot 
understand what philosophy is without philosophizing ourselves, and philosophizing 
depends on our capacity to awaken fundamental attunements. This means that 
philosophizing requires that we listen to the words or hints that come out of a fundamental 
attunement, a Grund-Stimmung. In this case, Heidegger focuses on boredom, the attunement 
that sets us in the long “while” of the pure passing of time, wherein the totality of the world 
seems opressing but, in so doing, reveals its invisible and inextricable bonds to us.447  
445 See Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 7/5. This is a provocative claim, for in opposition to the traditional 
philosophical stance against poetry, Heidegger indicates his interest in coming to proximity with poetry, which 
in turn implies a revaluation of the sensible beyond metaphysical frameworks.  
446 Ibid., 8/5. “Im Ganzen.” 
447 Jan Slaby pinpoints in few lines how is it that boredom works as a fundamental attunement that is condition 
for philosophysing. He says: “Boredom, as the experience of Lange-Weile –of a time that is becoming long –
points towards time as that which the fundamental questions of metaphysics are intimately tied up with.” Jan 
Slaby, "The other side of existence: Heidegger on boredom," in Habitus in Habitat II -Other Sides of Cognition, ed. 
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What is remarkable in Heidegger’s analysis of boredom is that it reveals the 
ontological character of moods or attunements. For, strictly speaking, one cannot talk 
philosophically about boredom without presuming one’s involvement in boredom itself, 
without awakening it. If one’s philosophical thinking on boredom is to be philosophical at all, 
it cannot simply posit boredom as an object of reflection but rather must immerse in the 
grounds of boredome itself as an attunement that was already there, as a structural 
constituent of our being.448  
Heidegger remarks, then, that fundamental attunements can only be awakened, 
rather than produced, precisely because they are radical phenomena, which cannot be derived 
from other phenomena, nor detached from existence. In a sense, existence itself, as the 
ecstatic openeness to the world, is attunement. Heidegger explains this point by saying: 
“Man only finds himself involved and affected at all if he is already capable of being affected 
in his Dasein and can find himself gripped in this ability to be affected, indeed if this 
possibility of being gripped lies in his very essence. This essential possibility of being gripped 
belongs to the essence of man insofar as his Da-sein always  -but not exclusively –implies 
being attuned.”449 Dasein is always attuned insofar as existing necessarily implies the capacity 
to be affected and being “gripped” [Ergriffenheit]; in one word: vulnerability.  
Along these lines, one could say that the “tone” [Stimmung] of existence, the tune of 
Dasein, attunement, presupposes a milieu of affectivity, which may be qualified as a general 
                                                                                                                                            
Sabine Flach, Daniel Margulies and Söffner Jan, 101-120 (Bern: Peter Lang AG, International Academic 
Publishers, 2010), 108.  
448 Slaby accurately remarks that for Heidegger boredom is not a state we produce: “So in order to perform the 
phenomenological act of waking us up to boredom, there is no need to create a state of boredom in the first 
place. Instead, one has to inhibit the activities and distractions that routinely fill most of one’s regular life. Once 
these shallow surface activities are halted, boredom is revealed to be already there, lurking beneath the surface 
of dispersing activities.” Ibid., 109.  
449 Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, 268/181. “Getroffen und betroffen wird er nur dann, wenn der Mensch in seinem 
Dasein treffbar und in der Betreffbarkeit ergreifbar ist, wenn in seinem Wesen die Möglichkeit des Ergriffenseins gehört zum 
Wesen des Menschen, sofern sein Da-sein immer –aber nicht nur –heißt: Gestimmtsein.” 
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capacity to be affected, moved, gripped and transformed. For this reason, I presume, 
Heidegger explains the possibility of awakening an attunement as a transformative move, as 
a modulation of existence. He says: “Where there is attunement, there is the possibility of 
change of attunement, and thus also of awakening attunement.”450  
Having said this, let me briefly refer to the problematic of gesture. As I have 
indicated, to be attuned means that one has been initiated into the qualitative idiom of the 
sensible, for attunements are a silent, yet sensible, communication with others and the world. 
In other words, that one sees something, or that one understand another person, requires 
that one participate in the affective dialogue that remains dormant in the manifest, public 
world. Attunements constitute, in this sense, the invisible thread that keeps us tied to the 
same world, the same horizon of intelligibility and visibility.  
One may say, therefore, that attunements require a subtle diacritical capacity of 
interpretation that pertains to the bodying forth of the body. For, as Heidegger often 
suggests, a subtle change in the tone of voice, or in the tonality of the color of the face, or in 
the movements of the hand, would make the entire difference between one attunement or 
another. This would explain in part why Heidegger says that poetic speech communicates 
the existential possibilities of attunement, as he does in Being and Time. For poetic speech 
plays with the enigmatic possibilities of the sensible dimension of speech, letting the words 
emerge as spontaneous gestures, which adumbrate zones or regions of significance, and 
which contain primitive and subtle, quasi-instinctual meanings. Presumably, the poetic word 
is the retrieval of a primitive effort of expression, a struggle to find the words that name 
what is pressing or important in a given situation. In this sense, it is the word itself, in its 
capacity to resonate “there,” that grants the possibility of communication.  
450 Ibid.“Wo Stimmung da ist, Wandel der Stimmung und so auch Weckung von Stimmung möglich.” 
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Let me conclude this analysis with a brief reference to Merleau-Ponty’s work, which 
bears important similarities to what has just been said. In The Prose of the World Merleau-Ponty 
meditates on the sensible dimension of language and says: “With my throat, my voice, my 
intonation, and, of course, with the words, with my preferred constructions and the time I 
allow each part of the phrase, I compose an enigma that has only one solution such that the 
other person, silently accompanying this melody bristling with changes, with switches and 
falls, can manage to take it into his own repertoire…”451 In line with this, one may say that 
the voice composes an enigma with only one solution because meaning is something that 
emerges from the unique event of speech as saying, from the singular gesture that makes it 
alive as a trace to be retrieved and carried further by others.  
In this sense, poetic speech has a decisive importance inasmuch as it makes salient 
the gestural dimension of language, and its intrinsic correlation with attunement, a relation 
that generally remains dormant or inconspicuous in our ordinary dealings with language. Yet, 
Heidegger unfolds the ontological presuppositions of this position only after the so-called 
turn in his thinking, when poetry comes to the forefront as the essential companion of 
thinking. 
Stimmung  and Body: The Lectures on Logic from 1934 
I have indicated that language and Stimmungen are imbricated in what could be called 
the gestural dimension of speech: the tonality of the voice, the way of speaking. Following 
on from Heidegger’s approach to poetic speech in Being and Time, I have remarked that the 
communication of the existential possibilities of attunement may become the proper task of 
451 The Prose of the World, 42-43/ 30. “Ce n’est pas en déposant toute ma pensée dans des mots où les autres viendraient l’y 
puiser que je communique avec eux, c’est en composant, avec ma gorge, ma voix, mon intonation, et aussi bien sûr les mots, les 
constructions que je préfère, le temts que je choisi de donner à chaque partie de la phrase, une enigme telle qu’elle ne comporte qu’un 
solution...”  
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poetic speech because poetic speech preserves the affective dimensionality of our relation to 
language. But the problem of the relationship between poetic speech and attunement 
becomes particularly important later, the 1930s, at the time of Heidegger’s decisive 
encounter with Hölderlin. Let me, therefore, consider Heidegger’s approach to the bodily 
dimension of attunements, as he develops it in his lectures on Logic from 1934, the same 
year of Heidegger’s first lectures on Hölderlin.   
In the 1934 Freiburg summer lecture, Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of 
Language,452 Heidegger addresses the problem of attunement and expands on the question 
concerning the bodily dimension of attunements. At this point, Heidegger takes into 
consideration the resonances between the terms “deterrmination” [Bestimmung] and mood or 
attunement [Stimmung].453 With regard to this, he remarks that the “determination” of our 
essence as human beings is dependent on attunements. This means that attunements such as 
joy, annoyance, or even indifference, define the way in which one stands in the world and, 
moreover, the way in which one comes to understand and interpret things in general.454 
Hence, attunements are fundamental phenomena determining the way we are “transposed” 
in the world; they are not subjective psychological experiences. Indeed, for Heidegger, 
psychologism misunderstands the true nature of affective dispositions. He says that “we 
misinterpret mood, because we do not want to see that precisely mood transposes us into 
452 Martin Heidegger, Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache, ed. Günter Seubold (Frankfurt am Main: 
Vittorio Klostermann, 1998). English: Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, trans. Wanda Torres 
Gregory and Yvonne Unna (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2009). Hereafter with reference first 
to the German, then to the English translation.  
453 In the English version of this lecture the term Stimmung is translated as “mood.” Yet, in the context of our 
present research it seems more appropriate to translate it as “attunement” because this term preserves the 
reference to the musical idea of tone or tuning, which is present also in the German.   
454 See ibid., 151-52/125-26.  
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the whole of beings, that each time it first circumscribes the sphere of beings beforehand, as 
it discloses [eröffnet] and keeps open [offenhält] the sphere of beings.”455  
In The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger declares that what characterizes 
humanity is the possibility of transposedness [Versetztsein] into the world, including the 
animal world, i.e., the capacity to “set” itself in relation to what is manifest as such, and as a 
whole.456 In the text from 1934, Heidegger further elaborates on this idea and shows that 
transposedness is made possible by attunements. Along these lines, he suggests that one’s 
intimate pre-understanding of the meaning of being is first disclosed through moods. 
Heidegger says: “By virtue of mood, we are exposed [ausgesetzt] into the being [das Sein] that 
oppresses or elevates us. We are not first isolated in an I that is curled up in itself, that 
subsequently comes into a relationship with things, but we are each time already in a mood, 
which exposes us beforehand into beings themselves. We ourselves dwindle in such 
exposedness into the thereby manifest being [Sein].”457   
Heidegger shows, thus, that moods or attunements contain an implicit understanding 
of the world. It is through attunements that the world appears, for instance, as threatening. 
Furthermore, Heidegger declares, in moods we do not recoil in a subjective self, instead we 
empty ourselves to leave room for things –which is another way of saying that we are 
transposed into the world. He says: “Precisely that which  we like to characterize as that 
which is inner, and [which we] transfer into the mind, is not in there anywhere, like a 
stomach, but it is outside, and we are outside by virtue of it in each case. Mood determines 
455 Ibid., 151/125. “Wir mißdeuten die Stimmung, weil wir nicht sehen wollen, daß gerade die Stimmung uns in das Ganze des 
seienden versetz, daß sie in vorhinein den Umkreis des Seienden jeweils erst umgrenzt, indem sie den Umkreis des Seienden eröffnet 
und offenhält. ” 
456 See Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Chapter Five.  
457 Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language, 152/126. “Kraft der Stimmung sind wir ausgesetzt in das Sein, 
das uns bedrängt oder erhebt. Wir sind nicht zuerst abgesondert in ein in sich eingerolltes Ich, das nachträglich in ein Verhältnis 
zu den Dingen kommt, sonder wir sind jeweils schon in einer Stimmung, die uns im vorhinein in das Seiende selbst aussetzt. Wir 
seltbs schwinden in solcher Ausgesetztheit in das dabei offenbare Sein.” 
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us in such a manner that we stand essentially in the exposedness.”458 This passage is 
remarkable: in it Heidegger challenges the traditional oppositions between inside and outside 
and reverses their order. The apparently innocuous analogy between the mind and the 
stomach carries out this reversal. Heidegger suggests that, on the one hand, what we usually 
take to be the “exterior” dimension of our being, the body and its organs, constitute that 
which remains enclosed, encrypted and invisible in our exposure to the world. Indeed, one 
could note, even the skin becomes invisible as pure “physical” skin in everyday life, the skin 
is never just a tissue that makes possible a neutral touch; instead, it is intrinsically charged 
with meaning in such a way that we are forced to neutralize its power with clothing. On the 
other hand, what appears to be internal and invisible, our moods and attunements, is 
precisely that which first comes to presence in our encounter with others, that which 
determines the way we stand out in the world, set out [ausgesetzt] with things and others. In 
line with this, one could say that the way we “stand” in the world, our own posture, can only 
be determined in light of the prefigurations of our attunements. And attunements, in turn, 
presuppose rootedness in nature, a sense of grounding, of belonging to the earth. This is, for 
example, what Heidegger suggests in the following passage, which continues the passage just 
quoted above:  
That which is visible and graspable of ourselves from the outside, the body, which we sense 
from inside, seems to be the properly main thing in the present-at-hand human being. With 
its help, we stand with both legs firmly on the ground. The body, not the dangling in 
exposedness through mood, counts thus as supporting ground. However, what do legs, body 
and other extremities mean here? If we were to have a dozen or more legs, we would not 
then stand firmer on the ground. We would not stand at all, if this standing were not 
attuned-through by moods, by virtue of which earth, ground; in short: nature first bears, 
preserves and threatens us.459 
458 Ibid. “Gerade das, was wir gern als Innerliches bezeichen und ins Gemüt welegen, ist nicht irgendwo darinnen, wie in einem 
Magen, sondern es ist draußen, und wir sind kraft seiner jeweils draußen. Die Stimmung bestimmt uns dergestalt, daß wir 
wesensmäßig in der Ausgesetzheit stehen.” 
459 Ibid. “Das von außen her an uns Sichtbare, der Leib, den wir von innen her spüren, scheint am vorhandenen Menschen das 




As Heidegger explains, the very sense of ground is something that can only be 
properly determined on the basis of moods or attunements [Stimmungen]. Standing firmly on 
the ground is a mode of being, a way of relating to being, a sense of appropriation or 
belonging to the world and to the earth. Hypothetically, even if one loses one’s ground, if 
one does not stand firmly on the ground, there must be a grounding attunement on the basis 
of which one may notice such loss. That is to say, steadiness or instability are primarily ways 
of responding to the world, which cannot be derived from a merely physical state of affairs: I 
might feel hesitant and unstable walking on twelve legs, whereas a physical impairment might 
compel me to embrace my situation with absolute resoluteness, forcing me to stand firmly 
on the ground. Put differently, attunements pervade the ground against which beings are 
delineated as such particular beings: the sun, the moon, the other’s body, the ripe fruit we 
see or the computer we write with, all of these things are given as such only with the colors 
and substance of affectivity. As Heidegger puts it, attunements are somehow the voice of 
nature, they show what is dangerous, threatening or essential. Along these lines, one could 
say that attunements are the closest we can get to the primordial logos of nature. For how 
could we come to know what is beautiful, desirable, repulsive, or hateful, if the secret codes 
to interpret these “meanings” were not at work in the atmosphere that we inhabit and 
breathe, and which has nurtured our beings before we came to have any sense of our own 
self?  
                                                                                                                                            
Ausgesetztheit durch die Stimmung, gilt so als der tragende Grund. Aber was besagen hier Beine, Leib und sonstige Gliedmaßen? 
Wenn wir ein Dutzend und mehr Beine hätten, wir stünden dann nicht fester auf der Erde. Wir stünden überhaupt nicht, wenn 
dieses Stehen nicht von Stimmungen durchstimmt wäre, kraft deren uns Boden, Erde, kurz: Natur erst trägt, behütet und 
bedroht.”  
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It is in this context that one must understand why Heidegger claims that the body is 
“suspended from the power of moods,”460 for strictly speaking we appropriate our own 
body, we come to “know” that this body is intimately ours and needs care, through moods. 
As I indicated above, the necessity or urgency to breathe, the need of support, the fear for 
what may come, all these phenomena presuppose that we already exist within an affective 
milieu, that we are in communication with the world as whole, and that we are exposed to a 
primordial sense of relevance or significance. In Heidegger’s words: “In the affirmation of 
the body’s being-born-by mood, the body does not become fancifully spiritualized, but 
precisely by virtue of the interwoveness in mood, corporeality has for us that which is 
oppressive and relaxing, that which is confusing or preserving.”461  
In sum, Heidegger suggests that the lived body is itself rooted in the communicability 
of attunement, it hinges on “the interwoveness in mood” [der Verwobenheit in die Stimmung], to 
such an extent that even what we take to be the most concrete or intense bodily experiences 
are carried through the milieu of affectivity, which is essentially invisible, non-objectifiable. 
From Stimmungen to Poetry: “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” 
It is widely known that the so-called turn in Heidegger’s philosophy, whose cardinal 
motifs can be traced back to the beginning of the 1930s, has to do with a decisive 
transformation in relation to language. This turn is itself a transformation in thinking, and 
occurs as the turn towards the thinking of the truth of being, in such a way “...that the truth 
of being come to language and that thinking attain to this language.”462 As John Sallis 
460 Ibid., 153/126. “…aufgehängt in der Macht der Stimmungen.” 
461 Ibid., 153-126/27. “In der Behauptung des Getragenseins des Leibes durch die Stimmung wird der Leib nicht phantastisch 
vergeistigt, sondern gerade kraft der Verwobenheit in die Stimmung hat die Leiblichkeit für uns das Bedrängende und Lösende, 
das Verwirrende oder Bewahrende.”  
462 Letter on Humanism, 344-246. “…daß die Wahrheit des Seins zur Sprache komme und daß das Denken in diese Sprache 
gelange.” On the theme of Heidegger’s turn, see also Martin Heidegger, "Preface Letter," in Heidegger. Through 
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expresses it, “the problem of language directs us into that of the reversal, and conversely. 
The two problems are intertwined, they belong togehter.”463 Thus, the necessary question is: 
how does Heidegger think the sensible dimension of language and attunement after the turn, 
and in the context of his decisive encounter with Hölderlin? 
In the lectures on Hölderlin from 1936,464 particularly in the lecture “Hölderlin and the 
Essence of Poetry,” one can find important indications to elucidate the problem of language 
and attunement. Specifically, Heidegger shows that language determines our exposure to the 
world as something that is never indifferent to us. He suggests that language inaugurates the 
possibility of a threat, a danger, namely, the possibility of being deeply affected by beings: 
“Danger is the the threat that being poses to being itself. But it is only by virtue of language 
at all that man is exposed to something manifest: beings which press upon him and inflame 
him in his existence, or nonbeings which deceive and disappoint him.”465  
As Heidegger explains, language grants the possibility of disclosure because it first 
gives significance to things: a site, a locus, a place in the world. Heidegger claims, precisely, 
that “language first creates the manifest place [Stätte] of this threat to being.”466 I take this to 
mean that language is a place that brings about the possibility of exposure and, thereby, the 
possibility of misunderstanding, dissimulation, deception and danger. The word is, in this 
sense, the ground wherein hearing and speaking come together, the site that allows for 
Phenomenology to Thought, trans. William Richardson, viii-xxiv (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), xvii-
xxiii. 
463 John Sallis, Language and Reversal, Vol. III: Language, in Martin Heidegger. Critical Assessments, ed. Christopher 
Macann, 190-211 (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), 202. 
464 Martin Heidegger, Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Hermann, Vol. 
Gesamtausgable Bd.4 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981). English: Elucidations of Hölderlin's poetry, 
trans. Keith Hoeller (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, an imprint of Prometheus Books, 2000). 
465 Ibid., 36-37/55. “Gefahr ist Bedrohung des Seins durch Seiendes. Nun ist aber derl Mensch erst kraft der Sprache 
überhaupt ausgesetz einem Offenbaren, das als Seiendes den Menschen in seinem Dasein bedrängt und befeuert und als 
Nichtseiendes täuscht und enttäuscht.” 
466 Ibid. “Die Sprache schafft erst die offenbare Stätte der Seinsbedrohung...” 
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exchange and encounter.467 Along these lines, one may say that the word is a dynamic place, 
a space of freedom; what in the Zollikon seminars is characterized as a pure saying or 
showing. That is to say, the word clears a site insofar as it is essentially poetic: the setting of 
the truth, of disclosure, just as it happens in the work of art.  
Inspired by Hölderlin, Heidegger understands the essence of the word in terms of 
the poetic word, and the poetic word as a gift, a free bestowal that is the foundation of a 
world: disclosure. The poetic word is a gift insofar as the poet lets the word say or show 
something on its own accord, he lets the being of the word appear in freedom. In this way, 
the poet speaks to let himself be enraptured by the excess of meaning, of being, that radiates 
from language, from the saying or showing of things. In a sense, it is the free radiance of 
things –the saying or showing of things themselves –that makes necessary the poetic, creative, 
institution of the word. Heidegger argues, indeed, that being and beings must be freely 
bestowed and created, and that “such free bestowal is a founding.”468  
Here, Heidegger’s approach to the notion of institution or foundation [Stiftung] 
recalls the formulations from the end of the lecture on The Origin of the Work of Art. In that 
text, Heidegger remarks that the work of art is grounded in the poetic word and, in turn, the 
poetic word is the foundation that sets history in motion. For the poetic word is an inaugural 
effort to define the outline and significance of things, in such a way that they may be be re-
appropriated in the future. As Heidegger expresses it, the poetic word is a setting of the truth 
of being; it is a movement of disclosure that institutes a tradition, the world of a historical 
people whose future and limits remain open. Hence, as was suggested in the fourth chapter 
of the present work, the poetic word emerges as a gesture, an elusive event that is manifest 
467 See ibid., 39/57. 
468 Ibid., 41/59. “Solche freie Schenkung ist Stiftung.” 
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as a trace or an outline, which is somewhat unnecessary or excessive in relation to anything 
given or available. In short, the poetic word is an event, Ereignis: the word that takes 
posession of us.  
To conclude this section, let me recall Merleau-Ponty’s elucidation of the relation 
between Ereignis and language in Heidegger. Merleau-Ponty argues, indeed, that language is 
Ereignis insofar as it is the institution of a mode of expression that is primordial and, 
therefore, cannot be restricted to a particular idiom.469 For any particular idiom or tradition 
presupposes an openness to the world, and language is originally entwined into the world, 
before it becomes a system. In this sense, the event of language is a re-setting in our origins, 
in openness, in such a way that we are given that which we must possess: “...we are 
transported to the place where we take posession of language (and especially to the place 
where it takes posession of us).”470 Paradoxically, this means that the primordial poetic word 
imposes itself as a donation –a gift that comes along with the world –; it demands a work of re-
interpretation and of free appropriation. In this regard, it seems to me, Heidegger touches on 
a cardinal point of the problematic of language as gesture. For, as Heidegger states and 
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes, the primordial word is a hint, an indication or outline that 
requires a continuation, it is the minimum trace necessary to make something visible without 
fixing its limits.  
Essential Hints and Gestures 
In Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry Heidegger qualifies the poetic word as the 
transferring of hints from the gods to the people. Reading some of Hölderlin’s verses from 
                                                
469 See Husserl at the Limist of Phenomenology, 52. 
470 In the context of his later lectures on Husserl, Merleau-Ponty reads Heidegger’s notion of Stiftung in relation 
to the Ereignis, as follows: “Denken is to be gathered in this Ereignis: we are dispersed outside of it. We set 
ourselves back up in it. cf. we rediscover the Urstiftung  of which we are the Endstiftung. cf. Was heisst Denken?: we 
rediscover a path that the thing has already traversed.” Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 61/50. 
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the poem “Rousseau,” Heidegger remarks that the saying of the poet is the “intercepting” 
[Auffangen] of the hints that constitute the immemorial language of the gods.471 Heidegger’s 
interpretation suggests that the essential word can only be captured in a fleeting instant, in 
the blink of an eye, in a fragmentary vision. One might say, then, that the essential hint 
surpasses “mortal” limits because its provenance is not a particular historical fact, which may 
be represented objectively; rather, it is experienced as a gift, a present that leaps over the 
sequence of an ordinary course of events. Thus, Heidegger indicates, the essential word, the 
language of the gods, and the language that is the legacy of a people, is the language that is 
hint, essential signaling or gesturing. But what is an essential hint? And what is it supposed to 
indicate? 
 Heidegger responds to these questions in his lecture course on Hölderlin from 1934-
35,  Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein."472 In this lecture, Heidegger explains that 
poetizing is “a saying of the type of the indicative making manifest.”473 Poetry, Dichtung, is 
dictated by the gods and this dictate or saying is “reiterated” or repeated [Weiterwinken] to the 
people.474 Thus, the poetic saying makes the gods manifest in their hinting or indicating, 
rather than as something meant or “observable” [Betrachbar].475 Consequently, what is 
essentially transmitted through poetry is the hinting as pure hinting, namely, as the trace of 
an absence, a trace that is repeatable and transferrable only insofar as it remains empty.  
                                                
471 Elucidations of Holderlin’s Poetry, 46/63. 
472 Martin Heidegger, Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein", ed. Susanne Ziegler, Vol. Gesamtausgabe 
Bd.39 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999). Eglish translation in preparation by William McNeill 
as Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germanien” and “Der Rhein,” to be realeased on September 18, 2014.  
473 Ibid., 30; my translation.“Dichten: ein Sagen in der Art des weisenden Offenbarmachens.” 
474 See ibid., 32. 
475 Ibid. 
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For Heidegger the hint [Wink] is different from the ordinary sign [Zeichen], the sign 
understood as a tool to point to something else and make it noticeable.476 Heidegger points 
out that the difference between the sign and the hint may be evident already in everyday 
gestures for salutation, for example, in the waving of our hands when meeting someone at 
the moment of arrival or departure.477 As Heidegger expresses it, the gesture of waving our 
hands while departing or arriving does not function as a sign, it does not intend to point to 
someone or something; rather, it is a hint. He further remarks that the gesture of salutation 
preserves the sense of proximity while departing, while the distance increases, or the sense of 
distance while arriving, while the proximity increases. In this way, the gesture yokes together 
distance and proximity, that is, the modulations of our invisible bonds to the others, the 
inner movements of our existential relations to others. This example is significant not only 
because it shows that hints are determined by a ground of existential significance, but also 
because it calls attention to the irreducible tension between visibility and invisibility that 
pervades our most simple bodily expressions. It is in this context that one must understand 
why Heidegger claims that “the gods hint, but simply insofar as they are.”478 Presumably, 
Heidegger underlines the reference to the verb “to be” because he intends to show that 
being is itself a hint, an elusive trace, an absence.   
In this way, Heidegger suggests that hinting constitutes the essential language of 
existence, the language of our involvement in being. Heidegger claims, in fact, that existence 
is poetic because it needs to be founded, given: it cannot be earned.479 Thus, he understands 
476 See ibid. 
477 See ibid. 
478 Ibid., 32; my translation. “Die Götter winken aber einfach, indem sie sind.” 
479 See Elucidations of Hölderlin’s Poetry, 42/60. 
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existence as poetic foundation, donation, or gift [Schenkung].480 With regard to this, and 
following Derrida’s reading of the gift, one might say that existence is a gift in the 
paradoxical sense of the gift: a present that is never present, a present or gift that withdraws 
its origins and grounds.481 Along these lines, the primordial, paradoxical gift of existence is a 
hint, it gives itself in hints and gestures. That is to say, language and existence are 
intertwined, they are primordial gifts, or givens, that presuppose each other.   
Indeed, one exists without knowing why, ignoring the ultimate source, the origin, the 
ground of existence. And the origin of existence is, however, hinted at in our own being, in 
the fact that we are. Concerning this, one could say that existing is the reiteration of the 
instituting gesture of being, the saying of being: the primordial exposure to the world. For 
existing is the gift of being. This gift is openness, clearing, withdrawal, and, therefore, 
essential freedom. But along with the gift of existence, of language, it comes the possibility 
of death, and the dissemination of the specters of death. 
As Heidegger indicates, in the foundation of language and of the world, in the 
transmission of the poetic hints, lies the possibility of danger, of non-being. This primordial 
danger conceals the essential difference between being and beings, and between essential 
hints and signs. Put differently, the transmission of the poetic hints brings about the 
possibility of concealment, and the closing off of possibilities: the forgetfulness of being. In 
this way, the hints of the poet foreshadow the possibility of no posibility, death: the danger. 
To be a poet is to embrace the danger by communicating the hints. And to belong to a 
480 With regard to this, Françoise  Dastur explains that the poetic work is institutive, and essentially historical, 
insofar as it institutes the singular word that constitutes the identity of a people, and determines its destiny. See 
Françoise Dastur, "Le poésie comme origine (Hölderlin et Heidegger)," Studia Phaenomenologica. Romanian Journal 
for Phenomenology 3, no. Special Issue (2003): 83-98, 97-98. 
481 See Jacques Derida, Donner le temps (Paris: Éditions Galilée, 1991), 21-38. 
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people is to embrace the danger by appropriating the hints. In both cases one is involved in 
the circle of history –in a history and a destiny [Geschick] –and finitude. 
Having said this, one can say that the danger is in the hint, which is sent in time, 
opened to the future. For essential hints are empty hints, they are not present, they say 
nothing; therefore, they carry within them the imminent possibility of misunderstanding and 
loss. Hints are essentially invisible, absent, even though they resonate in visible marks.482 
Accordingly, one may say that the poetic hint, as essential word, is Ereignis, the involvement 
in a silent dialogue [Gespräch] with the saying of being, with the word that is itself flesh, and 
flows with us, carries us, appropriates us. Let me elucidate this relationship between language 
and the event, as it is developed in some of Heidegger’s notes and lectures on language.  
Hints, Signs and Gestures in Zum Wesen der Sprache und zur Frage nach der Kunst  
In the years that followed these meditations on Hölderlin’s poetry, Heidegger 
continues with his attempt to think about the distinction between essential word and sign-
words, which remains a pressing difficulty. A decisive moment is when he distinguishes 
between language as pure means of communication and “expression,” and event-like signs. 
With regard to this, in the notes entitled Das Zeichen inlcuded in the volume Zum Wesen der 
Sprache und zur Frage nach der Kunst, particularly in §45, Heidegger establishes a threefold 
distinction betwen the “thing-like sign”[dinghafte Zeichen], expressive signs [ausdruckhaften 
Zeichen], and the essential “event-like signs” [ereignishafte Zeichen].  
                                                
482 In this sense, one may say that hints are essential words, for as John Sallis explains examining Heidegger’s 
lecture course on Parmenides, from 1942-43, “the fundamental meanings of words do not get effaced in the 
course of time, through use or perhaps misuse, but rather are always already effaced, concealed, apparent only 
in what is already derivative.” John Sallis, Delimitations: Phenomenology and the End of Metaphysics (Bloomington & 
Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995), 166. 
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Heidegger argues that “‘thing-like’ signs show something in a different way and for 
other reasons than announcements, gestures, and comportments.”483 Gestures, he continues, 
may be taken as living signs and, in a sense, as external expression of an interior. Heidegger 
explains that “here ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ count already as a grounding schema for living 
beings.”484 Heidegger does not delve into this problem here. It is clear, however, that he 
intends to distinguish between an objective sign that is simply visible, and a living sign or 
gesture that has intrinsic depth and that may be tentatively –and mistakenly –characterized as 
the visible expression of an invisible interior. But a more fundamental characterization of the 
sign, what Heidegger calls event-like sign, is irreducible to the level of visible signs. For thing-
like signs, expressions and language –understood in a narrow sense as a linguistic system –
are derivative phenomena. Essential signs, Heidegger suggests, are event-like insofar as they 
cannot be determined on the basis of what is objectively given. To be precise, the event-like 
signs do not designate or represent anything. Rather, as Heidegger puts it, they show in “the 
abyss” [Ab-grund].485 Presumably, this means that essential signs are gestures of openness to 
being, in which beings are gathered in the movement of the gesture, not set apart as mere 
things; for “in the [act of] showing each being is in the event, inasmuch as it is cleared 
[Gelichtet] in being as appropriated [als Geeigenet].”486 In this way, one might say that the event-
like character of the sign must be defined as a certain engagement with things, in which 
things themselves are silently incorporated as part of our existence.  
Specifically, in the context of this meditation on the essential sign, Heidegger 
indicates that the sign is what is most inconspicuous [Das Unscheinbarste] and without 
                                                
483 Zum Wesen der Sprache und zur Frage nach der Kunst, 92; my translation. “Dinghafte Zeichen zeigen in anderer Weise 
und auf anderen Grunde als Verlautbarungen und Gesten und Gebärden.” 
484 Ibid., my translation. “»Innen« und »Außen« gilt hier schon [als] Grundschema des Lebendigen.” 
485 Ibid., 89; my translation.  
486 Ibid., my translation. “Jedes Seiende ist, sobald es im Sein als Geeignet gelichtet ist, im Zeigen in das Ereignis.” 
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obstrusiveness [ohne Aufdrängnis].487 Thus he suggests that before one comes to notice the 
showing of something, ordinary signs and things, one has already received a hint or indication 
about what this something is –or, more precisely, about the fact that that being is –, and this 
indication is silent. This essential sign is itself part of our ground and, therefore, it is without 
ground. 
Heidegger intimates, then, that visible signs, words, gestures, and expressions are 
dependent on a silent showing or signaling that stems from the ground we dwell in. This 
ground is a non-ground because it is a clearing, an openness, and, thereby, the essential 
saying or showing is not comparable to any visible thing.488 In line with this, Heidegger 
develops an exploration of the essence of the sign, and of the act of indicating, which differs 
significantly from the analysis carried out in Being and Time, particularly  in §17 and §18.  
In Being and Time the sign is a peculiar thing or tool that refers to something else and, 
in so doing, “...raises the total meaning-context, the referencial totality, into our 
circumspection,” as John Sallis indicates.489 In his notes on language, Heidegger meditates on 
the fundamental essence of the sign, as it is illuminated out of the truth of being, instead of 
thinking the sign from the point of view of the tool.490 From this perspective, the essential 
sign denotes “no-thing.”   
Although in Being and Time signs are not taken as mere tools, for they make explicit a 
totality of significance,491 Heidegger remarks that such analysis is predominantly determined 
by ontic characterizations of the sign.492 For the essential sign does not raise the referencial 
                                                
487 See ibid. 
488 See ibid., 92.  
489 John Sallis, “Language and Reversal,” 194. 
490 See Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst, 94-95. 
491 See Being and Time, 80/78. 
492 Heidegger points out that this is a limit pertaining to Being and Time’s analysis of the sign and the 
phenomenon of reference. See Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst, 94.  
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totality to our circumspection, nor does it reveal a meaning-context, but rather openness or 
disclosedness as such. To be precise, one could say that the essential sign is the event itself: 
“The showing of the sign is not an indication set in movement through representing, it is the 
appropriating event itself.”493 It is in this context that one must understand the depth of 
Hölderlin’s poetic indication, so decisive for Heidegger, which declares that we are a sign to 
be read or interpreted.494 One could say that we are a sign to be interpreted because we are 
the clearing. And this means that we are in a relentless state of indigence, of dispossession: 
our being is the openness to what is yet to be given, yet to come, and which shall never 
become present, even though it has us from the very beginning. Existing is, indeed, a waiting, 
a long while, and the prefiguration of silence and death. In existing we send ourselves as a 
hint to the future, as a promise of meaning, as word: a history, a destiny.  
Precisely, in the course of these notes on language, Heidegger refers to the word as 
hint, and underscores that in this way “the word appropriates humanity.”495 He remarks that the 
event unfolds as wording,496 as hint or indication. This indication, he continues, is to be 
appropriated in gratitude, for gratitude is the receptivity that may release or bring something 
to presence.497 Here, one cannot help but think of a primordial dialogue, in which gratitude 
appears as an essential gesture or comportment that responds to other essential gestures: the 
initial gesture that says the word –a name, for example –and, thereby, gives existence.  
This analysis foreshadows the correlation between thinking [Denken] and thanking 
[Danken], which Heidegger adumbrates in the course of the notes and lectures on language I 
                                                
493 Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst, 88; my translation.“Das zeigen des Zeichens ist nicht eine durch 
das Vorstellen in bewegung gesetzt Weisung, es ist das Ereignen selbst.” 
494 See What is Called Thinking?,  11/9-10. 
495 Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst, 79, my translation. “Das Wort ereignet den Menschen.” 
496 In fact, in this same context, Heidegger notes that “The event words” [“Das Ereignis wortet”]. Ibid., 99; my 
translation. 
497 See ibid. 
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have been exploring up to now,498 which is further developed in relation to “memory” 
[Gedachtnis], “the gathering of thought,”499 in the lectures on What is Called Thinking? from 
1951 and 1952. Let me, then, examine the relationship between language, gesture and 
thinking in these lectures.  
Thanking, Thinking and Gesture 
In the beginning of the lectures on What is Called Thinking? Heidegger suggests that 
thanking and thinking are intrinsically related. They are both the response to a call, one 
which is itself a gift that should be returned: “Thought has the gift of thinking back, a gift 
given because we incline toward it.”500 Thinking is, in this sense, the gift of receptivity, and  
the gift of a promise. It is the promise of thinking, the exposure to what is most thought-
provoking, most striking, namely, “...that we are still not thinking.”501 Thinking, just as 
gratitude, is an essential event that is relentlessly postponed. In a sense, thinking does not 
happen: it is the inkling of an absence, a minimal touch.   
Heidegger explores the problem of thinking through one stanza from Hölderlin’s 
poem Mnemosyne. Heidegger calls attention to a specific verse in which Hölderlin says that we 
are a sign to be read. Presumably, Heidegger suggests, we are a sign because we point to what 
withdraws. Accordingly, what is most essential to us is the capacity to remain on the path of 
thinking what withdraws, our capacity to relate to what is unknown and to learn from it, not 
the alleged possesion of a rational capacity of representation. This means that what belongs 
to us most essentially is something we do not possess. Rather, it is something that 
dispossesses us, namely, a certain capacity to comply with what calls for us, what requires us. 
498 See ibid., 99-100.  
499 What is Called Thinking?, 5/3. “…die Versammlung des Denkens.” 
500 Ibid., 5/4. “Das Bedachte ist das mit einem Andenken Beschenkte, beschenkt, weil wir es mögen.” 
501 Ibid., 6/4. “…daß wir noch nicht Denken.” 
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Heidegger says: “Man learns when his doing and letting [Lassen] answers to whatever 
essentials are addressed to him at any given moment.”502  
In this context, Heidegger sketches out a comparision between the thinker and the 
joiner’s apprentice. He conceives thinking as “handicraft” [Hand-Werk],503 the “handicraft par 
excellence.” Presumably, in this case, Heidegger does not characterize thinking as a “craft” in 
general, but as handicraft, for thinking is intrinscally related to the hand. This means that the 
work of thinking hinges on our relatedness to sensible beings, just as the joiner’s work is 
founded on “relatedness to wood.”504  
 Heidegger remarks that “the hand is a proper thing.”505 He suggests that the hand 
belongs to us essentially because it is pervaded by language. He says precisely: “Only a being 
who can speak, that is, think, can have hands and can be handy in achieving works of 
handicraft.”506 Thereby, Heidegger claims that there is an abyssal difference between hands 
and sheer grasping organs. For language determines thinking, and “...thinking guides and 
carries every gesture of the hand. To carry means literally: to gesture.”507 Along these lines, 
Heidegger asserts that apes have grasping organs, but not hands. Apes do not have hands, 
502 Ibid., 5-6/4; modified. “Der Mensch lernt, insofern er sein Tun und Lassen zu dem in die Entsprechung bringt, was ihm 
jeweils an Wesenhftem zugesprochen wird.” 
503 Ibid., 18/16.  
504 Ibid., 17/14. This determination of handicraft as a work that brings forth the latent forms from the wood, 
and which is analogous to thought, seems to imply a revision of the determination of handicraft carried out in 
The Origin of the Work of Art, in which handicraft is described as a goal-oriented type of work that effaces the 
earthy dimension of the material, and which in this way it makes inconspicuous its work of disclosure. 
505 Ibid., 18-16; modified. “Mit der hand hat es eine eigene Bewandtnis.” J. Glenn Gray translates this sentence as 
follows: “The hand is a peculiar thing.” This translation preserves the idiomatic sense of Heidegger’s claim, but 
it loses sight of Heidegger’s reference to a unique relation between hand and thought, and the fact that for 
Heidegger the adjective “proper” [“eigen”] has a very particular significance. What is proper is what is authentic 
or essential, and “event-like.” For this reason, in the context of the present work, it may be necessary to use a 
more “literal” translation. I translated this phrase taking into account Derrida’s translation, which reads: “with 
the hand one is dealing with what is particular or proper” Jacques Derrida, "Geschlecht II: Heidegger's Hand," 
in Deconstruction and Philosophy: The Texts of Jacques Derrida, ed. John Sallis, trans. John P. Leavy Jr., 161-196 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 172.  
506 Ibid., 18/16. “Nur ein Wesen, das spricht, d.h. denkt, kann die Hand haben und in der Handhabung Werke der Hand 
vollbringen.” 
507 Ibid., 26/23; modified. “Das Denken leitet und trägt jede Gebärde der Hand. Tragen heißt wörtlich: gebärden.” J. Glenn 
Gray omits the second sentence in his translation of this passage, so I have translated it myself.  
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presumably, because they are fundamentally unable to think and speak. As Derrida contends, 
this is a dogmatic assertion that leaves in silence the “essential axiomatic” of Heidegger’s 
evaluation of the hand. It preseves the problematic opposition between man and animal –
problematic because unjustified–, and it presupposes controversial premises concerning the 
value of human work.508 In this sense, Derrida suggests, Heidegger’s position remains 
metaphysical. Let me, then, refer succinctly to Derrida’s critique of Heidegger. 
Derrida says that for Heidegger thinking is incarnated, thinking is “a certain manner 
of Dasein as Leib.”509 Moreover, he continues, thinking is  “handling,” a term that may not be 
understood as ordinary dealing or acting, but rather as an action that “belongs to the essence 
of the gift, of a giving that would give, if this is possible, without taking hold of anything.”510 
And yet, Derrida insists, this determination of thinking as gift is pervaded by a rhetoric of 
the proper, a secret desire for what is pure, essential and uncontaminated. Thus, he remarks 
with a critical tone, the hand is not determined by use and profit, “guided by capital.”511 
Rather, it follows the pure inclination of the gift as gift, which in this case determines what is 
proper of “our” essence as human beings.512 Thus, if it is to remain uncontaminated, within 
508 Derrida points out that Heidegger’s distinction between hands and grasping organs is “dogmatic in its 
form,” for “this traditional statement presupposes an empiric or positive knowledge whose titles, proofs, and 
signs are never shown [montrés]” (“Geschlecht II,” 173). Thus, Heidegger’s approach is controversially 
authoritative and questionable insofar as he is not showing, and not willing to show, the “essential axiomatic” 
of his discourse (see ibid.), that is, due to the fact that he leaves in silence the traces of the distinction between 
man and animal, between hand and grasping organs. As Derrida expresses it, this implicit axiomatic lays out a 
hierarchical distinction between the essential craft or work of the hand, and the ordinary trade-oriented craft 
wherein the hand, just as poetry, is in danger (see ibid., 170-71), and which entails a political evaluation of 
human work on the basis of a privileged language. 
509 Derrida, Geschlecht II, 171. 
510 Ibid., 173.  
511 Ibid., 170. 
512 As Heidegger explains in his Bremen lecture “Positionality”[“Das Ge-Stell”], from 1949, in a passage that 
seems to corroborate what Derrida denounces as a problematic ideal of the “authentic” or “proper,” the hand 
can only be properly determined in light of the totality, as a structural part of my being that cannot be isolated 
as a “piece”[Stück], which cannot be understood in terms of the elements of machinery. See Bremen and Freiburg 
Lectures, 37/35.   
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the sphere of the proper, the hand can only give itself, be itself. This is what  Derrida calls 
the “double vocation” of the hand.  
The hand has a double vocation because it is itself voice, it voices itself. In other 
words, the hand is monstrosity. Or, as Derrida expresses it, “the monstrosity [monstrosité] of 
the gift or of what gives itself.”513 This monstrosity of the hand involves a determination of the 
essence of the human that aims at a questionable and dangerous ideal of simplicity, unity and 
purity. This ideal of simplicity is based on the gift of language and, thereby, perpetuates a 
form of logocentrism.514 
Now, let me venture a response to Derrida. 
Despite the traces of logocentrism, and the rhetoric of the proper and the essential, it 
seems to me that Heidegger’s meditation on the hand undermines metaphysical logocentrism 
and anthropomorphism, and in a decisive way. As I have indicated in relation to Heidegger’s 
notes on the essence of language, the essential language is a silent one, a language that is 
itself disposession, withdrawal. It is language –and, by extension, thinking and the hand –that 
has us, and not the other way around.515 Thus, one could say that the essential giving, the gift 
of language and thinking, is not  opposed to taking, because it is not a gift the human itself 
does, but rather an event that involves us. As Derrida notices in recalling the double 
“vocation” of the gift, the proper goes out of the circle of exchange, it is a gift that gives itself 
without taking anything. But, paradoxically, this means that the gift is pure, essential, or 
proper, insofar as it is impossible. It is separated by an abyss from any “human” grasping or 
513 Derrida, Geschlecht II, 174. 
514 Derrida remarks that after the “Letter on Humanism” we cannot expect to find in Heidegger a sheer 
metaphysical anthropomorphism. This does not mean, as Derrida’s analysis makes clear, that there are not 
“traces” of a metaphysical anthropomorphism lurking behind the opposition between man and animal, giving 
and taking.  
515 Derrida mentions this reversal of our relation to language, but he does not explore its implications in the 
course of the article we are discussing here.   
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taking. In order to clarify this point, I will argue that Heidegger’s analysis of the gestures of 
the hand reveals an openness, which is itself a silence, a rift, a clearing [Lichtung]. And this 
means that the gestures of the hand are not opposed to Lichtung, contrary to what Derrida 
suggests when reading Lichtung in reference to light and the act of vision.516    
Derrida seems to underestimate silence as a structural element of the gift of language, 
for he makes no mention to the silence of the hand, the hollow the hand itself “is” in 
grasping, even though he quotes and comments in detail the passage in which a decisive 
alusion to silence appears.517 In contrast to Derridas’s view, I should note that Heidegger’s 
distinction between hand and grasping organ is marked by a reference to silence, and that 
this distinction functions at two levels.  
First, Heidegger remarks, the hand does more than grasping or catching, pressing or 
pushing, it can also reach or receive things. This is what I consider to be the first level of the 
difference, a difference that seems a difference of degree, a non-essential difference. For here 
the hand is determined in terms of a relation between things. In this case, the hand is not 
simply a grasping organ, but is quite similar to it.    
516 See ibid., 171. 
517 The passage in question, translated and commented by Derrida, reads as follows in the English version: 
“The hand designs and signs (zeichnet), presumably because man is a (monstrous) sign (ein Zeichnet ist). Two 
hands fold into one [falten sich: also join together], a gesture meant to carry man into the great simplicity [Einfalt; 
I am not sure of comprehending this sentence that plays on sich falten and Einfalt; whether it be a matter of 
prayer or of more common gestures, what matters above all is that the hands can touch each other as such, in 
auto-affection, even at the touch of the other’s hand in the gift of the hand; this implies that the hands can also 
show themselves]. The hand is all this, and this is the true hand work (das eigentliche Hand-Werk). Everything is 
rooted here that is commonly known as handicraft (Handwerk), and commonly we go no further. But the hand’s 
gestures [Gebärden: a word worked over very much by Heidegger in other texts too] run everywhere through 
language [or through the tongue], in their most perfect purity precisely when man speaks by being silent. And 
only when man speaks, does he think –nor the other way around, as metaphysics still believes. Every motion of 
the hand in every one of its works carries itself (sich trägt) through the element of thinking, every bearing of the 
hand bears itself [gebärden sich] in that element. All the work of the hand is rooted in thinking. Therefore, 
thinking (das Denken) itself is man’s simplest, and for that reason hardest, Hand-Werk if it would be properly 
accomplished (eigens).” Ibid., 175.  
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Second, and more importantly, the hand can reach and receive itself in its relation to 
others: “the hand extends itself, and receives its own welcome in the hands of others.”518 
Heidegger’s formulation seems to have a twofold meaning. On the one hand, it indicates that 
what is proper of the hand is its capacity to welcome and reach the others, yet not as things, 
that is, not as something to be taken, to be grasped; rather, as others to come, others 
separated by an insurmountable distance. On the other hand, Heidegger suggests, the 
possibility of welcoming the other hinges on the mere exposure of the hand as hand, the 
hand’s capacity to reach and “welcome” itself. I take this to mean that the hand can welcome 
the other, can let the other come, precisely in its capacity to show itself as hand, as bare hand 
that does nothing more than give itself, “receive,” or undertake its own capacity to receive or 
welcome. This is what the gesture of salutation, which Heidegger mentions in his analysis of 
the hint in Hölderlin, illustrates.  
One can see, therefore, that what is proper of the hand is an emptiness, a hollow, a 
concavity, or even a pregnancy, understood as the capacity to carry and endure the other. In 
other words, what is “proper” of the hand is its gestural capacity to bear, conceive, or 
gestate. Indeed, Heidegger says: “The hand carries. The hand designs and signs, presumably 
because man is a sign. Two hands fold into one, a gesture meant to carry man into the great 
oneness.”519 
Derrida notes that the term “Gebärde” is worked over very much by Heidegger, but 
he does not make a pause to examine this notion. He calls attention to the aforementioned 
passage and he talks about the folding [falten sich] of the hand, and about the great simplicity 
[Einfalt], the folding in one, of the two hands joint together, but he never examines why 
                                                
518 What is Called Thinking?, 18-19/16. “…sie reich sich und empfängt sich in der anderen.” 
519 Ibid., 18/16. “Die Hand trägt. Die Hand zeichnet, vermutlich weil der Mensch ein Zeichen ist. Die Hände falten sich, wenn 
diese Gebärde den Menschen in die große Einfalt tragen soll.” 
209 
Heidegger qualifies this movement as gestural. In his commentary on the text, Derrida simply 
remarks: “whether it be a matter of prayer or of more common gestures, what matters above 
all is that the hands can touch each other as such, in auto-affection, even at the touch of the 
other’s hand in the gift of the hand.”520  
Contrary to Derrida’s reading, one might say that if gesture is a carrying or bearing, 
and if it starts as a folding of the hand, then the fold is not so much a return to itself but 
rather the openness to an other, which is to be carried or suffered. As a supplementary note, 
let me recall here a passage from Heideger’s seminar on Heraclitus with Eugen Fink, from 
1966/67, in which Heidegger discusses what giving the hand means. Specifically, in the 
context of the problematic of perception and questions concerning sensible proximity and 
distance, Eugen Fink says: “Touching ourselves is also a special phenomenon. A minimum 
of distance holds sway between what touches itself.”521  
Hence, one could say that the folding of one hand already announces the irreducible 
alterity inscribed in one’s encounter with the hands of the others, for the alterity of the hand 
that is welcomed and brought to proximity is itself inscribed in a clearing. The hand is hand 
because it folds, and as it folds, it opens itself up, it unfolds an empty space. And this is why 
the hand may receive something. Along these lines, one might say that thinking is gestural, 
and not simply determined by the hands-things, because it bears an absence. Being there as 
hand, folding itself, the hand points to what withdraws, it thinks: the hand echoes something 
that withdraws, and suffers this loss.  
520 Derrida, Geschlecht II, 175. 
521 Heraclitus Seminar, 228-29/141. “Ein besonderes Phänomen ist auch die Selbstberührung. Zwischen dem Sichberührenden 
waltet ein Minimum von Ferne.” 
210 
At this point, let me refer to one of the final paragraphs from Heidegger’s Bremen 
lecture “The Danger,” in which he says: “To be an echo is the suffering of thinking.”522 
Clearly, the figure of the echo that is suffered recalls that of the hand that bears and endures 
what is to come, what is to be received. Along these lines, one could say that thought, which 
is itself saying or showing, is an echo insofar as it carries out a torsion, a separation, a 
departure from what is proper or essential. In this sense, thought exposes a wound, a pain, a 
suffering. Therefore, the folding, or echoing of the hand may be “affectivity,” “suffering,” 
ontologically understood, but not “auto-affection,” as Derrida remarks.   
In touching itself, in folding itself, the hand points to an other that withdraws, while 
opening up a separation or rift that undermines any pretence of coincidence or self-identity. 
This is also what Merleau-Ponty underscores in his phenomenological description of the 
folding of the hand. Recalling Merleau-Ponty’s analysis, one might say that, for Heidegger, 
too, the fold of the hand is a chiasm that brings about dispersion or multiplicity, the latencies 
of an outline, the gestation or conception of something to come. For, clearly, in this case, 
redoubling or folding implies at least three.523 Or, as Eugen Fink expresses it: “There is not 
brightness in which there is only one thing. In the brightness many things set themselves 
off.”524 
When the hand gives itself, when the hand generates a hollowness or concavity, it 
becomes somewhat non-human. For what is to come, what gestures adumbrate, as gestures, 
cannot be inscribed in human measures and calculations. Indeed, when someone gives the 
hand in friendship, one cannot measure the frienship, and when someone folds the hands in 
a prayer, one cannot measure the piety. These gestures are essentially invisible; they have a 
522 Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 66/61. “Ein Echo zu sein, ist das Leiden des Denkens.”  
523 See John Sallis, Double Truth, xii. 
524 Heraclitus Seminar, 232/144. “Es gibt keine Helle, in der nur ein Ding ist. In der Helle begrenzen sich viele Dinge” 
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strange provenance. Or, one might also say, they belong to being, to the most ancient echo 
of being, beyng, what Merleau-Ponty would call wild being.  
As Heidegger expresses it, the hand gives itself to beyng. In exposing itself as bare 
hand the hand reveals an ancient covenance, it hints at an otherness, the otherness of being: 
the one that has the hand. For when it returns to itself the hand is no longer human, it simply 
“is,” in its own “site,” somehow like Silesius’ rose: without why. Heidegger adumbrates this 
correlation between hand and being, in his Bremen lecture “The Turn,” from 1949, when he 
discusses questions concerning what we are supposed to do and how we must think. He says 
precisely that “...thinking is the authentic action [Handeln], where action means to give a hand 
[an die Hand gehen] to the essence of beyng in order to prepare for it that site in which it 
brings itself and its essence to speech.”525      
I want to suggest, then, that Heidegger introduces the figure of the hand as gesture 
because in gesturing the hand unfolds a hollow and, thereby, it exposes itself to the 
otherness of what may come, to the saying of the most ancient beyng. Indeed, hand’s 
gestures are themselves modalities of an ancient saying whose origins we ignore, a voice 
whose origins are prior to the history of metaphysics: one may say that they are mythical, 
poetic origins. In order to elucidate this point, I will examine Heidegger’s meditations 
concerning poetry and writing, as well as the relationship between history and literature, 
which are taken up in his lecture course on Schiller from the winter semester from 1936-
37,526 but also in the sections I have examined from What is Called Thinking?  
525 Bremen and Freiburg Lectures, 71/66. “...das Denken ist das eigentliche Handeln, wenn Handeln heißt: dem Wesen des 
Seyns and die Hand gehen, um ihm jene Stätte zu bereiten, in die es sich und sein Wesen zur Sprache bringt.” 
526 Übungen für Anfänger. Schillers Briefe über die äesthetische Erziehung des Menschen. In translating the passages from 
this text, I used as support the Italian translation: Martin Heidegger, Introduzione all'estetica. Le Lettere 
sull'educazione estetica dell'uomo di Schiller, ed. Adriano Ardovino, trans. Adriano Ardovino (Roma: Carocci, 2008).  
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Writing and Gesture 
Examining Schiller’s idea of the beautiful form, in the lecture on Schiller from 1936-
37, Heidegger wonders, where is the form of the work of art, or where is writing as such?527 
With regard to these questions, he suggests, one must acknowledge that the words guide us 
beyond themselves, they precede us in such a way that “we always already co-intend what is 
said.”528 He further indicates that “in the dialogue we live in language,”529 to the extent that 
language is already there speaking to us, without any “artificial abscission”[künstlich 
abschneiden],530 and without the need of a grammatic.531 In short, language is alive in the 
dialogue, it is not an instrument.   
These indications help us elucidate Heidegger’s claim according to which Socrates “is 
the purest thinker of the west.”532 In What is Called Thinking? Heidegger explains that 
Socrates’ greatness has to do with the fact that he “placed himself” [sich...stellen] and remained 
throughout his life “in the draft of the current.”533 “This is why,” adds Heidegger, “he wrote 
nothing.”534 Heidegger alludes here to the current of that which withdraws and calls for 
thinking. Probably, this is also the current of life and love, for in another reference to 
Socrates, a reference mediated by Hölderlin’s poem “Socrates and Alcibiades,” Heidegger 
calls attention to the verse that reads: “who the deepest has thought, loves what is most 
alive.”535 One could say, then, that Socrates is the purest and greatest thinker of the west 
because his thought was deeply engaged with life. But, what life? Presumably, the life that is 
527 Heidegger also formulates these questions in the course of his meditations on language in Zum Wesen der 
Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst, particularly in the notes devoted to Das Zeichen, 91. 
528 Heidegger, Übungen für Anfänger…, 86; my translation. “Wir meinen das Gesagte immer schon mit.” 
529 Ibid., 83; my translation. “im Gespräch leben wir in Sprache.”  
530 Ibid., 86. 
531 See ibid., 83.  
532 What is Called Thinking?, 20/17. 
533 Ibid., modified. “...in den Zugwind dieses Zuges.” 
534 Ibid., emphasis added.  
535 Ibid., 20. “Wer das Tiefste gedacht, liebt das Lebendigste.”  
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openness and withdrawal, the life of thought. For the figure of Alcibiades is presented here 
as the most lovable, the most alive, probably, because of his youth. And youth shines 
because of its possibilities. Youth is openness and, in a sense, nothingness: it is not fixed, not 
yet. And this openness, one may add, reveals the essence of life, of being. This is what 
remains, always, the same.  
Years later, in the Zollikon seminars, Heidegger states that Socrates is the greatest 
thinker of the West. In this case, Heidegger suggests that the strength of Socrates’ thought is 
measured by his capacity to say always the same about the same, that is, to say nothing.536 
This is precisely what sets Socrates apart from the rest of the “great” thinkers of the west, all 
of whom Heidegger qualifies as fugitives looking for a “lee” [Windschatten] in writing.  
As Heidegger expresses it, the current that draws thought is a current of air, a 
Zugwind, just like the voice. Writing appears, thus, as a fallacious attempt to find stability 
amidst the current of living speech, of the fleeting voice that disappears with the passing of 
life, which draws us away. The history of literature, the history of the fugitive thought that 
looks for shelter in writing, is the history of the West, the history of metaphysics. One might 
think, therefore, that Heidegger opposess the original presence of the living speech to the 
derivative and merely specular presence of the written word.537 And yet, Socrates’ example 
shows that living speech is not more effective, more present, than writing. Ultimately, 
Heidegger’s point is that neither the voice, nor writing offer a safe refuge against the currents 
of life. The virtue of Socrates is, in this sense, that he embraces the fact that life withdraws 
and passes away. The necessary questions are, then: what is there in the word, in speech, that 
536 As was already indicated in the first chapter of the present work, in the Zollikon seminars Heidegger refers 
to Socrates as the greatest thinker of the West, remarking in this case that to think always the same, to say the 
same about the same, is the “most difficult” thing, and is what Socrates did (See Zollikon Seminars, 30/24).  
537 Derrida suggests this at some point in the interpretation of Heidegger’s hand, which we discussed above.  
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calls for writing? What compelled Plato to fix and stabilize the words of his master? What 
did Socrates “say” that needs to be written? This set of questions may be synthesized in one 
fundamental question, which I already mentioned: Where is writing?  
This fundamental question has to do with the grounds of writing, which are also the 
hidden grounds of metaphysics. As Heidegger expresses it, writing is at the basis of 
metaphysics, and it emerges as a violation, an illegitimate irruption into the life of thought. 
Heidegger remarks in What is Called Thinking? that the figure of Socrates announces a still 
secret history of metaphysics, the history of the turn to writing, the turn to alphabetic 
writing, to logic and logistics. And Heidegger qualifies this turn as a getting away, an escape. 
Heidegger says precisely: “An as yet hidden history still keeps the secret why all great 
Western thinkers after Socrates, with all their greatness, had to be such fugitives.”538 
Heidegger gives some indications concerning this secret history of the “fugitive 
thought,” of the thought that became literature, in one of the seminar sessions on Schiller, 
dated January 20, 1937. Over the course of this seminar, in a formulation that prefigures the 
one I just mentioned about the currents of thought and language, Heidegger points out that 
“language has a peculiar instability,”539 for language fades away as soon as it comes to life in 
the dialogue: “Language is in the dialogue. But it soon fades away, and then, properly, is no 
more. In this way, language has a peculiar unstability. Nevertheless, the artistic gender that 
creates in language, which creates out of it and in it, became essentially historical.”540  
As Heidegger explains, and as was clear already in his meditations on Hölderlin, it is 
the poetic or artistic appropriation of language that gives language an initial impulse as 
538 Ibid., 20/18. “Es bleibt das Geheimnis einer noch verborgenen Geschichte, daß alle Denker des Abdendlandes nach Socrates, 
unbeschadet ihrer Größe, solche Flüchtlinge sein mußten.”  
539 Übungen für Anfänger…, 81; my translation. “...die Sprache hat eigentümliche Unbestandigkeit.  
540 Ibid., 81; my translation. “Die Sprache ist im Gespräch. Aber dieses ist ja verhallt, ist dann eigentlich nicth mehr. So hat 
die Sprache eine eigentümliche Unbeständigkeit. Trotzdem ist doch grade die Kunstgattung, die in der Sprache schafft, aus ihr 
schafft und in ihr ist, wesentlich geschichtlich geworden.” 
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foundation of the world of a people, of history. The question remains, “how did word and 
saying gain stability?”541 Heidegger gives a provisional response to this question by alluding to 
the traits of language that are salient in oral, pre-alphabetic traditions: “It [word and saying] 
was anticipatedly sung, spoken and preserved in memory.”542 Heidegger further remarks that 
“saying is in a certain sense a singing,”543 which “originates from determinate conditions and 
a determinate entourage, and then is sung again.”544 One could say, then, that singing is the 
most primordial characterization of the word, a saying that contains a horizon of melodic 
repetitions, which are embodied by a people. Specifically, Heidegger explains that the 
possibility of stability and the preservation of language hinges on the structuring of existence 
and language, the structuring that may be traced back to the song of rhapsodists: 
“Presupposition of stability was an articulation and a totally determined mode of existing of 
the people itself, which has its existence in language. Song of rhapsodists.”545 Heidegger 
suggests, then, that a people articulates its own existence by living language, in a sense, by 
singing it. On this view, what makes singing an originary mode of saying is the fact that it 
gathers up the voice of a community. One can also say that singing is itself an attuned mode 
of existing with others. It is, so to say, a shared comportment, a communal performance.   
The main conclusions Heidegger derives from this reference to singing are that 
“literature,” writing, is not a necessary condition of historicity, nor the only 
“reality”[Wirklichkeit] of language, and that language cannot be thought primarily or originally 
541 Ibid., my translation. “Wodurch bekam zu Anfang das Wort und das Gesagte einen Bestand?” 
542 Ibid., my translation. “Es wurde vorgesungen, vorgeredet und im Gedächtnis aufbewahren.” Heidegger sketches here an 
argument about the distinction between oral and alphabetic traditions that for the most part coincides with the 
theory that decades later was formulated by Eric Havelock in his book The Muse Learns to Write, and Marshall 
McLuhan in Gutemberg’s Galaxy.  
543 Ibid., 82; my translation. “Das Sagen ist gewissermaßen ein Sang.” 
544 Ibid., my translation. “bei bestimmten Gelegenheiten und in bestimmter Umgebung entstanden und dann weiter gesungen.” 
545 Ibid., my translation. “Die Voraussetzung der Beständigkeit war eine ganz bestimmte Gliederung und Daseinsform des 
Volkes selbst, das in der Sprache seine Existenz hat. Sang der Rhapsoden.” 
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in terms of writing, at least not in terms of alphabetic writing.546 Introducing a brief reference 
to Plato’s Phaedrus, Heidegger notes that if one considers the primordial determination of 
language as singing, one would see as “a monstrous change” [einen ungeheuren Wandel] that 
“language and what is said and spoken became written, circumscribed in writing.”547  
One can see, then, that the secret history of Western thought is the history that 
springs from a particular type of distortion, the monstrous mutation according to which 
language is “unnecessarily” circumscribed, encircled in writing, in such a way that its melodic 
unity is somehow effaced. As Heidegger puts it, what is monstrous in writing, or more 
precisely in alphabetic writing, is that it implies an expatriation, and in a certain sense a 
dismemberment, of primordial modes of saying and showing. In short, writing is a departure 
from the singing voice, from the language that is itself tune, Stimmung; not from the voice 
understood as self-presence.  
In alphabetic writing words are transcribed as if they were discrete elements, 
compounds of “sounds” [Lauten] that are somehow static and isolable. That is to say, in 
writing language starts being treated as an object, as a sort of thing. Yet, Heidegger takes 
precautions and notices that writing in general is not simply opposed to the voice, for the 
essence of the voice changes with the transformations of writing. Heidegger underscores that 
the introduction of alphabetic writing transfigures the essence of the voice in such a way that 
the voice “appears” as the articulation of sounds, not as sung words; and yet, he adds, what 
is said is determined by the way it is “tuned.” In short, the idea of the voice as self-presence 
is a correlate of alphabetic writing, which presupposes a certain indifferent, “objective” tone 
546 See ibid. 
547 Ibid. My translation. “daß die Sprache und das Gesagte und Gesprochene geschrieben wird, umgeschrieben in die Schrift.”          
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–still, a tone. Let me consider, for instance, the following remarks from the transcription of
Heidegger’s notes: 
What comes to be written in writing?  
What is properly writing?  
Writing are the sounds, vocals and consonants, in which what is spoken is transcribed  
A is a letter  (the Greeks got writing from the Egyptian)  
This is not obvious; the Chinese, for instance, write what is meant, and not what sounds.548 
Reading the initial questions formulated here, for example the one that reads “What 
comes to be written in writing?,” one notices that the inscription of the question involves a 
reference to the tone, that the writing itself, the writing of the “What” in italics, pre-figures 
“how” this questions must be answered: by attending to the tone, the stress of what is 
written. Precisely, the way in which Heidegger responds to these questions, the way in which 
these questions have been transcribed,549 suggests that writing necessarily flows beyond itself, 
that it hints at the grounds on the basis of which something is said. This approach reveals a 
circle, our involvement in a certain understanding of language and writing, the fact that we 
already presuppose something about what writing is and how writing works. In this sense, 
although alphabetic writing determines the voice as sound, to the extent that “A is a letter” 
that would correspond to the phonemon “A,” Heidegger’s analysis demonstrates that when 
the “A” says something it is no longer a phonemon but a singing voice: disclosure.  
The contrast with Chinese writing shows that the monstrosity of alphabetic writing 
has to do with a certain inversion of the relation between what is “said” and what is written, 
for alphabetic writing determines what is said in terms of elementary sounds, in terms of an 
548 Ibid., 82-83; my translation. “Was wird in der Schrift geschrieben?/Was ist eigentlich Schrift?/Schrift sind Laute, 
Selbstlauter, Mitlauter, in die das Gesprochene umgeschrieben wurde/A ist ein Buchstabe (Die Griechen hatten die Schrift von 
den Ägyptern)/Das ist nicht selbstverständlich; die Chinesen z.B. schreiben das gemeinte und nicht das Lautende.  
549 It is worth noting that here we are dealing with the transcription of notes from Heidegger’s students, as they 
were taken in the course of the lectures, and not with a manuscript from Heidegger. In any case, this fact 
reinforces our argument, for the transcription reveals an element, the tone, which we have proved to be 
essential in Heidegger’s approach to language.    
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objective determination of the presence of the voice, thus concealing the musicality of 
speech. Presumably, Chinese writing is of a different nature, for it conveys what is intended 
as such, not a fragmentary determination of a sound. In this sense, Heidegger characterizes 
alphabetic writing as monstrous precisely because it conceals its monstrosity, its poetic 
grounds. For the stability of language, no matter how it is achieved, implies in each case a 
transformation of the relation to meaning, to our entire being, to being in general. Heidegger 
says precisely: “It is not indifferent, what one writes and in what mode one transposes 
[oneself] in writing and stability.”550     
In sum, one can say that the purpose of Heidegger’s reference to the silence of 
Socrates is not to oppose writing to the “living presence” of the voice, nor to identify 
metaphysics with literature and writing without further qualification, but rather to show that 
writing implies a change in our relation to being, in such a way that the very same 
inscriptions and songs that give us a ground, which set the limits of an existential space and a 
territory, open up the possibility of loss and transformation: uprootedness.  
On this view, the point that needs emphasis is that writing gives no assurance of 
stability, despite its presumed “objectivity.” Indeed, Heidegger’s reference to Chinese 
writing, and specifically the brief reference to the Greek inheritance of writing from the 
Egyptians, alludes to the essential errancy that belongs to language. And, as I have already 
indicated, the essence of language cannot be determined by a particular grammatic, even 
though language as saying is always inscribed in “determinate surroundings” [bestimmter 
Umgebung]. This means, however, that the possibility of history, and of stability and presence, 
550 Ibid., 83; my translation. “Es ist nicht gleichgültig, was man schreibt, und wie man in die Schrift und in die Beständigkeit 
umsetzt.”  
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depends on a logos that is more ancient than alphabetic writing, a logos inscribed in our 
singing voices and attuned gestures.  
To conclude this section, let me refer to Heidegger’s meditation on language in “The 
Essence of Language.” Throughout this lecture Heidegger recalls Hölderlin’s verses about 
words as flowers of the mouth, and he relates this to the “modes of the mouth,” the dialects 
of different regions or Mundarten.551 The comparison between words and flowers elicits both 
the belonging to the earth and the departure or separation from it. Following on from 
Heidegger’s reading of this point, one could say that language involves a liberation from the 
earth, a de-parture from the roots, as well as a relatedness to what withdraws during this 
departure, communication at distance and in silence. For the flower never fully abandons the 
earth, although being suspended in the air. One could say, then, that the blossoming of 
words, which is already a departure from the earth, preserves this tension: the word is 
uprooted because it speaks from outside of the roots, and because it is already out of the 
ground. 
Gesture, Silence 
Based on these reflections on writing, let me assess the significance of Heidegger’s 
reflection on the silence of gesture, specifically of silence as gesture. Indeed, what is remarkable 
in hand’s gestures is that they speak without speaking, without sounds, and without 
grammatic. Along these lines, one might say that gestures reveal the essentiality of language. 
For gestures illustrate as no other phenomenon does the pervasive dimensionality of 
language: they give us speech even in the absence of movement. Being-there, still, is also a 
form of gesturing –even a corpse may preserve a gesture and say something.  
551 On the Way to Language, 193-97/97-101. 
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In What is Called Thinking?, before he states that we think insofar as we speak, and 
not the other way around, Heidegger says: “But the hand’s gestures run everywhere through 
language, in their most perfect purity precisely when man speaks by being silent.”552 Along 
these lines, one can say that Socrates’ refusal to write, the “purity” of his thought, the gesture 
of not-writing, is as meaningful as what he said in his dialogues. Moreover, if one is to 
understand what Socrates said, it is because one already understands the meaning of his 
silence. In a sense, Socrates’ silence reaches us beneath and beyond writing.  
One could say, indeed, that the gesture of silence is an originary mode of saying, for  
its resists grammatical frames, it is irreducible to writing. Perhaps, even the primordial saying 
of songs presupposes gestures, for gestures embody an immemorial poetic that may resonate 
in dance or theater, but whose origins coincide with the mysterious origin of the lived body. 
Let me explore this argument in line with some of Heidegger’s reference to the No-play. 
In “A Dialogue on Language,”553 from 1953-54, Heidegger takes up the problem of 
gesture, in a way that corroborates the originality of gesture in contrast to technical means of 
expression, and reveals the essential correspondence between gesture and language. In this 
dialogue, Heidegger deals with the question of aesthetics and hermeneutics, and problems 
related to the nature of art and poetry. He also discusses the differences between the 
Western, metaphysical sensibility, and the Japanese approach to art and the beautiful. In this 
context, gesture appears as a mode of saying or showing that challenges metaphysical modes 
of expression and conceptualization. 
In the dialogue, Heidegger recalls count Kuki’s words, and notes that in Japanese 
there is a word, “Iki,” that denotes something similar to the “aesthetic” experience. 
552 What is Called Thinking, 19/16. “Aber die Gebärden der Hand gehen überall durch die Sprache hindurch und zwar gerade 
dann am reinsten, wenn der Mensch spricht, indem er schweigt.”  
553 This dialogue is included in the volume On the Way to Language.Title: “Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache.”  
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Specifically, this word names the “sensible appearance, whose vivid rapture makes the 
suprasensible shine through.”554 Although this explanation of sensible beauty seems to 
perpetuate the metaphysical distinction between the sensible and the intelligible, the Japanese 
interlocutor dispels this association. He makes clear that, what in Iki is “sensible,” the Iro, 
color, is something more than what can be perceived through the senses. And the emptiness 
or nothingness that “shines trhough” the sensible, the Ku, is something different than what is 
“only-suprasensible”[Nur-Übersinnliche].555 These indications demonstrate the fundamental 
differences between Japanese and the Western language of metaphysics, and imply that there 
exists an imminent “danger” in translation: the danger of homogenization, the danger of 
losing sight of what is unique in each mode of being and language, and the danger of 
supressing that which shall remain unsaid. 
Looking for common references, which may facilitate a proper translation or 
communication from language to language, from house to house, Heidegger refers, through 
the voice of the Inquirer, to Kurosawa’s film Rashomon. He indicates that this film captures 
“subdued gestures” [verhaltene Gebärden] that cannot be inscribed within the domain of 
Western aesthetics.  
The Japanese considers that Kurosawa’s film may be “too realistic,” too imbeded in 
the objectifying view of photography –precisely because it is, indeed, a film. But he also 
acknowledges that the movie preserves a type of gesture of the hand, a mode of touching, 
that can hardly be called a gesture, for it is infinitely remote from any touch: “For this hand 
554 Ibid., 96/14; modified. “...sinnlichen Scheinen, durch dessen lebhaftes Entzücken Übersinnliches hindurchscheint.” 
555 Ibid., 97/15.  
 222 
is suffused and borne by a call calling from afar and calling still farther onward, because 
stillness has brought it.”556 
What is remarkable in this peculiar touch of the hand, which may be inconspicuous 
for any Western spectator, is that it somehow passes through the cribs of cinema and 
photography, it is not totally neutralized by them. This fact demonstrates the pervasiveness 
of the language of gestures as something that underlies the objective view of cinema. For the 
film speaks of this subtle Japanese gesture, despite its own objective codes and frames.557 
This means that cinema preserves a poetic dimension that concerns hints and indications, 
rather than direct objective representation of things.  
Indeed, despite the untranslatability of the Japanese gestures, something of their 
uniqueness speaks through the alien sphere of cinema, and reaches the eyes of the foreign 
inquirer. Therefore, one could say that the gestures endure in the movie as subtle traces or 
indications of an absense. In this sense, the reference to the film Rashomon may not be 
incidental. For this movie unfolds the multiple, irreconciliable perspectives surrounding a 
crime, an event that is essentially absent, which does not take place in the film. It is likely that 
Heidegger had this in mind, as he refers to this movie approvingly.  
Thus we see, despite its objective and rigid frames, that the film manages to let 
something unsaid shine through, which is precisely the condition of possibility for a true 
dialogue, and a genuine interpretation or translation. In line with this, one can say that the 
                                                
556 Ibid., 99/16. “Denn diese Hand ist von einem weither und noch weiterhin rufenden Anruf durchtragen, weil aus der Stille 
zugetragen.” 
557 In this sense, without making it explicit, and probably beyond the scope of what Heidegger foresees in his 
dialogical meditation, the dialogue with the Japanese comes close to Walter Benjamin’s observation, according 
to which photography and cinema reveal an “optical unconscious,” which has to do with the camera’s capacity 
to record nuances of gestures and affective dimensions of things that escape any explicit focus. This is to say 
that despite its mechanical character, photography and cinema preserve still a poetic dimension, a position 
clearly in tune with Heidegger’s analysis of technique.  
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possibility of hermeneutics, the possibility of genuine translation and communication, hinges 
on that which is left in suspense, but is still indicated in silence, through gestures. And this is 
precisely what the Dialogue itself, the dialogue between the Inquirer and the Japanese, 
indicates. One can see this in a close analysis of the dialogue.  
The Japanese interlocutor establishes a contrast between the language of cinema and 
the nature of the No-play. He underscores that the No-play takes place on an empty stage. 
Heidegger points out that “this emptiness demands uncommon concentration,”558 and the 
Japanese interlocutor responds that “thanks to that concentration, only a slight additional 
gesture on the actor’s part is required to cause mighty things to appear out of a strange 
stillness.”559 Following on from this, and to demonstrate how a minimal movement of the 
hand may make appear something great, the Japanese character himself performs a gesture. 
We, as readers, do not see this gesture, but Heidegger describes it to us.  We do not 
“see” the gesture that Heidegger describes. And, strictly speaking, neither does Heidegger see 
what the Japanese interlocutor shows. Still, Heidegger’s description says something about 
this gesture, it outlines some traces of what it is. We come to know, for instance, that the 
Japanese’s gesture brings to presence a mountain landscape that, in fact, is also absent or 
invisible on the original stage of the No-play. This sense of incompletion or emptiness, 
which is intensified by reducing what is visible to its minimum, is the most fundamental trait 
of this gestural showing. The Japanese inerlocutor says, indeed: “With it all, the gesture 
subsists less in the visible movement of the hand, nor primarily in the stance of the body. 
558 Ibid., 101/18. “Diese Leere verlangt eine ungewöhnliche Sammlung.” 
559 Ibid. “Dank ihrer bedarf es dann nur noch einer geringen Gebärde des Schauspielers, um Gewaltiges aus einer seltsamen Ruhe 
erscheinen zu lassen.” 
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The essence of what your language calls ‘gesture’ is hard to say.”560 Thus, the question 
becomes, how do we characterize this event, the type of saying the hands perform in silence. 
In short: Where is the gesture? 
The core of the problematic of gesture is laid down here. It is hard to say what a 
gesture is because, despite its being “corporeal,” it is also essentially invisible, inconspicuous, 
pervaded by invisibility, by nothingness. However, the term “gesture” itself hints at the 
fundamental traits of this experience. “And yet” says the Inquirer, “the word ‘gesture’ helps 
us experience truly what is here to be said”561  
Heidegger suggests, then, that in order to understand what is at stake in the gestures 
of the No-play, as well as in the peculiar touch of the hand that transpires in Rashomon, it is 
necessay to follow what the word itself indicates about this experience, what language says 
about itself. This means, in a sense, that word and gesture are imbricated, that they carry 
each other. Indeed, the Inquirer remarks, that “gesture is the gathering of a bearing.”562 And 
this is a reference to the etymology of the word. As I have often indicated, the German word 
for gesture, Gebärde, includes the prefix “Ge-,” which contains a sense of collecting or 
gathering –and, let me note in passing, the reference to this prefix is a leitmotif in 
Heidegger’s later works. This verb also contains a reference to the Mittelhochdeutsche verb 
“bern”,563 which alludes to the action of carrying, enduring or bringing forth something, 
namely, “Tragen.” These etymological references elucidate the idea that word and gesture 
come together. For understanding the word is to understand what the word does and, 
560 Ibid. “Dabei beruht die Gebäarde weniger in der sichtbaren Bewegung der Hand, nicht zuerst in der Körperhaltung. Das 
Eigentliche dessen, was in Ihrer Sprache »Gebärde« heißt, läßt sich schwer sagen.”  
561 Ibid., 101/18. “Und doch ist dieses Wort vielleicht eine Hilfe, das zu-Sagende wharhaft zu erfahren.”  
562 Ibid., “Gebärde ist Versammlung eines Tragens.” 
563 See Patrick Baur for further references to the semantic field of this term (Phanomennologie der Gebärden, 268). 
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conversely, that the words do what they say: the word “gesture” carries its own sense. And 
this movement happens in silence, inconspicuously.    
Continuing on from the reading of the Dialogue, one could say that the gesture is the 
gathering of a bearing, a bearing that we do not perform but which “first bears itself toward 
us,”564 just as it happens in language. This is to say that the gesture is the gift of a bearing, the 
gift we receive by bearing or carrying it in turn, “the gathering which originarily unites within 
itself what we bear to it and what it bears to us.”565 Thus, the gathering is not collection or 
composition after the fact, and the bearing itself is not a visible action. Rather, the gathering 
and the bearing come as openness to something, just as happens when the Japanese 
character makes the mountain landscape appear: “In a beholding that is itself invisible, and 
that, so gathered, bears itself to encounter emptiness in such a way that in and through it a 
mountain appear.”566  
In this regard, Heidegger’s approach to gesture implies a reference to the 
nothingness of being, the fundamental openness within which things appear and make 
themselves visible: “That emptiness then is the same as nothingness, that essential being 
which we attempt to add in our thinking, as the other, to all that is present and absent.”567  
As Heidegger expresses it, gesture is originary, primitive, wild language. It is a 
language that has not been said and cannot be said explicitly, which remains always in the 
564 Ibid., “...uns sich erst zu-trägt.”  
565 Ibid., 102/19. “die in sich ursprünglich einige Versammlung von Entgegentragen und Zutrag.”  
566 Ibid. “In einem selbst unsichtbaren Schauen, das sich so gesammelt der Leere entgegenträgt, daß in ihr und durch sie das 
Gebirge erscheint.”  
567 Ibid. “Die Leere ist dann dasselbe wie das Nichts, jenes Wesende nämlich, das wir als das Andere zu allem An- und Ab-
wesenden zu denken versuchen.” 
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background of affectivity, yet as a background that is essentially withdrawn, which 
relentlessly recedes from objectivity. In this sense, gestures remain essentially open. One 
might say that the gathering of gesture runs counter to the gathering of Ge-Stell, to the 
gathering of “positionality.” Resisting the positionality of Ge-Stell, gestures preserve the 
possibility of a vicarious encounter with what is essentially other and can only be announced 
indirectly.   
Chapter Seven: Primordial Language and Gesture in Merleau-Ponty 
Being, Saying and the Body: Preliminary Remarks on Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and 
Language 
The word “body” is a word whose meaning remains elusive, obscure, for there can 
be no distance from this “object:” we dwell in our bodies as we dwell in being, and the flesh 
of the body is the same flesh of the world. Yet, meaning pervades my body: my body speaks, 
names things, and sketches out in perception the beings of nature and the world. In a sense, 
the body gives a horizon of meaning. Or, to be more precise: in the body there is meaning. 
Merleau-Ponty’s exploration of the flesh reveals a fundamental paradox, for what 
appears to be the most concrete, sensible being, is pervaded by invisibility, by the 
inextricable no-thingness of meaning –not absolute nothingness but rather an evanescent 
nothingness, an atmospheric presence of the past. In this way, following Husserl’s path 
toward the bloße Sache, Merleau-Ponty ends up on the path of the Heideggerian “logos,” 
exploring an essential saying that is itself withdrawal, silence. Along this path, language is 
discovered as primordial logos of being. As Heidegger puts it, language, the essential word, 
just like being is not a “being,” but gives.568  
Interpreting this Heideggerian motif of the “gift” of language, Merleau-Ponty 
emphasizes in one of his later lecture-notes the importance of using the French “il y a” to 
translate the German “es gibt.” As Merleau-Ponty sees it, the crucial point in Heidegger’s 
expression is that “there is” being: we dwell in a plane, a region of being. Thus, “es gibt Sein” 
568 See Letter on Humanism, 334/238; On the Way to Language, 182-83/88. 
228 
does not mean that being gives something in particular, but rather that being is already 
presupposed, pre-given, in our dealings with things and our dwelling in the world.569   
With regard to the primordiality of language, in the “Letter on Humanism” 
Heidegger points out that language is “the house of being.”570 This expression indicates that 
we dwell in language; that language that precedes us and “has” us.571 This Heideggerian 
insight had decisive influence on Merleau-Ponty’s later works. One can see traces of this 
influence in the later lecture-notes, course summaries, unedited texts, and, less explicitly, in 
texts published during his life.572 For this reason, in the present chapter I will articulate 
Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of Heideggerian motifs on language and gesture by reading 
his main works in light of the hints found in these fragmentary lecture-notes and summaries.  
It seems to me that the most solid standpoint for undertaking this task is Merleau-
Ponty’s own interpretation of Heidegger’s turn. In the course summary of one of his lectures 
at the Collège de France from 1958, entitled “Possibilité de la philosophie,”573 Merleau-Ponty 
examines Heidegger’s approach to the relation between language and being, and he shows 
that, after Being and Time, Heidegger resets the question concerning the meaning of being, 
without dismissing it. As Merleau-Ponty explains, after Being and Time the cardinal question 
concerning the meaning of being is no longer determined as a centrifugal movement that 
goes from Dasein to being, “transcendance,”574 but rather as a step back to the original 
569 See Notes de cours, 113-14. 
570 Letter on Humanism, 313/115. 
571  See, for instance, Zollikon Seminars, 226/181, or On the Way to Language, 85/5.  
572  See, Notes de cours, 124-127, Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 59-63/48-52. For a similar formulation 
anteceding these direct references, see also The Prose of the World, 156/110.  
573 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Résumés de cours. Collège de France; 1952-1960 (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), 141-56. 
Translated into English as “Philosophy as Interrogation,” in: In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, trans. John 
Wild, James Edie and John O'Neill (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1988), 167-180. 
574 Notes de cours, 97. 
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disclosure of being, to Dasein as openness to being.575 Consequently, Merleau-Ponty remarks 
that Heidegger determines the point of departure for thinking the question of being as a 
“there exists” (“il y a”) that is disclosure at work.576 In this way, one may say that Heidegger’s 
turn towards the thinking of being does not involve the abandonment of the fundamental 
question from Being and Time, for Heidegger’s thinking preserves the same orientation 
towards being,577 but rather develops a more adequate formulation of the problematic of 
time,578 and a decisive refutation of “the anthropological misunderstanding” [l’equivoce 
anthropologist].579  
Thus, Merleau-Ponty remarks, after Being and Time Heidegger’s work is focused on 
the question of the truth of being, and explores the pre-objective “there” that grounds our 
understanding of the being of things. Explaining this point, Merleau-Ponty recalls 
Heidegger’s analysis of Silesius’ verse “the rose is without why” in The Principle of Reason. In 
line with Heidegger’s reading of this verse, Merleau-Ponty underscores that the rose does not 
have a cause out of itself and, in this sense, it is without foundation, a pure presencing: active 
being-there. As Merleau-Ponty explains, there exists in the simple presence of the rose an 
“act” of being  (“ester”), and this being reveals an enigmatic intertwining of being and 
language.580  
575 See ibid., 98. 
576 See In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, 90/177-78. See also Notes de cours, 95. 
577 In his Notes de cours, Merleau-Ponty says more emphatically that the “idea” is the same, just that now it is 
explained better (98).  
578 See In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, 90/178. 
579 Notes de cours, 95. What Merleau-Ponty calls the “anthropological misunderstanding” is the idea that the 
question of being may be subordinated to the question of Dasein, an idea Heidegger did not posit, but, as 
Merleau-Ponty explains, it is somehow implied in Being and Time.   
580 On the active sense of being, and its intertwining with language, see Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 
59/48. Regarding Merleau-Ponty’s use of the term “ester,” Lawlor explains: “The term ‘ester,’ it seems, is a 
neologism manufactured on the basis of the Latin stare, which is the infinitive ‘to be,’ in the active sense of 
realization. It would be used to denote the being of a contingent, spatiotemporal property such as tiredness” 
(English: 86, n.127).   
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Along these lines, one could say that Silesius’ verse depicts the rose as animated by 
the nascent logos of being: the simple presence of the rose “is,” the rose enacts the “is.” 
With regard to this, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the radiance of the presence of the rose 
cannot be separated from the word “being,” “is.” Put differently, the recognition of the rose 
as rose presupposes an understanding of what “being” means. One might say that the word 
“being” carries the being of the thing; the thing grows out of the space opened up by that 
word. Merleau-Ponty expresses this idea as follows: “The word to be is not a sign to which 
we could find a corresponding ‘representation’ or object: its meaning is not distinct from its 
operation, which is to make Being speak in us rather than us speak of Being.”581  
The aforementioned analysis reveals central aspects of Heidegger’s approach to 
language that are integrated in Merleau-Ponty’s work. First, the idea that language is without 
ground, unfounded, Abgrund: we dwell in language, language speaks itself, and there is 
“nothing” behind language.582 Second, as Merleau-Ponty suggests in his concluding remarks 
about Silesius’ verse, the intertwining of thing and word, and silence. For the thing is 
language in silence, a showing and saying in silence: what the rose “says” remains a secret. 
Thus, what characterizes this turn towards an ontological approach to language is the 
repositioning of language as original logos, as logos of the world, as the “house,” i.e., the 
abyssal ground of being.  
Language is original or primordial event of disclosure, the event that opens up a 
clearing, a horizon of possibilities. The rose shows and says itself in the openness of 
language. In this sense, there is a fundamental affinity between the rose and the body, for the 
581 In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, 90/179.“…le mot d’être n’est pas comme les autres un signe auquel on puisse faire 
corresponder une “representation” ou un objet: son sens n’est pas distinct de son operation; par lui c’est l’Être qui parle en nous 
plutôt que nous ne parlons de l’Être.” 
582 See Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 60/49. 
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body is –it is the presence of a being –, just as the rose. And yet, the body that is my body is 
not exactly like the rose because the rose remains in the ground, whereas my body is 
openness to the world. One could say that the rose rests in language, the being of the rose 
simply presupposes language, whereas we, as embodied beings depart from language: we are 
related to language as language –and, thereby, to the thing as thing. And this is precisely what 
the phenomenon of gesture manifests: the dynamic intertwining of the lived body and 
language.  
Accordingly, I shall demonstrate that gesture is a pivotal element in Merleau-Ponty’s 
philosophy of language. For, in Merleau-Ponty’s work, the phenomenon of gesture reveals 
the sensible dimension of language and, at the same time, reveals the body as the original 
source of signification. This means that, similarly to what happens in Heidegger’s work, 
gestures are themselves unique articulations of meanings: they are not expressions in a 
traditional sense, for they do not express pre-established meanings, they are not conventional 
means of communication. Having said this let me begin this investigation by analyzing 
Merleau-Ponty’s idea of expression.   
The Problem of Expression and Consciousness in the Phenomenology o f  Percept ion 
To some extent, Merleau-Ponty’s reading of Heidegger’s philosophical turn towards 
a thinking of being mirrors his own philosophical itinerary. Heidegger departs from a 
thinking centered in the being of Dasein, and moves towards a thinking of the truth of 
being. Similarly, in his philosophical trajectory Merleau-Ponty moves from the body as 
incarnated consciousness to the being of the world, the ontology of the flesh. As was 
indicated above, the intersection of these ontological paths passes through the recognition of 
the ontological primordiality of language. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty’s ontological “turn” 
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involves a reformulation of the relationship between consciousness and language, as it is 
determined in the Phenomenology of Perception.   
In the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty argues that perception is grounded in 
pre-predicative consciousness, which constitutes the body schema, the system of 
equivalences that makes possible my communication with the world. In this context, 
language seems to depend upon the originary consciousness of the body. This position 
implies that language is a derivative phenomenon, just as Leonard Lawlor indicates.583 
Perhaps, the most explicit formulation of this approach to language is found in the following 
passage from the preface to the Phenomenology of Perception: “Separated essences are the 
essences of language. It is the very function of language to make essences exist in a 
separation that is merely apparent, since through language they still rely upon pre-predicative 
life of consciousness.”584  
Merleau-Ponty suggests that the work of language hinges on the operations of 
originary consciousness, which somehow articulates our experience of the world before it 
comes to be expressed through words. He shows, accordingly, that the “function” of 
language is to make essences appear as independent from the operations of consciousness, 
that is, to create ideal meanings. Hence, language is taken as the medium that produces 
secondary, derivative, essences or meanings. Yet, it is important to notice that Merleau-
583 Leonard Lawlor explains that there is a rupture in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy, which goes from a derivative 
view of language to an ontology of language, in which language is originary, in his article “Essence and 
Language: The Rupture in Merleau-Ponty's Philosophy,” Studia Phaenomenologica III, no. 3-4 (2003): 155-62. As 
Lawlor explains, in the Phenomenology of Perception language is derived from originary consciousness.  
584 Phenomenology of Perception, x/xxix. “Les essences séparées sont celles du langage. C’est la fonction du langage de faire exister 
les essences dans une séparation qui, à vrai dire, n’est qu’apparente, puisque par lui elles reposent encore sur la vie anteprédicative 
de la conscience.”  In his article “Essence and Language,” Leonard Lawlor uses this passage to support his thesis 
that in the Phenomenology of Perception language is derived from originary consciousness, for he remarks that 
language makes essence exist separately. Still, it is important to emphasize, as I do in this section that Merleau-
Ponty underscores that the separation of linguistic essences is only apparent, not real, and for this reason one 
could say that language is ultimately imbricated in originary consciousness.  
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Ponty’s formulation is ambiguous, for he underscores that the function of language is 
“merely apparent,” that is, the operations of language, what language produces, cannot be 
truly separated from the life of consciousness. I take this to mean that the work of language 
is necessarily imbricated in the operations of consciousness, but I will explain this point later. 
For now, let me examine in detail Merleau-Ponty’s approach to the problem of expression.  
Merleau-Ponty explicitly describes the movement of expression that goes from pre-
predicative consciousness to signification as follows: “But our body is not merely one 
expressive space among all others, for that would be merely the constituted body. Our body, 
rather, is the origin of all the others, it is the very movement of expression, it projects 
significations on the outside by giving them a place and sees to it that they begin to exist as 
things, beneath our hands and before our eyes.”585  
The lived body, and not language, is the original source of expression, the one that 
“projects” itself in what would be the “second level” of significations, which in turn can 
appear as separate essences, as “things.” What is controversial is that the body seems to 
work as a positing consciousness whose “movement of expression” is centrifugal: it goes 
from consciousness to things. As Merleau-Ponty explains, this movement of expression is 
said to project significations on the “outside” in such a way that the body is implicitly taken 
as an “inside,” that is, a sort of subjective center that gives existence to words and things. 
Moreover, in this centrifugal movement, the outside appears opposed to the body, as object 
of perception. Hence, Merleau-Ponty’s position approaches the idealism he insistently 
refutes, for the body works as an original consciousness that “structures” the world. If one 
continues in this direction it is difficult not to see the lived body as an instance of a 
                                                
585 Ibid., 171/147. “Mais notre corps n’est pas seulement un space expressive parmi tous les autres. Ce n’est là que le corps 
constitué. Il est l’origine de tous les autres, le mouvement même de expression, ce qui projette au dehors les significations en leur 
donnant un lieu, ce qui fait qu’elles se mettent à exister comme des choses, sous nos mains, sous nos yeux.” 
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transcendental constituting consciousness, an implication that undermines the spirit of the 
Phenomenology of Perception, and which explains in part Merleau-Ponty’s self-critical remark in 
The Visible and the Invisible.  
Having said this, I shall formulate the main challenge in Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology of language by means of a question: how can we understand the motor 
intentionality of the body, and Merleau-Ponty’s reference to the originary consciousness of 
the body, without endorsing a sort of idealism? Indeed, Merleau-Ponty is aware of how 
difficult it is to dispel idealism once he defines the body as originary consciousness. With 
regard to this, he remarks that there is a paradox intrinsic to the phenomenon of  “being in 
the world.” He says: “I throw my perceptual intentions and my practical intentions against 
objects that appear to me, in the end, as anterior and exterior to these intentions, and which 
nevertheless exist for me only insofar as they arouse thoughts or desires in me.”586 Thus, 
intentionality implies the reference to transcendent objects, and yet they are recognized as 
such only from the point of view of consciousness, in the sphere of intentional acts. Yet, if 
consciousness is embodied, and if my body is openness to the world,  Merleau-Ponty must 
recognize that there is a movement that comes from objects to consciousness, in such a way 
that they awaken thoughts in me, as if they already contained the potentiality of meaning. 
Exploring this point, some paragraphs after distinguishing between the primary movement 
of expression of the body and the secondary significations of language, Merleau-Ponty 
concludes: “The experience of the body leads us to recognize an imposition of sense that 
                                                
586 Ibid., 97/84. “…en me portant vers un monde, j’écrase mes intentions perceptives et mes intentions pratiques en des objets qui 
m’apparaissent comme antérieurs et extérieurs à elles, et qui cependant n’existent pour moi qu’en tant qu’ils suscitent en moi des 
pensées et des volontés.” 
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does not come from a universal constituting consciousness, a sense that adheres to certain 
contents.”587  
Thus, although the body is supposed to initiate the movement of expression, 
projecting significations on the outside, Merleau-Ponty remarks that there is a fundamental, 
grounding “sense” imposed on my body: there is a meaning or sense that constitutes the 
body as the “knotting together of essence and existence,”588 and which cannot be separated 
from our existential relations to things.  
At this point, one should distinguish between two levels of signification. On the one 
hand, there is the level that corresponds to linguistic meanings, which are derivative. On the 
other hand, there is the most fundamental level of existential signification, which is pre-
predicative or, in a sense, “pre-linguistic.” And it is this existential background of 
signification that constitutes the body as originary consciousness. Accordingly, one could say 
that the originary consciousness of the body is a “pre-conscious” articulation of sense, a 
sense that is lived, adherent to the things perceived. Linguistic expressions, on the contrary, 
have a meaning borrowed from things or experiences. This meaning is sedimented: it 
appears fixed, as a thing.  
Still, if the body is a ground of existential significations, the question remains as to 
what qualifies the lived body as body, and how it is that an existential background of 
meaning is constituted in the body.  
One may sketch out a response to these questions on the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s 
approach to the body as a sexed being. In this context, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the body 
                                                
587 Ibid., 172/48. “La expérience du corps nous fait reconnaître une imposition de sens qui n’est pas celle d’une conscience 
constituante universelle, un sens qui est adhérent à certains contenus.” 
588 Ibid. 
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is first given as a libidinal body and thereby, a matrix of symbolic equivalences of the 
world.589 He introduces this point as follows: 
Indeed, the natural world is given as existing in itself beyond its existence for me, the act of 
transcendence by which the subject opens to the natural world carries itself along and we 
find ourselves in the presence of a nature that has no need of being perceived in order to 
exist. Thus, if we wish to reveal the genesis of being for us, then we must ultimately consider 
the sector of our experience that clearly has sense and reality only for us, namely, our 
affective milieu. Let us attempt to see how an object or a being begins to exist for us through 
desire or love, and we will thereby understand more clearly how objects and being can exist 
in general.590  
What is remarkable in this passage is the portrayal of affectivity as an ontological 
ground, as the ground on the basis of which things come to exist for us. Specifically, 
Merleau-Ponty remarks that in order to understand how beings or objects are constituted in 
general, first we must look at the way things are constituted as objects of desire or love. In 
this regard, he suggests that we are initially related to the world through affective bonds. 
Thus, one may say that the lived body is itself an “affective milieu,” the power of expression 
and desire that ties us to the world.   
As I have already argued, in the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty relates the 
concept of form or Gestalt to the concept of “body schema,” and suggests that the lived 
body must be understood as directionality, intentionality, and expression, that is, as openness 
to the world. Therefore, although Merleau-Ponty often depicts the body using the “language 
589 As Emmanuel de Saint Aubert points out, Merleau-Ponty’s concept of “body schema” implies from the 
beginning an understanding of the body in terms of libidinal intercorporeality, but this position will be 
expressly articulated only after the Phenomenology of Perception. See Emmanuel de Saint Aubert, Être et chair, 
Chapter 2. 
590 Phenomenology of Perception, 180/156. “En effet, le monde naturel se donne comme existant en soi au delà de son existence 
pour moi, l’acte de transcendence par lequel le sujet s’ouvre à lui s’emporte lui-même et nous nous trouvons en présence d’une nature 
qui n’a pas besoin d’être perçue pour exister. Si donc nous voulons mettre en évidence la genèse de l’être pour nous, il faut considérer 
pour finir le secteur de notre expérience qui visiblement n’a de sens et de réalité que pour nous, c’est-à-dire notre milieu affectif. 
Cherchons à voir comment un objet ou un être se met à exister pour nous par le désir ou par l’amour et nous comprendrons mieux 
par là comment des objets et des êtres peuvent exister en général.” 
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of consciousness,” what the body expresses or signifies is founded on our bodily experience, 
not on the sphere of consciousness or on the spirit. With regard to this, Merleau-Ponty says: 
Thus, when we say that bodily or carnal life and the psyche are in  a reciprocal relation of 
expression, or that the bodily event always has a psychical signification, these formulas need to 
be explained. Valid as they are for the exclusion of causal thought, nevertheless they do not 
mean that the body is the transparent envelope of Spirit [l’Sprit]. To return to existence as if 
to the milieu in which the communicaton between the body and the mind  [l’esprit] are 
comprehended is not to return to Consciousness or Spirit, and existential psychoanalysis 
must not serve as a pretext for a restoration of spiritualism. We will understand this better by 
clarifying the notions of “expression” and “signification” –which belong to the world of 
language and constituted thought –that we have just applied uncritically to the relations 
between the body and the psyche and whose correction must be learned through our bodily 
experience.591 
It is clear, then, that the use of “spiritualist” terms is strategic. It functions as an 
alternative to mechanistic interpretations of the body. Along these lines, one might say that 
the spiritualist language, the language of consciousness, serves to gain access to the affective 
dimensionality of the body as something that may not be reduced either to causal 
connections or to merely psychical states,592 but this problem is still in need of more precise 
formulations.  
Up to this point, one could say that the body is a cluster of affective and dynamic 
significations. Or, in Merleau-Ponty’s words, “a totality of lived significations that moves 
towards its equilibrium.”593 One should note, however, that although Merleau-Ponty 
describes the body as a tendency to equilibrium, the body remains open as an unstable unity, 
traversed by multiple conflictive tensions. That is to say, the body is essentially decentered, it 
591 Ibid., 186-87/162. “Quand nous disons que la vie corporelle ou charnelle et le psychisme sont dans un rapport d’expression 
réciproque ou que l’événement corporel a toujours une signification psychiche, ces formules ont donc besoin d’explication. Valables 
pour exclure la pensée causale, elles ne veulent pas dire que le corps soit l’enveloppe transparente de l’Esprit. Revenir a l’existence 
comme au milieu dans lequel se comprend la communication du corps et de l’sprit, ce n’est pas revenir à la Conscience ou à l’Esprit, 
la psychanalyse existentielle ne doit pas servir de prétexte à une restauration du spiritualism. Nous le comprendrons mieux en 
précisant les notions d’«expression» et de «signification» qu’apartiennent au monde du langage et de la pensée constitué, que nous 
venons d’apliquer sans critique et que l’expérience du corps doit au contraire nous apprendre à rectifier.” 
592 For arguments complementing this point, see Saint Aubert, Être et chair, 124.  
593 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 211/187. “c’est un ensemble de significations vécues qui va vers son 
equilibrium.” 
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is not the core of a substantive self. Rather, it is somewhat anonymous, a modulation of the 
generality of sensible being.594  
As Merleau-Ponty discusses the phenomenon of repression in relation to the 
“phantom limb,” he recalls that the body is fundamentally ambiguous: the body belongs to 
me and to the world. In a sense, one could say that the body is an anonymous existence 
traversed by forces that pertain to the world itself. Merleau-Ponty says precisely: “What 
allows us to center our existence is also what prevents us from centering it completely, and 
the anonymity of our body is inseparably both freedom and servitude.”595 
The body is, at the same time, freedom and servitude because its freedom, its 
spontaneity, condenses a history that exceeds one’s personal history, a history that is 
entwined into nature. The habits that constitute the identity of the body, its particular unity 
and style, take shape in the milieu of a general corporality. And, for this reason, these habits 
contain references to more general patterns or types of behavior. In this sense, the openness 
of the body is both the possibility of spontaneity and transformation and the possibility of 
homogeneity and mechanical repetition –these mechanical tendencies of the body are 
paradigmatically illustrated by the phenomenon of the phantom limb. Merleau-Ponty 
elaborates on this point by examining the way our thoughts, the significations we project, 
have the tendency to sedimentation. He suggests that thoughts and meanings are integrated 
in the world of perception in such a way that they constitute a second “world of thoughts.” I 
will now move on and examine this point.   
                                                
594 On the concept of generality, and its relation to Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of the concept of “body 
schema,” see Saint Aubert, Être et chair, Ch. 1.  
595 Phenomenology of Perception, 101/87. “Ce qui nous permet de centrer notre existence est aussi ce qui nous empêche de la 
centrer absolument et l’anonymat de notre corps est inséparablement liberté et servitude.” 
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Merleau-Ponty does not conflate the “world of thoughts” with the “first world” of 
perception. Rather, he tries to keep them separate. But, the question is: in what sense is the 
world of thoughts separated from the world of perception? Presumably, this separation 
occurs when the “world of thoughts” is sedimented, in such a way that its contents and 
operations may appear as fixed objects. And this happens because the operations of 
consciousness are shaped through memory, imitation, and habit, just as bodily functions. In 
this regard, Merleau-Ponty says: 
To the extent that consciousness is only consciousness of something by allowing its wake to 
trail behind itself, and to the extent that, to think an object, consciousness must rely upon a 
previously constructed “world of thought,” there is always a depersonalization at the heart of 
consciousness. From this appears the principle of a foreign intervention: consciousness can 
be ill, the world of its thought can fall to pieces; or rather, since the “contents” dissociated 
by the illness did not figure in normal consciousness as parts and only served as the supports 
for significations that transcended them, consciousness can be seen attempting to maintain 
its superstructures even though their foundation has collapsed. It mimics its customary 
operations, but without the power of obtaining their intuitive realization and without the 
power of hiding the strange deficiency that steal, from them, their full sense.596  
Analyzing Schneider’s pathology, Merleau-Ponty learns that consciousness may be 
alienated, it may fall out of its original living flux to remain fixed in its own world and 
operations. Alienated consciousness would not be consciousness in movement, openness to 
the world, but rather mechanism. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty describes the illness of 
consciousness as a redoubling of consciousness in which consciousness becomes foreign to 
itself: the “contents” of thought are dissociated from their original source and become pure 
mimicry. The superestructure of thought may collapse because, in its ideal or abstract flights, 
596 Phenomenology of Perception, 159-60/138-39. “Dans la mesure où la conscience n’est conscience de quelque chose qu’en 
laissant traîner derrière elle son sillage, et où, pour penser un objet, il faut s’appuyer sur un «monde de pensée» précédement 
construit, il y a toujours une dépersonalisation au coeur de la conscience; par là est donné le principe d’une intervention étrangère: la 
conscience peut être malade, le monde de ses pensées peut s’effondrer par fragments, -ou plutôt, comme les «contenus» dissociés par la 
maladie ne figuraient pas dans la conscience normale à titre de parties et ne servaient que d’appuis à des significations qui les 
dépassent, on voit la conscience essayer de maintenir ses superestructures alors aue leur fondement s’est effondré, elle mime ses 
opérations coutumières, mais sans puvoir en obtenir la réalisation intuitive et sans pouvoir masquer le déficit que les prive de leur 
sens plein.” 
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it becomes an innert system, uprooted from its existential foundations, i.e., its bodily 
anchorage in perception.  
In this way, Merleau-Ponty “repeats” at a different level an analysis that was initially 
related to the body, and which revealed the body as a power of expression that is anonymous 
and contains the possibility of alienation. This analysis shows that lived body and 
consciousness mirror each other, they operate in similar ways, they are two sides of the same 
intentional schemas. For the lived body is primordial consciousness: intentionality and 
expression. Consciousness is essentially embodied and takes up the habits and tendencies of 
the body, which is why consciousness can be ill and collapse into fragments, just as the body 
can. This means that consciousness is entanglement in the world, is exposure to the world. 
As Merleau-Ponty explains, consciousness has a body and, thereby, it extends upon the 
sensible generality of the world: “Consciousness projects itself into a physical world and has 
a body, just as it projects itself into a cultural world and has a habitus. This is because it can 
only be consciousness by playing upon significations given in the absolute past of nature or 
in its personal past, and because every lived form tends toward a certain generality, whether 
it be the generality of our habitus or rather that of our bodily functions.”597  
Having said this, the point I want to emphasize is that in order to conjure up the 
false alternative between spiritualism and materialism, Merleau-Ponty follows two routes. On 
the one hand, he describes the lived body as a body that is itself consciousness, a body that 
projects significations and is opened to the world as a meaningful totality. On the other 
hand, he shows that consciousness somehow imitates the body: it can be ill, and fragmented, 
597 Ibid., 160/139.“Que la maladie psychiche, à son tour, soit liée à un accident corporel, cela se comprend, en principe, de la 
même façon; la conscience se projette dans un monde physique, et a un corps, comme elle se projette dans un monde culturel et a des 
habitus. Parce qu’elle ne peut être conscience qu’en jouant sur des significations donées dans le passé absolu de la nature ou dans son 
passé personnel, et parce que toute forme vécue tend vers une certain généralité, que ce soit celle de nos habitus ou bien celle de nos 
«fonctions corporelles».” 
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and its operations may be sedimented in habits. Thus, one could say that there is a mirror-
play between consciousness and body, for Merleau-Ponty understands consciousness on the 
basis of the dynamics of the body, and the body as the phenomenal, existent body, which is 
itself consciousness. In a sense, these two routes converge in Merleau-Ponty’s notion of 
generality, as it is introduced in the citation above. For the lived body is a sectioning of the 
generality of the sensible. But this generality is also the condition of possibility for the 
movement or fluidity of thinking. Indeed, anchored in the lived present of bodily perception, 
the world of thought is not a static landscape of sedimented thoughts, it never reaches the 
full encompassing view of the kosmotheoros, for it is thought only insofar as it is alive, and it is 
alive only insofar as it remains in movement, open to a world whose horizons it cannot 
delimit from the outside. That is to say, in the optimal functioning of consciousness, the 
sedimentation of thoughts does not appear as a solid store of conceptual contents; instead, it 
is integrated into the atmosphere of existential significations animating our living present. 
With regard to this, Merleau-Ponty says: “...my acquired thoughts are not an absolute 
acquisition; they feed off my present thought at each moment; they ofer me a sense, but this 
is a sense that I reflect back to them.”598   
In sum, one could say that the lived body is a constitutive dimension of 
consciousness because it is intentionality and expression, and because the work of 
consciousness is not confined to the “world of thoughts,” but rather is reincarnated in the 
history of my body as an atmosphere pervading the present of perception. Merleau-Ponty 
further articulates this point through an analysis of language and its roots in living speech. As 
Merleau-Ponty explains, the phenomenological analysis of speech is the decisive step to 
                                                
598 Ibid., 151/132. “…mes pensées acquises ne sont pas un acquis absolu, elles se nourissent à chaque moment de ma pensée 
présente, elles m’offrent un sens, mais je le leur rends.” 
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overcome once and for all the subject-object dichotomy, and to grasp the unity of body and 
consciousness. This means, as was suggested above, that speech is consciousness in action 
and, conversely, that the operations of consciousness do not exist prior to the bodily 
articulations of speech.   
Language, Sedimentation and Gesture 
Merleau-Ponty argues that the tendency toward sedimentation is intrinsic to 
language, for language can refer to language, speak about itself, as no other modes of 
expression can. And, in this process, language itself becomes the milieu of reflection and 
ideality. Along these lines, one could say that the background of language constitutes the 
very fabric of our conscious life and, ultimately, that these cannot be separated: 
consciousness is consciousness in language. As I indicated early on, the separation between 
idea or meaning and linguistic expression is apparent, not real. Following this logic, Merleau-
Ponty remarks: “The sense of a phrase appears as intelligible to us throughout, even 
detachable from this phrase and defined in an intelligible world because we presuppose as 
given all the participations that it owes to the history of the language and that contribute to 
determining its sense.”599   
As Merleau-Ponty explains, the experience of sense or meaning presupposes 
familiarity with language, appropriation of the history of language. He suggests that it is this 
familiarity or habituation that makes language appear as a transparent means of 
communication, as the vehicle of ideas that are simply intelligible. This is one structural 
aspect of our experience of language. Specifically, this is what Merleau-Ponty calls “spoken 
599 Ibid., 219/194. “Le sens d’une phrase nous paraît intelligible de part en part, détachable de cette phrase même et defini dans 
un monde intelligible, parce aue nous supposons donées touts les participations qu’elle doit à l’histoire de la langue et qui contribuent 
à en determiner le sens.” 
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speech” (parole parlée): the totality of words and significations that are sedimented in the 
background of our understanding of things.  
Language appears to be an objective structure, an artifice, because it has already been 
integrated as a part of our intentional schemes. The operations of language seem to be 
subordinated to the control of consciousness because consciousness is already pervaded by 
the history of language. And this history is reactivated in each act of speech or expression. 
Following this argument, one could say that already in the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-
Ponty understands language to be an originary constituent of existence, a structural 
dimension of perception. In fact, in the argumentative context of the passage quoted above, 
and after comparing language and music, Merleau-Ponty concludes: “But as we have said the 
clarity of language is in fact established against an obscure background, and, if we push the 
research far enough, we find that language itself, in the end, says nothing other than itself, or 
that its sense is not separable from it.”600  
Thus, as Merleau-Ponty remarks, there is nothing behind language, the sense of 
words cannot be detached from our living engagement with speech. Sedimented language is 
part of our background understanding of things, and this means that language transpires 
throughout our bodily movements and comportments. Merleau-Ponty determines this 
existential dimension of language through the motif of gesture. He often uses the notion of 
gesture to qualify artistic modes of expression –like music and painting –whose meaning is 
intrinsic to the sensible dimension of the work, and whose meaning is experienced as part of 
an affective milieu. But he suggests that not only “artistic” gestures but gestures in general 
reveal an existential, affective, or emotional dimension of meaning, and that they somehow 
600 Ibid. “Mais en réalité, comme nous l’avons dit, la clarté du langage s’établit sur un fond obscur, et si nous poussons la recherche 
assez loin, nous troverons finalement que le langage, lui aussi, ne dit rien que lui-même, ou que son sens n’est pas séparable de lui.” 
244 
constitute the origin of language. He says precisely: “We must, then, seek the first hints of 
language in the emotional gesticulation by which man superimposses upon the given world 
the world according to man.”601  
In sum, one can say that emotional gesticulations are the initial flares of language, 
whereby the world is transfigured, impregnated with affective depth, turned into a human 
world. As Merleau-Ponty explains, gestures are essentially emotional and, for this reason, 
they reveal the pre-cognitive roots of language, the layer of existential significations that 
animate speech and that precede the use of language as a neutral vehicle of information. In 
line with this conclusion, Merleau-Ponty would suggest that emotional gestures are 
primordial determinations of language, instantiations of “speaking speech” (parole parlante), of 
the living dimension of speech. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty argues, along with the spoken word, 
sedimented language, there is speaking speech: the speech that is itself movement, action.  
Particularly, examining speech disorders such as aphasia, Merleau-Ponty 
demonstrates that speech is articulated in bodily movements and actions, not in the ideal 
sphere of thought. And this means that one accomplishes thought in the moment of 
performance, in the concrete speech. For this reason, as I have already indicated, the essence 
of speech may be characterized as gestural: “Speech is a genuine gesture and, just like all 
gestures, speech too contain its own sense.”602 Elaborating on this point, Merleau-Ponty 
compares the unity of significant gestures and the unity of the work of art, “...whose sense is 
601 Ibid., 219/194. “Il faudrait donc chercher les prmières ébauches du langage dans la gesticulation émotionelle par laquelle 
l’homme superpose au monde donné le monde selon l’homme.” 
602 Ibid., 214/189. “La parole est un veritable geste et elle contient son sens comme le geste contient le sien.”  
245 
only accessible through direct contact, and who send forth their signification without ever 
leaving their temporal and spatial place.”603  
We therefore see that already in the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty 
perceives in gestures a primordial dimension of language, which is not subordinated to the 
operations of a “pre-linguistic” consciousness. He shows that gestures institute a primordial 
layer of significance against the background of sedimented language, and the mute ground of 
nature. I should note, however, that in the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty also 
suggests that gestures are inscribed in a cultural world, as if gestures were essentially codified 
as social conventions, as if they were primarily a human production, and as if the body were 
somehow detached from nature and not an integral part of the carnal generality of the 
world.604 This point is problematic because behind gestural “conventions” there lies a basic 
ground of gestural communication that has no positive, fixed meanings, and this explains 
why communication across entirely different cultures is in principle possible.   
The Diacritical Structure of Language 
The articulation of the two basic dimensions of language, the living language 
engrained in bodily perception and “adherent” to the sensible appearance of things, and the 
historical sphere of sedimented meanings, is a pressing problem that haunted Merleau-Ponty 
in the years that followed the Phenomenology of Perception. And this problem motivates a 
continuous reflection on the theme of gesture, of living gestures and speech, and its 
articulations with language as a system.  
603 Ibid., 177/153. “…le sens n’est accessible que par un contact direct et qui rayonnent leur signification sans quitter leur place 
temporelle et spatielle.” 
604 See ibid., 220/194-95. Merleau-Ponty remarks, for instance, that gestures of anger in Japanese culture are 
determined on a different background than in the Western world, in such way that the meaning of the 
emotions is entirely different. This example is problematic because, although partially true, it seems to 
contradict the fact that gestures have a basic plasticity, which makes it impossible to circumscribe their 
meanings as cultural codes.  
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In his presentation at the first Colloque international de Phénoménologie in 1951,605 
Merleau-Ponty examines the relationship between gestural expressions, which are taken as 
part of the living ground of speech, and the “objective” stratifications of language. Merleau-
Ponty argues that although the distinction between these two spheres of language –language 
as objective system and language as living speech –is for the most part clear and 
unquestionable for disciplines such as linguistics and psychology; the articulation between 
them still prevails as an enigma for the phenomenological view. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, 
from a phenomenological perspective, the difficulty is to determine the ontological 
articulation of the different levels of speech,606 not only to lay out the juxtaposition of these 
two levels, a task already accomplished by Saussure.607  
In sum, Merleau-Ponty searches for the conditions that determine the emergence of 
novel meanings from the sedimentation of language. Here, he undertakes this task on the 
basis of Saussure’s distinction between language (langage) and speech (parole), and Saussure’s 
account of the interplay between the diachronic and synchronic orders of language.608  
In this context, Merleau-Ponty shows that the development of language never 
reaches the ideal state of a universal system, but rather functions as “a cohesive whole of 
convergent linguistic gestures.”609 In line with arguments from The Prose of the World, which 
will be examined in the following section of the present work, Merleau-Ponty qualifies 
605 See Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signes (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), ch. 2. English: Signs, trans. Richard C. McCleary 
(Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1964). Hereafter cited with reference first to the French, then to the 
English translation. 
606 Ibid., 108/86. 
607 See ibid., 86-87/108-09. See also Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, ed. Charles Bally and 
Albert Sechehaye, trans. Wade Baskin (New York: Philosophical Library, 1959), Introduction, ch. I-III. 
608 Saussure uses the terms “synchronic” and “diachronic” to distinguih between two types of linguistics, which 
correspond to two states of language: “Everything that relates to the static side of our science [linguistics] is 
synchronic; everything that has to do with evolution is diachronic. Similarly, synchrony and diachrony designate 
respectively a language-state and an evolutionary phase.” Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, 81.  
609 Signs, 109/87. “…un ensemble de gestes linguistics convergentes.” 
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language as an “ensemble of gestures,” and underscores that language works in each case as 
a dynamic totality that is reconfigured through singular events of expression. As Emmanuel 
Alloa points out, “just as language can be considered as a form of gesture, gesture itself 
manifests the diacritic structure of language.”610   
Following Saussure’s explanations of the function of diacritical markers in language, 
Merleau-Ponty argues that signs have a diacritic value because they do not constitute a 
system of fixed, positive meanings, but rather of lateral, indirect significations.611 He says 
specifically that signs are structured through differences, and oppositions: “Each one of 
them expresses only by reference to a certain mental equipment, to a certain arrangement of 
our cultural implements, and as a whole they are like a blank form we have not yet filled out, 
or like the gestures of others, which intend and circumscribe an object of the world that I do 
not see.”612 As Alloa indicates, Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation of Saussure, in what concerns 
the determination of language as diacritic,613 may be based on a play on “the double sense of 
écarter as both excluding and spacing, producing a gap (écart),”614 and he further remarks that 
“the only reference to the diacritical we find in the Cours de linguistique générale which Merleau-
610 Se Emmanuel Alloa, "The Diacritical Nature of Meaning. Merleau-Ponty with Saussure," Chiasmi 
International. Trilingual studies concerning Merleau-Ponty's Thought 15 (2013): 167-180, 171. See also Maurice Lagueux, 
"Merleau-Ponty et la linguistic de Saussure," Dialogue IV, no. 3 (1965): 351-364, 353.  
611 With regard to this, Alloa makes the following analysis of diacritical signs: “Diacritical signs are peculiar 
signs since, while being regulating utterances, they cannot be uttered themselves; while being operators of 
articulation, they cannot in turn become the subject of articulation. Determining the value of vowels in Ancient 
languages like Classical Greek or Latin, they are not vowels themselves, but rather come from the side and alter 
the vocalic value. Written in the margins of the letters, above, beneath or beside them, they provoke their 
alteration in terms of accentuation or tone. Sometimes, such as in Classical Greek, they were even used to turn 
a letter into a numeral. The basic function is however to determine the value of a sign and hence to exclude 
those possibilities that are not pertinent. As it were, the term diacritical would thus to be understood 
etymologically as that ‘through which’ (dia)a ‘distinction’(diakrisis) is to be made. The diacritical markers hence 
operate parginally, from the divide between signs, not so much attributing a signification to a sign than 
‘dividing’ possibilities, excluding significations.” “The Diacritical Nature of Meaning,” 168.  
612 Signs, 110/88. “Chaque d’eux n’exprime que par référence à un certain outillage mental, à un certain aménagement de nos 
utensils culturels, et ils sont tous ensemble comme un formulaire en blanc que l’on n’a pas encore rempli, comme les gestes d’autrui 
qui visent et circonscrivent un objet du monde que je ne vois pas.” 
613 Alloa alludes here, in particular, to a passage from Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Consciousness and the Acquisition of 
Language, trans. Hugh J. Silvermann (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973), 93. 
614 Alloa, “The Diacritical Nature of Meaning,” 172.  
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Ponty studied extensively is, if not pertinent for a conceptualization of the term, at least 
revealing on the impossibility of having something like a general, decontextualized writing of 
all languages.”615  
Thus, it seems, the determination of language as diacritic stems from Merleau-
Ponty’s interpretation of Saussure. In this regard, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that language 
presupposes an embodied, diacritical capacity of interpretation,616 and that meaning is 
constituted as a “differential process.”617 This means that signs function essentially like 
empty gestures, blank forms to be filled out in future appropriations.  
As Merleau-Ponty explains, the emptiness and silence surrounding the world of signs 
function as an invitation to praxis, even though no action would ever fill out the essential 
emptiness of the sign. Elaborating on this point, Merleau-Ponty explains that linguistic signs, 
just like gestures, rise up from the field of my actions, they stem from the “I can” rather than 
the “I think.” Hence, words as gestures are extensions of the corporal schemas uniting my 
body to the world, which operate without the directives of representations: “I have a 
rigorous awareness of the bearing of my gestures or the spatiality of my body which allows 
me to maintain relationships with the world without thematically representing to myself the 
objects I am going to grasp or the relationships of size between my body and the avennues 
offered to me by the world.”618 As Merleau-Ponty indicates, the structural silences of 
language, the diacritical differences and spaces that constitute speech, are pervaded by the 
615 Ibid., 172-73.The passage in question in the Course in General Linguistics states that, “...an alphabet applicable 
to all languages would probably be weighed down by diacritical marks” (34), and suggests that it is not possible 
to establish a uniform phonological system that would be applicable to all languages.   
616 Alloa expresses this point as follows: “The diacritical operation and the determination of significance do not 
start with standarized propositional language, but already at the level of perception.” “The Diacritical Nature of 
Meaning,” 174. 
617 Ibid. 
618 Signes, 111/89. “J’ai une conscience rigorouse de la portée des mes gestes ou de la spatialité de mon corps qui me permet 
d’entretenir des rapports avec le monde sans me représenter thématiquement les objets que je vais saisir ou les rapports de grandeur 
entre mon corps et les cheminements que m’offre le monde.”  
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silent “awareness” (conscience) of my body,  they are integrated in my embodied existence.619 
That is to say, the diacritical values of language hinge on the diacritical capacity of 
interpretation that is perception itself, and which allows me to capture differences of 
meaning in minimal, “unperceivable” movements, textures, and tones. For example, this is 
what happens when I listen to someone speaking and every alteration of the voice renders 
different significations of which I am not consciously aware.620  
Continuing this argument, Richard Kearney remarks: “Our body schemas, Merleau-
Ponty claims, operate like phonetic systems which function according to principles of which 
they are not conscious.”621 Kearney further explains that what is at stake here is not a 
reference to the unconsciouss, but rather to “imperception,” for in the salience of figures the 
grounds are not perceived as such, and “this diacritical interplay between figure and ground 
represents an endless reversibility –for what is one perceiver’s figure is another’s ground and 
vice versa.”622  
One may say, therefore, that diacritical perception hinges on the silent consciousness 
of background structures, in such a way that any thematic positing of concepts or 
representations, any attempt at founding perception in consciousness, may end up paralizing 
our movements and causing the event of signification to fail.623 We therefore see how the 
qualification of perception as diacritical is a decisive move towards the overcoming of the 
philosophy of consciousness. For if one is able to capture the meaning of the most minimal, 
619 In “Le monde sensible et le monde de l’expression,” one of the lectures given at the College de France in 1952-53, 
Merleau-Ponty explains that consciousness and movement must be understood as two extreme poles, two 
abstract moments of the unified movement of existence (see In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, 17/76). 
620 See Signs, 111/89. 
621 Richard Kearney, "Diacritical Hermeneutics," in Hermeneutic Rationality, ed. Maria Luísa Portocarreño, Luis 
António Umbelino and Andrzej Wiercinski, (Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2012), 177-96, 186. 
622 Ibid., 187.  
623 This is a central thesis from the Phenomenology of Perception, which structures Merleau-Ponty’s explanation of 
the case of Schneider.   
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inconspicuous variations in perception, before the explicit constitution of a “content,” then 
one must assume that the world itself, the world whose fabric is shared by my body, is that 
which lays down the basis for interpretation. It is in this argumentative context that one 
must understand Merleau-Ponty’s remark according to which significations animate speech 
(parole), just as the “world arouses my body.”624 In this regard, Alloa says that “one cannot 
but acknowledge that Merleau-Ponty went the way of an ontological questioning of the 
grounds of the diacritical and its discovery.”625  
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty suggests that language originates from bodily gestures or 
expressive acts, and that these gestures involve a schema of the world. And this means that 
the world is not the other of language, but rather the imminence of language. Continuing 
this argument, in The Prose of the World and the lectures related to this project, Merleau-Ponty 
further explores the articulation between body, world and language. Specifically, he 
investigates the grounds of the truth, and the primordial institution of meaning against the 
silent ground of nature. Thus, let me move on to examine Merleau-Ponty’s concept of truth 
and the idea of meaning as institution, in order to define how the passage to the problem of 
nature is developed.   
Meaning and Institution: Gesture and the Carnal Generality of the World 
After the Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty embarks on a philosophical project 
concerned with the correlation between mind and body, and a theory of truth. Part of this 
project is published as The Prose of the World, a book Merleau-Ponty left unfinished in 1951. In 
this book Merleau-Ponty outlines a theory of expression, according to which meaning is 
instituted in the sensible world as openness, a blank space to be retrieved in historical 
624 Signes, 112/89. “le monde anime mon corps.” 
625 Alloa, “The Diacritical Nature of Meaning,” 170. 
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appropriations. In this case, as in the Phenomenology of Perception, Merleau-Ponty takes up the 
analysis of expressive possibilities of the body and gestures in order to understand the 
primordial intertwining of body and mind. With regard to this, explaining Merleau-Ponty’s 
new project in his preface to The Prose of the World, Claude Lefort points out that “...the 
concrete theory of the mind was to be constructed around a new idea of expression which 
was yet to be completed, of an analysis of gestures and the mimetic uses of the body and all 
forms of language, to the most sublimated language of mathematics.”626  
Lefort’s indication, which is supported by Merleau-Ponty’s report to Martial 
Gueroult about his new project,627 confirms that the analysis of gestures is a crucial element 
in Merleau-Ponty’s exploration of the ontological grounds of language. As I have already 
indicated, gestures make manifest a sort of primitive and general communicability, they 
unfold a language that seems to be rooted in nature. Along these lines, one could say that the 
phenomenon of gesture presupposes the idea that we move within the milieu of a carnal 
generality, that our body functions as a mirror of the world. This idea of a carnal generality is 
present already in the Phenomenology of Perception, it is implicit in the concept of body schema, 
as has been suggested in previous sections of this dissertation. Yet, one finds an explicit 
formulation of this idea only in subsequent works.  
In the second chapter of The Prose of the World, in a footnote explaining how language 
is based on a sort of natural communicability –a nascent logos that stems from nature or the 
world itself –Merleau-Ponty argues that language is founded on the phenomenon of a 
“carnal generality: what warms me, warms him; it is founded on the magical action of like 
626 The Prose of the World, xii/xiii. 
627 See ibid. 
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upon like (the warm sun makes me warm), on the fusion of me embodied –and the world.”628 
As Merleau-Ponty explains, the carnal generality of the world is a primordial milieu of 
significance, which is constituted through the interpenetration and porosity of beings, the 
fluidity of the sensible.  
One might say that this carnal generality determines one essential moment of the 
origins of language, then, in the chapter entitled “The Indirect Language,” complemented by 
a second fundamental moment that corresponds to the structural dimension of silence, and 
whose main traits I examined in the previous section. Let me recall here that, for Merleau-
Ponty, sensible being is not a homogeneous milieu of communicability. My body is never 
simply “fused” with the world, for bodily movements and gestures are chiasmatic and 
spontaneous. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty indicates that gestures make leaps, ruptures, 
“...outlining, in the inconceivable platitude of being, hollows and reliefs, distances  and gaps 
–in short, a meaning.”629
Based on these premises, I suggest that Merleau-Ponty identifies two structural 
constituents of meaning. On the one hand, and let me emphasize this point, he considers the 
example of the transmission of warmth to the body and remarks that there exists a general 
communicability within the world that prefigures the work of language, and that is initially 
determined in terms of a “fusion” between body and world: the experience of the carnal 
generality of the world. On the other hand, in the passage cited above, Merleau-Ponty 
considers specifically the expressive dimension of painting and its diacritical character. In 
this case, Merleau-Ponty shows that gestures create hollows and gaps in being. And this 
means that gestures do not communicate directly, they are not in a relationship of continuity 
628 Ibid., 29/20. “…la généralité charnelle: ce qui me donne chaud lui donne chaud, sur l’action magique du semblable sur le 
semblable (le soleil chaud me donne chaud) sur la fusion moi incarné-monde...” 
629 Ibid., 110/79. “…desinner dans la platitude inconcevable de l’être des creux et des reliefs, des distances et des écarts; un sens.” 
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with the rest of the world, even though they are rooted in the carnal generality of the world. 
One must assume, therefore, that meaning emerges as a tension between these two 
moments. Put succinctly: meaning is the openness of a gap within the generality of the 
sensible. 
Indeed, Merleau-Ponty indicates that gestures and bodily expressions carry out a 
productive deformation of the world, a deviation from the world –including both the natural 
and the historical world –that institutes horizons of meaning. And this work of institution 
occurs as a reconfiguration of the whole. In this sense, the work of expression is not merely 
subjective, for human gestures and expressions are integrated with the common world of 
human practices, they are reconfigurations of the world as a whole. Merleau-Ponty explains 
this point as follows: 
The body not only flows over into a world whose schema it bears in itself but posseses this 
world at a distance rather than being possesed by it. The gesture of expression which 
undertakes on its own account to delineate what it intends and make it appear outside, 
retrieves the world and remakes it in order to know it so much the more. But already, with 
our first oriented gesture, someone’s infinite relationships to his situation had invaded our 
mediocre planet and opened an inexhaustible field to our behavior. All perception, and all 
action which presupposes it, in short, every human use of the body is already primordial 
expression.630 
Here, human gestures are qualified as rifts within sensible being, whereby a horizon 
of infinite possibilities is released, an emptiness that is also virtuality. Merleau-Ponty suggests 
that our interventions in the world, every human use of the body, are meaningful insofar as 
they open up a distance in relation to the world. For the world does not possess us, it is not 
predelineated before our actions. Rather, the world remains dormant, distanced, an enigma 
to be reactivated, “possessed” by us through attempts at interrogation. That is to say, the 
630 Ibid. “Non seulement le corps se voue à un monde dont il porte en lui le schéma: il le posséde à distance plutôt qu’il n’en est 
possédé. A plus forte raison, le geste d’expression qui se chqrge lui-même de dessiner et de faire paraître au dehors ce qu’il vise 
accomplit-il une vraie récupération du monde et le refait-il pour le connaître. Mais déjà, avec notre premier geste orienté, les rapports 
infinis de quelqu’un avec sa situation avaient envahi notre médiocre planéte et ouvert à notre conduite un champ indefini. Toute 
perception, et toute action que la suppose, bref tout usage de notre corps est déjà expression primordiale.” 
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world is always yet to be possessed, never actually given; it is fragmentarily intimated, 
indirectly, in our expressive acts.  
In the context of the passage cited above, Merleau-Ponty further suggests that our 
actions, as gestures, are outlines inscribed in the world, reintegated with the generality of the 
world in such a way as to call for new appropriations. Expanding on this point Merleau-
Ponty refers to painting, and his reference to painting is significant because painting elicits 
the depth of perception. Presumably, painting reveals the latency of meaning that vibrates 
within visible beings; it shows visible things as if they were about to say something, and this 
imminence of meaning is what Merleau-Ponty calls “primordial expression.” Furthermore, as 
painting returns to the visual world of perception, as it reconfigures the visual world, it 
instigates a re-enactment of the primordial interrogation of the world that is perception itself. 
As Merleau-Ponty explains, perception is itself interrogation because it is the 
response to an enigma: the enigma of the sensible world. Responding to this enigma, the 
body tranforms things into emblems of its own corporality, into signs. With regard to this, 
Merleau-Ponty says that “[p]erception makes what is expressed dwell in signs, not through 
some previous convention but through the eloquence of their very arrangement and 
configuration. It implants a meaning in what did not have one, and thus, instead of 
exhausting itself in the moment it occurs, perception inaugurates an order and founds an 
institution or tradition.”631 
Merleau-Ponty remarks that perception is primordial expression in order to show 
that perception is neither the expression of conventions nor the direct apprehension of the 
world itself, but rather openness to the world. And, as openness to the world perception 
631 Ibid., 110-11/78-79. “…il fait habiter en eux l’exprimé, non pas sous la condition de quelaue convention préalable, mais 
par l’éloquence de leur arrangement même et de leur configuration, implante un sens dans ce qui n’en avait pas, et qui donc, loin de 
s’épuiser dans l’instant où elle a lieu, ouvre un champ, inaugure un ordre, fonde une institution ou une tradition.” 
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does not contain the world as a system of fixed representations. Perception may only grasp 
the world indirectly by sketching forms, traces, outlines. One could say, then, that perception 
is foundation of meaning only insofar as it is “implanting” of meaning, effort of expression, 
adumbration of language. What perception discloses is the “seed” of signification, the 
institution of a field of meaning, not raw materials or sensations. And this means that 
perception is historical: it is involved in history, it is the institution of a tradition. That is to 
say, perception does not impose a meaning but rather opens up a field of meaning. In short, 
perception establishes, not things themselves, but ways of seeing things. 
Thus, perception perpetuates the enigma of the sensible world, it does not solve it. 
Along these lines, one could say that meaning is the very latency of meaning, interrogation. 
Based on these premises, Merleau-Ponty sketches out a response to the problem of 
translation and originality –in the sense of novelty. The problem is that different cultures, 
with different backgrounds of signification and value, with different modes of expression 
and gestures, can communicate, even though there is not an objective ground of perception. 
The difficulty consists, precisely, of explaining this possibility of communication without 
introducing the idea of a “Spirit” of history, and without presupposing that cultural 
differences depend upon objective material conditions. With regard to this, Merleau-Ponty 
indicates that cultures have a gestural origin, whose settings remain essentially open. He says: 
We propose, on the contrary [contrary to the idea of emplacing culture within a physical 
geographycal territory], to consider the order of culture or meaning as an original order of 
advent which should not be derived from the order of mere events, if such exist, or treated 
simply as the effect of unlikely conjunctures. If it is characteristic of the human gesture to 
signify beyond its simple factual existence and to inaugurate a meaning, it follows that every 
gesture is comparable to all others. They all arise from a single syntax. Each gesture is both a 
beginning and a continuation which, insofar as it is not opaque and enclosed like an event 
that is complete once and for all, has a value beyond its simple presence and is in this respect 
allied in advance with or an accomplice in all other expressive efforts. Moreover, the human 
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gesture is not only a possibility simultaneous with all other expressive efforts. It also assumes 
a structure with them in the world of painting.632   
Merleau-Ponty insists that the original source of meaning is not an order of mere 
events, a conjunction of facts rooted in a geographical territory. Rather, what is originary is 
the order of culture or signification, understood in terms of a somewhat gestural syntax: 
“each gesture is both a beginning and a continuation.” As Merleau-Ponty puts it, cultural 
expressions are preserved as gestural expressions, in such a way that every “factual” event is 
immediately inscribed as something more than a “presence,” as a hint that is sent to the 
future. This is particularly evident, for instance, in the tradition of painting. Merleau-Ponty 
explains that any painting can find resonances in any other, no matter the relative distances 
in terms of space and time. For what makes all gestures comparable, including the gestures of 
painting, is their tentative character, their openness to the possibility of future 
interpretations.  
Merleau-Ponty develops these arguments further in his 1952 article “Indirect 
Language and the Voices of Silence,” which stems from the previously discussed, central 
chapter in The Prose of the World. On this occasion he declares that language can only be 
preceded by language. He says precisely: “speech always comes into play against the 
background of speech.”633 Thereby, he concludes, if there is not original presence behind 
language, then all language is indirect and, therefore, silence.634 One could say that language 
632 Ibid., 121/79-80. “Nous proposons au contraire de reconnaître l’ordre de la culture ou du sens comme un ordre original de 
l’avenement qui ne doit pas être derivé de celui, s’il existe, des pures événements, ni traité comme le simple effet de certaines 
rencontrespeu probables. Si l’on admet que le propre du geste humaine est de signifier au-delà de sa simple existence de fait, 
d’inaugurer un sens, il en résulte que tout geste est comparable à tout autre, au’ils relévent tous d’une seule syntaxe, que chacun 
d’eux est une commencement, comporte un suite ou des recommencements en tant qu’il n’est pas, comme l’événement, opaque et fermé 
sur lui-même, et une fois por toutes réndu, qu’il vant au-delà de sa simple présence de fait, et qu’en cela il est par avance allié ou 
complice de toutes les autres tentatives d’expression. Davantage: non seulement il est composible avec elles, et s’organise avec elles 
dans un monde de la peinture (mais encore si la trace en demeure).” 
633 Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence, 53/244. “la parole joue toujours sur fond de parole.” 
634 See ibid., 54/245. 
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is essentially indirect because, as was explained above, what language signifies or 
communicates is based on an act of institution, an effort of expression that is, in a sense, 
groundless, silent. And yet, the silence that grounds language is always a silence pregnant 
with voice, communication at distance, the hint that communicates something precisely 
insofar as it is not coincidence but disclosure, un-veiling. Continuing this argument, Merleau-
Ponty says that “if we press the meaning of the little word ‘say’ and bring into light what 
constitutes the price of language, we would find that it is the intention to unveil the thing 
itself and to go beyond what is said to what what is said signifies.”635 One could say, then, 
that the effort of expression, primordial language, is a continuous movement of disclosure, a 
relentless effort to establish the truth, and to test the limits of our historical world. In this 
sense, one can say that language and expressive acts in general unfold as the struggle to 
establish the truth against the inextricable silence of the world, the silence of nature. Let me 
now move on to examine the way in which Merleau-Ponty carries out the passage from the 
problem of the truth to nature. 
In the lecture course entitled “Materials for a Theory of History”(1953-54), Merleau-
Ponty remarks that all action is situated in a historical horizon, in such a way that history 
appears as the inner logic connecting “all the levels of activity.”636 This means that we dwell 
in history, in a horizon of openness and freedom, so that our actions resonate in humanity in 
general, not only in the space and time we dwell in: “our contact with our age is an initiation 
into every age, man is a historian because he belongs to history and history is only the 
635 The Prose of the World, 145/102. “Si nous pressons le sens de cet petit mot «dire», si nous tirons au chair ce qui fait le prix 
du langage, nous y trouvons l’intention de dévoiler la chose même, de dépasser l’énoncé vers ce qu’il signifie...” 
636 In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, 44/96. “...tous les ordres d’activité.”   
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amplification of practice.”637 This approach to history supplements the arguments I sketched 
out above, but it also establishes the basis for understanding Merleau-Ponty’s approach to 
the concept of truth.  
As Merleau-Ponty explains, on the basis of this theory of history we can say that 
truth is not a factual state, a static delimitation of facts, nor a certain representation of things, 
but rather the very struggle of expression, the practical efforts to bring to light the obscure 
laws guiding our practical activities. He says precisely: “Truth is not found in certain 
historical agents, nor in the achievement of theoretical consciousness, but in the 
confrontation of the two, in their practice, and in their common life.”638 As will become clear 
in subsequent arguments from these lectures, this means that truth gains its ideality from its 
historical preservation and reactivation as institution, its integration in practices and efforts 
of expression that participate in a common world, a sensible world which functions as 
“hinge” [charnière].639  
Elaborating on this idea, in the summary of the 1954-55 course, “Institution in 
Personal and Public History,” Merleau-Ponty defines the concept of institution as follows: 
“Thus, what we understand by the concept of institution are those events in experience 
which endow it with durable dimensions, in relation to which whole series of other 
experiences will acquire meaning, will form an intelligible series or a history –or again those 
events which sediment in me a meaning, not just as survival or residues, but as the invitation 
to a sequel, the necessity of a future.”640  
637 Ibid., 50/101. “Notre contact avec notre temps est une initiation à tous les temps; l’homme est historien parce qu’il est 
historique; l’histoire n’est que l’amplification de la pratique.”  
638 Ibid., 55/105. “La vérité ne se trouve pas dans certains sujets historiques existants, ni dans la prise de conscience théorique, 
mais dans leur confrontation, dans leur practique et dans leur vie commune.” 
639 Ibid., 60/180. 
640 Ibid., 61/108-09.“On entendait donc ici par institution ces événements d’une expérience qui la dotent de dimensions durables, 
par rapport auxquelles toute une série d’autres expériences auront sens, formeront une suite pensable ou une histoire, - ou encore les 
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One can see, then, that the concept of institution serves to articulate what could 
perhaps be called an agonistic concept of truth: truth as the historical strife for the 
preservation of meaning, as something that must be reactivated in singular acts and practices. 
Along these lines, one might say that the truth is set as an interrogation, instituted as an 
event that demands a response, and that may not be preserved as a representation. Moreover, 
one could add that truth is the expression of a peculiar desire: the inexhaustible desire for the 
future, for the preservation of the world.641  
Following this logic it is clear that the world we live in, the world in which the truth 
is set, is pervaded by desire. Indeed, as Merleau-Ponty explains, the notion of institution 
presupposes a certain “animal” magnetism, a certain urge for imitation and propagation that 
impregnates from the outset our bodily interactions with others. Merleau-Ponty says 
precisely: “There is something comparable to institution even at the animal level (the animal 
is impregnated by the living creatures which surround him at birth).”642  
In this way Merleau-Ponty suggests that gestures follow a somewhat “subterranean 
logic” [logique souterraine],643 a logic that is not manifest. This means that the instituted truth or 
meaning imposes itself through carnal contact: impregnation. And this includes the 
experience of truth and meaning in science. Presumably, science looks for the truth per se, 
événements qui déposent en moi un sens, non pas à titre de survivance et de résidu, mais comme appel à une suite, exigence d’un 
avenir.” 
641 Emmanuel de Saint Aubert, in his book Être et chair, articulates the problematic of desire in Merleau-Ponty 
as follows: “La phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty –dans sa grande attention à l’intrication de la perception et du mouvement, 
aux subtilités d’une foi perceptive et interrogative qui soutient notre être-au-monde, ou encore à l’engagement anthropologique 
integral impliqué par la vision en profondeur –, éclaire ce point et fraye une essentielle approche indirecte du désir. Celui qui voit 
endure et dépasse l’inachèvement de la chose perçue, celui qui perçoit la profondeur traverse le conflit des images monoculaires et 
consent à l’inépuisable”(339). 
642 In Praise of Philosophy and Other Essays, 61/109. “Il y a quelque chose comme une institution dans l’animalité (il y a une 
imprégnation de l’animal par les vivants qui l’entourent au début de sa vie).” 
643 Ibid., 63/110. 
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objective truth, and uses a logic that is universal and atemporal. But even in this case, says 
Merleau-Ponty, the experience of the truth depends upon a common field of experience.644  
Based on these premises, I want to suggest that although Merleau-Ponty considers 
the order of culture as original, the problem concerning the limits between history and wild 
nature becomes more pressing after he delves into the problem of truth, and this motivates 
in part the transition to the theme of nature. For the very effort to unveil the things 
themselves presupposes that we have received a subtle indication of their being. Moreover, it 
presupposes that the silence of the thing has impregnated the silence of language. In short, 
we see things because they somehow call our attention. Along these lines, one may say that 
our “cultural” gestures are propagations of the immemorial history of nature: our bodily 
expressions somehow contract the history of nature, and conversely, the history of nature is 
reconfigured by our expressive efforts.  
Indeed, as was previously argued, Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the phenomenon of 
gesture indicates that the sphere of sedimentend significations is incorporated in the passing 
of time, in such a way that what initially appeared to be a mere artifact ends up integrated 
with the flow of perception through habit. This may explain why, at the beginning of The 
Prose of the World, Merleau-Ponty says that “language is the double of being,”645 a formulation 
that prefigures the path to be followed in The Visible and the Invisible, and that envisions 
language as replication of the gathering force of being, for in this same context language is 
also determined as “...the gesture of renewal and recovery which unites me with myself and 
others.”646  
                                                
644 Ibid., 64/111. 
645 The Prose of the World, 10/5. “il est la doublure de l’être.” 
646 Ibid., 26/17. “…est le geste de reprise et de récupération qui me réunit à moi-même comme à autrui.” 
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Having said this, let me recapitulate and conclude this section. In The Prose of the 
World and texts related to this project, Merleau-Ponty outlines a definition of the bodily 
dimension of language, according to which our body is institution of meaning, expression, 
history. Regarding this, Merleau-Ponty says that “…it is through our body that we have the 
first experience of the impalpable body of history prior to all initiation into art.”647 In this 
sense, one could say that the body functions as a sort of writing that preserves the history of 
the world, and which is not simply the mute voice of nature. Up to this point, however, the 
problem of the articulation between human language and the mute logos of nature, of wild 
being, has not been resolved. For if the body is already a departure from nature and is 
historical, this presuposes an idea of being as double, as reduplication, for the body is in the 
world and the world is made of the same stuff as the body. And this is the crux that leads 
Merleau-Ponty toward the problem of nature and being, the one that occupies him in the 
years following the writing of The Prose of the World.     
Gesture and Ontology of Language: On the Way to The Visible  and the Invis ib le  
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of institution serves to determine the historical dimension 
of gestures and language. As Merleau-Ponty explains, gestures somehow synthesize our 
history and, at the same time, outline a meaning that is sent over, as an interrogation, to the 
future. Continuing this argument, while concluding the summary course on “Institution in 
Personal and Public History,” Merleau-Ponty says that the purpose of reflecting on the 
concept of institution is to set phenomenology on the path of a metaphysics of history, 
which comes along with a meditation on the meaning of being, and which does not simply 
                                                
647 Ibid., 117/83. “Nous avons dans notre corps avant toute initiation à l’art la premiére expérience du corps impalpable de 
l’histoire.” 
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assume that “being exists” [l’être est].648 In this sense, it seems, the problem of institution is a 
preliminary to ontology. 
With regard to this problem of ontology, in his course summary on “The Problem of 
Passivity: Sleep, the Unconscious, Memory” (1954-55), Merleau-Ponty points out that he 
intended to “...develop an ontology of the perceived world going beyond sensible nature.”649 
As Merleau-Ponty states, the challenge is to develop an ontology that does not presuppose a 
mechanistic view of nature and that does not perpetuate the opposition between nature and 
consciousness. Thus, in this context, “going beyond sensible nature” means: going beyond a 
metaphysical understanding of nature. In line with this, Merleau-Ponty underscores that our 
perceptual experience presupposes the contact with an “outside” (dehors), and this outside is 
not the outside counterposed to subjective consciousness, but rather it is an atmosphere 
charged with the presence of the past. That is to say, sensible nature cannot be opposed to 
consciousness because nature has always already been part of our past, of our history. And 
this means that what we understand as a conscious action, or as a voluntary attribution of 
meaning, is not a transparent or immediate relation to things: it involves a “distance” (écart), 
the variation or modulation of a previously instituted field of meaning and existence, a 
reconfiguration of the common, sensible world that was already there.650 In short, our 
present actions are never entirely present: they are rooted in perception and, thereby, in the 
past of nature. In this context, Merleau-Ponty remarks that perception is neither passive nor 
active; it is anterior to both passivity and activity, it is a pre-personal engagement with the 
world as a whole, primordial memory, which operates even in dormancy. This explains, to 
some extent, why we can re-awake after a deep sleep, for even then there is a certain contact, 
648 In Praise of Philosophy, 65/113. 
649 Ibid., 66/114. “Le cours cherchait à prolonger au-delà de la nature l’ontologie du monde perçu” 
650 See ibid., 67/115. 
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a pre-personal consciousness: perception. Furthermore, Merleau-Ponty suggests that there is 
a minimum in perception in which perception touches on the generality of nature and brings 
it out of darkness, though not to full light. The experiences of dream and art, in which the 
activity of waking consciousness is suspended, may bring us back to the grey zone of 
perception that constitutes the threshold to nature.      
As Merleau-Ponty remarks, the access to the roots of perception, the minimum of 
perception, requires dialectical efforts: the capacity to distinguish what is positive in 
negativity and what is negative in positivity, independently of the traditional opposition 
between consciousness and nature, subject and object.651 Following this logic, nature cannot 
be taken as absolute negativity, as absolute silence. This means that a thinking of nature as 
such should be possible: nature as phenomenon, the “macro-phenomenon” that involves us 
and things.652   
The problematic of nature, as it is articulated in the later lectures at the Collège de 
France was partly prefigured in Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of perception. The reference to the 
living ground of meaning, to the carnal generality of the world adumbrated in The Prose of the 
World, also hints at important elements of Merleau-Ponty’s later approach to nature and the 
ontology of the flesh. Yet, the investigation of the phenomenon of nature as such, as 
enigmatic source of meaning that nurtures existence and supports our being, becomes the 
object of an explicit thematization only at the time of the preparatory stages of The Visible 
and the Invisible. Indeed, in his lectures on Nature, Merleau-Ponty repeatedly remarks that this 
investigation is the preparation for a phenomenological ontology of visible being. In his first 
651 Ibid., 79/123-24.  
652 As Renaud Barbaras explains it, “to say in effect that natural being is macrophenomenon is to affirm that the 
very reality of nature implies its perceptibility: there is all-encompassing being only as perceived being.” Renaud 
Barbaras, "Merleau-Ponty and Nature," Research in Phenomenology 31, no. 1 (2001): 22-38, 36. 
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lecture from 1956-57, Merleau-Ponty explains this point as follows: “Naturalism apart, an 
ontology which leaves nature in silence shuts itself in the incorporeal and for this very reason 
gives a fantastic image of man, spirit and history.”653  
As I already have indicated, nature is the elemental phenomenon that supports 
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of meaning as institution. Nature is, in principle, irreducible to the 
spheres of spirit and history. And, for this reason, it is the ground that makes possible the 
continuous transformation of historical significations. As Merleau-Ponty explains, in 
reference to Lucien Herr’s comentary on Hegel, nature “is there from the first day.”654 This 
means that nature continuously renovates the present of perception and animates the 
historical significations sedimented in our history. To be precise, Merleau-Ponty’s argument 
is that gestures may be spontaneous only insofar as they have a source that is irreducible to 
the level of instituted significations and historical events. Following this logic, nature as such, 
as the macro-phenomenon that envelops our being and our actions, cannot be posited as an 
absolute principle that is causa sui, nor may it be reduced to a mechanism, for that would be 
to return to determinism.  
It is in this context that we must understand why the phenomenon of nature is 
intrinsically related to the general question of the meaning of being, and to the question 
concerning the original rapport between being and man. Specifically, as was argued in earlier 
chapters, Merleau-Ponty articulates these questions on the basis of a reading of Husserl’s 
later works and Heidegger’s meditations on language. In the context of the present reflection 
on language and gesture, what must be emphasized is that Merleau-Ponty finds in nature an 
653 Nature, 91/130.”Tout naturalism mis à part, une ontologie qui passe sous silence la Nature s’enferme dans l’incorporel et 
donne, pour cette raison même, une image fantastique de l’homme, de l’sprit, et de l’histoire.” 
654 Ibid., 94/133“La nature “est au premier jour.” In the context of his reading of Hegel and Schelling, this idea is 
also referenced in the Course Notes (see ibid, 49). 
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original logos, a non-instituted pre-word, a milieu of communication and mute significations 
that animate language. As Renaud Barbaras pus it, “nature is not only soil, but also cradle of 
expression.”655 In order to clarify this point, let me examine Merleau-Ponty’s interpretation 
of the problem of ideality in Husserl. 
Reading Husserl’s The Origin of Geometry, in the summary of the lecture course 
“Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology,” Merleau-Ponty recalls that ideality depends upon 
the appropriation of previous productions or acts of institution. Along these lines, he 
explains that signification arises from the re-enactment of speech, from the participation in a 
dialogue with others. For, Merleau-Ponty remarks, “every production of the spirit is a 
response and an appeal, a coproduction.”656 Based on these premises, Merleau-Ponty argues 
that ideality does not pre-exist speech; rather, it emerges out of the propagation and 
sedimentation of the word, particularly in the form of writing.  
As Merleau-Ponty explains, writing is the mutation of the word that preserves the 
mere form of communicability, it is the matrix for the potential dialogue between x and x, a 
dialogue whose sense remains dormant until someone comes to awaken it.657 What is 
remarkable in this analysis of writing is that it emphasizes both the essentially embodied 
character of language and ideality and its fundamental iterability, the fact that language is 
basically a phenomenon of propagation. Husserl shows, indeed, that ideality is inscribed in 
the horizon of a tradition as the concrete –embodied –reactivation of writing and 
sedimented speech. And this means that every singular act of speech is never just “singular,” 
for in speaking we carry on with a dialogue that started long before our own existence. One 
655 Renaud Barbaras, “Merleau-Ponty and Nature,” 29. 
656 In Praise of Philosophy, 167/187. “toute production de l’sprit est réponse et appeal, co-production.” See also Husserl at the 
Limits of Phenomenology, 8 (English translation).   
657 Ibid. 
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can say, therefore, that language involves a tendency toward repetition, which in turn reveals 
a desire or need of fulfillment, of meaning. Language is, in this sense, a call for language. In 
line with this, and referring to Heidegger’s On the Way to Language, Merleau-Ponty concludes 
that “to come back to the problem of ideality, Husserl’s analysis foreshadows Heidegger’s 
thought on the ‘speaking of speech.’”658     
Merleau-Ponty points out that what Husserl says about ideality and horizon in The 
Origin of Geometry is taken up from a different perspective in the “Foundational 
Investigations.” As I have said in earlier chapters, in this text Husserl explains the problem 
of ideality from the bottom up: his point of departure is the problem of the earth, rather 
than the sphere of ideality. As Merleau-Ponty puts it, Husserl suggests that before having 
bodies as mere objects there exists a unified horizon of the sensible, a community or 
“society” within the sensible world, a general communicability with the world. This is, for 
example, what the following passage indicates: “There is a kinship between the being of the 
earth and that of my body (Leib) which it would not be exact for me to speak of as moving 
because it is always at the same distance from me. This kinship extends to others, who 
appear to me as other bodies, to animals whom I understand as variants of my embodiment, 
and finally even to terrestrial bodies since I introduce them into the society of living beings 
when saying, for example, that a stone ‘flies.’”659   
The contrast Merleau-Ponty establishes between these two directions in Husserl’s 
work, one departing from the problem of ideality and the other from the problem of the 
658 Ibid., 168/189. “Pour revenir au problème de l’idéalité, les analyses de Husserl devancent les pensées de Heidegger sur le 
‘parler de la parole.’” See also Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 9 (English translation).   
659 Ibid., 169/190. “Il y a parenté entre l’être de la terre et celui de mon corps (Leib), dont je ne peux dire exactement qu’il se 
meut puisau’il est toujours à la même distance de moi, et la parenté s’étend aux autres, qui m’appaissent comme «autres corps», 
aux animaux, que je comprends comme variantes de ma corporéité, et finalement aux corps terrestres eux-mêmes puisque je les fais 
entrer dans la société des vivants en disant par exemple qu’une pierre «vole».” See also Husserl at the Limits of Phenomenology, 9 
(English translation). 
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earth, reveals the body as the pivotal element that yokes together the society of living beings 
and the tradition or history of ideas. Elaborating on this point, in his last lecture from 1960, 
“Nature and Logos: The human Body,” Merleau-Ponty concludes that “now we must think 
of the human body  (and not ‘consciousness’) as that which perceives nature which it also 
inhabits.”660  
In this context, one can say that just as we carry the earth within ourselves, in the 
lived body, so we carry meaning in every act of speech and gesture. The community between 
body and sensible world in general establishes the bonds of perception as a horizon of 
communicability and affectivity. Thus, there is no need to presuppose a world of 
consciousness separate from the living world, one subordinated to the other, in order to 
explain the emergence of meaning and ideality. Rather, Merleau-Ponty suggests, one could 
say that there is a “double being” (un être double): “The themes of the Umwelt, of the body 
schema, of perception as true mobility (Sichbewegen), popularized by psychology and 
neurophysiology, all express the idea of corporality as an entity of two faces or two 
‘sides’...”661  
We therefore see how Merleau-Ponty articulates the problem of expression and 
meaning through the idea of the generality of the sensible, of the body schema as 
prefiguration of the sensible flesh of the world.662 As Merleau-Ponty points out, the 
characteristic duplicity of the body, according to which it is both sensed and sensing, reveals 
the body schema as what could be called a “..lexicon of corporality in general, a system of 
660 Ibid., 176/196. “C’est maintenant le corps humaine  (et non la ‘conscience’) qui doit apparaître comme celui que percoit la 
nature don’t il est aussi l’habitant.” 
661 Ibid., 177/197. “Les thèmes de l’Umwelt, du schéma corporel, de la perception comme mobilité vraie (Sichbewegen), 
popularisés par la psychologie ou la physiologie nerveuse, expriment tous l’idée de la corporéite comme être à deux faces ou à deux 
«côtes»...”  
662 As I indicated already, in different sections of the present work, Emmanuel de Saint Aubert extensively 
develops this argument in his book Être et chair I. 
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equivalences between the inside and the outside, which prescribes one to the other its 
fulfillment in the other.”663 In this way, the human body structures a “natural symbolism” 
[symbolism naturel],664 it is primarily a libidinal body, whose ontological articulations would be 
explored in The Visible and the Invisible, particularly in the chapter entitled “The Intertwining –
The Chiasm.”  
One could say, then, that this “lexicon” of corporality is a prefiguration of the 
ontological structure of the flesh, as it is described in The Visible and the Invisible. As it was 
argued in an earlier chapter, the flesh names the intercrossing of the visible and the invisible, 
of inside and ouside, that constitutes the world of perception. In this context, ideality is 
understood as the invisible side of the sensible that is manifest in language, which is still 
flesh, a flesh that, compared to the flesh of the visible body, is “less heavy, more 
transparent.”665  
Let me recall that, according to Merleau-Ponty, the world of language is somehow 
prefigured in the structure of bodily perception –for example, in the redoubling of hand 
touched and hand touching. Therefore, one can say that language is animated by the silent 
logos of the sensible world, a logos that is itself desire and affectivity. And this means that, 
strictly speaking, language cannot refer to things as if they were constituted beforehand, for 
things are always already pervaded by silence and invisibility.666 Rather, Merleau-Ponty insists, 
one could say that the relation between sensible things and language is governed by the 
ambiguity and promiscuity of the sensible.  
663 Ibid., 178/197. “c’est une lexique de la corporéité en général, un système d’équivalences entre le dedans et le dehors, qui 
prescrit à l’un de s’accomplir dans l’autre” 
664 Ibid., 180/199. 
665 The Visible and the Invisible, 198/153. “…moin lourd, plus transparent.” 
666 This, precisely, is the limit of Bergson’s theory of pure perception and intuition, which Merleau-Ponty bears 
in mind in the formulation of his approach to language and truth.  
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For this reason, Merleau-Ponty remarks, the language that speaks of sensible being –
which should be the language of philosophy –must be indirect and metaphorical, “...where 
what counts is no longer the manifest meaning of each word and of each image, but the 
lateral relations, the kinships  that are implicated in their transfers and their exchanges. It is 
indeed a language of this sort that Bergson himself required for the philosopher. But we 
have to recognize the consequence: if language is not necessarily deceptive, truth is not 
coincidence, nor mute.”667  
Merleau-Ponty underscores that, in order to gain access to the language of the truth, 
it is necessary to bring language back to its living roots, its gestural origins, its “nascent state” 
in perception.668 With regard to this, let me be clear that the point is not to demonstrate that 
everything is subordinated to language, nor that language only speaks about itself, but rather 
to understand that silence is a constitutive and operative dimension of language, and that this 
silence is imbricated in life, in the logos of living things. This is why Merleau-Ponty says that 
“...language lives only from silence; everything we cast to the others has germinated in this 
great mute land which we never leave.”669  
One can thus say that the life of language comes from silence, from the silence that 
is life, but this silence is also truth, revelation, an inaugural expression of “something,” an 
“X,” an interrogation that provokes philosophical questioning.670 In this context, Merleau-
667 Ibid., 164/125. “Ce qui compte n’étant plus le sens manifeste de chaque mot et de chaque image, mais les rapports latéraux; 
les parentés, qui sont impliqués dans leurs échanges. C’est bien un langage de ce genre que Bergson même a revendiqué pour le 
philosophe. Mais il faut bien voir la conséquence: si le langage n’est pas nécessairement trompeur, la vérité n’est pas coincidence, 
muete.” 
668 Ibid., 165/125. “…à l’état vivant ou naissant.” 
669 Ibid., 165/126. “…il ne vit que du silence; tout ce que nous jetons aux autres a germé dans ce grqnd pays muet qui ne nous 
quitte pas.” 
670 See ibid. Emphasizing that the language of the philosopher is based on this nascent logos of things, 
Merleau-Ponty develops this argument as follows: “But, because he has experienced within himself the need to 
speak, the birth of speech as bubbling up at the bottom of his mute experience, the philosopher knows better 
than anyone that what is lived is lived-spoken, that, born at this depth, language is not a mask over Being, but –
if one knows how to grasp it with all its roots and all its foliation –the most valuable witness to Being, that it 
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Ponty indicates, one can see that the sedimentation of language as a linguistic system is 
grounded on the language of perception, and thus it is a “regional problem” in philosophy:  
“Hence the problem of language is, if one likes, only a regional problem –that is, if we 
consider the ready-made language, the secondary and empirical operation of translation, of 
coding and decoding, the artificial languages, the technical relation between a sound and a 
meaning which are joined only by express convention and are therefore ideally isolable.”671 
Thus, Merleau-Ponty suggests, the fundamental ontological problem in relation to 
language has nothing to do with language understood as a linguistic system, but rather with 
the language that is itself gesture, and which may also be called the language of being: the 
language that pervades all dimensions of existence, the universal theme of philosophy. In 
order to clarify this point, let me call attention to the following passage, which continues the 
one cited above: 
But if, on the contrary, we consider the speaking word, the assuming of the conventions of 
his native language as something natural by him who lives within that language, the folding 
over within him of the visible and the lived experience upon language, and of language upon 
the visible and the lived experience, the exchanges between the articulations of his mute 
language and those of his speech, finally that operative language which has no need to be 
translated into significations and thoughts, that language-thing which counts as an arm, as 
action, as offence and as seduction because it brings to the surface all the deep-rooted 
relations of the lived experience wherein it takes form, and which is the language of life and 
of action but also that of literature and of poetry –then this logos is an absolutely universal 
theme, it is the theme of philosophy.672 
does not interrupt an immediation that would be perfect without it, that the vision itself, the thought itself are, 
as has been said, “structured as language,” are articulation before the letter, apparition of something where there 
was nothing or something else.” 
671 Ibid.“De sorte que le problème du langage n’est qu’un problème régional, si l’on veut –c’est-a-dire: si l’on considère le langage 
tout fait, l’opération secundaire et empirique de traduction, de codage et de décodage, les langages artificiels, le rapport technique d’un 
son et d’un sens qui ne sont joints que par convention expresse, et sont donc idéalement isolables.” 
672 Ibid. 165-66/126.“…mais qu’au contraire, à considérer la parole parlante, l’assomption comme naturelle des conventions de 
la langue par celui qui vit en elle, l’enroulement en lui du visible et du vécu sur le langage, du langage sur le visible et le vécu, les 
échanges entre les articulations de son paysage muet et celles de sa parole, enfin ce langage opérant qui n’a pas besoin d’être traduit 
en significations et en pensées, ce langage-chose qui vaut comme séduction, parce qu’il fait affleurer tous les rapports profounds du  
vécu où il s’est formé, et qui est celui de la vie et de la action, mais aussi celui de la littérature et de la poésie, alors ce logos est un 
thème absolument universal, il est le théme de la philosophie.” 
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This passage is remarkable because it depicts the nascent logos of life in terms of a 
language that is itself movement and action. Merleau-Ponty suggests, however, that this 
nascent logos is not sheer “natural” language devoid of conventions, for it is the “speaking 
word” that integrates conventions as part of its living significance. Indeed, as Merleau-Ponty 
puts it, the speaking word is the word that is intertwined with lived experience in such a way 
that it cannot be detached from the body. It functions like an extension of the body. 
Merleau-Ponty qualifies this essential word as “language-thing,” and this means that it is 
concrete, it resonates in the world, it does something: this word is like an arm. Along these 
lines, Merleau-Ponty says that the speaking word can seduce and offend, for example. But 
one must be careful not to think that the essential power of the word is restricted to visible 
or practical “effects.” For literature and poetry, which speak with the logos of perception, 
behold the sensible dimension of language, the unfolding of the being of language as 
openness. Indeed, Merleau-Ponty suggests that language can affect the others precisely 
insofar as it permeates their flesh, it is flesh. Language can seduce or offend because the 
others and I have the same flesh. And the flesh is from the outset the redoubling of 
affection, the exposure to alterity, even within the close circle that defines my own self, and 
which determines the privileged connection with my own body. With regard to this, 
Merleau-Ponty says: 
Yet this flesh that one sees and touches is not all there is to flesh, nor this massive corporeity 
all there is to the body. The reversibility that defines the flesh exists in other fields; it is even 
incomparably more agile there and capable of weaving relations between bodies that this 
time will not only enlarge, but will pass definitely beyond the circle of the visible. Among my 
movements, there are some that go nowhere –that do not even go find in the other body 
their resemblance or their archetype: these are the facial movements, many gestures, and 
especially those strange movements of the throat and mouth that form the cry and the voice. 
Those movements end in sounds and I hear them. Like crystal, like metal and many other 
substances, I am a sonorous being, but I hear my own vibration from within; as Malraux 
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said, I hear myself with my throat. In this, as he also has said, I am incomparable; my voice is 
bound to the mass of my own life as the voice of no one else.673  
Merleau-Ponty insists that the flesh is not bodiliness understood as objectivity, 
because the flesh names the reversibility and duplicity of our perceptual experience, and the 
relentless intertwining of the visible and the invisible that perception presupposes. Or, one 
might also say, the flesh is the sensible milieu that makes possible our contact with things, as 
well as the intangible halo that surrounds this contact. In the passage cited above, Merleau-
Ponty indicates that the reversibility of the flesh is more “agile,” that its inner motility is 
intensified and more fluid in the fields not circumscribed to the spheres of  direct contact or 
touch. For before one comes to touch something, before one enters the domain of 
intentional relationships, there is in this massive corporality that defines one’s own body a 
clearing, a space of play, a gap or void in which one’s being resonates and acquires a voice. 
Merleau-Ponty says, “I am a sonorous being,” and that the reversibility of the flesh is at 
work in the movements of my throat, in the “ungraspable” phenomenon of the voice. I 
should note, however, that the voice Merleau-Ponty describes here as the resonating of my 
own being is a voice that is somewhat mute; it goes nowhere, it says nothing. To some 
extent, it is like the empty clinking of crystal. In this sense, Merleau-Ponty suggests that the 
element of the flesh operates in the vibrations of our bodily movements, the facial 
movements and gestures that emerge spontaneously from my body without intending 
anything in particular.  
673 Ibid., 188/144. “Or, cette chair que l’on voit et que l’on touche n’est pas toute la chair, ni cette corporéité massive, tout le 
corps. La réversibilité qui définit la chair existe dans d’autres champs, ell y est même incomparablement plus agule, et capable de 
nouer entre les corps des relations qui, cette fois, n’elargiront pas seulement, passeront définitivement le cercle du visible. Parmi mes 
mouvements, il en est qui ne vont nulle part –qui ne vont pas même retrouver dans l’autre corps leur resemblance ou leur archétype: 
ce sont les mouvements du visage, beaucoup des gestes, et surtout ces étranges mouvements de la gorgeet de la bouche qui font le cri et 
la voix. Ces mouvements-là finissent en sons et je les entends. Comme le cristal, le metal et beaucoup d’autres substances, je suis un 
être sonore, mais ma vibration à moi je l’entends du dedans; comme a dit Malraux, je m’entends avec ma gorge. En quoi, comme il 
l’a dit aussi, je suis incomparable, ma voix est liée à la masse de ma vie comme ne l’est la voix de personne.” 
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In sum, one could say that before being a thing one’s body is flesh, and this means 
that it is gesture, it moves, vibrates, and resonates just for the sake of hearing and seeing, as a 
mass thoroughly pervaded by invisibility and silence: as a clearing, as openness.  
My body is, in this sense, the locus of the exchange between the visible and the 
invisible, silence and sound, wherein the flesh of the world reveals its own potentialities. 
Specifically, in a working note from December 1960, Merleau-Ponty cryptically says: “The 
flesh = this fact that my body is passive-active (visible-seeing), mass in itself and gesture.”674 
In concluding the present chapter, this note is of special significance because it equates flesh 
and gesture. One can say, then, that the flesh is essentially gesture, and that gestures involve 
both passivity and activity, and carry out a fold, a movement that reflects our silent 
engagement with the world. More precisely, one could say that gestures are specular images 
of the world, for they reflect how we stand in the world, and how the world stands for us.675    
674 Ibid., 319/271. “La chair = ce fait que mon corps est passif-actif (visible-voyant), masse en soi et geste –.” 
675 In the context of this working note, Merleau-Ponty sketches out this idea as follows: “The specular image, 
memory, resemblance: fundamental structures (resemblance between the thing and the thing-seen). For they are 
structures that are immediately derived from the body-world relation – –the reflections resemble the reflected 
= the vision commences in things, certain things or couples of things call for vision – –Show that our whole 
expression and conceptualization of the mind is derived from these structures: for example reflection.” Ibid. 
Conclusion 
From Philosophy of Gesture to Gestural Philosophy 
The present dissertation explored the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, with a 
focus on their approaches to the problem of gesture. I have shown that the problem of 
gesture is at the center of cardinal questions involving the themes of art and language. 
Specifically, I have argued that the proper sphere of human acting may be characterized as 
ecstatic involvement in the world, in such a way that the world itself is founded and 
reconfigured through what could be called, borrowing a expression from Merleau-Ponty, a 
gestural syntax: a sequence of hints, outlines, spacings. Along these lines, I have further 
remarked that gestures presuppose a milieu of affectivity and attunements, and that art and 
poetic or literary language are paradigmatic expressions of this grounding milieu. This 
affective milieu is our primordial point of contact with the world. For this reason, Heidegger 
and Merleau-Ponty see poetic works in general as necessary points of reference for 
philosophizing. Thus, one may say that the theme of gesture draws philosophy towards the 
limits of a primal, poetic contact with the world, in which thinking becomes, in a sense, 
performance. It is at this point that the point of view of a philosophy of gesture is in some 
way transformed in a gestural philosophy, a philosophy that is itself poetic comportment.  
Although I have hinted at the problem of performativity and philosophy, this point 
has not been examined in this dissertation. Such task would have required an extensive 
analysis of the style of each philosopher, comparing different periods and works in a way 
that would exceed the scope of the present research. Still, to conclude this dissertation, I will 
sketch out a basic approach to this problem. In this regard, I should note that the works of 
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Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have different ways of approaching the gestural or 
performative dimension in philosophy, and that Heidegger’s thinking is, in this particular 
sense, more radical. Hence, for the purposes of the present conclusion, I shall focus on the 
work of Heidegger, and specifically on texts I have already worked out.   
Unfortunately, the only remains of Merleau-Ponty’s last ontological project are just 
preliminaries and fragments. They suffice to show, however, that his thinking radically 
challenges the limits of phenomenology and philosophy. Merleau-Ponty says indeed that the 
flesh is something that has no name in philosophy, thus suggesting that his thinking of the 
flesh adumbrates a new philosophy, a new way of thinking. What kind of thinking is this? He 
gives some concrete indications to respond to this question in Eye and Mind. He suggests that 
the experience of painting reveals key elements of a new metaphysics of the body, for 
painting inhabits the visible world. Furthermore, he remarks, painting reveals the contours of 
things, their outlines, without sacrificing their depth. He also refers to Proust and to the 
experience of literature. With regard to this, he insists that philosophy must return to the 
grounds of sensible ideas, tenebrous ideas that involve us in an affective and sensible 
atmosphere. Thus, it seems, the ontology of the flesh is fundamentally indirect. It explores 
the sensible world following the indications of artistic or literary works –and even science. 
But, what about the sensible milieu of philosophy, language? Is it not necessary to poetize 
with language –the affective and sensible milieu of language –as one does philosophy about 
the sensible world?  
Although Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy is full of examples excerpted from literature 
and art, it is clear that his own way of philosophyzing is not so literary or artistic. Thus, one 
can say that, despite being deeply concerned about the problem of gesture, Merleau-Ponty’s 
work is not gestural itself. It is not concerned about letting language speak from itself. Still, 
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we cannot know how Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy would have developed after the encounter 
with the enigmatic element of the flesh.  
In this regard, Merleau-Ponty’s work is, in my opinion, essentially different from 
Heidegger’s. Concerning this argument, it seems impossible to reconcile their differences. 
For Heidegger’s language and style is experimental, in that he brings philosophy closer to 
poetry. He does not simply talk about poetry, or language, but rather he allows language to 
guide thinking; in other words, he lets language and thinking occur, be event-like. Along these 
lines, one can say that Heidegger’s philosophy, specifically after the so-called turn, is 
essentially gestural. It delves into the sensible dimension of language and moves with it.  
This is particularly clear in his works from the late 1930s and thereafter, as in the 
notes on language that I examined in the present work. Thus, let me elucidate this problem 
considering specifically the notes from Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst.  
The Performative Character of Heidegger’s philosophy 
As it was already argued in relation to his notes on language, for Heidegger the 
essential word is a hint, an event-like sign. It does not determine anything in particular, and it 
cannot be grasped in visible things.676 Along these lines, one may say that the word 
appropriates us following the directives of the paradoxical logic of attunements: the word 
gives itself as a phantasmagoric presence that touches us and moves us from a distance. 
Insofar as the word is hint, it may be characterized as the trace of an absence, of a painful 
departure, of a tearing apart.677 In this sense, he suggests,  the hint carries out the decisive 
split between word and words, between essential sign and conventional ordinary sign –one 
might also say, between being and beings.  
676 See Zum Wesen der Frage und Zur Frage nach der Kunst,31. 
677 See ibid., 45-50. 
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And yet, this is not something Heidegger plainly asserts, but rather something he 
communicates indirectly through his involvement in language, for an appropriate approach 
to the essence of language cannot simply talk “about” language.678 Indeed, the performative 
and rhetorical implications of philosophical language, elements present from the beginning 
of Heidegger’s trajectory, gain increasing importance throughout his explorations of the 
language of the event.679 
Heidegger approaches the event-like word and sign through constellations of terms or 
phrases that remain open, letting words and signs resonate in the uniqueness of their 
appearance, just as fragmentary hints or traces, without setting them into one-directional 
logical relationships, with fixed meanings.680 Words and signs are wrested out of silence, but 
in such a way that they never abandon the realm of silence, that is, to the extent that they 
become manifest as hints. Thus, words are to be grasped as minimal indications that break 
silence: the latencies of a voice that is caught in action, in the movement of departure from 
its silent origin. Let me explain this point considering the following brief passage, which 
bears the title “Language wrests” [Die Sprache entreißt]: 
The word – the stillness.  
From out of the rift and bearing away in the sounding and the tune.681 
678 As Krzysztof Ziarek points out, the essential word, the “other word,” is not something we can talk about, 
but rather something we can follow attentively as a hint: “This other word is not something one can talk 
‘about,’ just as little as one could talk ‘about’ this transformed language, as neither is reducible to or graspable as 
an object that could be grasped or comprehended conceptually.” Krzysztof Ziarek, Language after Heidegger, 
Kindle Edition (Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2013), 147.  
679 This is something we can easily infer if we consider, for instance, the performative element present in 
Heidegger’s Contributions to Philosophy, whose style pervades in parts the notes on language we are dealing with 
here. With regard to this, Daniela Vallega-Neu says the following: “What the language of the Contributions says is 
found in the performative motion, that is, in the occurrence of thinking and language, and not in something 
that this occurrence would present objectively.” Daniela Vallega-Neu, Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy: An 
Introduction (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 3.  
680 Concerning Heidegger’s concept of language, Ziarek indicates: “The philosophical significance of this 
approach to ‘redefining’ language can be summarized as follows: ‘what’ language is, how it happens, is 
described by Heidegger first not as an idea or a concept but as the relatedness opened up in its design (Aufriss) 
by the constellation enacted by a set of prefixes” (Language after Heidegger, 26) 
681 Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst, 58; my translation. “Das Wort – die Stille. /Dem Riß 
entnehmen und forttragend in das Lauten und die Stimme.” 
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Here, one does not find a definition of the word or language from without. Instead, 
Heidegger lets words and signs to carry out the work of language, to say something in such a 
way that the essence of language, the manner in which it initially moves us or affects us, 
unfolds from an experience with language itself. Let me consider, for example, the 
correlation between the pair of terms “word” and “stillness,” which are separated by a 
hyphen. The hyphen means nothing, and yet it does something: it keeps together the words, 
while simultaneously reveals the silent space that sets them apart. One might say that the 
hyphen itself is a rift whose movement is defined in the second line of the passage, and 
which marks the initial moment of departure from silence towards the sound and the 
voice.682  
Hence, Heidegger suggests that there is silence in the word and a resonance of the 
word in silence. One could say that the simple trace of the hyphen hints at the origin of 
language, the breaking of silence in a minimal trace; for Heidegger occasionally characterizes 
the primordial showing as the strife that breaks silence and brings language to sound.683 
Thus, on the one hand, the hyphen is an outline that recalls the earthly dimension of the 
word, just as in the setting of the truth in the work of art.684 In this case, the earthly element 
coud be determined both as writing and voice, and silence. On the other hand, one can say 
that the hyphen marks a departure and an abyss –a movement away from the earth-ground –
, a deterritorialization that causes violence against the word. For the “hyphen” is already 
hyphen, the “word” is already word, the “trace” is already trace... too close to us to be 
682 Elsewhere, in the course of these notes and lectures on language, Heidegger expressly determines the 
“movement” [Bewegung] of language in terms of the rift [Riß]. Ibid., 46. With regard to this “movement” of 
language that is carried out through diacritical marks and signs see also Ziarek, Language after Heidegger, 47.  
683 See ibid., 153.  
684 See ibid., 111, 134. 
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essential silence, too meaningful to be the showing that is pure showing, the word that is 
simply a word.   
In this way, one can experience the failure of language, the rupture or fracturing of 
the word that leaves the essential word behind, in an elusive silence. This failure of language 
is at the same time the failure of silence, a certain experience of the impossibility of silence: 
the need of a trace. Pain transpires through this need, the pain anchored in the abyssal 
separation from the origin, the pain that necessitates an assuaging word. Alluding precisely to 
this experience of failure and pain, in his lecture “The Essence of Language” (1957-58), 
Heidegger remarks that one can only bring language as such to the word in those rare 
occasions when the words are missing, when “…we cannot find the right word for 
something that concerns us, carries us away, oppresses or encourages us.”685  
Following Heidegger’s reading, one could say that the word is at the same time 
wound and healing, pain of departure, separation, and mourning, as well as promise of 
favour or grace. In a passage from these notes on language that recalls the problematic of the 
hint in Hölderlin, Heidegger says precisely that “The word ‘is’ – the indicative [winkende] 
stillness of favour out of the pain in the event.”686 That is to say, the word itself, the “is” –
again accompanied by the breach of the hyphen –intimates the possibility of grace...out of 
pain.    
One can see, then, that words, indications, spacings, blanks, and pauses, signs 
marking turns or leaps –the hyphen, the comma, or the colon, for instance –map out the 
685 On the Way to Language., 151/59 “...wo wir für etwas, was uns angeht, uns an sich reißt, bedrängt oder befeuert, das rechte 
wort nicht finden.” 
686 Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst, 62; my translation. “Die Wort »ist« – die im Ereignis aus dem 
Schmerz winkende Stille der Huld.” 
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geography and topological traits of a unique and inextricable territory:687 the silence of the 
event, the silence of the truth of being, the “pre-word” [“Vor-wort”].688 According to 
Heidegger, the silence of being is not a homogeneous silence, it is not a metaphysical 
nothingness, but the latency of multiple modes of manifestation, a silence with voice or tune 
(Stimmung): “word and tune of beyng.”689  
Essential words and signs respond to a pressing silence, just as gestures issuing from 
an urgent painful call. In a sense, one may say that essential words are like silent tears: “to 
still thirst - tears still.”690 In these notes Heidegger elicits the affinity between thirst and tears, 
and the essential silence of the event-like word. He gives subtle indications concerning the 
sensuous and affective plane of the event, in line with the bodily dimension of attunement 
and affectivity previously discussed. The water remains a secret element, absent, because the 
water we drink and the “water” (tears) we release in pain are essentially different, 
incomparable, while at the same time it maintains a certain affinity.  
Heidegger suggests, therefore, that within the sphere of the event-like indications there 
is no such thing as plain, physical water, but rather tears, or the water we need to quench 
thirst, for example. In each case there is a silent tune at work that discloses the water as a 
essential sign, operating a transfiguration whose inner rules one cannot see.  
687 This idea is posited by Ziarek as follows: “The overall implication of these ways of rethinking language by 
listening to it and by amplifying the resonance of what words, prefixes, hyphens, and compounds disclose is 
that the ‘twisting free’ of metaphysics (Verwindung), or at least thought’s preparation for the possibility of such 
release from metaphysical conceptuality, depends on thinking’s capacity to open up its conceptual structure to 
the poietic movement of language. Without transforming our relation to language, and with it of the way e 
deploy language in thinking, there is no possibility of twisting free of the metaphysical framing of the question 
of being or of changing the manner in which humans experience their existence with regard to it.” Language after 
Heidegger, 28. 
688 Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst, 59. 
689 Ibid., 69; my translation. “Wort und Stimmen des Seyns.” 
690 Ibid., 62; my translation.	  “den Durst stillen – Trännen stillen.” 
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But, based on this analysis, one might still ask in what sense is this direct experience 
with language philosophical, namely, an experience of thinking. This question is related to 
Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of Heidegger, according to which, although his thinking shows 
that one cannot express being directly, he still looks for a direct expression of being.691 
Alternatively, as I have already suggested, Merleau-Ponty suggests that one follow the hints 
given by other experiences of being, such as the one given in life, or in science.692 Let me 
finish by exploring a response to this criticism, trying to explain in what sense Heidegger’s 
questioning aims at producing an experience of thinking, which is direct insofar as it is not 
necessarily guided by other modes of expression, without presupposing a metaphysical 
understanding of being, as something that may become directly accessible or present.  
Thinking and the Language of the Event 
As I have already said in chapter six, distinguishing “thing-like” signs, expressive or 
living signs, and essential signs, Heidegger decisively rejects any comparison between the 
essential word and the phenomenal word, the essential sign or gesture and the phenomenal 
gesture. Such a drastic distinction between phenomenal signs and event-like signs seems to 
harbor a hidden metaphysical dualism, in which the bodily or phenomenal side of experience 
is neglected. Yet, Heidegger’s purpose is different: to challenge metaphysics, and to think the 
sensible dimension of the sign in a non-objective manner. This is, indeed, what the following 
passage explains: “The difference between sensible and non-sensible (supersensible) is 
metaphysical. Silence, event-like in essence, is more ‘sensible’ than the sensuousness of sheer 
senses, more perceptible than black and white –because more event-like–, more ‘impressive’ 
691 See Notes de cours, 148. He says precisely: “…il cherche une expression directe de l’être dont il montre par 
ailleurs qu’il n’est pas susceptible d’expression directe.”  
692 See ibid. 
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than sense-impressions. Everything that is impression-like remains at the front-[face] and 
surface objectively thought.”693  
It is worth noting that although Heidegger claims that the event-like sign is never 
“comparable” [vergleichbar] to any phenomenal sign or gesture,694 in the passage cited above 
there is a comparison between event-like perception and sense-perception. However, 
Heidegger determines this comparison in such a way that a difference in degree indicates a 
difference in nature. In a sense, the comparison indicates that event-like phenomena are 
unique: they are more sensible than any sensible thing because they are felt as something that 
concerns us deeply. One could say, then, that Heidegger finds in bodily silence, in a certain 
privation of the sensible, an intensification of perception and affectivity. For manifest in 
silence is the depth of the sensible, its intensive affectivity, which is inconmensurable with 
“superficial” quantitative properties.  
Heidegger insistently determines the “exchange” of hints, the essential dialogue 
constituting the appropriation of the event, using terms such as “gratitude” [Dank] and 
“grace” [Huld, Gunst].695 In line with previous reflections on the correlations between 
thinking and thanking, one might say that these terms qualify the way in which we receive-
perceive something that is of essential significance, they provide the tone through which 
essential hints may be caught. Indeed, gratitude qualifies that which is received in freedom, 
as a grace or favour. Moreover, gratitude calls attention to an excess that breaks out of the 
693 Ibid., 62; my translation. “Der Unterschied von Sinnlich und Unsinnlich (Übersinnlich) ist metaphysisch. Die Stille ist 
ereignishaft im Wesen »sinnlicher« als die Sinnlichkeit der bloßen Sinne, vernehmlicher –weil ereignender –als Schwarz und Weiß, 
»affizierender« als Sinnes-Eindrucke. Alles Eindruck-hafte bleibt an der gegenständlich gedachten Vorder- und Oberfläche.”  
694 See ibid., 89. This formulation was first discussed at the beginning of the previous section in relation to 
Heidegger’s distinction between the thing-like signs, expressive signs and event-like signs.  
695 At some point, Heidegger alludes to the “event-like” word in relation to the “turn”[Kehre], and in the 
constellation of terms such as “gratitude” [Dank], “grace” [Gunst], and “salutation” [Gruß] (91), thus suggesting 
that the event-like word is the hint that induces a turn or transformation in thinking, just as the one he 
experienced in his encounter with Hölderlin, or with Nietzsche, for instance.  
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circle of causal economy; gratitude is a modality of openness: receptivity. With regard to this, 
in a passage on gratitude, Heidegger says: “...event-like indication in the hints of the truth of 
beyng –delivering and bringing.”696  
I therefore suggest that gratitude names a primordial receptivity, a relatedness to 
being, to the truth. And this receptivity must properly be characterized as a hint, a gesture. 
Following this reading, one can determine more precisely the sensible dimension of event-
like hints. Indeed, Heidegger qualifies gratitude as an intensive “touch,” suggesting that it is 
the minimal touch necessary to awaken wonder and, thereby, thinking. He says: “Often it 
[gratitude, Dank] is only a hardly noticeable touch, out of which amazement grows 
concerning a yet unexpected silence, which lets everything rest calmly.”697 
Thus, gratitude is an intensive, qualitative touch, which is invisible, inconspicuous, 
insofar as it is subtle, minimum. Heidegger further remarks that in gratitude a minimum 
touch may bring forth a maximum intensity: wonder. In a sense, then, the event of gratitude 
is a non-event, something like a traumatic shock that effaces its traces. As Heidegger 
explains, in a way, gratitude leaves us in silence, which makes everything rest in peace. It is a 
moment of suspension, for nothing happens, there is only the pure imminence of the event, 
expectation. Along these lines, one can say that gratitude is only a word, a pure word or 
indication that does not designate anything real or actual, as it is ordinarily understood. 
Gratitude cannot be grasped in anything present, it simply occurs as an inconspicuous 
gesture that responds to a gift, when the gift has not become possesion, when it is something 
we do not have, not yet.  
696 Ibid., 99; my translation. “...ereignetes Weisen in die Winke der Wahrheit des Seyns –Befreien und Bringen.”  
697 Ibid., my translation. “Oft ist es ein kaum merkliches Anrühren, daraus ein Verwundern erwacht über bisher Ungeahntes 
Stilles, das ruhig alles in sich beruhen läßt.”  
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Based on these premises, I contend that Heidegger’s philosophy may be an attempt 
to provoke thinking by awakening gratitude, or wonder, specifically in relation to the gifts of 
language. It seems that such a movement may be possible by generating a peculiar sort of 
shock; it is the shock of minimal touch, a minimal indication. Perhaps something like the 
indication of a hyphen, or the indications of words that say nothing objective. The “Event” is 
one such word.  
In this way, one can corroborate that Heidegger’s philosophy is not veiled mysticism 
that aims at a direct contact with being; it is not an invitation to fuse with absolute silence, 
but rather a gestural philosophy that involves the reader in order to investigate event-like 
phenomena. For ontological phenomena, event-like phenomena, are those to be seen as one is 
involved in them. These are essentially invisible, but may be recognized as gestures, in the 
sense one has in mind when one talks of a gesture of friendship or gratitude. In sum, one 
could say that Heidegger’s philosophy is gestural insofar as it explores hints and gestures that 
must be interpreted from within an experience of language.  
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